REKHA SHARMA, J. Appellant No. 1 and the respondent are the companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956.The former does the business of advertisement and thelatter of printing . On July 24, 1996, appellant No. 1 had placed upon the respondent, purchase order for printing of brochures. As per the respondent, the said purchase order was varied fromtime to timeand in terms of the varied order, the requisitequantity of brochures were delivered to the appellant. Theof scanning, planning, proofing of Mescos Floaters, Retailers Ad, StudioJanak Ad and Diwan Saheb Press Ad. The respondent had raised four invoices upon the appellantbearing No. (i) 97-98/2556 dated April 23, 1997, (ii) 96/1381dated September 30, 1996, (iii)96/1421 dated October 31,1996 and (iv) 97-98/2358 dated October 21, 1997 of a total value of Rs. 1,46,070/-. The appellant company declined to pay the aforesaid amount whereupon the respondent filed a suit against appellant No. 1and also against its Director–appellant No. 2 for the recovery of Rs. 1,88,566.37 withpendente lite and future interest @ 21% per annum. The appellants disputed their liability to pay the suit amount on the ground that time was the essence of thecontract and that the respondent had delivered thebrochures after the delivery period resulting in huge lossesto it. The appellant also alleged that the brochureswerenotprinted as per the order and specifications. Insofar as thework of scanning, planningand proofing of Mescos Floaters –Retailers Ad was concerned, the appellant denied havingplacedany such order upon the respondent. The learnedCivil Judge on the basis of evidence on record decreed thesuitoftherespondentforasumofRs18856637withrecoveryof decretal amountalong with the cost of the suit.Aggrieved by the decree so passed, the appellants preferredan appeal before an AdditionalDistrict Judge but with nosuccess. Hence, the present appeal. The main plank on which learned counsel for the appellants assailed the judgment and decree of the courtsbelow was that they committed an error in accepting thecertificate of incorporation ofthe respondent companyEx.PW1/1 without formal proof. It was alsoargued that thecourts below failed to appreciate that the resolution datedAugust 29, 1998 exhibited asEx.PW1/2 authorizing an officerof the respondent company to file the suitwas not proved byproducing minutes books ofthe company and, therefore, thesuit ought to have been dismissed both on the ground ofrespondent having failed toprove the certificate ofincorporation and the resolution dated August 29, 1998. It was alsoargued that thecourts below failed to appreciate that the resolution datedAugust 29, 1998 exhibited asEx.PW1/2 authorizing an officerof the respondent company to file the suitwas not proved byproducing minutes books ofthe company and, therefore, thesuit ought to have been dismissed both on the ground ofrespondent having failed toprove the certificate ofincorporation and the resolution dated August 29, 1998. The respondent, on the other hand, contendedthat the appellants did not raise any objection as to themodeofproof ofeither the certificate of incorporationEx.PW1/1 or theresolution Ex.PW2/2 before thelearnedCivil Judge. These objections were raised for the first time beforebeyond pleadings. Having said so, learned counsel for therespondent nonetheless dealt with the objections raised bythe appellants as to the admissibility of the certificate ofincorporation and the resolutiondated August 29, 1998. Itwas submitted that the appellants themselves had admittedthese documents at the stage of ‘admission/denialofdocuments’ and it was only then that the certificate ofincorporation was exhibited as Ex.PW1/1 and the resolutionas Ex.PW1/2. Hence, no evidence was required to provethese documents. At the outset it maybenoticedthat it is a matterof record that the appellants never raised any dispute as tothe mode of proof of documents Ex.PW1/1 and Ex.PW1/2before the trial court. Therefore, it was not open to them tohave raised the same before the first Appellate Court.However, sincethe first Appellate Court has elaborately dealt with the same, I also feel inclined to deal with thequestion raised. It is elementarythatevidencewhether oral ordocumentaryis led only if the parties are at issues with eachother. It is laid down in Order 14 Rule 1 “that issues arises requirement to lead evidence if one party accepts thedocument of another or admits a fact stated by the other. Here in the present case, the certificate of incorporation andthe resolutiondated November 29, 1998 filed by therespondentwere admitted by the appellants at the time of‘admission/denial of the documents.’ Therefore, the partieswere not at issue with each other in so far as these twodocuments were concerned. Hence, there was no need tolead any formal evidence to prove the documents. It will be apposite here to refer to a judgment of the Apex court titled R.V.E.Venkatachala Gounder v. A.V.& V.P.Temple reported in AIR 2003 Supreme Court 4548. The following paragraph is relevant in so far as the present case is concerned. It reads as under:- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ordinarily an objection to the admissibility ofevidence should be taken when it is tenderedand not subsequently. The following paragraph is relevant in so far as the present case is concerned. It reads as under:- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ordinarily an objection to the admissibility ofevidence should be taken when it is tenderedand not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may beclassified into two classes:- (i) an objection thatthe document which is sought to be proved isitself inadmissiblein evidence; and(ii)where the objection does not dispute the admissibilityof document in evidence but is directedtowards the mode of proof alleging the same tobe irregular or insufficient. In the first case,appeal or revision. In the latter case, theobjection should be taken beforethe evidenceis tendered and once the document has beenadmitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, theobjection that it should not havebeen admitted in evidence or the modeadopted for proving the document is irregularcannot be allowed to be raised at any stagesubsequent to the marking of the document asan exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule offair play. The crucial test is whether anobjection, if taken at the appropriate point of time would have enabled the party tenderingthe evidence tocure the defect and resort tosuch mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because bythis failure theparty entitled to object allowsthe party tendering the evidence to act on anassumption that the opposite party is notserious about the modeof proof. Reference may also be made toa judgment of Division Bench of this court in the caseof Alacs Finanz Ltd. v. M/s Oksh Technologies reported in 119(2005) Delhi Law Times 585 (DB)wherein it has held that where secondary evidence is admitted without there being a proper objection, it becomes primary. In view of the aforementioned judgments particularly the judgment of the Apex Court (Supra) there is no merit in the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant. As already noticed above in the present case no objection Learned counselfor the appellant had relied uponEscorts Limited v. Sai Autos & Ors.reported in42(1990) DelhiLaw Times 446. The judgment has no applicability tothe facts of the present case. It may bestated even at the risk of repetition that in the present casethe appellant themselves had admitted the documents and,therefore, no formal proof was required to further prove thesamewhereasthere was no such admission in the case citedby learned counsel for the appellant. The judgment has no applicability tothe facts of the present case. It may bestated even at the risk of repetition that in the present casethe appellant themselves had admitted the documents and,therefore, no formal proof was required to further prove thesamewhereasthere was no such admission in the case citedby learned counsel for the appellant. Insofar as the merits of the case are concerned, Ifind that both the courts below have carefully appreciatedthe evidence on record and have consequently held theappellants liable to pay the suit amount. I find no reason todisturb the concurrent findingsof the courts below based onappreciation of evidence. The appeal raises no question oflaw much less substantial question of law. There is no meritin the appeal. The same is dismissed.