JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—Heard Sri Rahul Sahai, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sanjay Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondent No. 2. 2. By this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 13.2.2008, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ballia holding the revision filed by the respondents against the order dated 27.9.2007 of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation as maintainable. 3. Brief facts of the case necessary to be noted for deciding the issue raised in the writ petition are; an objection under Section 9-B of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 was filed by the respondent No. 2 praying that plot No. 603/1 area 40 Are be kept out of consolidation after condoning the delay in filing the objection. The Consolidation Officer passed an order dated 18.1.2005 condoning the delay in filing the objection directing plot No. 603/1 area 40 Are be kept out of consolidation. Against the order passed by the Consolidation Officer, an appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Settlement Officer Consolidation. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation by order dated 27.9.2007 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 18.1.2005 and remanded the matter to the Consolidation Officer to pass a fresh order after hearing both the parties. Against the order dated 27.9.2007 of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation, the respondent No. 2 filed revision No. 674 under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. An objection was raised by the petitioners who were respondents in the revision that the revision having been filed against the remand order, is not maintainable and the question of maintainability of the revision be decided first after hearing the parties. The Deputy Director of Consolidation heard the parties on the question of maintainability of revision and by the impugned order dated 13.2.2008 held that the revision is maintainable, which has been challenged in the present writ petition. 4. Sri Rahul Sahai, learned Counsel for the petitioners challenging the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation contended that the order of Settlement Officer, Consolidation being only a remand order, the revision was not maintainable. He submits that remand order is an interlocutory order and revision against an interlocutory order is expressly excluded under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. He submits that remand order is an interlocutory order and revision against an interlocutory order is expressly excluded under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment in the cases of Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, AIR 1981 SC 707 ; Ajab Singh and others v. Jt. Director of Consolidation and others, 1996 R.D. 104; Rajbir v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1999 (90) R.D. 313; Rajit Ram Singh and others v. Mahadev Singh and others, 2002 (93) R.D. 224. 5. Sri Sanjay Singh, learned Counsel for the contesting respondents refuting the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioners, contended that appeal having been finally allowed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation after setting aside the order of the Consolidation Officer, the order of the appellate Court is not an interlocutory order and the revision was fully maintainable. He further submits that according to Section 48 Explanation (3), the Deputy Director of Consolidation has very wide power and the revision is fully maintainable. 6. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 7. The only issue which has arisen for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether against an order of Settlement Officer, Consolidation, passed in appeal under Section 11 of the Act, remanding the case to the Consolidation Officer, a revision is maintainable under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. It is useful to look into the provisions of Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 before proceeding further to examine the issue. Section 48 of the Act empowers the Director of Consolidation to examine the record of any case decided or proceeding taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any order. By U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act No. 20 of 1982, the words ‘other than interlocutory order’ has been added excluding the correctness or otherwise of an interlocutory order. An Explanation (2) was also added by same U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act No. 20 of 1982 explaining the expression ‘interlocutory order’. Section 48 as stood after the above amendment is as follows : “48. An Explanation (2) was also added by same U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act No. 20 of 1982 explaining the expression ‘interlocutory order’. Section 48 as stood after the above amendment is as follows : “48. Revision and reference.—(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than interlocutory order passed by such authority in the case of proceedings and may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case of proceedings as he thinks fit. (2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub-section (3). (3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1). Explanation.(1)—For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officers, Consolidation and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. Explanation.(2)—For the purposes of this section, the expression ‘interlocutory order’ in relation to a case or proceedings, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. Explanation. (3)—For the purposes of this section to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to examine any finding, whether of fact or law, recorded by any subordinate authority, and also includes the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence.” 8. A perusal of Section 48 thus, indicate that the power of revision can be exercised with regard to an order passed by any subordinate authority of any case decided or proceedings taken other than interlocutory order. The expression ‘interlocutory order’ has been explained in Explanation (2) which means in relation to a case or proceedings such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. 9. The expression ‘interlocutory order’ has been explained in Explanation (2) which means in relation to a case or proceedings such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. 9. The question to be answered thus, is as to whether an order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation allowing the appeal after setting aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and remanding the matter is an ‘interlocutory order’ and secondly as to whether against such interlocutory order, the revision is barred. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgement of Kshitish Chandra Bose (supra) for the proposition that the order of remand is an interlocutory order. In the above case, the suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed by the trial Court. The first appeal was filed which Court affirmed the order of the trial Court. Second appeal was filed before the High Court in which second appeal, the High Court by judgment dated 17.2.1967 remanded the case to the trial Court for decision on the question of title. After remand, suit was dismissed. An appeal was filed before the High Court and High Court dismissed the appeal by judgment dated 13.9.2007 thereafter the appeal was filed before the Apex Court. It was contended that the plaintiff did not come up in the appeal against the first judgment of the High Court because the order passed by the High Court was not a final order but was in the nature of interlocutory order. The Apex Court in paragraph 6 laid down that it was open for the appellant to assail even the first judgment of the High Court. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment are being quoted herein below : “5. Secondly, it was contended that even so the finding of the High Court on the question of adverse possession was given without at all considering the materials and evidence on the basis of which the two posts had concurrently found that the plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession. Secondly, it was contended that even so the finding of the High Court on the question of adverse possession was given without at all considering the materials and evidence on the basis of which the two posts had concurrently found that the plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession. It is contended that the plaintiff did not come up in appeal before this Court against the impugned judgment of the High Court obviously because the order passed by the High Court was not a final one but was in the nature of an interlocutory order as the case had been remanded to the Additional Judicial Commissioner and if the revisional Court had affirmed the finding of the trial Court, no question of filing a further appeal to the High Court could have arisen. Thus, the appellant could not be debarred from challenging the validity of the first judgment of the High Court even after the second judgment by the High Court was passed in appeal against the order of remand. In support of this contention, the Counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Satyadhavan Ghosal v. Shiksha Mitra, Deorajin Debi, (1960) 3 SCR 590 : ( AIR 1960 SC 941 ) where under similar circumstances this Court observed as follows : “In our opinion the order of remand was an interlocutory judgment which did not terminate the proceedings and so the correctness thereof can be challenged in an appeal from the final order.” In coming to this decision this Court relied on an earlier decision in the case of Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria and vice versa, 1953 SCR 136 : ( AIR 1953 SC 23 ) where the same view was taken. 6. Mr. Sinha appearing for the respondent was unable to cite any authority of this Court taking a contrary view or overriding the decisions referred to above. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that it is open to the appellant to assail even the first judgment of the High Court and if we hold “that this judgment was legally erroneous then all the subsequent proceedings, namely, the order of remand, the order passed after remand, the appeal and the second judgment given by the High Court in appeal against the order or remand would become non est." 10. The proposition laid down in the above case was thus that even if against the first judgment passed by the High Court, appeal was not taken to the Supreme Court since it was a remand order, in appeal against the latter judgment of the High Court, the correctness of the first order of the High Court can be looked into. The Apex Court also referred to the earlier judgment of the High Court as an interlocutory order. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in the said case. It is however, relevant to note that the question as to whether against the first judgment i.e. the remand order passed by the High Court, the appeal was maintainable to the Supreme Court in the above case was not there in the said case nor it was held that against an interlocutory order appeal did not lie. 11. The judgment on which much emphasis was laid by learned Counsel for the petitioners is the case of Ajab Singh (supra). The other cases relied by learned Counsel for the petitioners i.e. Rajbir v. Dy. Director of Consolidation (supra), Rajit Ram Singh and others v. Mahadev Singh and others, also take the same view that the remand order by Settlement Officer, Consolidation being an interlocutory order, the revision shall not lie under Section 48 of the Act. 12. The judgment in the case of Ajab Singh (supra) is required to be noted in some detail. An objection was filed by the petitioner under Section 9-A (2) of the Act claiming succession to one Smt. Nihali on the basis of the Will. Another objection was filed by another set. The Consolidation Officer by order dated 18.9.1992 rejected the objection of the petitioner. Appeal was filed before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. Settlement Officer, Consolidation allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and remanded the matter to the Consolidation Officer with a view to give an opportunity to the petitioner to prove execution and attestation of the Will. A revision was filed before the Deputy Director of Consolidation which was allowed and the order of the Consolidation Officer was restored. The writ petition was filed challenging the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. One of the submissions raised before the High Court was that order of remand being interlocutory order, the revision was not maintainable. A revision was filed before the Deputy Director of Consolidation which was allowed and the order of the Consolidation Officer was restored. The writ petition was filed challenging the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. One of the submissions raised before the High Court was that order of remand being interlocutory order, the revision was not maintainable. This Court laid down following in paragraph 15 : “15. It is next to be seen whether the order of remand passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation was not open to revision it being an ‘interlocutory order’ within the meaning of Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which excludes, in no uncertain terms, an ‘interlocutory order’ from the purview of revisional jurisdiction. In Satya Dhayan Ghosal v. Smt. Deo Rajan Devi, an order of remand has been held to be an interlocutory judgment in that it does not terminate the proceeding and its correctness can be challenged in appeal from the final order. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion the Apex Court has relied on its earlier decision rendered in Keshar Deo Chamaria v. Radhey Kissen Chamaria and the proposition laid down therein has been reiterated in Kshitish Chandra v. Commissioner of Ranchi. In view of these authorities, I am of the considered view that the order of remand passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation was an ‘interlocutory order’ within the meaning of Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and, therefore, not open to revision. Its legality can, however, be examined in revision against the final judgments and orders rendered pursuant to the order of remand and if at that stage the Deputy Director of Consolidation finds that the order of remand was legally erroneous, all subsequent proceedings, viz. the order passed by the Consolidation Officer pursuant to the order of remand as also the appellate order passed in appeal preferred against such order of the Consolidation Officer would become non est. Since the order of remand is neither appealable nor revisable, its correctness is open to examination at subsequent stage when the matter comes up finally in revision. The impugned order is therefore, liable to be quashed on this ground as well. Since the order of remand is neither appealable nor revisable, its correctness is open to examination at subsequent stage when the matter comes up finally in revision. The impugned order is therefore, liable to be quashed on this ground as well. The decision in Bhagwat and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others has no application to the facts of this case and in any case it cannot be accepted in view of the Apex Court’s direct decisions on the point.” 13. This Court relied on three judgments of the Apex Court in coming to the conclusion that revision was not maintainable. The first judgment relied was Satyadhan Ghoshal v. State of U.P., AIR 1960 SC 941 . The apex Court in the aforesaid case had occasion to consider the principle of res judicata as enshrined under Section 11, C.P.C. as well as Section 105, C.P.C. The apex Court laid down that principles of res judicata applies as also between two stages in the same litigation. The Apex Court in the said judgment also laid down that correctness of the remand order can be challenged in an appeal from final order. Following was laid down in paragraph 16 : “16. It is clear therefore that an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order. A special provision was made as regards order of remand and that was to the effect that if an appeal lay and still the appeal was not taken the correctness of the order of remand could not later be challenged in an appeal from the final decision. If however an appeal did not lie from the order of remand the correctness thereof could be challenged by an appeal from the final decision as in the cases of other interlocutory orders. The second sub-section did not apply to the Privy Council and can have no application to appeals to the Supreme Court, one reason being that no appeal lay to the Privy Council or lies to the Supreme Court against an order of remand.” 14. The second sub-section did not apply to the Privy Council and can have no application to appeals to the Supreme Court, one reason being that no appeal lay to the Privy Council or lies to the Supreme Court against an order of remand.” 14. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Keshar Deo Chamaria v. Radhey Kissen Chamaria, AIR 1953 SC 23 was also not a case where the question as to whether against a remand order appeal or revision will lie or not, was considered. The third judgment relied was judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi (supra) which has already been noticed in the preceding paragraph, and was also a case where the proposition was laid down that a remand order which was not challenged earlier can be challenged against the final order. Another judgment which is relevant to be noticed is the case of Preetam Singh v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, (1996) 2 SCC 270 . In the case before the Apex Court against the order of Consolidation Officer an appeal was filed which was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Consolidation Officer for a fresh decision. On remand, the Consolidation Officer allowed the objection. Appeal was dismissed. A revision was filed before the Assistant Director of Consolidation, who also dismissed the revision. A writ petition was filed in this Court in which the question was referred as to whether the finding recorded by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation for remand order was open to correction in revisional jurisdiction since the remand order had not been directly challenged in the revision. The High Court took the view that the remand order of Settlement Officer, Consolidation became final. The apex Court referring to two judgments in the case of Jasraj Inder Singh v. Hemraj Multanchand, (1977) 2 SCC 155 and Sukhrani v. Hari Shanker, (1979) 2 SCC 463 , laid down that the Assistant Director of Consolidation had ample power to examine the correctness of the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation even if remand order of Settlement Officer, Consolidation have not been specifically put to challenge in separate and independent proceedings. Following was laid down in paragraph 6 : “When the matter was in revision before the Assistant Director (Consolidation), he had to the entire matter before him and his jurisdiction was unfettered. Following was laid down in paragraph 6 : “When the matter was in revision before the Assistant Director (Consolidation), he had to the entire matter before him and his jurisdiction was unfettered. While in seisin of the matter in his revision a jurisdiction, he was in complete control and in position to test the correctness of the order made by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) effecting remand. In other words, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction the Assistant Director (Consolidation) could examine the finding recorded by the Settlement Officer as to the abandonment of the land in dispute by those tenants who had been recorded at the crucial time in the Khasra of 1359 Fasli. That power as a superior Court the Assistant Director (Consolidation) had, even if the remand order of the Settlement Officer had not been specifically put to challenge in separate and independent proceedings. It is noteworthy that the Court of the Assistant Director (Consolidation) is a Court or revisional jurisdiction otherwise having suo motu power to correct any order of the subordinate officer. In this situation the Assistant Director (Consolidation) should not have felt fettered in doing complete justice between the parties when the entire matter was before him. The war of legalistics fought in the High Court was of no material benefit to the appellants. A decision on merit covering the entire controversy was due from the Assistant Director (Consolidation).” 15. The above judgment of the apex Court is also an authority for the proposition that the remand order if not challenged can be questioned subsequently when challenge is put to final order after remand before the higher Court. No such proposition was laid down in the above case that remand order could not be challenged in revision. The basis of judgment of this Court is the cases of Ajab Singh, Rajbir and Rajit Ram Singh (supra) that remand order being interlocutory order, revision is barred. However, the judgment of the Supreme Court referred by this Court in the above cases also held that that remand order is interlocutory order. One more judgment which is required to be noted is the judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Bhajan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2001 (92) R.D. 330. This Court in the said judgment further classified a remand order in two categories. One more judgment which is required to be noted is the judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Bhajan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2001 (92) R.D. 330. This Court in the said judgment further classified a remand order in two categories. The Court held that order of remand will be interlocutory, if they are simplicitor remand. However, if the Court while remanding the matter records finding of fact or law which may be binding, the remand order could not be interlocutory order. Following was laid down in paragraph 3 of the judgment : “3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the revision of the respondents was not maintainable because the order of S.O.C. dated 5.1.1985 passed in appeal was remand order and, therefore, interlocutory order as held by decision of this Court in the case of Ram Narayan v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1990 (90) RD 313. Both these decisions rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner, Ranchi. The decision of the Supreme Court has been given in the context of Civil Procedure Code. Learned Counsel for the respondents has relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pritam Singh v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, for the proposition that remand orders are not always interlocutory order and it depends upon the remand order. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the bar of revision against interference order was introduced in Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in the year 1982 for the first time and, therefore, the decision of the Division Bench of the year 1978 cited by the respondents is no longer good law. Having considered all the decisions as well as logical points I am of the opinion that remand orders would be interlocutory order if they are simplicitor remand orders. However, if the Court remanding matter has recorded finding of facts or even finding of law which would be binding after remand upon the Court to which matter has been remanded, the remand order would not be interlocutory order, as in respect of those issues it has finally decided the controversy.” 16. However, if the Court remanding matter has recorded finding of facts or even finding of law which would be binding after remand upon the Court to which matter has been remanded, the remand order would not be interlocutory order, as in respect of those issues it has finally decided the controversy.” 16. In view of the law laid down in the above noted case, treating the order of remand as an interlocutory order, the second question which still is to be answered is as to whether against such an interlocutory order of remand by which the appeal has been finally decided by setting aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and remanding the matter, the revision is maintainable. 17. Section 48 Explanation (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 while defining the expression ‘interlocutory order’ confines the ‘interlocutory order’ to mean such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. A plain reading of Section 48 (1) with Explanation (2) is that revision against only such interlocutory order was barred which does not have the effect of finally disposing of such case or proceeding. The remand order which have effect of finally disposing of such case or proceedings are not included where revision is contemplated to be barred. Thus, each and every interlocutory order is not contemplated to be covered by prohibition under Section 48. Only a particular category of interlocutory orders have been contemplated to be excluded from the scrutiny of Section 48. For example, if objection under Section 9-A or in appeal an interim order is passed granting injunction or any kind of interim relief, the revision will be barred since that order does not have the effect of finally disposing of case or proceeding but when an interlocutory order has consequences of finally disposing of case or proceeding that is clearly out of prohibition contemplated under Section 48. The judgment of this Court in the case of Ajab Singh (supra) has not adverted to Explanation (2) of Section 48 which defines the ‘interlocutory order’. In the facts of the present case, the appeal was finally decided by setting aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer, the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation thus, finally terminated the appellate proceeding. In the facts of the present case, the appeal was finally decided by setting aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer, the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation thus, finally terminated the appellate proceeding. Such kind of order was not contemplated to be interlocutory order against which revision was barred. 18. There is one more aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of i.e. as to whether the appeal under Section 11 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 can be said to be a proceeding because Section 48 refers to any case decided or proceeding taken. In case the appeal is treated to be a case then obviously the appeal having been decided, the case is decided. The word ‘proceeding’ is a wider term than a case. This Court in Ram Nayan v. Director of Consolidation, AIR 1965 All 172 held that “word ‘proceeding’ is wider than the word ‘case. It may also include administrative proceeding.” The word proceeding has been used in several provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and it is useful to refer Sections 40 and 41 of the Act, which throw considerable light as to what is contemplated by proceeding under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Sections 40 and 41 are quoted below : “40. Proceedings before Settlement Officer Consolidation, Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer to be judicial proceedings.—A proceeding before a Director of Consolidation, Deputy Director of Consolidation, Settlement Officer Consolidation, Consolidation Officer and Assistant Consolidation Officer, shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code. 41. Application of U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901.—Unless otherwise expressly provided under this Act, the provisions of Chapter IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, shall apply to all proceedings including appeal and applications under this Act.” 19. Section 40 of the Act provides that a proceeding before the Director of Consolidation shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228. An appeal before Settlement Officer Consolidation under Section 11 is also a judicial proceeding as per Section 40. 20. Section 41 of the Act more clearly explain the intendment of the Legislature. An appeal before Settlement Officer Consolidation under Section 11 is also a judicial proceeding as per Section 40. 20. Section 41 of the Act more clearly explain the intendment of the Legislature. Section 41 provides that provisions of Chapter IX and X of U.P. Land Revenue Act shall apply to all proceedings including appeal and applications under this Act. Thus proceeding has been defined in an inclusive manner which includes the appeal also. Section 41 clearly indicates that appeal is a proceeding. The appeal before Settlement Officer Consolidation being a proceeding and it has been finally decided by the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 27.9.2007 since nothing more was to be done in the appeal, the said order is clearly not covered by the definition of ‘interlocutory order’ as given in Explanation (2). Thus, the bar under Section 48 against filing of revision was not attracted. 21. From the judgment of this Court in Ajab Singh and others v. Jt. Director of Consolidation and others (supra), Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi (supra), Rajbir v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Rajit Ram Singh and others v. Mahadev Singh and others (supra), it is clear that Explanation of Section 48 has not been considered and without considering the distinction between two kind of interlocutory orders, a general proposition has been laid down that revision is barred against interlocutory orders. 22. In view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that against those orders of Settlement Officer Consolidation passed in appeal which have effect of finally deciding the appeal be it may an order of remand, the provisions of Section 48 shall apply but in view of the fact that a contrary view has been taken in the above noted cases, judicial propriety demands that the question be referred to the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Division Bench for consideration. 23. 23. In view of the foregoing discussions, following questions are framed to be considered by a Division Bench : (i) Whether an order passed in appeal under Section 11 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by the Settlement Officer Consolidation deciding the appeal finally by setting aside the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer is an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and revision is barred against such order under Section 48. (ii) Whether the law laid down in Ajab Singh and others v. Jt. Director of Consolidation and others, 1996 R.D. 104, Rajbir v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1999 (90) R.D. 313, Rajit Ram Singh and others v. Mahadev Singh and others, 2002 (93) R.D. 224 lay down the correct law. 24. Let the papers be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Division Bench to consider the above noted questions. ————