JUDGMENT Nirmal Yadav, J. - This is defendants regular second appeal challenging the concurrent findings recorded by learned Sub Judge IInd Class, Fatehabad and Additional District Judge, Hisar vide their judgments and decrees dated 18.8.1986 and 17.9.1988, respectively, vide which the plaintiffs suit for declaration, that he is owner of the suit land with a consequential relief that defendant be restrained from effecting recovery of decretal amount on the basis of order and decree dated 23.5.1984 passed by Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Fatehabad, in case Himat Rai v. Kehar Singh, has been decreed. 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that land measuring 47 Bighas - 2 Biswas was allotted to one Sunder Singh son of Nihal Singh by virtue of allotment No. 132. The plaintiff/respondent averred that Appellant-Himat Rai in collusion with one Kishan Singh, son of Gurdat Singh, who impersonated himself as Sunder Singh, the original allottee, purchased the suit land along with his three brothers Bansi Dhar, Diwan Chand and Puran Chand through a registered sale deed dated 18.7.1958 for an ostensible consideration of Rs. 5,000/- on the basis of which mutation No. 220 dated 31.7.1958, (Ex.P1) was sanctioned. 3. According to plaintiff, when the fraud committed by defendant-Himat Rai came to light, a case under Sections 419/420 IPC was registered against him and Kishan Singh who had impersonated himself as Sunder Singh. Kishan Singh was convicted by the Court for the above-said offence. It was further averred that out of the land, which had fallen to the share of the defendant, plaintiff and his brother Sher Singh were cultivating the land measuring 9 bighas - 11 biswas, comprised in khasra No. 286 min, from the year 1961 onwards without payment of any rent or batai. After consolidation, the land under the cultivation of the plaintiff was depicted as rectangle No. 37, Khasra Nos. 18(80) and 23(6-18), total land 14 kanals - 18 marlas. The plaintiff also denied the title of the defendant over the suit property. Defendant had filed various applications for recovery of arrears of rent, which were contested by the plaintiff and those applications were rejected by the revenue authorities. The plaintiff was holding the suit land in his own right, having acquired ownership of the same. 4. The defendant contested the suit. He took up the plea that the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata. The plaintiff was holding the suit land in his own right, having acquired ownership of the same. 4. The defendant contested the suit. He took up the plea that the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata. Plaintiff had no cause of action and the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. On merits, it was pleaded that defendant had purchased the suit land vide sale deed dated 18.7.1958 from Sunder Singh son of Nihal Singh for a consideration of Rs. 5,000/- and mutation was also sanctioned in this regard. He denied the knowledge of any criminal case having been registered against him and Kishan Singh, son of Gurdat Singh. According to defendant, plaintiff was tenant on the suit land under him on payment of 1/3rd batai, therefore, the plaintiff is not competent to challenge the title of the defendant. The defendant, however, admitted that various applications moved by him under Section 14 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 were dismissed summarily. It was submitted that the plaintiff could not acquire title of ownership by adverse possession being a tenant under the defendant. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the trial Court :- "1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit land as alleged in plaint ? OPP 2. Whether the order dated 23.5.84 passed by Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Fatehabad is against law and facts, without jurisdiction and is not binding on the rights of the plaintiff ? OP 3. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by the principle of res judicata ? OPD 4. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit ? OPD 5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in the present form ? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action ? OPD 7. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? OPD 8. Relief." 5. The trial Court after taking into consideration the evidence and facts on record decided issues Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff holding the plaintiff to be owner of the suit property by way of adverse possession from the date when the first application for recovery of rent was dismissed i.e. 29.6.1968. OPD 8. Relief." 5. The trial Court after taking into consideration the evidence and facts on record decided issues Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff holding the plaintiff to be owner of the suit property by way of adverse possession from the date when the first application for recovery of rent was dismissed i.e. 29.6.1968. Issue No. 3 was also decided in favour of the plaintiff holding that decision of the revenue court under Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act on the relationship of landlord and tenant, does not operate as res-judicata and it is open to challenge in a subsequent suit or any other collateral proceedings between the parties. While deciding issue No. 4, the trial Court has held that order and decree dated 23.5.1984 passed by the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Fatehabad is without any jurisdiction and the same can be challenged in the civil suit and thereby decreed the suit of the plaintiff and he was declared as owner in possession by way of adverse possession. The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by Ist Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 17.9.1988 affirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Since aggrieved, the appellant-defendant has filed the present appeal. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the evidence on record. In my considered view, the following question of law arises for consideration in the present regular second appeal : "i) Whether the plaintiff could claim any title or ownership over the suit land by way of adverse possession, being in possession of the suit property as a tenant ?" 7. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant argued that appellant purchased the suit property from Sunder Singh for a sale consideration of Rs. 5,000/- on 18.7.1958 and mutation No. 220 (Ex.P1) was also sanctioned in this regard on 31.7.1958. Learned counsel further argued that plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence on record vide which the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant has been held to be invalid and mutation (Ex.P1) has been cancelled. He referred to jamabandi for the year 1959-60, Ex.D3 wherein Himat Rai along with his brothers has been shown to be in possession of the suit property as owners. He referred to jamabandies, Ex. He referred to jamabandi for the year 1959-60, Ex.D3 wherein Himat Rai along with his brothers has been shown to be in possession of the suit property as owners. He referred to jamabandies, Ex. D-1 and Ex.D-2, for the years 1971-72 and 1976-77, respectively, and Khasra Girdawari from Kharif 1972 to Rabi 1977 wherein Kehar Singh, plaintiff has been shown to be a gair marusi tenant on payment of 1/3rd batai. Since the respondent/plaintiff was a tenant under the appellant/defendant, applications for payment of rent and ejectment from the suit property were filed against the plaintiff. However, those applications were rejected summarily on the plea taken by the plaintiff that a criminal case is pending against Kishan Singh, the vendor of the suit property and the defendant. Learned counsel further argued that the defendant was never charged of any offence under Sections 419/420 IPC. He rather pointed out that vide order dated 2.2.1961 (Ex.P9), the defendant was discharged by the Magistrate Ist Class, Hisar as no case was found to be made out against him. Learned counsel, therefore, argued that the defendant is owner of the suit property and plaintiff was a tenant under him. Learned counsel further argued that defendant filed a suit for recovery of rent from the year 1976 to 1979, which was decreed by the Assistant Collector Ist Grade vide order and decree dated 23.5.1984. The Assistant Collector has observed in the order that as per registered sale deed, defendant is the owner of the suit property till the sale deed is in existence and not cancelled and he shall remain to be the owner of the suit property. It is argued that finding of the Assistant Collector is based on documentary evidence and revenue record produced before him. 8. The next argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant is that from the pleadings of the plaintiff, it is prima facie proved that he has himself admitted the defendant to be the owner of the suit property. In spite of this, he is claiming ownership over the suit land by adverse possession. This plea cannot be raised by the plaintiff, who is a tenant under the appellant defendant on payment of 1/3rd batai. Learned counsel further argued that suit for declaration by a person, who is claiming ownership over immovable property by adverse possession, is not maintainable. In spite of this, he is claiming ownership over the suit land by adverse possession. This plea cannot be raised by the plaintiff, who is a tenant under the appellant defendant on payment of 1/3rd batai. Learned counsel further argued that suit for declaration by a person, who is claiming ownership over immovable property by adverse possession, is not maintainable. Such a plea can only be raised in defence in a suit for recovery. The relief claimed by the plaintiff that he has become an absolute owner cannot be granted on the basis of adverse possession. In support, the learned counsel relied on 2006(3) RCR(Civil) 97 [Bhim Singh and others v. Zile Singh and others] and also a judgment of the Delhi High Court in Prem Nath Wadhawan v. Inder Rai Wadhawan, 1993(3) Punjab Law Reporter (Delhi Section) 70. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff argued that both the Courts below have returned a concurrent finding of fact that relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be decided by a revenue court i.e. Court of Assistant Collector Ist Grade under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. Only a civil Court can settle such a dispute, therefore, both the Courts below have rightly held the decree dated 23.5.1984 to be null and void and not binding on the rights of the plaintiff. In support learned counsel referred to an Apex Court judgment in Rachhpal Singh and others v. Dalip, 1987 PLJ 572, a Full Bench judgment of this Court reported as 1981 P.L.J. 539 - Amar Singh and another v. Dalip and a Division Bench of this Court in Khazan Singh and another v. Dalip Singh and another, 1969 P.L.J. 459. It is argued that the present suit is not barred by the principle of res judicata, as the decree passed by the revenue court can be challenged in the Civil Court. 10. On a careful consideration of the rival submissions and scrutiny of entire record, it is true that the revenue Court under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Tenancy Act), has not been invested with the exclusive jurisdiction to pronounce upon the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 10. On a careful consideration of the rival submissions and scrutiny of entire record, it is true that the revenue Court under the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Tenancy Act), has not been invested with the exclusive jurisdiction to pronounce upon the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Under Section 77 of the Tenancy Act, the revenue court has been empowered to decide certain disputes between landlord and tenant, which necessarily means that existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, is a condition precedent before cognizance of any matter is taken by a revenue court. The revenue court is, therefore, entitled to pronounce upon the relationship between the parties only for the purposes of deciding disputes within its cognizance, as enumerated under Section 77 of the Tenancy Act. The Legislature has not conferred any jurisdiction on the revenue court to pronounce finally upon the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The decision of the revenue Court under Section 77 of the Tenancy Act on the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties would not operate as res-judicata and it would be open to challenge in a subsequent suit or in other collateral proceedings between the parties. In the present case, the defendant filed the suit for recovery of rent for the years 1976 to 1979 against the plaintiff. The revenue court after taking into consideration the revenue record, observed that Himat Rai (defendant) has been shown to be the owner of the suit property in the jamabandies for the years 1971-72 and 1976-77 while Kehar Singh (plaintiff) has been shown to be a gair marusi tenant. The plaintiff had challenged the ownership of the appellant defendant-Himat Rai mainly, on the ground that sale deed executed in his favour is a result of fraud as the vendor Kishan Singh had executed the sale deed by impersonating himself as Sunder Singh. However, no document was placed on record if the sale deed dated 18.7.1958 has been declared to be null and void. The Assistant Collector Ist Grade, therefore, held that till the registered sale deed in favour of Himat Rai and others is valid, they are the owners of the suit property. Even mutation was sanctioned on the basis of sale deed executed in favour of defendant-Himat Rai and his brothers. The Assistant Collector Ist Grade, therefore, held that till the registered sale deed in favour of Himat Rai and others is valid, they are the owners of the suit property. Even mutation was sanctioned on the basis of sale deed executed in favour of defendant-Himat Rai and his brothers. In pursuance of the sale deed and mutation, the revenue record also depicts Himat Rai and his brothers as owners of the suit property. The Assistant Collector Ist Grade has not decided the issue with regard to relation between the "landlord and tenant finally. Rather the issue of ownership has been decided collaterally while deciding the application for recovery of rent in a suit for recovery of rent wherein the question of ownership of land is quite immaterial. In fact, the revenue officer has to prima facie proceed on the assumption that entries in the revenue record are correct. The title claimed by the plaintiff on the basis of mutation cannot be challenged in such suits. In case the plaintiff was aggrieved against the ownership of the defendant on the basis of the revenue record, he could challenge before the competent civil Court the sale deed, which resulted in sanctioning of mutation qua the disputed land and incorporation of revenue entries on the basis of that sale deed. Admittedly, there is no document on record to show that plaintiff had challenged the sale deed executed in favour of defendant Himat Rai and his brothers or the mutation sanctioned on that basis. It can, thus, safely be inferred that the plaintiff has never challenged the basic documents i.e. sale deed and mutation on the basis of which ownership of the land in dispute has been conferred on the defendant. Insofar as the criminal case, as referred to by the plaintiff, is concerned, the defendant stood discharged by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class. In such circumstances, the decree dated 23.5.1984 passed by the revenue court cannot be said to be null and void as the suit was decided by the Assistant Collector Ist Grade under Section 77 of the Tenancy Act for the recovery of rent and no question as to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was decided. The relationship between the plaintiff and defendant of landlord and tenant has rather been admitted by the plaintiff himself. The relationship between the plaintiff and defendant of landlord and tenant has rather been admitted by the plaintiff himself. It is the admitted case of the plaintiff that he has been cultivating the land of which defendant and his brothers became owner vide registered sale deed dated 18.7.1958. Though, according to plaintiff, he has never paid any rent to the defendant. Even as per the entries recorded in the jamabandies for the year 1971-72 (Ex.D1) and 1976-77 (Ex.D2) and Khasra Girdawari, the plaintiff has been shown to be a tenant on payment of 1/3rd batai. The plaintiff has placed on record the order of the Assistant Collector Ist Grade dated 24.1.1974 (Ex.P3) disposing of the application moved by the defendant for payment of rent from Kharif 1970 to Kharif 1972. The said application was, of course, decided against the defendant, as he was not able to produce any evidence. The order dated 1.10.1975 (Ex.P4) has also been placed on record vide which the application for recovery of rent from Rabi-1972 and Kharif-1973 was decided. In the said proceedings, the plaintiff disputed the title of the defendant mainly, on the ground that a criminal case was pending against him as registered sale deed was executed by one Kishan Singh by impersonating himself as Sunder Singh, the original owner of the suit property. The application was dismissed without going into any evidence on record. Thereafter, the defendant filed another application for recovery of rent from Kharif 1976 to Rabi 1979. 11. From the above facts, it is clearly seen that the plaintiff had been denying the relationship of landlord and tenant mainly, on the ground that the sale deed registered in favour of the defendant was bogus and not binding on him. This plea cannot be accepted. The sale deed in favour of the defendant is still valid as till date no document has been placed on record to prove that the said sale deed has been cancelled and, therefore, the plaintiffs plea that his possession over the suit land is open, hostile and to the knowledge of the true owner, is not tenable. The owner i.e. defendant has been claiming the rent from the plaintiff by filing applications before the revenue authorities, therefore, the adverse possession as claimed by the plaintiff, is not open and does not bestow upon him any title of ownership. The owner i.e. defendant has been claiming the rent from the plaintiff by filing applications before the revenue authorities, therefore, the adverse possession as claimed by the plaintiff, is not open and does not bestow upon him any title of ownership. Moreover, the plaintiff while staking his claim of ownership by adverse possession has himself prima facie admitted the ownership of the defendant. In the present case, the onus was on the plaintiff to prove that he has become owner of the suit property. He has not placed on record any document showing that the sale deed in favour of the defendant and his brothers has been cancelled and is no more a valid document. There is no merit in the plea of adverse possession raised by the respondent/plaintiff. The plea of adverse possession can be raised in defence in a suit for recovery of possession, but the relief of declaration that the plaintiff has become absolute owner cannot be claimed keeping in view the provisions of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Under Article 64 of the Limitation Act, a suit for possession of immovable property by a person, who while in possession of the property had been dispossessed from such possession, based on previous possession and not on title, can be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession. According to Article 65 of the Limitation Act, a suit for possession of immovable property based on title can be filed by a person claiming title, within 12 years and the limitation under this Article commences from the date when the possession becomes adverse. A bare reading of the aforesaid two Articles of the Limitation Act, would show that in order to contest a suit for possession filed by a person on the basis of his title, the plea of adverse possession can be taken by a defendant, whose possession is hostile, continuous and open to the knowledge of the true owner. The plea of adverse possession is a defence available only to such a defendant as described in Column No. 3 of Article 65 of the Limitation Act wherein it has been specifically mentioned "when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff". The plea of adverse possession is a defence available only to such a defendant as described in Column No. 3 of Article 65 of the Limitation Act wherein it has been specifically mentioned "when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff". In these circumstances, the natural inference, which flows is that when such a plea of adverse possession is available to a plaintiff, then no declaration with regard to ownership can be sought by the defendant on the basis of his title. In this regard, the following observations made by the learned single Judge of this Court in Bhim Singhs case (supra) would be quite useful : "15. Therefore, it must follow that the intention behind Article 65 is clear and unambiguous i.e. not to provide any period of limitation for a suit for possession by a plaintiff on the basis of title, however, at the same time by providing a defence to a defendant of adverse possession. The defendant in such a defence would have to prove the aforesaid factum of adverse possession and, naturally the onus of proving the aforesaid defence would be upon the defendant. The reason behind the intention of the Legislature is very clear. If a defendant is able to establish his adverse possession, then the very title of the plaintiff to the property is extinguished. But for the aforesaid defence of adverse possession, a plaintiff has no restriction of limitation to seek possession of immovable property on the basis of his title." The contention of the plaintiff that his adverse possession has ripened into title of ownership, as he has been in possession of the suit land for the last more than 12 years and the possession is open, hostile and conspicuous to the original owner, does not appear to be correct as the defendant had already filed a suit for recovery against the plaintiff. Once the plaintiff claims himself to be a tenant, he cannot substantiate his claim for adverse possession. 12. Accordingly, the findings of both the Courts below that plaintiff has become owner in possession, cannot be sustained. The respondent/plaintiff has miserably failed to prove that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, rather it is well proved from the revenue record that plaintiff was a tenant under the defendant on payment of 1/3rd batai. 12. Accordingly, the findings of both the Courts below that plaintiff has become owner in possession, cannot be sustained. The respondent/plaintiff has miserably failed to prove that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, rather it is well proved from the revenue record that plaintiff was a tenant under the defendant on payment of 1/3rd batai. Since the plaintiff did not pay batai for a certain period, the defendant had to file a suit for recovery of batai. 13. Resultantly, the appeal filed by the appellant/defendant is accepted, the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below are set aside and suit of the plaintiff for declaration to the effect that he is owner in possession of the agricultural land measuring 14 kanals-18 marlas situated in village Majra, Tehsil Fatehabad, District Hisar is dismissed. However, it is worth mentioning that as per appellant/defendants own admission to the effect that respondent/plaintiff is a gair marusi tenant under him on payment of 1/3 rd batai, the respondent shall only be dispossessed by following the due process of law. Appeal allowed.