Honble SHARMA, J.–Rajendra Sahu, an auto-rikshaw driver, did not know what the `unborn next moment held for him. While he was sitting on his auto-riksha at autostand, his assassin came in a Maruti car, called him near the car and opened fire at him. Injured Rajendra Sahu was removed to the Hospital where he breathed last. Sudhir Kumar Jain, appellant herein, along with co-accused Sahilendra Gautam, was indicted for having committed murder of Rajendra Sahu before the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1 Kota, who vide judgment dated November 25, 2003, while acquitting co-accused, convicted and sentenced the appellant as under:- Under Section 302 IPC : To suffer imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5000/-, in default to further suffer simple imprisonment for three months. Under Section 3/25 Arms Act : To suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default to further suffer simple imprisonment for one month. The substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. (2). The prosecution case is woven like this:- Raghunath Suman (Pw.22) ASI Police Station Dadabari Kota on April 17, 2003 recorded Parcha Bayan (Ex.P-22) of injured Rajendra Sahu (since deceased) at MBS Hospital Kota wherein he stated that at around 9.45 AM on the said day he came to the auto-stand near Baheti Hospital in his autoriksha bearing No.RJ-20P/5505. Around 12 Noon while he was sitting on his auto-riksha he saw one Maruti 800 bearing No.RJ-06C-3432 coming from the side of Talwandi and got halted in front of auto-stand. Three persons were sitting inside the car. Out of them one person half opened the glass of left front side gate of the car and signaled him to come nearer to the car. He then got down of auto-riksha and went near the car. In the meanwhile the person, who was sitting on the left front side of the car armed with Desi Katta (country made pistol), opened fire at him as a result of which he received injuries just above his navel and blood started oozing out. The persons sitting in Maruti car drove the car towards aerodrome. Iqbal then took him to the hospital in auto-riksha. On that parcha bayan a case under Section 307/34 IPC was registered and investigation commenced. Statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were recorded. During the course of investigation Rajendra Sahu succumbed to his injuries and Section 302 IPC was added. Iqbal then took him to the hospital in auto-riksha. On that parcha bayan a case under Section 307/34 IPC was registered and investigation commenced. Statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were recorded. During the course of investigation Rajendra Sahu succumbed to his injuries and Section 302 IPC was added. Necessary memos were drawn, the accused were arrested and on completion of investigation charge sheet was filed. In due course the case came up for trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1 Kota. Charges under Sections 302, 302/34 IPC and 3/25 Arms Act were framed. The accused denied the charges and claimed trial. The prosecution in support of its case examined as many as 31 witnesses and got exhibited the documents. In the explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused claimed innocence. No witness in defence was however examined. Learned trial Judge on hearing final submissions convicted and sentenced the appellant as indicated herein above. (3). We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned public prosecutor and with their assistance scrutinised the material on record. (4). Rajendra Sahu vide Postmortem Report(Ex.P9) received following ante mortem injuries:- 1. Multiple punctured wound (wounds of entering of fire arms) of size 3/4 x 1/2 cm in the area 18cm x 8cm on the lower part of Rt. side of chest over the upper part of abdomen Rt. side with blackening 2. Stitched wound 20cm longer on the left preandi region abdomen. 3. Stitched wound 9cm longer Rt. flate of abdomen. In the opinion of Dr. R.K. Sharma (Pw.26) the cause of death was shock as a result of firearm injuries to intestine at liver sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. (5). Shimbhu Dayal (Pw.2), Iqbal (Pw.4), Dilip Kumar (Pw.9) and Farookh Mohammad (Pw.17) did not support the prosecution case and they were declared hostile. According to them they did not see the incident and reached near the injured after the incident occurred. (6). Suresh Kumar (Pw.18) however deposed that on the date of incident he was posted as Constable in Police Station Chechat. On that day around 10 AM when he came out of police station for the purpose of delivering the `Dak and Tameels (post and summons/ notices duly served) at Kota, he met Sudhir Jain Contractor, who was going to Kota in white Maruti Car. On that day around 10 AM when he came out of police station for the purpose of delivering the `Dak and Tameels (post and summons/ notices duly served) at Kota, he met Sudhir Jain Contractor, who was going to Kota in white Maruti Car. Suresh Kumar got lift in the car and sat on the rear seat. At Bus-stand Chechat one Shailendra Gautam occupied the driver seat and Sudhir was made to sit on the left side near the driver seat. Around 12 Noon the car reached near Baheti Hospital Kota. Suresh Kumar then got down of the car and took few steps ahead. In the meanwhile Sudhir signaled one auto-riksha driver to come nearer the car. In the meanwhile gun was fired. Suresh Kumar could only see the car in which he came from Chechat to Kota. He could not see as to who sustained firearm injury. He then went to Juvenile Court and came back to Chechat in the evening. (7). Raghunath Suman (Pw.22) who was posted as ASI in the Police Station Dadabari, deposed that on receiving information about the incident, he reached to MBS hospital around 12.40 PM and found Rajendra lying on Bed No.9 in Emergency Ward. He was in a fit state of mind to give the statement. His Parcha Bayan (Ex.P-22) was recorded on which he put his signatures. (8). Dr.Renu Raonka (Pw.28) was posted as Vice Principal in the MBS Hospital on April 17, 2003. In her deposition she stated that on that day around 12.30 PM she attended injured Rajendra. She produced Bed-head ticket (Ex.P-28) and operation notes (Ex.P-29) of Rajendra. IN her cross examination she stated that at 12.30 PM when she examined the injured his blood pressure was 150/70 and pulse was ticking 104 times per minute. His condition was stable. He was fully conscious and talking. She deposed thus:- ^^ejht gksk esa Fkk iw.kZ gksk esa Fkk ckrphr dj jgk FkkA** (Patient was conscious, fully conscious and was talking). (9). Samiullah Investigating Officer (Pw.29) arrested appellant Sudhir Jain on April 17, 2003 at 5.50 PM vide arrest memo (Ex.P- 14). Sudhir Jain volunteered that he had concealed 12 bore Desikatta under a stone in Balakund Nala (drain). This information was recorded by IO in the memo (Ex.P- 31) and pursuant to the information Desi-katta got recovered vide recovery memo (Ex.P-15). (10). Sudhir Jain volunteered that he had concealed 12 bore Desikatta under a stone in Balakund Nala (drain). This information was recorded by IO in the memo (Ex.P- 31) and pursuant to the information Desi-katta got recovered vide recovery memo (Ex.P-15). (10). Bishan Chand (Pw.25) was posted as Armour in Police Line. On July 3, 2003 he examined Deshikatta recovered at the instance of Sudhir Jain and submitted his report (Ex.P-26). In his deposition Bishan Chand stated thus:- ^^oDr fujh{k.k dV~Vk dk fVªxj ,Dku [kjkc gksus ls ;g pyus ;ksX; ugha FkkA fVªxj ,Dku esa [kjkch Qk;j gksus ds ckn Hkh vk ldrh gSA** (At the time of inspection trigger action of Katta was defective and therefore it could not be fired. The defect in trigger action could also be caused after the fire.) (11). Samiullah IO (Pw.29) found Maruti Car No.RJ-06C-3432 standing in front of the house of Niranjan Jain (father of appellant Sudhir Jain) and recovered it vide recovery memo Ex.P- 12. A look at Ex.P-12 demonstrates that glass of left front door of the car was completely shattered. There was a fresh dent inside the left front door and left indicator was broken. (12). We also notice that in the explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. appellant denied all the allegations and only stated that he was falsely implicated. (13). Factual situation emerges from the material on record may be summarized thus:- (i) From the testimony of Suresh Kumar Constable (Pw.18) it is established that Sudhir Jain was sitting on the left side of car near the driver seat. The car got halted near the auto-stand at 12 Noon and Sudhir Jain signaled one auto-riksha driver to come nearer the car. In the meanwhile gun was fired. (ii) Rajendra Sahu, auto-riksha driver, received gunshot injuries at auto-stand and was admitted to MBS Hospital Kota. Raghunath Suman ASI (Pw.22) recorded Parcha Bayan of Rajendra Sahu wherein he stated that one Maruti car bearing No.RJ- 06C- 3432 got halted near auto-stand at 12 Noon. Three persons were sitting in the car, out of them one person sitting on the left front side of the car armed with Desi-katta half opened the glass and signaled him to come nearer the car. Three persons were sitting in the car, out of them one person sitting on the left front side of the car armed with Desi-katta half opened the glass and signaled him to come nearer the car. He then got down of auto-riksha and as soon as he reached near the car, the person opened fire at him as a result of which he sustained firearm injuries just above his navel. (iii) Dr. Renu Raonka (Pw.28) deposed that around 12.30 PM when she attended injured Rajendra Sahu, he was fully conscious and talking. (iv) Desikatta allegedly used in commission of offence got recovered at the instance of appellant Sudhir Jain. (v) According to Bishan Chand Armour (Pw.25) the defect in trigger action of Katta could be caused after fire. (vi) Maruti Car bearing No.RJ-06C-3432 found standing in front of the house of Niranjan Jain (father of appellant Sudhir Jain). Glass of left front door of the car was completely shattered. There was a fresh dent inside the left front door and left indicator was broken. (vii) District Magistrate Kota vide order dated July 10, 2003 (Ex.P-33) granted sanction to prosecute appellant Sudhir Jain under Section 3/25 Arms Act. (14). Learned counsel for the appellant assailed the impugned finding from various angles and urged as under:- (i) Alleged eye witnesses did not support the prosecution case. (ii) Recovery of 12-bore gun could not be made basis for conviction of appellant since the said gun was not found in working condition by Armour Bishan Chand (Pw.25). Recovery motbirs also did not support the prosecution case. (iii) The prosecution failed to prove motive of the appellant to commit the crime. (iv) Evidence of Suresh Kumar (Pw.18) could not be relied upon for convicting the appellant since he was not acquainted with the deceased. His statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded after much delay i.e. on May 4, 2003. (v) Document Ex.P-33 was not in accordance with law therefore conviction under Section 3/25 Arms Act cannot be sustained. (vi) The police failed to find out original owner of the white Maruti car, thus appellant was implicated falsely. (vii) Parcha Bayan (Ex.P-22) has wrongly been relied upon for convicting the appellant, since immediately after being shot by unknown and unidentified person the appellant was not in senses. Thus parcha bayan appears to be false, forged and concocted document. (15). (vi) The police failed to find out original owner of the white Maruti car, thus appellant was implicated falsely. (vii) Parcha Bayan (Ex.P-22) has wrongly been relied upon for convicting the appellant, since immediately after being shot by unknown and unidentified person the appellant was not in senses. Thus parcha bayan appears to be false, forged and concocted document. (15). The first contention of learned counsel for the appellant was that alleged dying declaration of Rajendra Sahu was recorded under mysterious circumstances, which create doubt about its genuineness. Learned counsel took us through the cross examination of Raghunath Suman (Pw.22) to show that fitness certificate was not obtained from the Doctor by him before recording Parcha Bayan of Rajendra Sahu. This contention is devoid of merit in view of testimony of Dr.Renu Raonka (Pw.28), who categorically stated in her cross examination that at 12.30 PM when she attended the injured Rajendra Sahu his blood pressure was 150/70 and pulse was ticking 104 times per minute. His condition was stable, he was fully conscious and talking. In Deepak Chikna vs. State of Rajasthan [2007(4) WLC (Raj.) 714] and Tej Singh vs. State of Rajasthan [2007(2) Cr.L.R. (Raj.)1018] = (2006(4) RLW 2593) on which reliance was placed by learned counsel, the dying declarations were recorded under mysterious circumstances. In Deepak Chikna (supra) the wife of deceased admitted that dying declaration was not signed by the deceased but in fact she in her own handwriting forged the signature of the deceased. In the instant case we see no reason to disbelieve the statement of Raghunath Suman ASI (Pw.22) and Dr.Renu Raonka (Pw.28). Having closely scrutinised the dying declaration Rajendra Sahu we find that it was not the result of prompting, tutoring or imagination. We do not see any infirmity in it. Raghunath Suman had no enmity with the appellant. Had he intended to implicate the appellant falsely, he could have incorporated the name of appellant in the Parcha-Bayan. (16). Learned counsel for the appellant contended that recovery of desi katta at the instance of appellant was planted by the police therefore it could not have been relied upon. We do not see any substance in this contention also. Had he intended to implicate the appellant falsely, he could have incorporated the name of appellant in the Parcha-Bayan. (16). Learned counsel for the appellant contended that recovery of desi katta at the instance of appellant was planted by the police therefore it could not have been relied upon. We do not see any substance in this contention also. After the appellant volunteered information about the weapon of appellant, the IO got it recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and pursuant to the information Desi-katta, concealed by the appellant under a stone in the drain, got recovered. (17). Section 27 of Evidence Act lays down an exception to the rule that a confession made by an accused person whilst he is in custody must be excluded from evidence and permits the admission of such a confession under the conditions prescribed by it. The law in India on the subject dealt with in Section 27 is wider than the common law in England. It appears from the provisions of Section 27 that it has been taken bodily from the English law. In both the laws there is a greater solicitude for a person who makes a statement at a stage when the danger in which he stands has not been brought home to him then for one who knows of the danger. In English Law, the caution gives him a necessary warning and in India the fact of his being in custody of a police officer serves the purpose. (18). Section 27 seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given some guarantee is afforded thereby than the information was true and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence. It is not correct to presume that information given by the accused under Section 27 is compelled testimony, so as to attract Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. (19). In Prakash Chand vs. State (Delhi Admn.) [ AIR 1979 SC 400 ] the Apex Court held that the evidence of circumstance simpliciter that an accused led a police officer and pointed out the place where weapon was found hidden, would be admissible as conduct, under Section 8, irrespective of whether any statement made by him contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27. (20). (20). In Rammi vs. State of MP (1999)8 SCC 649 , the Apex Court held thus:- (Paras 11&12) "Regarding the recovery of weapons, the prosecution could utilise statements attributed to the accused on the basis of which recovery of certain weapons was effected. Section 27 of the Evidence Act permits so much of information which lead to the discovery of a fact to be admitted in evidence. Here the fact discovered by the police was that the accused had hidden the blood stained weapons. In that sphere what could have been admitted in evidence is only that part of the information which the accused had furnished to the police officer and which led to the recovery of the weapons." "True, such information is admissible in evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, but admissibility alone would not render the evidence, pertaining to the above information, reliable. While testing the reliability of such evidence the Court has to see whether it was voluntarily stated by the accused." (21). In Himachal Pradesh Administration vs. Om Prakash (1972)1 SCC 249 the Apex Court interpreted Section 27 of Evidence Act thus:- "A fact discovered within the meaning of Section 27 must refer to a material fact to which the information directly relates. In order to render the information admissible the fact discovered must be relevant and must have been such that it constitutes the information through which the discovery was made. What should be discovered is the material fact and the information that is admissible is that which has caused that discovery so as to connect the information and the fact with each other as the `cause and effect that information which does not distinctly connect with the fact discovered or that portion of the information which merely explains the material thing discovered is not admissible under Section 27 and cannot be proved. The concealment of the fact which is not known to the police is what is discovered by the information and lends assurance that the information was true. No witness with whom some material fact, such as the weapon of murder, stolen property or other incriminating article is not hidden, sold or kept and which is unknown to the police can be said to be discovered as a consequence of the information furnished by the accused. No witness with whom some material fact, such as the weapon of murder, stolen property or other incriminating article is not hidden, sold or kept and which is unknown to the police can be said to be discovered as a consequence of the information furnished by the accused. What makes the information leading to the discovery of the witness admissible is the discovery from him of the thing sold to him or hidden or kept with him which the police did not know until the information was furnished to them by the accused." (22). In Ghanshyam Das vs. State of Assam (2005) 13 SCC 387 the Supreme Court held that evidence regarding pointing the place where weapon was thrown and its recovery can be looked into to throw light on the conduct of accused under Section 8. It was observed as under:- (Para 5) "Another incriminating circumstance which corroborates the case of the prosecution is that the appellant led the IO PW.12 to Kharbhanga riverside and pointed out the place where he had thrown away the Khukri. According to the evidence of PW.12 the IO and PW.6, the Khukri was recovered from the river with the help of a diver. Though both the Courts have eschewed this circumstance from consideration on the ground that no information was recorded by PW.12 the IO so as to attract Section 27 of the Evidence Act, we are of the view that the evidence of PW.12 and PW.6 to the effect that the accused led them to the spot and pointed out the place where the Khukri was thrown, which fact stands confirmed by its recovery, can be looked into to throw light on the conduct of the accused under Section 8 of the Evidence Act." (23). In the instant case Samiullah (Pw.29) recovered Desi-katta from the place pointed out by the appellant in his disclosure statement. The appellant led Samiullah to the spot and got desikatta recovered. This incriminating circumstance corroborated the case of the prosecution. (24). Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that Desi-katta allegedly recovered at the instance of appellant was defective and could not have been used. We have been taken through the Armour report (Ex.P-37). The Armour in his report (Ex.P-37) stated that at the time of inspection of the gun, trigger- action of the gun was found defective. (24). Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that Desi-katta allegedly recovered at the instance of appellant was defective and could not have been used. We have been taken through the Armour report (Ex.P-37). The Armour in his report (Ex.P-37) stated that at the time of inspection of the gun, trigger- action of the gun was found defective. This submission of learned counsel has no legs to stand. Desi-katta was sent to FSL for examination. A perusal of the FSL report (Ex.P-37) shows thus:- "DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES Packet `A contained two lead pellets. Packet `B contained nineteen lead pellets. Packet `C contained one 12-bore country made pistol, marked W/1. Note: Packets marked `A, `B and `C were first received and examined in Serology Division. RESULT OF ANALYSIS 1. One 12-bore country made pistol (W/1) from packet `C is not a serviceable firearm in the present condition due to some defect in its mechanism. However, after repair it can be made serviceable. 2. The examination of the barrel residue indicates that submitted 12-bore country made pistol (W/1) had been fired. However, the definite time of its last fire could not be ascertained. 3. Twenty one lead pellets from packets `A & `B are normally used in 12-bore ammuniton. These pellets could have fired from 12-bore country made pistol (W/1) from packet `C." (25). Learned counsel for the appellant failed to notice that Armour Bishan Chand (Pw.25) in his deposition also stated that the defect in trigger action could be caused after the fire. Even the FSL report clearly shows that the examination of the barrel residue indicated that 12-bore country made pistol (W/1) had been fired. Further it was opined that Twenty one lead pellets, which were removed from the body of deceased, could have fired from 12- bore country made pistol (W/1) which was recovered at the instance of the appellant. (26). Learned counsel next urged that the prosecution could not establish motive of appellant behind the crime. It is well settled that failure to bring on record any evidence regarding motive does not weaken the prosecution case. In a similar situation their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Meharban vs. State of MP, (1996)10 SCC 615 indicated thus:- (Para 9) "We may deal with yet another submission of Shri Bachawat which relates to the failure of the prosecution to bring on record any motive for the assaults. In a similar situation their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Meharban vs. State of MP, (1996)10 SCC 615 indicated thus:- (Para 9) "We may deal with yet another submission of Shri Bachawat which relates to the failure of the prosecution to bring on record any motive for the assaults. There are two answers to this submission. The first is that the motive lies locked in the heart of a man, and so, it becomes difficult to know the same. Failure to bring on record any evidence regarding motive does not, however, weaken a prosecution case, though existence of the same may strenthen the same. Secondly, there is also nothing on record to show as to why the dying man would have falsely implicated the appellants. Natural presumption is that a dying man does not lie, if there be no motive for the same. If false implication would have been the motivation, Ranjit Singh would have involved accused Jagannath also, with whom he had some dispute; but he was not named as one of his assailants." (27). The next contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that even if the prosecution case is taken as it is, it can be noticed that Desikatta went off due to rash and negligent handling by the appellant and that is why the glass of the car was shattered, indicator was broken and there was a dent inside the door of the car. According to learned counsel charge against appellant does not travel beyond Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. Reliance is placed on Janardan Prasad vs. State of Rajasthan (1977 Cri.L.J.68) = (1976 RLW 410). (28). Case of Janardan Prasad (supra) is distinguishable. In that case the incident occurred at the shop at 12 Noon when Janardan Prasad Sub- Inspector of Police, Mool Chand (deceased) and K.P.Mehta assembled at the shop of Gopi Chand and all of them commenced taking drinks. Janardan Prasad had a revolver with him in a leather case. He took out the revolver from the leather case, loaded it with cartridges and commenced cleaning it. Soon thereafter, all of a sudden, a roar of gun fire was heard and Mool Chand (deceased) who was sitting in front of Janardan Prasad, fell down on the ground and died instantaneously on account of bullet injury received on the chest from the revolver. Soon thereafter, all of a sudden, a roar of gun fire was heard and Mool Chand (deceased) who was sitting in front of Janardan Prasad, fell down on the ground and died instantaneously on account of bullet injury received on the chest from the revolver. The High Court having considered the entire material on record indicated thus:- (Para 16) "... All these facts reasonably lead to the inference that the testimony of Pw.9 and Pw.10 to the effect that at the time of explosion, the revolver Ex.1 was lying in the lap of the appellant and the testimony of Pw.10 that at the relevant time, the appellant was cleaning the revolver, appear to us to be trustworthy. In the circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the revolver went of due to rash and negligent handling of the loaded revolver by the appellant. We would, accordingly, alter the conviction of the appellant from that under Section 302 IPC to one under Section 304-A IPC." (29). The facts of the instant case however do not show that country made pistol went off due to its rash and negligent handling by the appellant. The appellant was armed with unlicenced countrymade pistol. He got the Maruti car halted at autostand, pushed down half glass of left door of the car, signaled Rajendra Sahu to come nearer to the car and as soon as Rajendra Sahu reached near the car the appellant opened fire at him. Dying declaration of Rajendra Sahu gets corroboration from the testimony of Suresh Kumar Constable. Delayed examination of Suresh Kumar has not adversely affect the prosecution case. (30). The prosecution thus is able to establish following circumstances against the appellant:- (i) From the testimony of Suresh Kumar Constable (Pw.18) it is established that Sudhir Jain was sitting on the left side of car near the driver seat. The car got halted near the auto-stand at 12 Noon and Sudhir Jain called one auto-riksha driver and thereafter gun was fired. (ii) Rajendra Sahu, auto-riksha driver, received gunshot injuries at auto-stand and was admitted to MBS Hospital Kota. (iii) Raghunath Suman ASI (Pw.22) recorded Parcha Bayan of Rajendra Sahu wherein he (without naming the appellant) stated that one Maruti car bearing No.RJ-06C-3432 got halted near auto- stand at 12 Noon. (ii) Rajendra Sahu, auto-riksha driver, received gunshot injuries at auto-stand and was admitted to MBS Hospital Kota. (iii) Raghunath Suman ASI (Pw.22) recorded Parcha Bayan of Rajendra Sahu wherein he (without naming the appellant) stated that one Maruti car bearing No.RJ-06C-3432 got halted near auto- stand at 12 Noon. Three persons were sitting in the car, out of them one person sitting on the left front side of the car having Desi-katta half opened the glass and called him. He got down of auto-riksha and as soon as he reached near the car, the person opened fire at him. (iii) Dr. Renu Raonka (Pw.28) deposed that around 12.30 PM when she attended injured Rajendra Sahu, he was fully conscious and talking. (iv) Desikatta allegedly used in commission of offence got recovered at the instance of appellant. (v) According to Bishan Chand Armour (Pw.25) the defect in trigger action of Katta could also be caused after fire. (vi) Maruti Car bearing No.RJ-06C-3432 found standing in front of the house of Niranjan Jain (father of appellant Sudhir Jain). Left door glass of front side of car was completely shattered. There was a fresh dent inside the left front door and left indicator was broken. (vii) After the prosecution discharged initial burden it was for the appellant as per Section 106 of the Evidence Act to come forward with a probable defence but the appellant only stated in his explanation under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he was falsely implicated in the case. (viii) District Magistrate Kota vide order dated July 10, 2003 (Ex.P-33) granted sanction to prosecute appellant Sudhir Jain under Section 3/25 Arms Act. (ix) As per FSL report (Ex.P-37) the pistol recovered at the instance of appellant had been fired and the 21 pellets recovered from the body of deceased could be fired from the said pistol. (31). We cannot approach the action of Samiullah, Investigating Officer (Pw.29) and Raghunath Suman (Pw.22) with initial distrust. The investigating officer had no enmity with the appellant. Even if independent person fails to support the recovery of incriminating articles at the instance of appellant, it cannot be presumed that recovery of firearm at the instance of appellant is untrustworthy. (31). We cannot approach the action of Samiullah, Investigating Officer (Pw.29) and Raghunath Suman (Pw.22) with initial distrust. The investigating officer had no enmity with the appellant. Even if independent person fails to support the recovery of incriminating articles at the instance of appellant, it cannot be presumed that recovery of firearm at the instance of appellant is untrustworthy. The Supreme Court in State Govt.of NCT Delhi vs. Sunil (2001) 1 SCC 652 = (RLW 2001 (1) SC 3) indicated in para 21 thus:- "It is for the accused, through cross examination of witnesses or through any other materials, to show that the evidence of the police officer is either unreliable or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a particular case. If the Court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness of such records of the police the Court could certainly take into account the fact that no other independent person was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions." (32). From the facts established we find that the circumstantial evidence in the instant case does not fall short of the required standard of proof. The circumstances so established are consistent only with the guilt of appellant and inconsistent with his innocence. All the circumstances exclude with certainty the possibility of guilt of any person other than the appellant. (33). For these reasons, we we find no merit in the appeal and it accordingly stands dismissed. Conviction and sentence of appellant under Section 302 IPC and 3/25 Arms Act are maintained.