JUDGMENT: PRASAD, J. (1.) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of conviction dated 18.2.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kandi in sessions trial No. 353/05 arising out of sessions serial case No. 73 of 2005 by which the appellants herein were convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 448/366/376(2)(g) of Indian Penal Code. The appellants were heard on the question sentence and thereafter by an order passed on the same day that is on 18.2.2006 they were sentenced to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for ton years as also to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- each, in default of payment of fine to undergo further R.I. for a period of six months each for the offence punishable under Section 376(2) (g) of Indian Penal Code. They were also sentenced to suffer R.I. for six months as also to pay fine of Rs. 100/-each, in default of payment of fine to undergo further R.I. for a period of one month each for the offence punishable under Section 448 of I.P.C. No separate sentence for the offence punishable under Section 366 of I.P.C. was however awarded by the learned trial Court. The sentences awarded to the appellants for the offence punishable under Sections 376(2)(g)/448 of I.P.C. were ordered to run concurrently. (2.) Prosecution version as unfolded during trial in a nutshell is as follows:-The prosecutrix , P.W.2 (her name is not being mentioned herein as per directives of the Honble Apex Court) was the resident of Village Jadavpur within the limits of Bharatpur P.S.. The prosecutrix is a married woman having a male child aged 18 months. The appellants belonged to Bindapur village within the limits of Bharatpur P.S. and they were not the strangers to the prosecutrix. In the night of 5/6 April, 2005, the prosecutrix along with her 18 months old son was lifted from their house by the appellants after gagging her mouth. The appellants thereafter, took the prosecutrix along with her said baby to a nearby field and raped her forcibly one after another. The incident was narrated by the prosecutrix to her mother-in-law, Chadrabali Das (P.W. 3) immediately after her arrival to the house. Sufal Das (P.W.1), husband of the prosecutrix at that time was working elsewhere. He was informed over phone by his mother. The incident was narrated by the prosecutrix to her mother-in-law, Chadrabali Das (P.W. 3) immediately after her arrival to the house. Sufal Das (P.W.1), husband of the prosecutrix at that time was working elsewhere. He was informed over phone by his mother. He came back and having acquainted himself with the incident from the prosecutrix on her way to hospital, he along with his mother took the prosecutrix to Kandi hospital, where he was engaged upto 2.30 p.m. for arranging the medical treatment of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix was medically examined by Dr. Samar Mondal (P.W. 5) at Kandi hospital who was at the relevant time on emergency duty. Thereafter, the husband of the prosecutrix came to Bharatpur P.S. and lodged complaint (Exhibit -1), scribed by Nur Alam (P.W. 7) at 18.15 hours on 6th April that is to say within 15/16 hours from the incident. (3.) At Police Station, Bharatpur, on the basis of the First Information Report of Sufal Das a case being No. 29/05 dated 6.4.2005 under Sections 448/376(2) (g) of the I.P.C was registered against the appellants. Investigation was entrusted to S.I. Manik Lal Dey (P.W. 15) who in course of investigation visited the P.O. ; seized the wearing apparels of the prosecutrix that is one torn mudstained sari, one saya without tying rope, an old torn blouse without hooks and one lamp under seizure list ; recorded the statement of the prosecutrix in hospital and other witnesses ; seized also the bed head ticket of the prosecutrix from hospital under seizure list and subsequently made prayer before the learned SDJM, Kandi for recording the statement of victim under Section 164 of Cr.P.C, on the basis of which the statement of the victim was recorded under Section 164 of Cr. P.C. (Exl. 7) by Smt. Sutapa Sana, the then Judicial Magistrate, Kandi on 18.4.2005. In course of investigation, the appellants too had undergone potency test conducted by Dr. Samir Mondal (P.W. 5) and Dr. Bholahalh Manna (P.W. 6) who on clinical examination found the appellants capable of sexual intercourse. (4.) On completion of investigation, the appellants were charge-sheeted and put on trial after committal to the case to the Court of Sessions. (5.) In the trial Court, charges under Sections 448/366/376(2)(g) of I.P.C. against the appellants wore framed. The appellants pleaded not guilty with which they were charged and claimed to be tried. (4.) On completion of investigation, the appellants were charge-sheeted and put on trial after committal to the case to the Court of Sessions. (5.) In the trial Court, charges under Sections 448/366/376(2)(g) of I.P.C. against the appellants wore framed. The appellants pleaded not guilty with which they were charged and claimed to be tried. (6.) In the trial Court, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses, material amongst them is the prosecutrix (P.W. 2), her mother-in-law Chandrabali Das (P.W.3), her husband Sufal Das (P.W. 1) and Dr. Samir Mondal (P.W. 5). Apart from leading oral evidence, the prosecution also tendered and proved largo number of exhibits which were marked as exhibit 1 to 11 and MAT Exhibit 1 and 2. (7.) On behalf of the defence, one witness appears to have been examined. (8.) The defence version as it appears from the trend of cross-examination of P.Ws and suggestion thrown to the witnesses as well as from the answer given by the appellants in reply to their examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was that the appellants have been falsely implicated in this case in order to extract money; that they are impotent and incapable of sexual intercourse and the incident was not occurred in the manner as stated by the prosecutrix. (9.) The learned Trial Judge disbelieved the defence version. The learned Trial Judge after considering the oral and documentary evidence and hearing the learned Counsel for the parties passed the order of conviction and sentences against the appellants as indicated above. (10.) Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that the prosecution has failed to prove its case by adducing clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Learned Counsel further contended that the entire prosecution case rests on the testimony of the prosecutrix, her husband and her mother-in-law and their evidence are sell-contradictory regarding the mode and manner of the incident, nature and character of the house of the prosecutrix. Learned Counsel also urged that the investigation is perfunctory as material witnesses have not been examined by I.O. nor called on witness box at the time of trial and their non-examination is latal to the prosecution case. The further submission made by the learned Counsel is that the medical evidence totally belies the prosecution case as the Doctor has not found any external injury on the body of the prosecutrix or on her private part. The further submission made by the learned Counsel is that the medical evidence totally belies the prosecution case as the Doctor has not found any external injury on the body of the prosecutrix or on her private part. Last but not the least submission is that delay in lodging the F.I.R. has not been satisfactorily explained. (11.) Per contra the learned Counsel appearing for the State respondent supported the impugned judgment. It was argued that the learned trial Court had adequately discussed the evidence on record and had assigned adequate reasons for recording its findings of guilt for the offences with which the appellants were charged and no case has been made out for this Court to interfere with the impugned judgment. Learned Counsel further contended that the evidence of the prosecutrix is quite natural and the same is not suffering from any infirmities. Learned Counsel also contended that apart from the prosecutrix, the witnesses namely P. W. 3 and P.W. 1 also corroborated the version of the prosecutrix regarding the mode and manner of the incident. (12.) We have given our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the respective contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties. We have perused the various exhibits tendered and proved by the prosecution to substantiate its case and the impugned judgment. (13.) The entire perusal of record shows that the prosecution rests on the testimony of the prosocutrix as well as on the testimony of P.Ws. 3 and 1, the mother-in-law and the husband of the prosecutrix respectively to whom the prosecutrix had disclosed about the alleged offence of sexual assault committed on her by the appellants immediately after the incident. (14.) It is now well settled that a finding of guilt in a case of rape can be based on the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. The very nature of offence makes it difficult to get direct corroborating evidence. The evidence of the prosecutrix should not be rejected on the basis of minor discrepancies and contradictions. If the victim of rape slated on oath that she was forcibly subjected to sexual intercourse, her statement will normally be accepted even it is uncorroborated unless the rnatorial on record requires drawing of an inference that there was consent or that entire incident was improbable or imaginary. If the victim of rape slated on oath that she was forcibly subjected to sexual intercourse, her statement will normally be accepted even it is uncorroborated unless the rnatorial on record requires drawing of an inference that there was consent or that entire incident was improbable or imaginary. It is also well settled that the absence of injuries on the private part of the victim will not itself falsify the case of rape, nor construed as evidence of consent. (15.) In the present case, the prosecutrix is an illiterate, rustic residing in most backward area of our country and her evidence is required to be appreciated with this background. The P.W. 2, the prosecutrix deposed as follows: "In this Chaitra one incident occurred in the mid night of 1/1.30 a.m. My husband was not in her house. My husband came to Kandi for doing some job. He works as an assistant of mason. My house consists of Chitabar ghar. My tin shed structure was fashioned with chober dori (coir rope). I was sleepaing with my child who is a son aged about 1 1/2 years. Purnakar Mondal, Upajadu Maji and Bikash Mondal entered into my house after cutting rope. They thereafter gagged my mouth with clothings. Therafter I was brought out by them along with my child. They took me to a nearby field. When the child started weeping, they gagged his mouth with clothings. Later Purnakar committed rape upon me just as a husband does with a wife. Upajadu Maji, secondly committed rape upon me and subsequently Bikash Mondal raped upon me. They all committed rape upon me after uplifting the clothings up to the waist. They all present before this Court, (identified). They have threatened me saying that they would kill me, my husband and my child if I disclose the matter to the public or to anyone else. I, then told them, leave me dont murder me, dont murder my child. I will not disclose this fact to anyone. Thereafter I came to my house with the child. They followed me to some extent. They again threatened me saying that they would kill me and my child if I raise hue and cry at that moment. I thereafter with my mouth shut entered into my house. I will not disclose this fact to anyone. Thereafter I came to my house with the child. They followed me to some extent. They again threatened me saying that they would kill me and my child if I raise hue and cry at that moment. I thereafter with my mouth shut entered into my house. I, thereafter, awaken my mother-in-law by touching her leg and told the incident of rape and also the involvement of Purnakar, Upajadu Maji and Bikash Mondal to this incident of rape. My mother-in-law thereafter phoned to my husband. Then she took me to Kandi hospital for treatment. While I was on the way to Jajon Police camp, I saw my husband coming there at Jojon. I met my husband there. When my husband asked regarding the incident, I told my husband regarding the incident of rape. Both of them later hospitalized me at Kandi S.D. Hospital. Two injection was given to me in the hospital. The child was also given some medicine. I was not brought to this Court earlier and I did not make any statement. I do not know what is the meaning of the word Court. ( To Court) I have come before one Hakim who is a Lady Hakim and there I made one statement. I have told the Hakim regarding this incident in detail. I put my L. T. I. in that statement before Ld. Hakim." (16.) Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence and should be rejected by us. We regret that we cannot accede to this contention. After going through her entire deposition carefully, we find that she is a wholly reliable witness. In the first instance she had given vivid description about the incident of house trespass by the appellants as well as about the incident of rape by the appellants upon her one after another coupled with threat to murder her and her male child if she would resist the onslaught. Secondly, it is not believable that she being a rustic married woman having male child will stake her reputation by making a false charge against someone concerning her chastity unless she was actually raped. Thirdly, we find her account of the incident to which we have referred earlier, is in consonance with the important probabilities. Secondly, it is not believable that she being a rustic married woman having male child will stake her reputation by making a false charge against someone concerning her chastity unless she was actually raped. Thirdly, we find her account of the incident to which we have referred earlier, is in consonance with the important probabilities. Fourthly, the appellants who are riot the strangers to the prosecutrix and who had been named and identified by her before trial Court as her rapists, is substantially inconformity from her earlier version as contained in her statement recorded by the learned Magistrate (P.W. 13) under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. (Ext. 7). On the face of the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. (vide Ext. 7) to the effect that "ora guard diya daralo aar amake chupchap bari phirte holo", we aro in complete agreement with the reasoning made by the learned trial Court that the learned Magistrate was under misconception on looking into the sentence and deposed otherwise in her evidence before Court. Fifthly, the production of wearing apparels of the prosecutrix that is one torn sari coupled with mud stained, one saya without tying rope and an old torn blouse without hooks (Mat Ext. 1, collectively)and one kerosene lamp (Mat Ext. 2) by P.W. 3 before I.O. and its seizure by the I.O. (Ext. 6). Sixthly, neither from the evidence of the prosecutrix nor otherwise, the defence could show any probability of the appellants having been roped in falsely in this sexual crime for any malicious reasons. On the contrary, the plea that the appellants are incapable of sexual intercourse has been clearly negatived by the two Doctors viz. P.W. 5 and P.W. 6 who on clinical examination found the appellants capable of sexual intercourse. (17.) Apart from these, we find that the following circumstances corroborate and lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix :-(a) The F.I.R. in this case was lodged at P.S. which is situated at a distance 18 Kilometres from the place of occurrence by the husband of the prosecutrix to whom the prosecutrix had narrated the fact on her way to hospital. The appellants were named in the F.I.R. as the rapist of the prosecutrix. (b) The evidence of the prosecutrix was corroborated by her mother- in-law (P.W. 3) to whom she narrated the incident immediately after her arrival at the house. The appellants were named in the F.I.R. as the rapist of the prosecutrix. (b) The evidence of the prosecutrix was corroborated by her mother- in-law (P.W. 3) to whom she narrated the incident immediately after her arrival at the house. (18.) P.W. 3, the mother-in-law of the prosecutrix deposed as follows: "Pupa Das is my daughter-in-law. Sufal Das is my son. In the month of Chaitra, one incident occurred with my daughter-in-law. I was sleeping in my room. She was also sleeping in her room. She came to me at about 2/2.30 A. M. (mid night) and told me regarding the incident. She came to me in weeping condition and told me, maa amake shesh kare felelo. Then I asked what are you saying ? Then she said that Purnakar, Upajadu and Bikash did the incident. She told me that she was brought out from her room and thereafter they committed rape upon her as husband does with wife. Nearby our house there is a field and she was taken away there by them. My son used to work in Pago/ Thakurs house and there I informed the incident to my son. As my son was working in the house of Pagol Thakurs Jamaibabu, as such, I requested Pagol Thakur to make a phone call to Jamaibabu for informing the incident to my son, Sufal Das. I thereafter contacted my son over telephone and talked with my son. I then came to my house and took one van. When I was taking my daughter-in-law in the said van, I came across my son near Jojan Police camp and thereafter we all went to Kandi Hospital. I thereafter hospitalized my daughter-in-law and returned to our house because of small child. I can identify the clothings which she was wearing on that day of incident. (The wearing apparel is wrapped in plastic having tied with a thread. The level; is inside the plastic. The thread is being opened): This is the wearing apparel ( sari, saya and blouse) which she was wearing on that relevant time. This is the small lamp (lampho) which was twinkled on that very night. The wearing apparels is marked Mat Ext. 1 collectively and the lamp is marked Mat Ext. The level; is inside the plastic. The thread is being opened): This is the wearing apparel ( sari, saya and blouse) which she was wearing on that relevant time. This is the small lamp (lampho) which was twinkled on that very night. The wearing apparels is marked Mat Ext. 1 collectively and the lamp is marked Mat Ext. 2." (c) The evidence of the prosecutrix was also corroborated by her husband ( P.W. 1) to whom she had narrated the incident on the way while she was taken to hospital. (19.) P. W. 1, the husband of the prosecutrix deposed as follows: "The name of my wife is Rupa Das. One incident occurred with Rupa Das in the month of Chaitra. I was not in my house. I went for my work. I work as an assistant of a mason (Raj mistry). I came to Kandi for the job on that day. The owner of the house asked me to do the job for 4 days. After completion of 2 days of job, I was informed by my mother over phone that wherever you are, you must come to the village as there is some problem. I immediately rushed to my house when I was on the way to my house, I saw that the patient is being brought to the hospital. The patient is Rupa Das. When she was on the way, I have asked the reason forgoing to hospital. Near Jojan, I have asked this fact to my wife. My house is "chitabera Ghar". The gate of my house is a iron tin structure having tied with rope. The accd. Persons cut the rope of my "chitabera Ghar" and entered into my house while my wife was sleeping. They lit up a lamp. ( Gharer madhaya alo jalalo). She then recognised these 3 accd. persons in the said light, These accd. persons gagged her mouth with clothings and then picked her up to a place. They also took the child with them. These accd. persons thereafter committed rape one by one to my wife and my child was in their lap one after another at this stage of rape. Witness shows gesture of rape. I have heard this fact from my wife. I was then asked to hospitalize my wife at Kandi Hospital. Nur Alam Sk. worked with me earlier. I asked Nur Alam Sk. Witness shows gesture of rape. I have heard this fact from my wife. I was then asked to hospitalize my wife at Kandi Hospital. Nur Alam Sk. worked with me earlier. I asked Nur Alam Sk. to write a written complaint on my behalf and I have narrated him the incident and he wrote a written complaint on my behalf. I thereafter filed a written complaint before Bharatpur P.S." (20.) It is true that P.W. 1 in his evidence before the trial Court has added something which he did not mention in the F.I.R. This by itself does not go deep to discredit the material part of the testimony of P.W. 1 particularly when he has mentioned the name of the appellants as the rapist of his wife as also the fact of narrating the incident to him by his wife, That apart, the law does not require that F.I.R. to contain all the minute facts and circumstances that the informant might know. The F.I.R. is lodged with a view to setting the investigative process in motion and not for the purpose of setting down on paper all known facts and circumstances about the incident. Moreover, the mental and physical condition of the informant will have to be considered when minute details are expected. (d) The prosecutrix was subjected to medical examination by P.W. 5, Dr. Samir Mondal who had the first opportunity to examine the prosecutrix at Emergency Department Kandi, Hospital on 6.4.2005 during which the prosecutrix stated the incident which was recorded by P.W. 5 (Ext. 2). (21.) P.W. 5 deposed as follows: "/ am at present posted at Kandi Hospital as M.O. On 6.4.2005, I was posted at Kandi Hospital in the same rank. On that day I was at emergency duty and I have admitted one Pupa Das, wife of Sufal Das of Jadavpur P.O. Harish Chadrapur under P.S. Bharatpur in the District of Murshidabad. I have only examined her externally but I did not make internal examination of the patient, Pupa Das. She was complaining of pain in her abdomen. There is a history of assault by rape in my report. On examination, I found tenderness on her abdomen. I, thereafter admitted the patient in the maternity ward for internal examination and management. This medical report is prepared by me and it bears my hand writing and signature. She was complaining of pain in her abdomen. There is a history of assault by rape in my report. On examination, I found tenderness on her abdomen. I, thereafter admitted the patient in the maternity ward for internal examination and management. This medical report is prepared by me and it bears my hand writing and signature. The medical report of this witness is marked Ext. 2." (22.) Indisputably, P.W. 14 Dr. Madhusudan Saha did not find any injury on the private part of the prosecutrix while she was examined on 7.4.05. For the purpose of proving commission of offence of rape, however, the same was not necessary as the prosecutrix, a grown up rustic married woman aged 23 years and she was furthermore mother of one male child (Viswanath and Ors. v. State, Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu 2008 AIR SGW 3246 paragraph 12 relied on.) (23.) An identical question was also considered by the Apex Court in Santosh Kumar v. State of M.P. (2006)8 JT (SC) 171 and para 10 of the report is reproduced below : "10. The question, which arises for consideration, is whether the proved facts establish the offence of rape. It is not necessary for us to refer to various authorities as the said question has been examined in considerable detail in Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey, 1992(30) JT (SC) 270 and paras 37 to 39 of the said judgement are being reproduced below: " 37. We feel that it would be quite appropriate, in this context, to reproduce the opinion expressed by Modi in Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (Twenty First Edition) at page 369 which reads thus: "Thus to constitute the offence of rape it is not necessary that there should be complete penetration of penis with emission of semen and rupture of hymen. Partial penetration of the penis within the labia majors or the vulva or pudenda with or without emission of semen or even an attempt at penetration is quite sufficient for the purpose of the law. It is therefore quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains. In such a case the medical officer should mention the negative facts in his report, but should not give his opinion that no rape had been committed. Rape is crime and not a medical condition. It is therefore quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains. In such a case the medical officer should mention the negative facts in his report, but should not give his opinion that no rape had been committed. Rape is crime and not a medical condition. Rape is a legal term and not a diagnosis to be made by the medical officer treating the victim. The only statement that can be made by the medical officer is that there is evidence of recent sexual activity. Whether the rape has occurred or not is a legal conclusion, not a medical one". 38. In Parikhs Text book of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, the following passage is found: "Sexual intercourse -In law, this terms is held to mean the slightest degree of penetration of the vulva by the penis with or without emission of semen. It is therefore quite possible to commit legally the offence of rape without producing any injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains." 39. In Encyclopaedia of Crime and Justice (Vol.4) at page 1356, it is stated: "...................even slight penetration is sufficient and emission is unnecessary." Therefore, the absence of injuries on the private parts of a victim specially a married lady cannot, ipso facto, lead to an inference that no rape has been committed." (24.) The testimony of the prosecutrix inspire confidence and is found to be reliable. She is an innocent rustic married woman having one child. She was not a stranger to the appellants. She is the victim of dastardly offence of gang rape though it was done in night. Therefore, when she was taken to field nearer to her house by the appellants she had opportunity to see them. When the gang rape was done at the threat of her life as well as at the threat of her baby, she was absolutely helpless and she cannot be expected to go on resisting except to resign to her fate and succumb to their sexual assault. Her evidence is intrinsically true and she is a truthfulness witness. Her evidence cannot be viewed with doubt, disbelieve or suspicion. Testimony of victim of sexual assault is at par with the testimony of an injured witness. Her evidence is intrinsically true and she is a truthfulness witness. Her evidence cannot be viewed with doubt, disbelieve or suspicion. Testimony of victim of sexual assault is at par with the testimony of an injured witness. Just as it is presumed that a person sustaining injuries in the occurrence is not likely to shield the real culprit, a rape victim is highly unlikely to protect her tormentor and to falsely implicate some person in the same way. Therefore, evidence of the prosecutrix has great probative force. The prosecution story as a whole strikes the judicial mind as probable. The evidence of the prosecutrix is corroborated by her mother-in-law, her husband and also by the evidence of Dr. Samir Mondal. Besides some minor wear and tear in the evidence of the aforesaid material witnesses, learned Counsel for the appellants could not point out to us any material infirmity which could persuade us to hold contrary. A sentence from here and a sentence from there cannot be used to condemn the prosecution case as false. Discrepancies are likely to occur for variety of reasons, namely the social status of the parties, education and the time when the deposition of the witness is recorded. We do not find any artificiality in the version of the material witnesses of the prosecution and the discrepancies pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants in course of argument in our considered opinion are of insignificant nature and do not at all detract the material part of the version of the material witnesses. Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses, therefore, cannot be annexed with undue importance, more so when important "probabilities factor" echoes in favour of the version narrated by the material witnesses. The evidence of the prosecutrix as stated above would clearly reveal that she was subjected to sexual violence as put forth by the prosecution and same has not only been corroborated by her mother-in-law including her husband but also by the Doctor (P.W. 5) as well as by the other facts and circumstances of the case. In such conditions, minor contradictions though present in the evidence of the material witnesses, need not be attached with any importance at all. In such conditions, minor contradictions though present in the evidence of the material witnesses, need not be attached with any importance at all. This is more so, having regard to social back ground of our country and the situation of females, it cannot be believed that the prosecutrix and his relatives would concoct a false case of sexual assault against the appellants which would stand a reputation lower in the society nor it could be believed that the prosecutrix would allow the real culprit to go scot-free and fabricate a false case against the appellants. The rape is a crime destroys entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional cries. We all are aware that when the fact of rape having been committed on a woman is known to the society all would look upon her with contempt and hence, the version of prosecutrix in such offence cannot be brushed aside lightly, and corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial prudence in every case of rape, where the victim is subjected to sexual assault and is not an accomplice to the crime, but is a victim of another persons lust, and it would be improper, unrealistic and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion and seek corrdboration when judicial prudence would not so demand. In the same way, justice cannot be made casualty in the name of minor contradictions either in the evidence of the prosecution or defects in the investigation at the hands of the Investigating Agency. If judicial conscience is satisfied as to the credibility of the deposition and the say of the prosecutrix, then a fossil formula of insisting upon corroboration to the say of the prosecutrix would be unnecessary impediment in dispensation of justice. (25.) It appears to us that the Investigating Officer (P.W. 15) had not been diligent enough but for that reason we do not feel that reliable and clinching evidence adduced in this case by the material witnesses should be discarded. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of the Honble Apex Court in Karmal Singh v. State of M.P., 1995 AIR SCW 3644. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of the Honble Apex Court in Karmal Singh v. State of M.P., 1995 AIR SCW 3644. In the said decision, it has been stated by the Apex Court that in case of defective investigation, it would not be proper to acquit the accused if the case is otherwise established because in that event it would tantamount to be falling in the hands of an erring Investigating Officer. This aspect was also highlighted in Dhanaj Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004)3 SCC 654 . It is difficult to believe that only because either Pagol Thakur or his Jamaibabu as well as the van puller have not been examined, the testimony of the material witnesses of the prosecution cannot be believed. They as per prosecution version, were not the eye-witnesses. At the most it could be said that they were a supporling witnesses only to substantiate the testimony of P.W. 3 to the effect that she requested Pagol Thakur to phone his Jamaibabu for informing P.W. 1 to turn up home as well as to substantiate her version about her taking the prosecutrix towards hospital by a van. (26.) In these circumstances, non-examination of either Pagol Thakur or his Jamaibabu and the van puller, is not fatal to the prosecution case. In the case of State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra reported in (2002)9 SCC 86 the Honble Apex Court ruled that non-examination of one of the neighbours who had rushed towards her house after a call by her is not a serious infirmity in the prosecution case as he was not the witness of the commission of the offence. The evidence which is adduced by the prosecution is required to be examined on the touchstone of its truthfulness, when it is found that the evidence which is recorded is truthful, examination of this witness and that witness loses its importance in criminal trial and these are principles laid down by the Honble Apex Court to appreciate evidence in criminal trials. (27.) In course of argument the learned Counsel for the appellants tried to impress upon us that there is delay in lodging the F.I.R. and as such there would be suspicion in the factum of the case. We find no force in the aforesaid sweeping contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants. (27.) In course of argument the learned Counsel for the appellants tried to impress upon us that there is delay in lodging the F.I.R. and as such there would be suspicion in the factum of the case. We find no force in the aforesaid sweeping contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants. Delay in every case cannot be a ground to arouse suspicion. It can only be so when the delay is unexplained. In the instant case there is some delay in lodging the F.I.R. for the reasons of the absence of the husband of the prosecutrix, hospitalisation of the prosecutrix to Kandi Hospital coupled with her treatment there and considerable distance of 18 kilometre of the P.S. from the place of occurrence. Delay in the instant case is self-explanatory and it needs no further explanation. (28.) Having given our anxious consideration to the entire matter in issue, we do not find any reason to disbelieve the testimony of the material witnesses of the prosecution. Keeping in mind the realistic manners of appreciation of evidence, by no stretch of reasoning, it could be said that the prosecution was not able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt through the testimony of the prosecutrix and also through the testimony of her mother-in-law, her husband and Dr. Samir Mondal. (29.) In view of the above discussion we are firmly of the view that the appellants have been rightly convicted by the learned Trial Court for the offences as indicated above. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order of conviction warrants no inference in this case. (30.) In operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. The criminal law allows some significant discretion to the judge in arriving at a sentence in each case. Judges in essence affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime, yet in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. In our coutry, statuary provision for psychotropic treatment during the period of incarceration in the jail is not available, but reformist activities are systematically held at many places with the intention of treating the offenders psychologically so that he may not repeat the offence in future and may feel repentant of having committed a crime. (31.) In the instant case, from the material on record, it does not appear that the appellants have any adverse criminal antecedent. (31.) In the instant case, from the material on record, it does not appear that the appellants have any adverse criminal antecedent. It is evident from the material on record that the appellant Purnkar Mandal has minor children, that rest of the appellants are in the early twenties and they have been in custody for more than 2 and half years. (32.) Considering all these facts, we are of the view that for the ends of justice the substantive sentence of imprisonment fixed at ten years by the learned Trial Court for the offence punishable under Section 376(2) (g) of I.P.C. should be reduced to eight years. Rest of the sentences shall remain in tact. (33.) With this modification in the sentence, the appeal is partly allowed. (34.) The entire amount of fine if released, shall be paid to the prosecutrix by way of compensation. (35.) The appellants are in jail. They are directed to serve out the remainder part of their sentences as modified herein. (36.) The learned Trial Court is directed to issue necessary revised jail warrant as required by the Rules in respect of these appellants. (37.) Lower Court Records with a copy of this judgment to go down forthwith to the concerned learned Trial Court for information and necessary action.