Judgment :- The petitioners are working as helpers in the respondent Electricity Board and they are challenging the charge-memo dated 07. 2005 given to them. They have also obtained an interim order on 09. 2005. 2. Heard the arguments of Mr. V. Shanmugham, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. M. Vaidhyanathan, learned Standing Counsel representing the respondents and have perused the records. 3. In normal course, the writ petitions are liable to rejected since this Court cannot go into the merits of the contentions raised against the respondents at the stage of the charge-memo. 4. The Supreme Court in its decision reported in 1987 (2) SCC 179 [State of U.P. Vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and another] dealt with the power of the Court in dealing with a charge memo at the show-cause stage and the following passage found in paragraph 9 will make the position clear. Para 9: "The High Court was not justified in quashing the show cause notice. When a show cause notice is issued to a government servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the government servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. The purpose of issuing show cause notice is to afford opportunity of hearing to the government servant and once cause is shown it is open to the Government to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the government servant and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. Interference by the court before that stage would be premature, the High Court in our opinion ought not have interfered with the show cause notice." 5. The Supreme Court vide its judgment reported in (2004) 3 SCC 440 [Special Director and another Vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another], in paragraph 5 observed as follows: Para 5: "This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show cause notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of parties. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another], in paragraph 5 observed as follows: Para 5: "This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show cause notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of parties. Unless the High Court is satisfied that the show-cause notice was totally non-est in the eye of the law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioners should invariably be directed to respond to the show-cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show-cause notice was founded on any legal premises, is a jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by the recipient of the notice and such issues also can be adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice initially, before the aggrieved could approach the court. Further, when the court passes an interim order it should be careful to see that the statutory functionaries specially and specifically constituted for the purpose are not denuded of powers and authority to initially decide the matter and ensure that ultimate relief which may or may not be finally granted in the writ petition is not accorded to the writ petitioner even at the threshold by the interim protection granted." 6. Further, the Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2006) 12 Supreme Court Cases 28 [Union of India and another vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana] in paragraphs 13 to 16 held as follows: Para 13: "It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board vs. Ramesh Kumar Singh (1996) 1 SCC 327 , Special Director vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (2004) 3 SCC 440 , Ulagappa vs. Divisional Commissioner Mysore (2001) 10 SCC 639 , State of U.P. Vs. Brahm Datt Sharma (1987) 2 SCC 179 , etc. Para 14: The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is; that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. Brahm Datt Sharma (1987) 2 SCC 179 , etc. Para 14: The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is; that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. Para 15: Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such a discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. Para 16: No doubt, in some very rate and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter." 7. Further, in the decision reported in 1996 (3) SCC 157 [Secretary to Government, Prohibition and Excise Department Vs. L.Srinivasan], the Supreme Court has held that the charge cannot be quashed only on the ground of delay and any finding recorded by the Court will prejudice the enquiry. The Supreme Court has also pulled up the member of the Administrative Tribunal for having interfered with the charge memo as if the Tribunal is the appellate authority. The following passage found in paragraph 3 of the said judgment makes the position very clear. Para 3: "We are informed that charge-sheet was laid for prosecution for the offences of embezzlement and fabrication of false records etc. and that the offences and the trial of the case is pending. The following passage found in paragraph 3 of the said judgment makes the position very clear. Para 3: "We are informed that charge-sheet was laid for prosecution for the offences of embezzlement and fabrication of false records etc. and that the offences and the trial of the case is pending. The Tribunal had set aside the departmental enquiry and quashed the charge on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings. In the nature of the charges, it would take a long time to detect embezzlement and fabrication of false records which should be done in secrecy. It is not necessary to go into the merits and record any finding on the charge levelled against the charged officer since any finding recorded by this Court would gravely prejudice the case of the parties at the enquiry and also at the trial. Therefore, we desist from expressing any opinion on merit or recording any of the contentions raised by the counsel on either side. Suffice it to state that the Administrative Tribunal has committed grossest error in its exercise of the judicial review. The member of the administrative Tribunal appears to have no knowledge of the jurisprudence of the service law and exercised power as if he is an appellate forum dehors the limitation of judicial review. This is one such instance where a member had exceeded his power of judicial review in quashing the suspension order and charges even at the threshold. We are coming across such orders frequently putting heavy pressure on this Court to examine each case in detail. It is high time that it is remedied." 8. However, Mr. V. Shanmugham, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, strenuously contended that in the present cases, the charge-memos issued were contrary to the Standing Orders and that they were issued with a pre-meditation and, therefore, they are liable to be quashed. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Tamil Nadu Electricity Board was directed to produce the original records relating to the basis of issuance of the charge-memos and the same was submitted for perusal by this Court. 10. It is seen from the records that an Industrial Co-operative Society, by name, The Turticorin Thermal Power Station Industrial Co-operative Service Society Limited [for short, INDCOSERVE] was functioning in the Tuticorin Thermal Power Station under the second respondent herein. 10. It is seen from the records that an Industrial Co-operative Society, by name, The Turticorin Thermal Power Station Industrial Co-operative Service Society Limited [for short, INDCOSERVE] was functioning in the Tuticorin Thermal Power Station under the second respondent herein. The said Society was organised with a view to streamline the engagement of contract labour and the entire infrastructure including the Management of the Society was entrusted to the Officers of the second respondent. Wages were directly paid by the Board. Subsequently, on the abolition of contract labour system in Thermal Power Station due to the policy decision taken by the Government, there was no requirement for the Society and it was proposed to take 450 persons, who were employed by the Society, as workers of the Electricity Board. Since the employment was guaranteed if they were employed by the INDCOSERVE society, bogus enrolment was done with the connivance of the officials of the Board. This came to the notice of the Board through a Vigilance enquiry and it was found that eight persons were enrolled as members only with a view to secure employment in the Board. One P.K. Arumugam, who was the then Chief Engineer of the second respondent Thermal Power Station was responsible for the same and the vigilance enquiry noted that eight persons (including the present five petitioners) have been made as members at the instance of the then Chief Engineer, who wanted to accommodate the children of the existing employees of the Electricity Board and enrolled them as members without authority. Therefore, a direction was given to take action. 11. The Special Officer, INDCOSERVE society, by the General Body Meeting dated 15. 1996 decided to remove the eight members, who were fraudulently enrolled and a resolution to that effect was also passed. This was also duly informed to the Vigilance Department. In the light of the same, the petitioners were disengaged from service after issuance of a show cause notice. The present writ petitioners filed writ petitions being W.P. Nos. 18075 to 18080 of 2000 before this Court and this Court, by a common order dated 22.02.2001, dismissed the writ petitions by stating that the petitioners, being workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [for short, I.D. Act] are bound to raise an industrial dispute since disputed questions of fact have been pleaded and only an industrial adjudication is an effective remedy. As against the said order, the petitioners preferred writ appeals being W.A. Nos. 2928 to 2933 of 2001. This Court, vide common judgment dated 03. 2004, held that the disengagement of the petitioners was not out of any disciplinary proceedings and, therefore, they need not be relegated to the Labour Court. 12. The operative portion of the judgment of the Division Bench may be usefully extracted below: Para 13: "For the above conclusion, we hold that the impugned orders are not by way of punishment inflicted based on a disciplinary proceedings. Hence the question of relegating the appellants to labour court for adjudicating the issue does not arise. Hence, the order of the learned single Judge holding that the impugned orders are punishment and the appellants are at liberty to approach the labour court for adjudicating the issue by letting evidence to challenge the impugned orders cannot be sustained. Para 14: In terms of section 2(oo) of the Act, the order of termination not issued by way of punishment shall mean only the orders of retrenchment. Once we come to the conclusion that the impugned orders are by way of retrenchment, not by way of punishment, the appellants are entitled to reinstatement of service as the respondent Board did not either issue 3 months notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of notice. We also find no prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as the case specified by the Government was also obtained. Hence the writ petitions are allowed and the order of termination are set aside. Para 15: However, we make it clear that whether the appellants have secured their enrolment in the INDCOSERVE society in a dubious manner or not, is a matter for adjudication by the society under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act which provisions shall govern the enrolment admission and removal of membership. Our attention is not drawn by the respondent Board is to whether the names of the appellants were removed from the membership of the society so as to sustain the power of the Board to take action. Our attention is not drawn by the respondent Board is to whether the names of the appellants were removed from the membership of the society so as to sustain the power of the Board to take action. Though it is pleaded that the society did not agree to remove the name of the appellants from the membership of the society, the report of the Vigilance Cell cannot by itself be the basis for ordering termination straightaway. Para 16: In view of the above, the respondent Board is still at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellants by following the procedures as contemplated under the Regulations for the alleged misconduct by securing employment by enrolling their name in INDCOSERVE society in dubious manner." [Emphasis added] 13. Aggrieved by the common judgment of this Court, the respondent Board filed Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 17339 to 17344 of 2004 and the same were dismissed on 23. 2005. 14. It was thereafter, the petitioners were placed under suspension by proceedings dated 26. 2005 under the Certified Standing Orders applicable to workmen other than those engaged in clerical work. Subsequent to the suspension, charge-memos dated 07. 2005 were given to the petitioners in terms of the Certified Standing Orders, which are impugned in the present writ petitions. The petitioners have also obtained interim orders restraining the TNEB from proceeding further. 15. The action of the petitioners in, once again, filing second set of writ petitions is a clear abuse of process of law and as such, they are liable to be dismissed without any further consideration. 16. It is seen from the order of the Division Bench that the Division Bench had granted liberty to the respondent Board to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners by following the procedure as contemplated under the Regulations for the misconduct of securing employment by enrolling their names in the INDCOSERVE society in a dubious manner. This direction of the Division Bench cannot be overcome by once again challenging the charge-memos without going through the process of the enquiries initiated by the Board. In fact, it was the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the membership of the petitioners was not removed from the Society and it is only the Society which can take action against them. In fact, it was the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the membership of the petitioners was not removed from the Society and it is only the Society which can take action against them. This overlooks the fact that the general body of the INDCOSERVE society had removed the names of the writ petitioners as early as 15. 1996 as seen from the original file produced by the respondents. Even otherwise, the Division Bench did not accept the contention of the petitioners that there were no resolution to remove their names but merely recorded that it was their plea that the INDCOSERVE society did not agree to remove their names. 17. Notwithstanding the fact that the direction given by the Division Bench is binding on the petitioners, the learned counsel insisted on referring to certain decisions of the Supreme Court in this regard. He contended that there was no misconduct committed by the petitioners over which the respondents can proceed to take disciplinary action. 18. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1985 (2) SCC 35 [Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation] wherein the Supreme Court, after referring to the decision in Glaxo Laboratories vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut [ (1984) 1 SCC 1 ], held in paragraph 4 as follows: Para 4: "It is thus well-settled that unless either in the Certified Standing Order or in the service regulations an act or omission is prescribed as misconduct, it is not open to the employer to fish out some conduct as misconduct and punish the workman even though the alleged misconduct would not be comprehended in any of the enumerated misconducts." It is not clear as to how this judgment is of any assistance to the petitioners when the charge-sheet was framed in terms of the Certified Standing Orders applicable to the petitioners. 19. In the present cases, only by virtue of being members of the INDCOSERVE society, the eligibility of employment into the Board arose and the Board had fixed the membership as 450 workers, whose names were given to the Board earlier. The fact that at the time of absorption, there were only 425 members in the INDCOSERVE society as against the sanctioned strength of 450 workers cannot help the case of the petitioners. The fact that at the time of absorption, there were only 425 members in the INDCOSERVE society as against the sanctioned strength of 450 workers cannot help the case of the petitioners. What was required was whether the petitioners were members of the INDCOSERVE society, who were eligible for absorption as per the sanction made by the Board. The Vigilance Report had noted that the names of the petitioners were included so as to accommodate the demand of the staff of the Electricity Board to have their children and wards so that they may gain entry in to the Boards service. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.L. Kalra vs. Project & Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. [ 1984 (3) SCC 316 ] and more particularly, relied on paragraphs 26 and 31 of the judgment: Para 26: "Now if what is alleged as misconduct does not constitute misconduct not by analysis or appraisal of evidence, but per se under 1975 Rules the respondent had neither the authority nor the jurisdiction nor the power to impose any penalty for the alleged misconduct. An Administrative Authority who purports to act by its regulation must be held bound by the regulation. “Even if these regulations have no force of law the employment under these corporations is public employment, and therefore, an employee would get a status which would enable him to obtain a declaration for continuance in service, if he was dismissed or discharged contrary to the regulations.” Para 31: "To sum up the order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority is illegal and invalid for the reasons: (i) that the action is thoroughly arbitrary and is violative of Article 14. (ii) that the alleged misconduct does not constitute misconduct within the 1975 Rules. (iii) that the inquiry officer himself found that punishment was already imposed for the alleged misconduct by withholding the salary and the appellant could not be exposed to double jeopardy, and (iv) that the findings of the inquiry officer are unsupported by reasons and the order of the disciplinary authority as well as the Appellate Authority suffer from the same vice. Therefore, the order of removal from service as well as the appellate order are quashed and set aside." The grievance projected by the petitioners does not fall within the parameter indicated by the Supreme Court in paragraph 26 of the judgment in A.L. Kalras case (Cited supra). 21. The learned counsel for the petitioners also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1984) 1 SCC 1 [Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut] wherein the Supreme Court held in paragraph 23 as follows: Para 23: "In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is none the less a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty. Accordingly, the contention of Mr Shanti Bhushan that some other act of misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated in Standing Order 22 can be punished under Standing Order 23 must be rejected". 22. The Electricity Board is governed by the Certified Standing Orders and the petitioners have been charge-sheeted against specific acts of misconduct which was indicated in the impugned charge-memos themselves. Therefore, placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Glaxo Laboratories case (Cited supra) is most inappropriate. 23. Further, the Division Bench had categorically given liberty to the Board to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners for securing employment by getting enrolled in the INDCOSERVE society in a dubious manner. In the teeth of such direction, the contentions raised by the petitioners are wholly impermissible and the second round of litigation at their instance is highly reprehensible. 24. Though an additional typed set dated 12. 2007 was filed by the petitioners along with the supplementary affidavit of the same date after orders were reserved, they only disclose at the maximum the defence that can be pleaded by them in a regularly conducted departmental enquiry. This Court, at the stage of challenge to the charge-memo, cannot go into the defence of the petitioners and it is for them to establish their innocence in the enquiry. This Court, at the stage of challenge to the charge-memo, cannot go into the defence of the petitioners and it is for them to establish their innocence in the enquiry. The Supreme Court had categorically held that securing employment through back door method or by committing fraudulent entry, can never be countenanced by Courts. 25. In the light of the above, all the writ petitions are misconceived and devoid of merits. Accordingly, they shall stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.