Judgment Per PRANAB KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAY, J. All the three appeals have been preferred from the same judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge at the instance of the State of West Bengal and two other Trade Unions of one Jute Mill respectively. We have heard these appeals analogously and the same are also disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The principal question of law to be decided in these appeals is whether the dispute referred by the impugned order of reference is an 'industrial dispute' within the meaning of Section 2k of the Industrial Disputes Act? 3. The facts leading to these appeals are briefly narrated hereinafter: The respondent/writ-petitioner Birla Corporation Limited being the owner of Soorah Jute Mill decided to shift the said Jute mill to Birlapur, 24-Parganas (South) and the Managing Director of the said company submitted its aforesaid proposal for shifting the said jute mill to the State Government in the year 2001. 4. The State Government, however, by a written communication dated February 27, 2002 asked the said writ petitioner to supply certain information for the purpose of taking decision over the aforesaid proposal of the writ petitioner and one of the requirements mentioned therein was "consent of worker's union" in favour of the aforesaid proposal of shifting of the jute mill. 5. The writ petitioner, however, declined to submit the consent of the worker's union and observed that the same would not be purposeful. The Additional Labour Commissioner of the State of West Bengal started negotiations to resolve the disputes which arose out of the aforesaid proposal of the management for shifting the jute mill. The Additional Labour Commissioner could not, resolve the disputes and ultimately, submitted' his report in this regard to the appropriate authority of the State Government. 6. The Government of West Bengal thereafter by the order dated December 19, 2005 referred the dispute relating to the under mentioned issues to the First Industrial Tribunal for adjudication: (1) Whether the proposed shifting of the Jute Mill locate at 102, Narkeldanga Main Road, Kolkata - 54 to Birlapur 24 Parganas (South) by the management is justified: (2) To what relief, if any, are the Workmen entitled? 7. 7. The Birla Corporation Limited challenged the aforesaid reference before this Hon'ble Court by filing a writ petition and the learned single Judge upon hearing the parties allowed the said writ petition by the judgment and order under appeal. 8. The learned single Judge while allowing the writ petition specifically held that shifting of the jute mill itself cannot constitute an industrial dispute and quashed the order of reference. 9. Learned Advocate General appears on behalf of the appellant-State of West Bengal in the appeal bearing F.M.A. No. 548/2007 and submits that the decision of the learned single Judge to quash the reference made by the Government was not based on undisputed obvious facts and the said decision of the learned single Judge cannot be supported even from the facts apparent from the writ petition and documents annexed to it. Learned Advocate General also submits that the order of reference dated December 19, 2005, if closely scrutinised, will make it clear that the issue relating to the justification of the decision of the management with regard to the proposed shifting of the jute mill has been referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the Government in a particular context. The learned Advocate General further submits that the purport of the issues framed in the reference is to be interpreted in the context of such statement. 10. Referring to the issues referred for adjudication by the order of reference, learned Advocate General submits that the word "justification" is a word of wide import and encompasses within itself various aspects of the disputes. According to the learned Advocate General, the question of "justification" is not directed against the Management's decision but from the angle of the Workers with regard to the apprehension about their possible retrenchment or at least drastic change in the conditions of employment. The learned Advocate General further submits that the records of the case would establish beyond doubt that disputes exist between the workers and the employer. According to the learned Advocate General, it is impossible to imagine that the entire staff of Soorah Jute Mill would be absorbed in Birlapur Jute Mill in identical posts with same facilities, position and amenities. 11. Mr. Roy, learned Advocate General urged before this Court that the aforesaid various questions with their possible ramifications should be examined by the Industrial Tribunal while adjudicating the first issue of "Justification". Mr. 11. Mr. Roy, learned Advocate General urged before this Court that the aforesaid various questions with their possible ramifications should be examined by the Industrial Tribunal while adjudicating the first issue of "Justification". Mr. Roy further submits that the word "justified" is a commonly resorted word used in reference carrying wider import and scope of investigation. Reference couched in such a language cannot be allowed to be distorted by a pedantic and narrow approach. Mr. Roy referred to and relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Agra Electric Supply Company Limited, Agra v. Workmen (1983) 1 SCC 436 : 1983-I-LLJ-304. 12. According to Mr. Roy, what is most important is the conciliation proceeding that led to the reference. Referring to the report of the Conciliation Officer, Mr. Roy submits that in the very opening paragraph of the report, the said Conciliation Officer has mentioned about the dispute raised by the three trade unions praying for a direction upon the management to lift the lock out or suspension of work prevailing at the jute mill since March 23, 2004 which according to the workmen was unjustified. The learned Advocate General further submits that the report as also the order sheet of the Additional Labour Commissioner will clearly indicate that the company did not agree to open the factory at the existing site on the ground that the workers must agree to shift the said jute mill at first. The Labour Commissioner noted that both parties were rigid in their respective stands. 13. On behalf of the State of West Bengal it has been submitted that in the report, the Additional Labour Commissioner held that no permission for shifting was obtained. It has also been submitted on behalf of the State that the management failed to produce any document to show that Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority did not allow them to make expansion. Learned Advocate General submits that the Labour Commissioner categorically held that transfer of the unit of Narkeldanga Main Road and merging it with Birlapur will certainly tantamount to closing down the place of business at Narkeldanga Main Road requiring permission under Section 25(O) of the Act and the management had not even applied for such permission. Learned Advocate General submits that the Labour Commissioner categorically held that transfer of the unit of Narkeldanga Main Road and merging it with Birlapur will certainly tantamount to closing down the place of business at Narkeldanga Main Road requiring permission under Section 25(O) of the Act and the management had not even applied for such permission. The learned Advocate General also submits that the Commissioner framed the following issues for reference: (J) Whether the management is justified in declaring suspension of operation in the Soorah Jute Mill with effect from 6 a.m. on March 29, 2004. (2) What relief, if any, the workmen are entitled? 14. It has been argued on behalf of the State of West Bengal that the reference made by the State Government although not appearing in the same language must be understood to have the same significance. Referring to the report of the Conciliation Officer and the letters of the unions as also the writ petitioners, learned Advocate General submits that the condition of service of the workers will be affected as a result of the shifting of the jute mill. Learned Advocate General further submits that the learned single Judge did not appreciate the consequences of the shifting of the Soorah Jute Mill which will have a definite effect on the workmen and the same, therefore, leads to an industrial dispute. According to the learned Advocate General, disputes and differences exist in the matter of shifting of the jute mill especially when condition of service of the workmen will be affected by such shifting. 15. Mr. Gautam Chakraborty, learned senior counsel while arguing on behalf of the appellant in connection with the appeal bearing F.M.A. No. 549/2007 urged before this Court that the apprehension of the workers about the change of their conditions of service would tantamount to an industrial dispute. Mr. Chakraborty specifically argued before this Court that due to the shifting of the industrial unit, terms of employment of the employees would be interfered with and the same would give rise to an industrial dispute. Mr. Mr. Chakraborty specifically argued before this Court that due to the shifting of the industrial unit, terms of employment of the employees would be interfered with and the same would give rise to an industrial dispute. Mr. Chakraborty relied on a decision of the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Orissa High Court in the case of Utkal Galvanizers (P) Ltd v. State of Orissa and Others (1995) LIC 2277 and submitted that a preliminary should be raised before the Tribunal which would consider the reference should be raised before the Tribunal which would consider the question before examining the matter on merits and give a finding whether or not it has jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. 16. Referring to the aforesaid decision Mr. Chakraborty further submits that in the present case, the dispute is related with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment of the workmen of the establishment concerned and, therefore, such dispute should be regarded as an industrial dispute. Mr. Chakraborty also referred to and relied on the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in support of his arguments: (1) Hondaram Ramchandra v. Yeshwant Mahadev Kadam (D. by LRs.) 2008-I-LLJ-860 45 (SC) (2) ANZ Grindlays Bank Ltd v. Union of India and Others 2006-LLJ-271 (SC) (3) Utkal Galvanizers (P) Ltd v. State of Orissa and Others (supra) 17. Mr. Kalyan Bandyopadhyay, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of one of the appellants in relation to the appeal bearing F.M.A. No. 255/2007 also supports the arguments advanced by the other learned senior counsel representing the appellants in other two appeals and submits that when shifting of an industrial establishment leads to a dispute relating to employment or non-employment or the terms of employment of any person then such dispute will constitute an industrial dispute, which the learned single Judge failed to appreciate. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further submits that the shifting of the jute mill in the present case is totally covered by the Schedules under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Mr. Bandyopadhyay also submits that in both Second Schedule and Third Schedule, residuary jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Tribunal apart from the fact that in the Second Schedule withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege has been specifically mentioned in Item No.4. So, according to Mr. Mr. Bandyopadhyay also submits that in both Second Schedule and Third Schedule, residuary jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Tribunal apart from the fact that in the Second Schedule withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege has been specifically mentioned in Item No.4. So, according to Mr. Bandyopadhyay, the disputes mentioned in the order of reference are totally covered by the Second and Third Schedules under the Industrial Disputes Act. 18. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further submits that the workers of the jute mill raised valid disputes with the management. Referring to the records available before this Court Mr. Bandyopadhyay submits that the workers not only opposed the proposal for shifting but also called the strike. Mr. Bandyopadhyay referred to the various letters issued on behalf of the workers union on different decisions. Mr. Bandyopadhyay also submits that series of grounds for objecting to the proposal for shifting have been recorded in different written communications which according to the said learned senior counsel, have been ignored by the learned single Judge resulting in the order under appeal becoming perverse. 19. According to Mr. Bandyopadhyay, by asking for justification of the proposed shifting, the appropriate Government wanted to ascertain the consequences of the said shifting. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further submits that the Tribunal has every power to consider the incidental aspects of the reference as laid down in the case of Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen and Others AIR 1967 SC 469 : 1967-I-LLJ-423. 20. It has been argued on behalf of the aforesaid appellant that the Government authority made the reference after proper application of mind and upon taking note of the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties in the conciliation proceedings at different times as well as the records relating to various queries made by the Government and answered by the management of the Company with regard to the proposal for shifting of the concerned jute mill. Mr. Bandyopadhyay also urged before this Court that there is no scope of judicial review in respect of the reference made by the Government for adjudication of the disputes. Mr. Bandyopadhyay submits that the order of reference made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is an administrative order and it involves no is and is made on subjective satisfaction of the Government. Therefore, unlike judicial or quasi judicial order, it cannot be examine by the High Court. Mr. Bandyopadhyay submits that the order of reference made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is an administrative order and it involves no is and is made on subjective satisfaction of the Government. Therefore, unlike judicial or quasi judicial order, it cannot be examine by the High Court. Mr. Bandyopadhyay referred to and relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Indian Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar Barat and Others, AIR 2000 SC 915 : (2000) 3 SCC 93 : (2000) 2 MLJ 79 : 2000-I-LLJ-809. 21. Mr. Bandyopadhyay however, submits that the policy decision of the management in the instant case with regard to proposed shifting of the jute mill cannot be kept outside the judicial review and relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority, N.D. and Another v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats and Others (2008) AIR SCW 762. 22. For the aforementioned reasons, Mr. Bandyopadhyay submits that the impugned order of reference cannot be termed as bad. 23. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned senior counsel representing the respondent/writ petitioner in connection with the appeal bearing OF.M.A. No.548/2007 submits that the justification of the decision of the management to shift the Jute mill cannot be the subject matter of reference. Mr. Mukherjee further submits that shifting itself cannot be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2k of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned senior 5 counsel of the respondent/writ petitioner specifically submits that the consequences of the proposed shifting of the Soorah Jute Mill was never referred for adjudication by the appropriate Government upon framing a specific issue. Mr. Mukherjee also submits that the existence of an industrial dispute is the condition precedent for making a reference before the Tribunal. 24. According to Mr. Mukherjee, mere managerial decision to shift the industrial establishment cannot give rise to the existence of an industrial dispute. Mr. Mukherjee submit that all disputes cannot be regarded as industrial disputes and reference should be made •for adjudication upon framing proper issue only when an industrial dispute exists. The managerial decision to shift the establishment from a particular place cannot be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2k of the Industrial Disputes Act. Mr. Mukherjee submit that all disputes cannot be regarded as industrial disputes and reference should be made •for adjudication upon framing proper issue only when an industrial dispute exists. The managerial decision to shift the establishment from a particular place cannot be an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2k of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned senior counsel of the respondent/writ petitioner specifically urged before this Court that when no industrial dispute is in existence or apprehended, the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference. According to the said learned senior counsel, Government cannot mechanically make any reference without being satisfied about the existence of an industrial dispute. Mr. Mukherjee referred to and relied on the following decisions in support of his aforesaid arguments: (1) Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat and Others AIR 1968 SC 529 : 1968-I-LLJ-834 (Paragraph 4). (2) Jaipur Udyog Ltd v. Cement Work Karmachari Sangh, Sahu Nagar AIR 1972 SC 1352 : (1972) 1 SCC 691 : 1972-I-LLJ-437 (Paragraphs 9 & 11) (3) National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Others AIR 2000 SC 469 : 2000-I-LLJ-247 (Paragraphs 9 & 24) (4) Nedungadi Bank Ltd v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others AIR 2000 SC 839 : (2000) 2 SCC 455 : 2000-I-LLJ-561 (Paragraphs 7 & 8) (5) Bank of Baroda Employees' Association and Another v. Union of India and Others 2005-II-LLJ-912 (Cal) (6) Shalimar Paints Ltd. v. Third Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal and Others 1971-II-LLJ-58 (Cal) (Paragraphs 15,16,17 & 18). 25. Referring to the decision in the case of Biddle Sawyer Ltd. v. Chemical Employees Union, 2007-III-LLJ-391 (Paragraphs 38 & 41), Mr. Mukherjee submits that the employers have every right to shift the place of business. 26. Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, learned senior counsel also appears on behalf of the respondent/writ petitioner in connection with one of the appeals bearing F.M.A. 549/2007 and submits that the appropriate Government in the present case never formed any opinion regarding existence of an industrial dispute and according to Mr. Mitra, there was no basis for formation of any opinion regarding existence of the industrial dispute. Mr. Mitra submits that every managerial decision cannot be the subject matter of industrial dispute. 27. Mitra, there was no basis for formation of any opinion regarding existence of the industrial dispute. Mr. Mitra submits that every managerial decision cannot be the subject matter of industrial dispute. 27. The learned Advocate General, however, submits that the issue No. 1 mentioned in the impugned reference is not the only issue and the same should be considered in the light of the issue No.2. The learned Advocate General also submits that the issue No. 2 is very much relevant and this Court should appreciate the same. According to the learned Advocate General, surrounding circumstances have to be seen in order to understand the actual meaning of the reference. Roy further submits that the language of the issues under reference cannot be considered in isolation and the issues suggested by the Conciliation Officer should be taken into consideration which were admittedly, couched in a different language. Mr. Roy referred to and relied on the following decisions in support of his aforesaid arguments: Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Employees' Union and Others AIR 1978 SC 1137 : (1978) 2 SCC 188 : 1978-II-LLJ-11 Agra Electric Supply Company Limited, Agra v. Workmen (supra) Management of Addison and Co. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madras and Others 1979-I-LLJ-465 (Mad) 28. Mr. Roy also referred to the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Minimax Ltd. v. Its workmen (represented by the Minimax Workmen's Union and Another) 1968-I-LLJ-369 (Pat) at page 372 in order to explain how the reference should be properly interpreted. . 29. The learned Advocate General categorically submits that the point of jurisdiction should be decided by the learned Tribunal on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and Writ Court should not decide the said issue even though it has the power to do so and relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Management of Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd., Madras v. Workers and Others AIR 1963 SC 569 : 1962-II-LLJ-227 (Paragraphs 5 to 18). Mr. Roy strongly argues, before this Court that the effect of shifting has serious consequences on other reliefs regarding condition of service or affectation of employees. Mr. Roy submits that surrounding circumstances should be appreciated by this Court in an appropriate manner in order to find out the existence of an industrial dispute. 30. Mr. Mr. Roy strongly argues, before this Court that the effect of shifting has serious consequences on other reliefs regarding condition of service or affectation of employees. Mr. Roy submits that surrounding circumstances should be appreciated by this Court in an appropriate manner in order to find out the existence of an industrial dispute. 30. Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharyya, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/writ petitioner, in the appeal bearing F.M.A. No. 255/2007 referred to Second Schedule and Third Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act and submitted that the dispute mentioned in the impugned reference does not relate to any matter specified in the said Second Schedule and Third Schedule of the said Act. 31. In the backdrop of the aforesaid arguments advanced on behalf of the respective parties, let us now examine the order under appeal passed by the learned single Judge. 32. Undisputedly, if the appropriate Government forms an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended then under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Government is empowered to refer the said dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication. Relevant portions of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act are set out hereunder: "10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion, that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing (a) ... ... ... (b) ... ... ... (e) ... ... ... (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication......" 33. The order of reference can, therefore, only be made if the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. Existence or apprehension of any industrial dispute is the sine qua non. 34. In the case of Workmen Employed by Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Limited, AIR 1984 SC 1683 : (1984) 4 SCC 392 : 1984-II-LLJ-391, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "4. Section 10(1) confers power on the appropriate Government to refer an existing or apprehended industrial dispute, amongst others, to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. 34. In the case of Workmen Employed by Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Limited, AIR 1984 SC 1683 : (1984) 4 SCC 392 : 1984-II-LLJ-391, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "4. Section 10(1) confers power on the appropriate Government to refer an existing or apprehended industrial dispute, amongst others, to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The dispute therefore, which can be referred for adjudication, of necessity, has to be an industrial dispute which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference, and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it." Industrial Dispute has been defined in Section 2k of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in the following manner: "2(k) 'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person." 35. From the aforesaid definition it is clear that all disputes and differences between employers and workmen will not constitute industrial dispute. A dispute can be said to be an industrial dispute if such dispute is connected with employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any person. In the instant case, the dispute referred to the Tribunal for adjudication is in relation to the justification of the proposed shifting of the jute mill by the management which on the face of it, therefore, cannot constitute an industrial dispute. 36. It has been contended by the learned Advocate General that shifting does not mean shifting only but also includes consequences thereof. When the shifting has not yet taken place question of any consequence thereof does not arise. Furthermore, the learned single Judge has also made it clear that in the event, appropriate Government forms an opinion to the effect that any dispute or difference arises between the employer and the workmen in relation to employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of employment due to such shifting then the appropriate Government will be free to make a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.. Therefore, if the shifting takes place and such shifting results in or gives rise to any dispute or difference with regard to employment or non-employment or terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person, then and thereafter only, such a dispute can be raised and referred. 37. In any event, there has to be shifting of the Jute mill at first and if thereafter such shifting gives rise to an industrial dispute then such dispute can be referred for adjudication under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act for which specific liberty has been granted by the learned single Judge. However, in the present case, the Issue is not even shifting but is the justification of the proposed shifting. Therefore, it is the business decision of the company which cannot form an industrial dispute unless it affects the employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any person. 38. An argument has also been advanced on behalf of the appellant that by the proposed shifting there would be merger of the writ petitioner company with other company. Mr. Mitra, learned senior counsel representing the writ petitioner categorically submitted before this Court that Birla Corporation Limited is the company which remains as the employer, and employer-employee relationship would continue with Birla Corporation Limited. 39. Another argument has also been advanced on behalf of the appellants that the shifting of the concerned jute mill amounts to closure and hence, forms an industrial dispute. The aforesaid argument, in our opinion, is without substance since closure is associated with loss of employment whereas shifting results in no loss of employment. It is not closing down of the place of employment but shifting of the place of employment. The word "closure" has conceptually a definite connotation in industrial law and is necessarily associated with the concept of loss of employment. Furthermore, the Impugned order of reference does not mention that shifting in the instant case means closure of the jute mill. 40. We have already observed hereinbefore that the justification of the proposed shifting of the jute mill by the management on the face of it cannot constitute an industrial dispute as the same ipso facto does not give rise to any dispute or difference with regard to employment or non-employment or terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. 41. 41. The employer has an inherent right to choose his place of business as has been clearly held by a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Shalimar Paints Ltd. v. Third Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal and Others (supra). The observations of the learned single Judge in the aforesaid decision are as follows 1971-II-LLJ-58 at p. 62: "16. It, therefore, follows that just as an employee cannot make a claim for an extra allowance when he shifts his residence to a more distant place from his office there can be no claim for compensation when the employer shifts his business or undertaking from one place to another. The employer, in my view, has an inherent right to choose his place of business. The fact that some of the employees may have to incur additional expenses by way of travelling as a result of such shifting of employer's business or undertaking, does not entitle the employee to make a claim for extra benefit or compensation. In any event such a claim cannot be made on the ground that there has been a transfer of employees. The expression 'transfer', in my opinion, connotes that an employer has more than one place of business and the employee is called upon to work in a different place of business from the one in which he worked previously....." 42. However, on account of shifting of the jute mill, subsequently if any dispute or difference arises between the employer and the workmen in relation to the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person then such dispute can be referred to for adjudication by the Tribunal and the learned single Judge has specifically granted such liberty to the appellants, herein. 43. Mr. Anindya Kr. Mitra, learned senior counsel representing the respondent/writ petitioner referred to a report made by the Additional Labour Commissioner to the Principal Secretary, Government of West Bengal, Labour Department wherein the said Additional Labour Commissioner having considered a judgment of the Calcutta High Court had clearly mentioned that after considering all aspects he was of the view that the workmen cannot lawfully object to the shifting of the Mills from its present site to Birlapur, which we cannot altogether ignore. 44. 44. The learned Advocate General incited the attention of this Court to the issues suggested by the Labour Commissioner for reference. Undisputedly, the issues suggested by the Labour Commissioner were not ultimately referred by the appropriate Government to the Tribunal for adjudication. 45. We are concerned with the issues mentioned in the impugned order of reference by the appropriate Government and not with the issues suggested by the Labour Commissioner to the appropriate Government for reference since the issues framed by the Labour Commissioner were not accepted even by the appropriate Government as the proper issues to be referred for adjudication. 46. The affectation of the workmen due to the proposed shifting of the Soorah Jute Mill was never considered to be a proper issue by the appropriate Government. The respondent/writ petitioner, in our opinion, has rightly submitted that what was referred by the appropriate Government to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 47. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that this Hon'ble Court in its Writ Jurisdiction should not decide the validity of reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the same should be adjudicated by the Tribunal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the aforesaid issue in the following decisions: (1) Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others (supra) (2) ANZ Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Union of India, and Others (supra) (Paragraph 13) (3) National Engineering industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Others (supra). In the case of ANZ Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Union of India and Others (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the aforesaid issue and observed 2006-I-LLJ-271 at p. 276: "13.......... It is true that normally a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained against an order of the appropriate Government making a reference under Section 10 of the Act as the parties would get opportunity to lead evidence before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal and to show that the claim made is either unfounded or there was no occasion for making a reference. However, this is not a case where the infirmity in the reference can be shown only after evidence has been adduced. However, this is not a case where the infirmity in the reference can be shown only after evidence has been adduced. In the present case the futility of the reference made by the Central Government can be demonstrated from a bare reading of the terms of the reference and the admitted facts. In such circumstances, the validity of required to be considered for examining the issue raised." 48. In the present case, we are of the opinion that no evidence is required to be considered in order to adjudicate the validity of the impugned reference and, therefore, this Hon'ble Court can decide the validity of the impugned reference in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 49. The observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neduagadi Bank Ltd v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others (supra) are very much relevant in this regard. Paragraph 8 of the aforesaid judgment is set out hereunder 2000-I-LLJ-561 at p. 564 of LLJ: "8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference, has been made under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside that is certainly subject to judicial review, limited though it might be. The High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction, of the Labour Court. In National Engg. Industries Ltd, v. State of Rajasthan (supra) this Court observed: "24. It will be thus seen that High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when I there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject-matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the Appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the Appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no f industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference." 50. When it has been alleged that there is no industrial dispute then this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition in order to decide the question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. In the case of National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of - Rajasthan (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed 2000-I-LLJ-247 at p. 264 of LLJ: "26. It will be thus seen that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject-matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction......" 51. Industrial Tribunal is empowered to adjudicate industrial disputes relating to any matter mentioned in the Second and Third Schedule. In the present case, the dispute referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the impugned order of reference dated December 19, 2005 is not relating to any matter specified in the Second and Third Schedule and, therefore, Industrial Tribunal cannot have any jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. 52. The respondent-Birla Corporation Limited filed the writ petition challenging the validity of the order of reference and seeking interference by this Hon'ble Court on the ground that on the face of the impugned order of referred (sic reference) what has been referred is not an industrial dispute. 53. If it appears on the face of the order of reference that the same does not constitute an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2k of the Industrial Disputes Act, then this Hon'ble Court in its writ jurisdiction can quash the said reference on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction which has been done in the instant case by the learned single Judge. 54. 54. The respective learned senior counsel representing the appellants in these appeals have cited various decisions in support of their arguments which are not required to be dealt with separately as those cases have no manner of application in this case. None of those cases lay down the proposition that the decision of the management with regard to the proposed shifting of an industrial undertaking is an industrial dispute. The learned counsel of the appellants could not also cite any decision where it has been held that even though what has been referred is not an industrial dispute, Matters incidental thereto can bring it within the ambit of an industrial dispute for adjudication. In all the cases cited on behalf of the learned counsel of the appellants what was referred was an industrial dispute and what was being considered was whether that industrial dispute could take into its ambit some other matters incidental to the referred industrial dispute or covering some other matters on a broad construction of the industrial dispute referred by the appropriate Government. 55. For the aforementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that a dispute referred by the order of reference does not constitute an industrial dispute and the learned single Judge has rightly quashed the order of reference. 56. We, therefore, hold that the learned single Judge was right in allowing the writ petition and thus affirm the judgment under appeal passed by the said learned single Judge. In the result, these appeals fail and the same are hereby dismissed but with no order as o to costs. Let urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned Advocates of the parties on completion of usual undertaking. TAPAN MUKHERJEE, J. 57. I agree. Writ petition allowed Later: After pronouncement of the judgment, Mr. S.P. Sarkar, learned counsel representing the appellant in the appeal bearing F.M.A. No. 549/2007 prays for stay of the operation of the said judgment and order. We find no reason to grant such stay. Accordingly, the prayer for stay is refused. Appeals dismissed.