Judgment :- This is an application seeking review of the order dated 11-07-2008 passed by the Court in C.R.P.No. 2804 of 2008, whereby, this Court directed the respondents to represent the plaint, and further directed the trial Court to number the suit on such representation. The genisis for this multifaceted litigation is as under; Respondents and two others executed an agreement of sale in favour of the petitioner and others on 17-08-1989 in respect of some property, and they were put in possession of the property. Thereafter, as the respondents have not performed their part of the contract, petitioners and others filed O.S.No.73 of 1997 before the learned I Additional District Judge, Nellore, for specific performance of the agreement of sale. The said suit was ultimately dismissed on 12.11.2007. However, in the said suit, the trial Court framed an issue as to whether the defendants, (respondents herein ), can set up any claim against the plaintiffs (review petitioners and others), and if so, whether it has any bearing on the relief of refund of sale consideration claimed by plaintiffs. While dismissing the suit, the trial Court observed that defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to compensation as they gave their shares in the rice mill to the plaintiffs even without consent; but the defendants have not filed any counter claim seeking compensation. In the light of the observations made by the trial Court and further contending that for no fault of theirs they were dispossessed from the suit property and were deprived of the fruits of the rice mill, respondents instituted the present suit, being C.F.No.3072 of 2008 before the Principal District Judge, Nellore, claiming compensation from the date of dispossession i.e., 18.12.1989 till the date of institution of the suit i.e., 23.04.2008. However, office took objection stating that the claim of the respondents relating to the period from 18.12.1989 to 22.04.2005 is barred by limitation and the suit is maintainable only from 23.04.2005 till the date of institution of the suit. Aggrieved thereby, respondents filed the Civil Revision Petition before the Court. This Court, observing that numbering of the suit is between the Court and the plaintiffs, dispenced with notice to the petitioner/defendant, and allowed the said revision on 11.07.2008, as stated supra. Aggrieved thereby, respondents filed the Civil Revision Petition before the Court. This Court, observing that numbering of the suit is between the Court and the plaintiffs, dispenced with notice to the petitioner/defendant, and allowed the said revision on 11.07.2008, as stated supra. Now the petitioner besought to review the said order stating that he had no opportunity to submit the merits of the case, that since the order of the trial Court, dated 01.05.2008 passed in C.F.No.3072 of 2008 is a deemed decree under section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(CPC) only a regular appeal lies under Section 96 of CPC but not a revision, and that as part of the suit claim is barred by limitation, the suit is not maintainable. Heard Sri M.V.S.Suresh, learned counsel for the new petitioner and Sri M.Venkata Narayana, learned counsel for the respondents. Sri M.V.S.Suresh, learned counsel for the review petitioner, raised an objection to the very maintainability of the revision. He contended that since rejection of plaint is a deemed decree under sub-section (2) of Section 2 CPC, a regular appeal can be filed, but not a revision, and that the respondents restored to gross misuse of process of Court. He further contended that the order of this Court in the revision is violative of principles of natural justice, as a decree rejecting part of suit claim can only be set aside after issuing notice to the aggrieved party, and therefore, the review petitioner was deprived of an opportunity to put forth his contentions. Per contra, Sri M.Venkata Narayana, learned counsel for the respondents contended that as the trial Court did not reject the entire claim of the respondents and it only directed them to restrict their claim, it does not amount to rejection of plaint within the meaning of order V11 Rule 11(d)CPC. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, it is not a deemed decree. The learned counsel further contended that since numbering of suit is between the plaintiff and the Court, this Court rightly dispensed with notice to the petitioner. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, it is not a deemed decree. The learned counsel further contended that since numbering of suit is between the plaintiff and the Court, this Court rightly dispensed with notice to the petitioner. Both the learned counsel have relied upon several precedents in support of their contentions In the backdrop of the arguments advanced, the only questions that arise for consideration in this revision are: 1) Whether revision against the order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Nellore in C.F.No.3072 of 2008, directing the respondents to represent the plaint restricting their claim for the period, which is within limitation is maintainable? and 2) Whether the order of this Court is liable to be reviewed? Before going into the merits of the matter, the maintainability of some of the proceedings, particularly, the revisions and miscellaneous appeal as such needs to be dealt with. Once a suit is presented before the civil Court, the examination thereof is taken up at various stages and from different angles. When the plaint presented before a Court does not accord with the procedural aspects, it is returned to the plaintiff pointing out the objections. Opportunity is given for compliance. These objections may include those relating to adequacy of Court fee, limitation, doubt as to the jurisdiction of the Court, be it of territorial, pecuniary or the one of subject matter, maintainability or otherwise of the suit, in the light of the provisions contained in the various statutes, statement of cause of action with the required amount of certainty, etc. whenever a plaint is returned, the plaintiff would have a right to represent the same either by compliance with the deficiency pointed out by the Court or by explaining as to how the objection raised by the Court does not arise. If the plaint is once again returned on not being satisfied with the explanation offered or lapse committed by the plaintiff, the remedy is to challenge the same by filing revision. When the Court finds that the suit presented before it is barred on any grounds mentioned in Rule 11 of Order VII CPC, it will entail in rejection of plaint. Such rejection can be ordered by the Court on its own accord, or on application filed by the opposite party. When the Court finds that the suit presented before it is barred on any grounds mentioned in Rule 11 of Order VII CPC, it will entail in rejection of plaint. Such rejection can be ordered by the Court on its own accord, or on application filed by the opposite party. One important aspect that needs to be borne in mind is that while a plaint can be returned only at a stage before it is numbered, whereas rejection can be ordered at any stage till the suit is disposed of. In as much as a final expression of view on certain facets of the suit emerges out of an order of rejection, remedy by way of a regular appeal is provided under CPC. This emerges from the definition of decree under Section 2(2) CPC, which includes an order of rejection of plaint. Once the order is equated to decree, the only remedy provided under CPC is the one under Section 96 CPC. There is another way of examining the matter, Order XLIII cpc enlists the nature of orders that are made appealable under Section 104 CPC. There is no mention of an order passed under Rule 11 of order VII CPC in this list. Therefore, there would not be any occasion for filing the appeal under order XLIII Rules 1 and 2 CPC against an order rejecting the plaint. All the aforementioned provisions state about filing of appeals and civil miscellaneous appeals. Further, general superintendence power is given to the High Courts under Sections 115 CPC and 227 of the Constitution, to interfere with the order of the Subordinate Court if there appears error patent on the face of the record, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. The trial Court took an objection regarding limitation and thereby returned the plaint. Respondents represented plaint stating that as per Section 9 of the limitation Act continuous running of time-disability is defined as the want of legal qualification to act. Such legal qualification is not there to claim damages to the respondents because of pendency of O.S.No.73 of 1997 and the cause of action is postponed till the judgment in O.S.No.73 of 1997 is passed. Such legal qualification is not there to claim damages to the respondents because of pendency of O.S.No.73 of 1997 and the cause of action is postponed till the judgment in O.S.No.73 of 1997 is passed. However, the trial Court, disagreeing with the said view, held that when the earlier suit was pending, the respondents were not under any disability to file a suit or counter- claim for compensation or mesne profits, that there was nothing to stop running of limitation against the claim of respondents during the pendency of earlier suit, and therefore, the suit for compensation for three years beyond 23.04.2008 is barred by limitation. In this context it is to be seen that plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact, and it can not be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. In this regard, this Court as well of the Apex Court in catena of judgments held that Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties and disputed question cannot be decided at the threshold. In Popat and Kotecha Property V. State Bank of India Staff Association 2005 (6) SCJ 582 the Apex court dealt with the aspect of rejection of plaint on the ground of limitation at the threshold and laid down as under: “……Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitations fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So, a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainly and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest republicate at sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). So, a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainly and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest republicate at sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for legislatively fixed period of time….” The Apex court ultimately held that the High Court erred in holding that Order VII Rule 11 CPC was applicable. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Rangam Yellaiah v. Chinta Shankaraiah 2003 (5) ALT 403 , while dealing with similar aspect, held as under: “….All the factual disputes which may have to be gone into both parties letting in evidence cannot be decided at the threshold unless on the allegations made in the pliant itself, the Court can arrive at a conclusion that the suit is clearly barred by any law, be that a question of limitation or any other question. When several other factual aspects are also to be gone into while deciding a question of law involved incidentally, the rejection of plaint at the threshold cannot be sustained…” In view of the above decisions, it is clear that the aspect of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and it cannot be decided at the threshold. Apparently, the suit was returned before numbering on the ground of limitation. Therefore, this court allowed the revision observing that whether respondents are entitled to claim damages for the period claimed by them is a matter to be decided by the trial Corrupt during the course of trial and it cannot be decided at the threshold. Reverting to the facts of the case, for deciding the first aspect as to whether revision is maintainable, it is to be seen as to whether the order of the trial Court is deemed decree. The trial Court returned the suit filed by the respondents on the ground that Compensation for three years beyond 23.04.2008 is barred by limitation and thereby directed them to restrict their claim since three years prior to 23.04.2008. According to the learned Counsel for the review petitioner, since the order of the trial Court is a deemed decree under Section 2(2) of CPC, only an appeal lies but not revision. According to the learned Counsel for the review petitioner, since the order of the trial Court is a deemed decree under Section 2(2) of CPC, only an appeal lies but not revision. I am not in agreement with the said contention of the learned counsel. No doubt, in case of rejection of plaint, an appeal shall lie. But here it is not the case of rejection of plaint. It is only return of plaint directing the respondents to restrict their claim for compensation and to represent the plaint, which is not rejection of plaint, as per Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. So, when it is held that it is not rejection of plaint the question of filing an appeal does not arise. As observed above, whenever a plaint is returned, the plaintiff would have a right to represented the same either by compliance with the deficiency pointed out by the court or by explaining by compliance with the deficiency pointed out by the court or by explaining as to how the objection raised by the court does not arise. If the plaint is once again returned on not being satisfied with the explanation offered or lapse committed by the plaintiff, the remedy is to challenge the same by filling revision. The further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if the order of the trial court is termed as return of plaint, then also it is appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC. However, in my considered view, the said contention is untenable. Even if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that return of the plaint is also an appealable order is accepted, then also, this court is not precluded from interfering with the order of the Subordinate Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction when there is an error apparent on the face of the record. Even if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that return of the plaint is also an appealable order is accepted, then also, this court is not precluded from interfering with the order of the Subordinate Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction when there is an error apparent on the face of the record. Taking the same view, the Apex Court, in the case of Rajasthan State Electricity v. Union of India 2008(6) SCJ 70 held that availability of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar for granting relief in exercise of power under Article 227 of the constitution.] Further, in the case of Kota Sreevalli v. Chinni Seetharamaiah 2006(3) ALT 215, a learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing with maintainability of revision despite alternative remedy held as under: “When there exist a regular remedy of appeal, the High Court cannot examine the correctness of a decree, in the proceedings under Article 227 of the constitution of India. However it needs to be noted that the very purpose of conferring supervisory jurisdiction, under Article 227 is to arm the High Court with adequate power, to ensure that the subordinate counts do not deviate from the settled principles of law, particularly, in the matter of producer. A clear distinction needs to be maintained as to the adjudication of the findings recorded by the courts, on the merits, on the one hand and examination of deviations on the other hand. While the former is in the exclusive province of remedy of appeal, the latter can certainly constitute the subject matter of the revision, under Article 227.” The power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts and Tribunal within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Since there is error apparent on the face of the record, this court, exercising its power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution can definitely interfere with the order of the trial court. Petitioner sought review of the said order stating that he was deprived of an opportunity of putting forth the merits of the matter. However, it is to be seen that numbering of suit is between the court and the plaintiff and the defendant comes into picture only after summons are served on him pursuant to numbering the suit. Petitioner sought review of the said order stating that he was deprived of an opportunity of putting forth the merits of the matter. However, it is to be seen that numbering of suit is between the court and the plaintiff and the defendant comes into picture only after summons are served on him pursuant to numbering the suit. Keeping the same in view, this court dispensed with notice to the petitioner. Further this Court did not go into merit of the case and directed the trial court to number the suit and decide the same on merits. If the petitioner has any grievance, he will not be precluded from putting forth his case before the trial Court. The question of reviewing the order would arise only when there is error apparent on the face of the record or on account of some mistake. In this regard, the Apex court in Haridas das v. Smt. Usha Rani Banik’s 2006(4)SCJ 182 set aside the order of review of the Gauhati High Court and observed as under: “ …. A perusal of Order XLVII Rule 1 show that review of a judgment or an order could be sought: (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or any other sufficient reason.” In the instant case, the review petitioner could not establish that any new and important matter or evidence is discovered, and that there is error apparent on the face of record or any other sufficient reason. His only apprehension is that since the respondents filed an application seeking attachment before judgment for the entire suit claim, he would be fastened with false liability. As stated above, this Court did not go into the merits of the case and specifically directed the trial court to decide the matter in accordance with law. Petitioner would be at liberty to raise all the contentions before the trial court objecting the claim of the respondents/plaintiffs. Therefore, this court is of the view that there is nothing to review the order in the revision. Petitioner would be at liberty to raise all the contentions before the trial court objecting the claim of the respondents/plaintiffs. Therefore, this court is of the view that there is nothing to review the order in the revision. For the foregoing reasons, this court is of the view that there are no merits in this application. Accordingly, the Review Civil Revision Miscellaneous petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.