Research › Search › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

2008 DIGILAW 971 (CAL)

Syed Zahiruddin Ahmed Bagdadi v. Board of Wakfs

2008-10-01

MANIK MOHAN SARKAR

body2008
JUDGMENT:- (1.) This application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 28.2.2006 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Wakf Tribunal, West Bengal in Appeal No. 6 of 2005. (2.) Briefly the petitioners case is that Pir Hazrat Syedena Mohammad Sufi Obaidullah Baghdadi Shah be called as "Sufi Obaidullah Baghdad! Shah", the grandfather of the petitioners husband, was the owner of various properties in Calcutta including premises Nos. at 5A and 5B, Christopher Road and 8 Bright Street, Calcutta- 700 019, formerly known as 8 Charmari Ghughudangha Road, Calcutta-700 019 and said Sufi Obaidullah Baghdadi Shah established a Khankhah a Mohammedan institution used for imparting religious doctrine and rules of life and he was usually called Sajjadanashin. Gradually the said Sufi attained the status of Pir Sahib and head of the Khankhah in his status as Sajjadanashin (Spiritual Superior). Durgah at the above stated address is known as Durgah Kadan-E-Rasul. For the up keeping of the maintenance of the religious functions in the said address including Fataha at Durgah Kadan-E- Rasul, Abdur Rahim a resident of Burdwan and a devotee of Sufi Obaidullah Baghdadi Shah created a wakf in respect of the properties which are situated in the District of Burdwan by a registered deed of wakf dated 7.2.1913 and appointed his Pir Shahib as the sole Mutwalli and also laid down the provision of succession to the office of Mutwalli to be succeeded through his male descendents and the Oaddinashin/Sajjadanashin of the Durgah.The said Wakf Estate was enrolled in the office of Board of Wakf Estate named as the Abdur Rahim Wakf Estate under E.G. No. 10790. On the death of original Mutwalli, his disciple and son Syed Sultan Gyasuddin Ahmed Baghdadi began to look after and manage the said Durga as he was appointed Sajjadanashin and also in the capacity of Mutwalli as per line of sanction mentioned in the Wakfnama. Since the Mutwalli remains as Sufi Obaidullah Baghdadi Shah was laid to raise and buried in a portion of the Khankhah premises, "wood used to be laid every year in the said premises" by the decycle coming from various parts of India. Since the Mutwalli remains as Sufi Obaidullah Baghdadi Shah was laid to raise and buried in a portion of the Khankhah premises, "wood used to be laid every year in the said premises" by the decycle coming from various parts of India. In the fear 1977 Syed Sultan Gyasuddin Ahmed Baghdadi died leaving behind a will by virtue of which his two sons out of seven, Syed Badruddin Ahemed Baghdad and Syed Kamaluddin Ahamed began to look after two Durgahs in the capacity of Sajjadanashin and while Syed Badruddin Ahmed discharged his such duty at the Durgah at 5A and 5B Christopher Road, Syed Kammuddin Ahamed discharged his duty as Sajjadanashin in respect of Durgah Kadam-E-Rasun, at 8A Bright Street where his father Syed Gyasuddin Ahmed Baghdad was buried upon his death. (3.) Said Badruddin Ahmed died on 19.11.92 leaving behind his survivers, the writ petitioner and his widow Nazira Khatbon, opposite party No.3 and his two daughters namely Syed Abeda Khatoon and Syedav Afrida Khatoon. Said Nazira Khatoon, then applied before Board of Wakfs for considering her claim as Mutwalli Wakf Estate in pursuance of the same, a general notice was issued inviting objection against her application. In pursuance to the same, petitioner claimed himself to be recorded as a Mutuwalli. Accordingly, hearing was initiated by the then Commissioner of Wakfs for such recording the name of Mutwalli but the hearing was postponed at the instance of one Akbar AN who filed a writ application before the Honble High Court, Calcutta being C.O. No. 4295(W) of 1993 and by an order dated 10.11.1994 the Honble High Court directed the then Commissioner of Wakfs to proceed with the hearing of the said matter before him after serving a fresh notice to the parties. The Commissioner of Wakfs issued fresh notice to the parties and fixed 30.01.95 as the date of hearing. The Commissioner of Wakfs issued fresh notice to the parties and fixed 30.01.95 as the date of hearing. The present petitioner prayed for adjournment on the ground of missing of his application to appoint a Mutwalli and though his prayer has shown to be allowed, but latter it was found that the Commissioner of Wakfs dismissed the petitioners application for recording him as Mutwali by an order dated 30.01.1995 and communicated the gist of order showing recording of the name of Syeda Nazira Khatoon as permanent Mutwalli and the same had been substituted in place of her deceased husband Syed Badruddin Ahmed, dividing the land sanction as stated in the Wakfnama executed by the Wakif. The petitioner filed writ application being W.P. No.1829 (W) of 1998 challenging the said order of the Commissioner of Wakfs with various reliefs in the nature of mandamus, certiorari and also for ad interim order of injunction and the said writ application was taken out by Honble Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose and His Lordship by His judgment and order dated February 12,1999 disposed of the writ application observing that the writ application was belated one and gave liberty to the writ petitioner to make proper application in accordance with law. Petitioner preferred mandamus appeal being A.P.O.T. No. 122 of 1999 and the same was disposed of by Their Lordships the Honble Justice S. B. Sinha and the Honble Justice S. N. Bhattacharjee on 5th March, 1999 and the appeal was disposed of with the direction upon the Board of Wakfs and disposed of the petitioners application as expeditiously as possible preferably within period of six weeks. Opposite Party No.3 challenge the said judgment before Honble Supreme Court of India by His Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 11229 of 1999 where the present petitioner already lodged a caveat the said Special Leave Petitioner ultimately was dismissed as withdrawn on 30th August, 1999. Ultimately, the matter was taken up by the Board of Wakfs after due notice to the parties on 14th October, 1999 and after hearing the learned Counsels of the respective parties, passed an order canceling the appointment of Mst. Nazira Khatoon as Mutwalli and the petitioner was recorded as the Mutwali of Abdul Rahim Wakfs Estate. Ultimately, the matter was taken up by the Board of Wakfs after due notice to the parties on 14th October, 1999 and after hearing the learned Counsels of the respective parties, passed an order canceling the appointment of Mst. Nazira Khatoon as Mutwalli and the petitioner was recorded as the Mutwali of Abdul Rahim Wakfs Estate. Opposite Party No. 3 made a writ application being W. P. No. 22044(W) of 1999 challenging the said resolution passed by the Board of Wakfs and the said writ application was transferred by the High Court Calcutta to the Wakf Tribunal, West Bengal at Calcutta and the same was numbered as 6 of 2005. The said appeal was ultimately heard by the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal and by judgment and order dated 28th February, 2006 allowed the appeal and set aside and cancelled the resolution dated 14.10.99 passed by the Board Of Wakf and also the order dated 17.11.99 passed by the Chief Executive Officer of the Board of Wakf. (4.) Being aggrieved by and/or dissatisfied with the said judgment and order of the Wakfs Tribunal, the present application has been filed by the petitioner on several grounds as stated in the present application under Article 227. (5.) As it appears from the respective partys case as well as from the submission made by the learned Lawyers of the respective parties, both the sides did not dispute over the story of creation of Wakf and the appointment of the Mutwaliship of Syed Badruddin Ahmed in respect of Wakfs State. All the trouble began after the Board of Wakfs appointed respondent No. 3, Mst. Nazira Khatoon on her application on the basis of a deed of trust left by last Mutwali, her husband Syed Badruddin Ahmed, in her favour as he had no son and there the entire dispute started to brew since the present petitioner, claiming himself as lineal male descendant of the original Mutwali, made a counter claim before the Commissioner of Board of Wakfs for his appointment as Mutwali ignoring the application of respondent No.3, Mst. Nazira Khatoon. (6.) Thereafter, different legal process continued after appointment of the respondent No. 3, Mst. Nazira Khatoon. (6.) Thereafter, different legal process continued after appointment of the respondent No. 3, Mst. Nazira Khatoon as the permanent Mutwali in respect of Wakfs Property and ultimately the appointment of respondent No. 3 was cancelled by the Board of Wakfs and the present petitioner was appointed as the permanent Mutwali of the Wakfs Property in view of the original deed of Wakfs executed by the Wakif, Syed Abdur Rahim. (7.) The respondent No.3 preferred an appeal against such order of canceling her appointment as Mutwali, before the Wakfs Tribunal which reversed the order of the Board of Wakfs and revalidated the earlier order dated 30.01.1995, appointing the respondent No.3, Mst. Nazira Khatoon as the permanent Mutwali. (8.) In course of submissions by the respective parties, it is revealed that the petitioner tried to establish that the Board of Wakfs has done correctly by canceling the appointment of respondent No.3, Mst. Nazira Khatoon as a permanent Mutwali as the respondent No. 3 mis-represented the fact or made a concealment of the fact in respect of the office of Mutwali. On the other hand, it was submitted from the side of the respondent No.3 that Board of Wakfs cannot cancel the said order since the statute has not given it the right to review its own order or to recall it and also it is submitted that the appointment of respondent No.3 was not even by way of removal as per provision of Section 64 of the Wakfs Act which requires some specific allegations for removal of an appointed Mutwali. (9.) Mr. Ashok Banerjee, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner submitted that appointment of respondent No.3, Mst. Nazira Khatoon in place of her deceased husband, Mutwali was on the basis of her presentation of a fresh deed of Wakfs left by her husband, ignoring the desire of the original deed of wakfs created by Abdur Rahim who gifted his properties in the Wakfs Estate and appointed original Mutwali and directed the lineal descendent of the office of the Mutwali through the son and grand son of the Mutwalies. It is his further submitted that respondent No.3 canceled the original deed of Wakfs and got herself appointed as Mutwali on her application before the Commissioner of Board of Wakfs by practicing fraud and mis-representation of fact. (10) It is further submitted by Mr. It is his further submitted that respondent No.3 canceled the original deed of Wakfs and got herself appointed as Mutwali on her application before the Commissioner of Board of Wakfs by practicing fraud and mis-representation of fact. (10) It is further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that the petitioner filed application before the Board of Wakfs with a prayer to ignore the prayer of Mst. Nazira Khatoon and placed his claim to be appointed as Mutwali as being the lineal male descendent of the original Mutwali on the basis of original deed of Wakf and it is alleged that the prayer of the petitioner was ignored by the Board of Wakf and order was passed in his absence and without giving any opportunity to the petitioner of being heard on the basis of his application though in the order, presence of petitioner was recorded, erroneously. (11.) Mr. S. P. Ray Chowdhury, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent No.3 submitted that the order dated 30.1.1995 by the Board of Wakfs appointing respondent No.3 as the Mutwali, has attained finality and such order of appointment cannot be ignored or cancelled by Board and the only way out to the Board is to take up proceeding for removal of such Mutwali for some misdeed as described under Section 64 of the Wakfs Act, 1998. It is further submitted by Mr. Ray Chowdhury that the Board has no jurisdiction to review its own order as there is no such provision in the Wakfs Act for review its own order. In this context, Mr. Ray Chowdhury relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1273 (Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji) in the following lines as held by the Honble Court:-"It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order." (12.) It is submitted that once the board appointed any person as Mutwali of a Wakfs Property, its hand became tied under the legal obligation and besides the provision of Section 64 of the Act the board cannot exercise any other jurisdiction to cancel such order. (13.) It is further submitted by Mr. Ray Chowdhury that no fraud or mis-representation of fact or concealment of fact was done by the respondent No.3 in respect of the original deed of Wakfs since a copy of the same is kept in the register of Wakfs maintained in the office of the Board of Wakfs as the enlistment of Wakfs was done on the basis of presentation of a copy of such deed of Wakfs along with application for enlistment. It is claimed that the Board of Wakfs had the knowledge of such deed officially and the allegation of concealment of fact or practicing fraud or representation on the part of the respondent No.3 at the time of consideration of her application for appointment as Mutwali, did not arise. (14.) Mr. Ray Chowdhury, the learned Advocate defended the judgment and order passed by the Wakfs Tribunal for setting aside the order of the Board of Wakfs by canceling the appointment of respondent No. 3. (15.) In this respect Mr. (14.) Mr. Ray Chowdhury, the learned Advocate defended the judgment and order passed by the Wakfs Tribunal for setting aside the order of the Board of Wakfs by canceling the appointment of respondent No. 3. (15.) In this respect Mr. Ray Chowdhury further submitted that since the allegation of mis-representation and practicing fraud cannot be established against the respondent No.3 at the time of hearing of her application for appointment as Mutwali, the order passed by the Board of Wakfs on 30.1.1995, appointing her as permanent Mutwali was finally passed and since it is not challenged at that stage, the Board has no authority to recall the said order and only remedy in setting aside the said order is by way of preferring an appeal against it before the Wakfs Tribunal or to file a civil suit praying for a declaration to that effect, since at the relevant point of time of order dated 30.1.1995, Bengal Wakfs Act, 1934 was in force and in the said act, subsequently revealed, filing of suit was not barred. (16.) Mr. Ray Chowdhury further submitted that the moment the petitioner prays for removal of the respondent No.3 from Mutwali, it is accepted without any doubt that the respondent No.3 was acting as Mutwali at the relevant point of time and she was functioning in that capacity. It is submitted that in such a situation, Mutwali can only be removed through a proceeding under Section 64 of the Act on some limited ground as mentioned in the said section. When the provision of Section 64 has specifically mentioned the ground for removal of Mutwali in Clauses (a) to (k), the Board cannot consider any other ground for such removal and if the Board ventures to do so, it would be extraneous consideration and since the Board is out of authority in doing so, the resolution taken by the Board for canceling the appointment of respondent No.3 as Mutwali is liable to be set aside and that was so done correctly by the learned Wakfs Tribunal in appeal against the said cancellation resolution of the Board. It is submitted that since the Board of Wakfs cancelled the appointment of respondent No. 3 as Mutwali on a ground which is not included in Section 64, it was an Act without jurisdiction by the Board, as such act of the Board is not within any provision in the Act. (17.) It is further submitted by Mr. Ray Chowdhury that the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal with illustrated reason, leaves no reason to be interfered with and even if it is argued that the Board of Wakfs did not consider the original deed of Wakf and the line of succession, that aspect was duly considered by the Wakfs Tribunal while sitting on appeal, as it is reflected in its judgment. (18.) Mr. Ray Chowdhury further submitted that in revisional jurisdiction, factual aspect gives no scope for consideration and such consideration in detail has been done by the appellate authority, the learned Wakfs Tribunal. (19.) Mr. Ray Chowdhury further submitted that even if the decision of the Board of Wakfs in appointing the respondent No.3, Mst. Nazira Khatoon, as Mutwali reached its finality unless an appeal is preferred against it or a review is prayed in respect of the said order it remained as binding upon the parties and he relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1061 (State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee and Ors.) in this context, wherein the Honble Court held :- "A wrong decision by a Court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides." (20.) It is submitted that the present petitioner has already preferred an appeal which was duly considered by the learned Appellate Tribunal as already discussed and was rejected. There is no scope for review its order by the Board of Wakfs which it has done by a subsequent resolution, canceling the appointment of respondent No.3 as Mutwali and to appoint afresh the present petitioner as the new Mutwali in respect of the present Wakfs Property. In respect of the power of review, Mr. Ray Chowdhury already relied upon the decision report in 1970 Supreme Court 1273 (supra). (21.) Mr. In respect of the power of review, Mr. Ray Chowdhury already relied upon the decision report in 1970 Supreme Court 1273 (supra). (21.) Mr. Ashok Banerjee submitted in answering the submission from the respondent No. 3 that no review can be made of the order dated 30.1.1995 in absence of such review provision in the Wakfs Act, 1985, since the said order was obtained by the respondent No. 3 in respect of her appointment as Mutwali, by practicing fraud and misrepresentation with intentional suppression of the original Wakfnama and she left an impression in the mind of the Board of Wakfs that only the deed of trust of the year 1984 left by her husband, the last Mutwali, was the only document in respect of present Wakfs Property, suggesting her to be appointed as Mutwali. (22.) Mr. Banerjee further submitted that Court or Tribunal or similar adjudicating authority has inherent power to recall its own order which has been obtained by practicing fraud and mis-representation on it, since.... (23.) Mr. Banerjee in this context relied upon some decision of Honble Supreme Court and other High Courts to secure his submission that an order obtained by practicing fraud and mis-representation of fact upon an adjudicator is void ab initio and is a nullity in the eye of law, in the following decision in 1992 (1) Supreme Court Cases 534 (Shrisht Dhawan (Smt.) v. M/s. Shaw Brothers) as per reference by Mr. Banerjee it has been held by the Honble Apex Court:-"Fraud and Collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. Fraud arises out of deliberate active role of representator about a fact which he knows to be untrue yet he succeeds in misleading the representee by making him believe it to be true..................it arises from deception committed by disclosure of incorrect facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke; exercise of power and procure from an authority and Tribunal. It must result in exercise of jurisdiction which otherwise would not have been exercised". (24.) Mr. Banerjee also relied upon another decision reported in 1994 (1) Supreme Court Cases 1 (S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by Lrs. v. Jagannath (dead) by Lrs. and Ors.). Wherein the Honble Apex Court held that:-"The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such a absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. v. Jagannath (dead) by Lrs. and Ors.). Wherein the Honble Apex Court held that:-"The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such a absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands.....................We have no hesitation to say that a person, whos case is based on false-hood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation." (25.) Mr. Banerjee further relied upon a decision reported in 1996 (5) Supreme Court Cases 550 (Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (Indian) Pvt. Ltd.) wherein it has been held by the Honble Court:- "Since fraud affects this solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court, the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practiced upon that Court. Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order". (26.) Mr. Banerjee concluded his such reliance by referring to a decision reported in 2003 (8) Supreme Court Cases 319 (Ramchandra Singh v. Savitri Debi and Ors.):-" Fraud as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by word or letter. It is also well settled that mis-representation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent mis-representation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent mis-representation is caled deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations preceded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations preceded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata". (27.) Representing respondent No.4, learned Lawyer Mr. Jaharlal De submitted that this respondent is not concerned about who is to be the Mutwali in respect of present Wakf Property as he was not running after the said office by way of competing with the respondent No.3, but according to Mr. De since the respondent No.4 is the great grandson of the Wakif who created the Wakf, would like to offer himself to act in the management of the Wakf Property, either in the capacity of Mutwali to be appointed by the State Government in case any person eligible to be Mutwali is not traced by the Board of Wakf as per desire of the Wakf deed and if any vacuum is created in the office of Mutwali in such circumstance. (28.) In consideration of the respective partys submission in the present matter, it is revealed that the moot question of dispute here lies in, firstly in respect of appointment of respondent No.3 as Mutwali by the Board of Wakfs and secondly in the cancellation of such appointment of respondent No.3 on the application by the present petitioner, by a subsequent order.The grievance from the side of the respondents, specifically respondent No.3 remained in asking the authority of the Board of Wakfs to review its own order and to pass an subsequent order adverse to the first one by way of canceling of appointment of Mutwali. It is fact that, though canceling of appointment of a Mutwali has not been prescribed in the Wakf Act, 1995 in such wording, there is provision for removal of Mutwali under statutory provision of Section 64 of the Act. It is fact that, though canceling of appointment of a Mutwali has not been prescribed in the Wakf Act, 1995 in such wording, there is provision for removal of Mutwali under statutory provision of Section 64 of the Act. (29.) Before going to any further detail to analyse the authority of the Board of Wakf to reverse its previous order without taking the course of review (which the present act does not provide) or an enquiry as per provision of Section 64 of the Act, the reference of the powers and function of the Board as provided in the Wakf Act, 1995 is to be looked into in respect of the appointment and removal of the Mutwali. Section 32(1) of the Act reads as follows:- "Subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, the general superintendence of all Wakfs in a State shall vest in the Board established for the State; and it shall be the duty of the Board so to exercise its powers under this Act as to ensure that the Wakfs under its superintendence are properly maintained, controlled and administered and the income thereof is duly applied to the objects and for the purposes for which such Wakfs were created or intended: Provided that in exercising its powers under this Act in respect of any Wakf, the Board shall act in conformity with the directions of the Wakif, the purposes of the Wakf and any usage or custom of the Wakf sanctioned by the School of Muslim law to which the Wakf belongs. Explanation: For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that in this sub-section, Wakf includes a Wakf in relation to which any scheme has been made by any Court of law, whether before or after the commencement of this Act." (30.) Further in Section 32(2) (g) authorises the Board to appoint and remove the Mutwali in accordance with the provision of the Act. (31.) Section 32(1) of the Act gives an introductory reference of the status Board of Wakf in a State as it says that the general Superintendence of all Wakf in the Estate shall vest in the Board established by the State by following the provisions in that regard under the statute. (31.) Section 32(1) of the Act gives an introductory reference of the status Board of Wakf in a State as it says that the general Superintendence of all Wakf in the Estate shall vest in the Board established by the State by following the provisions in that regard under the statute. It has further been provided that the duty of the Court shall be exercised its power under the Act so as to ensure that the Wakf under its superintendence are properly maintained, controlled and administered. (32.) The incident of the power of the Board has been confined by the proviso at Section 32(1) wherein it has been provided that the Board shall act in conformity with the directions of the Wakif, the parties of the Wakf and any usage or custom of the Wakf sanctioned by the School of Muslim Law to which the Wakf belongs. (33.) So the Board cannot go beyond the direction of the Wakf as given in the deed of Wakf, at the time of creation of the Wakf. In other wards, the Board is to give proper respect to the desire of the Wakif if the said desire has been expressed through the direction given in the deed itself in respect of properties of the Wakf, appointment of first Mutwali and the provision for succession to the office of Mutwali, either by way of hereditary process or otherwise and any other direction in respect of management and administration of the Wakf and Wakf Property. The provision of Section 32(1) is very much clear about the position of Wakf Board in relation to a Wakf since the section itself has given a statutory direction upon the Board to act in conformity with the direction of the Wakif. So when no direction, as such, is provided in the deed of Wakf, the Board has been empowered to Act in conformity with any usage or custom of the Wakf sanctioned by the School of Muslim Law to which the Wakf belongs. (34.) The provision of Section 32(2) (g) provides for appointment and removal of Mutwalis and the Board acts on such power but in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In other wards the Board cannot act in the appointment and removal of Mutwali by any other means except beyond the provision of the Act. (34.) The provision of Section 32(2) (g) provides for appointment and removal of Mutwalis and the Board acts on such power but in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In other wards the Board cannot act in the appointment and removal of Mutwali by any other means except beyond the provision of the Act. (35.) As per description of the incident of the present Wakf by all the parties, admittedly, Sufi Ubaydulla Bagdadi Shah created the Wakf and Pir Shahiy was appointed the sole Mutwali. At the time of creation of the Wakf, a provision was made in the deed that the office of Mutwali was to be succeeded through his male descendents-by specifically stating that the appointed Mutwali would enjoy the management of the Wakf Property and also the usufructs therefrom as per direction in the deed and though the word male descendent has not been specifically mentioned that the enjoyment will flow to the next generation by describing the same as "Putro and Poutradi". (36.) In this context, Mr. Roy Chowdhury submitted by defining the Bengali word Putro Poutradi, referred to the definition given of such word in DEVs dictionary of Bengali word to English, the said conjunctive word was stated to be future generation : descendents. He also referred to the definition of the said word in reference to the dictionary of Sahitya Sansad that Putro Poutradi meant future generations, posterity and claimed that future generation also include female descendents Including the widow of last Mutwali. By referring the said definition given to those dictionaries, Mr. Roy Chowdhury submitted that future generation include both male and female descendents. With all respect to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, I cannot accept his such submission since in the same dictionary the word Putro has been meant as son and the male child and the word. Putro Poutradi does not include also the female descendents. Further generation continues through child and wife of the predecessor does not come within the lineal descendent of a person for consideration as the successor through next generation. (37.) In the lineal descendent after the death of original Mutwali, his disciple and son, Syed Sultah Gyasuddin Ahamed Bagdadi was appointed as the Mutwali. This fact has not been denied by either of the parties. (37.) In the lineal descendent after the death of original Mutwali, his disciple and son, Syed Sultah Gyasuddin Ahamed Bagdadi was appointed as the Mutwali. This fact has not been denied by either of the parties. After the death of Gyasuddin Ahamed Bagdadi, one of his seven sons, Syed Badruddin Ahamed Bagdadi, became and discharged the duty of Mutwali. (38.) The death of Badruddin Ahmed Bagdadi left the present parties to dispute over the office of Mutwali. As it has already been discussed, the widow of Badruddin Ahmed, the last Mutwali, the respondent No.3 applied for her appointment as Mutwali, on the basis of the Deed of Trust left by her husband in her favour. Her application was entertained by the Board and the interested parties were duly notified. The present petitioner-responded to the said notice and made a counter claim for his appointment as the next Mutwali in pursuance to the direction given in the deed of Wakf left by the original Wakif. (39.) By the order dated 30.1.1995 the Board of Wakf, in accordance to the direction given by order dated 10.1.1995 by this Honble High Court in connection with C.O. No. 4295 (W) of 1993 the Board appointed the respondent No.3, Mst. Nazira Khatoon without disclosing the reason for his consideration for such appointment as Mutwali and simple reason was given that the Wakf Estate was running without any Mutwali. The said order dated 30. 1. 1995 was passed in reference to the hearing on the application for appointment of Mutwali, on 20.1.1995. The order dated 20.01.1995 shows that the present petitioner filed an application praying for time on the grounds stated therein, though on that earlier date it was noted that the parties present were heard at length. (40.) In the order dated 30.1.1995, it was mentioned that the present petitioner, Jahiruddin Ahmed informed the Board that he had submitted some application in the office of the Board, but observation was made in that order that receipt of such application was not disclosed in the office E.C and N/C files. Subsequently, as per order of the Division Bench of this Honble High Court in A.P.O.T. No. 122 of 1999 brought by the present petitioner, the Board took a resolution in its meeting dated 14.10.1999 in compliance of the direction of Honble Court for consideration of petitioners application. Subsequently, as per order of the Division Bench of this Honble High Court in A.P.O.T. No. 122 of 1999 brought by the present petitioner, the Board took a resolution in its meeting dated 14.10.1999 in compliance of the direction of Honble Court for consideration of petitioners application. In the said resolution the presentation of respective partys case was considered again by the Board and in compliance to the original deed of Wakf left by the Wakif was considered in respect of office of Mutwali as per desire of the original Wakif and the Board also considered that deed of Trust left by Badruddin Ahmed Bagdadi creating a right in respondent No.3 to the office of Mutwali, was not as per provision in the original deed and recalled the earlier order dated 30.1.1995 and cancelled the appointment of the respondent No. 3 as Mutwali and being in the male lineal descendent of the first Mutwali, the petitioner was appointed as Mutwali of the Wakf Estate. (41.) I agree with the submission of Mr. S. P. Ray Chowdhury, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.3 that the Act does not provide any specific provision for review of its own order by the Board and that the Board can only remove a Mutwali only as per provision of Section 64 of the Act. I also agree with Mr. Ray Chowdhury that the specific conduct as provided in Clauses A(a) (k) was not the cause of removal of the respondent No.3 from Mutwali, by the resolution of the Board dated 14.10.1999. (42.) Mr. Ray Chowdhury has submitted that once the respondent No.3 is appointed as Mutwali, she cannot be removed from such office without going through the enquiry proceeding as provided under Section 64 of the Act. (43.) Here comes a question as to whether the appointment of respondent No.3 to the office of Mutwali was done in accordance to the provisions made in that regard and if the same is not so done, whether the said appointment was void ab initio or voidable as per claim made on behalf of the petitioner. (43.) Here comes a question as to whether the appointment of respondent No.3 to the office of Mutwali was done in accordance to the provisions made in that regard and if the same is not so done, whether the said appointment was void ab initio or voidable as per claim made on behalf of the petitioner. In this context, there was submission from the side of the petitioner that there was a concealment of fact from the side of the respondent No. 3 in respect of existence of the original Deed of Wakf and such concealment of fact is to be treated as practicing fraud upon the grantor for obtaining an order in her favour for appointment as Mutwali. (44.) It has been observed earlier that Board is to act in conformity with the direction of the Wakif as per provision of Section 32(1) proviso and in the Act of appointment, the Board was to consider the direction of the Deed of Wakf, but the Board has not explained as to why the respondent No.3 was considered to the office of Mutwali. Had there been a consideration by the Board of Wakf in respect of the direction given in the deed of the present Wakf for the office of future Mutwali after the death of original Mutwali, the Board is presumed not to have passed such an order for appointment of respondent No.3 as Mutwali. The resolution dated 14.10.1995 is a consequence to perusal of such direction in the Deed of Wakf. The submission on behalf of the respondent No.3 is that the reference of the original Deed of Wakf at the time of hearing might have been done for consideration for appointment of respondent No.3 as Mutwali, since a copy of such deed was in the register in reference to application for enlistment of the Wakf of Property. But such submission cannot be accepted since reference of the same was not made by the respondent No. 3 at the time of disposal of her application for appointment of Mutwali. From the resolution dated 14.10.1995 canceling the respondent No.3 as Mutwali, it is revealed that respondent No.3 only refer to the deed of trust left by her husband Badruddin Ahmed, the last Mutwali in her favour for such office. From the resolution dated 14.10.1995 canceling the respondent No.3 as Mutwali, it is revealed that respondent No.3 only refer to the deed of trust left by her husband Badruddin Ahmed, the last Mutwali in her favour for such office. This has created an impression upon the Board that the claim of the respondent No. 3 to the office of Mutwali was rightly done as per desire of the Deed of Trust. The respondent No.3, as it appears both from the order dated 30.1.1995 as well as the resolution dated 14.10.1995, did not refer to the original Deed of Wakf and to show that Deed of Trust left by her husband was as per desire made in the original Deed of Wakf. (45.) But the moot question still remains to be decided whether order by way of cancellation without having the provision of review in the act or without holding any enquiry as per provision of Section 64 of the Act, can be sustained. (46.) Before going to decide on the point of power of the Board to recall its own order without any specific provision in the Act, the status of the Board is to be scanned. The provision of Section 13 of the Wakf Act, 1995 is in respect of incorporation of the Board which is appointed by the State Government by the notification in the official gazette and is a body corporate having perpetual succession. The Wakf of Board is not conglomeration of individuals and not even akin to company but is a statutory body, pure and simple. It is an administrative body incorporated to supervise Wakf in the Estate and its management and administration. (47.) So it is found that the Board of Wakf is an Administrative body created by the statute and its acts are mostly in the form of administrative action and such administrative action sometimes takes the form of quasi judicial action when the Board is to go through some enquiry procedure for arriving on some decisions in relation to the Wakf. The process of appointment and the removal of a Mutwali comes within such quasi judicial process of the Borad of Wakf. (48.) In this context, Mr. The process of appointment and the removal of a Mutwali comes within such quasi judicial process of the Borad of Wakf. (48.) In this context, Mr. Banerjee, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner submitted that even though there is no provision of review in the Act itself, the Board has every power to recall its previous order which has been obtained by concealment or misrepresentation of fact which amounts to fraud. In this regard, Mr. Banerjee earlier relied upon the decision reported in 1992 (1) Supreme Court Cases 534 to argue that fraud is product of deliberate active role of re-presentator in respect of some fact which he knows to be untrue and still by making such mis-representation, he succeeds in obtaining an order in his favour by misleading the representee making him to believe his representation to be true. (49.) In this context reference may be made to the order dated 30.1.1995 of the Board by which the respondent No.3 has been appointed as Mutwali and also to the resolution dated 14.10.1995, to ascertain that the respondent No.3 procured her appointment only producing the Deed of Trust left by her husband Badruddin Ahmed. It is nobodys denial that the Deed of Wakf which never recited that the future Mutwali would be able to create any Deed of Trust or other document for selecting a person of his choice to be future Mutwali on his demise. In this context, reference may be made to 1969 (2) ACC 471 (Ahmed G. H. Hariff and Ors. v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kolkata). It has been observed by the Honble Apex Court that "the moment of Wakf is created all rights of property pass out of Wakif and vest in the Almighty. Therefore, the Mutwali has no right in the property belonging to the Wakf. He is not a Trustee in the technical sense, his position been merely that of a Superintendent or a Manager. A Mutwali has no power; without the permission of the Court, to mortgage, sale or exchange of Wakf Property or any part thereof unless he is expressly empowered by the Deed of Wakf to do so". He is not a Trustee in the technical sense, his position been merely that of a Superintendent or a Manager. A Mutwali has no power; without the permission of the Court, to mortgage, sale or exchange of Wakf Property or any part thereof unless he is expressly empowered by the Deed of Wakf to do so". (50.) From such observation of the Honble Court as well as from the description of Mutwali in Wakf Act, it is revealed that the Mutwali has got no independent authority to transfer his right in the Wakf to some person of his/her choice by creating any instrument to that effect. However, such an act is not totally restricted on the Mutwali since a Mutwali can do so if so authorised by the original Deed of Wakf containing the desire of the Wakif or in the event he has taken the permission of a Court in that respect. (51.) If such an act on an existing Mutwali is restricted, the last Mutwali Badruddin Ahmed had no authority to create any Deed of Trust in favour of a person of his choice, his wife Mst. Nazira Khatoon in the present case. As already discussed, the original Deed of Wakf contained the version of succession of Mutwali by way of lineal male descendent of original Mutwali and in that case, the respondent No.Ss eligibility to become a Mutwali was not clean since she is not indirectly authorised to apply for such in the original Deed of Wakf. Absence of eligibility of the respondent No.3 was in the mind of the respondent No.3 herself and as her husband Badruddin Ahmed was the last Mutwali, the privilege of such office could not be ignored by the respondent No.3 and for that reason there was a creation of unauthorised Deed of Trust by Badruddin Ahmed. Order of the Board dated 30.1.1995 shows that the respondent No.3 referred the original Deed of Wakf before the Board at the time of hearing an enquiry for selection to the office of Mutwali since there was no mention or reference of such Deed of Wakf in the said order. Order of the Board dated 30.1.1995 shows that the respondent No.3 referred the original Deed of Wakf before the Board at the time of hearing an enquiry for selection to the office of Mutwali since there was no mention or reference of such Deed of Wakf in the said order. Since the original Deed of Wakf was not referred to or placed before the Board by the respondent No.3 at the time hearing of her application for appointment as Mutwali to establish the authority for creation of such Deed of Trust by Badruddin Ahmed, it may be treated as concealment of fact and that concealment might have been done by the respondent No.3 for the purpose of her success with an order of her appointment to the office of Mutwali. This act of respondent No.3 was for the purpose of creation of an impression in mind of the members of the Board of Wakf that she was properly authorised by the last Mutwali to ascend to the chair of Mutwali. (52.) In this context, the practice of fraud by way of mis-representation and concealment of fact, a reference can be made to-the view of the Honble Apex Court in a decision reported in 2004 (3) Supreme Court Cases 1 (Ashok Leyland Limited v. State of T.N. and Anr.) wherein the Honble Court held "Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the Court" and in this context the Honble Apex Court made reference to Shrisht Dhawan of the said Court wherein it was held:- "Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Miltons sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his ability to, wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him into snares. It has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. In Websters Third New International Dictionary fraud in equity has been defined as an act or omission to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. It has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. In Websters Third New International Dictionary fraud in equity has been defined as an act or omission to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. In Blacks Legal Dictionary, fraud is defined as an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender a legal right; a false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, it has been defined as criminal deception, use of false representation to gain unjust advantage; dishonest artifice or trick. According to Halsburys Laws of England, a representation is deemed to have been false, and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at the material date false in substance and in fact. Section 17 of the Contract Act defines fraud as act committed by a party to a contract with intent to deceive another. From dictionary meaning or even otherwise fraud arises out of deliberate active role of representator about a fact which he knows to be untrue yet he succeeds in misleading the representee by making him believe it to be true. The representation to become fraudulent must be of the fact with knowledge that it was false. In a leading English case (Derry v. Peek) what constitutes fraud was described thus:(All ER p. 22 B-C) Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false." (53.) If the Board is deceived by the act of the applicant for appointment as Mutwali by way of mis-representation and concealment of fact, having no eligibility to be considered to the office of Mutwali and if any order passed to that effect for such appointment it may be treated that such order is not properly authorised order since it is result of practicing of fraud upon the Board. (54.) It has been discussed earlier that the Board shall act in conformity with the direction of the Wakif and so it is a mandatory direction upon the Board that it cannot go out side such direction, if so given, in the Deed of Wakf for the appointment of future Mutwali. Since the original Deed of Wakf was not consulted at the time of appointment of respondent No.3 as Mutwali, as it appears from the text of the order dated 30.1.1995 it is revealed that the Board did not act in conformity with the direction of the Wakif as the Deed of Wakf created by the Wakif clearly stated that the Mutwali will continue through the male descendent of the.Original Mutwali through his sons, grandsons etc. In that case it may be presumed that the order dated 30.1.1995 has an inherent and patent error in respect of appointment of respondent No.3 as it was not done by obeying the mandatory direction upon the Board in respect of its superintendence, control on the administration of the Wakf, If such an order is passed by the Board which is embedded with patent error whether the Board can rectify the same by a subsequent order by following the mandatory direction as provided in Section 32(1) of the Wakf Act. In this context, reliance may be made to a decision reported in AIR 1994 Supreme Court 853 wherein it has been held:- "A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation, If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side than he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party." (55.) It is fact that in the four corners of Wakf Act there is-no provision for making review of its own order by the Board of Wakf nor there is any whisper in any of the sections that the Board may rectify an error created by a previous order of the Board passed on the same subject. It is fact that Administrative Authority has got no inherent power to review unless such power is conferred upon it by the concerned law specifically or bye necessary implication and in this respect I should abide to the decision relied upon by Mr. It is fact that Administrative Authority has got no inherent power to review unless such power is conferred upon it by the concerned law specifically or bye necessary implication and in this respect I should abide to the decision relied upon by Mr. Ray Chowdhury as reported in AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1273 (supra). But at the same time it is also to be looked into whether such an Administrative Authority can recall or revoke its earlier order which has been obtained by practicing fraud or concealment of fact and mis-representation, without any application of power of review. In this context, this Court rely upon a decision reported in AIR 1989 Supreme Court 997 wherein it has been held:-"Indeed, the submissions of Sri Thakur on the point contemplate the exercise of the power to cancel or revoke the permission in three distinct situations. The first is where the grant is itself vitiated by fraud or mis-representation on the part of the grantee at the time of obtaining the grant. To the second situation belong the class of cases where the grantee, after the grant violates the essential terms and conditions subject to which the grant is made. In these two areas, the power to grant must be held to include the power to revoke or cancel the permit, even in the absence of any other express statutory provisions in that behalf. There must, of course be the compliance with the requirements of natural justice and the grounds must be such as would justify such drastic action. This cancellation is a preventive step. The one aspect of the remedial measures is set out in Section 27 of the Act. There may be cases of third kind where the grant may be voidable at the instance of Development Authority or otherwise entitling the Development Authority to initiate appropriate declaratory or other action to get rid of the effect of the permission. It is true that in exercise of powers of revoking or cancelling the permission is akin to and partakes of a quasi-judicial complexion and that in exercising of the former power the authority must bring to bear an unbiased mind, consider impartially the objections raised by the aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with the principles of natural justice. It is true that in exercise of powers of revoking or cancelling the permission is akin to and partakes of a quasi-judicial complexion and that in exercising of the former power the authority must bring to bear an unbiased mind, consider impartially the objections raised by the aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with the principles of natural justice. The authority cannot permit its decision to be influenced by the direction of others as this would amount to abdication and surrender of its discretion. It would then not be the authoritys discretion that is exercised, but someone elses. If an authority "hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires." Such an interference by a person or body extraneous to the power would plainly be contrary to the nature of the power conferred upon the authority. De Smsith sums up the position thus: "The relevant principles formulated by the Courts may be broadly summarised as follows. The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. The authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories; failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories; failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive." (56.) So in reference to the said view of the Honble Apex Court it is revealed that the power to grant must be held to include the power to revoke or cancel the grant, even in the absence of any other expressed statutory provision in that behalf and it is viewed that it is to be done for the compliance of natural justice and it should be done in such a way which justified a drastic action in that respect. (57.) It is fact that the above two referred decisions related to the acts of the Court to display the discretionary jurisdiction, but the order dated 30.1.1995 having a patent error to appoint a person who has not been authorised by the Wakif to act as a Mutwali, such principle laid down in those two decisions can be followed in the present context since the order dated 30.1.1995 of the Board, though an Administrative Authority, it has a quasi judicial complexion since the Board had to arrive at such decision through the style of an enquiry on the application of the respondent No.3 for her appointment as Mutwali by showing a contest from the present petitioner. The principle laid down in those two decisions can be followed in the present context to scrutinise as to whether the action of the Board in canceling the appointment of respondent No. 3 by order dated 30.1.1995, was correctly done or not and if it was not correctly done Board had sufficient opportunity to scrutinise the matter again for arriving at a correct decision as the Board has to act in conformity with the desire of the Wakif as described in the original Deed of Wakf. (58.) So in my view, by the action of the Board by canceling the previous order dated 30.1.1995 by the resolution dated 14.10.1995. (58.) So in my view, by the action of the Board by canceling the previous order dated 30.1.1995 by the resolution dated 14.10.1995. It has not done any illegal act as the order of appointment of respondent No.3 by order dated 30.1.1995 had the inherent defect since the respondent No.3 was in no way authorised or eligible to be appointed to the office of Mutwali of the concerned Wakf. Further the resolution dated 14.10.1995 shows that it was done as per High Courts order. The said resolution was in consequence to a direction by a Division Bench of this Honble High Court in A.P.O.T. No.122 of 1999/G. A. No. 658 of 1999/W. P. No. 1829 of 1998 to consider the application of the present petitioner. In order dated 30.1.1995 it was stated by the Board of Wakf that application referred to in the above stated Honble Division Benchs direction, was not traced and that application became the subject of consideration by the Board of Wakf in the resolution dated 14.10.1995, in consequence to the direction given by the Honble Division Bench. (59.) However, in consideration of all the observation made above, I am of the view that the Board of Wakf did no wrong in canceling the appointment of the respondent No.3 as the Mutwali as per order dated 30.1.1995 and in appointing the petitioner as Mutwali on being the lineal male descendent of original Mutwali Syed Obaidullah Bagdadi. (60.) In consideration, this Court is also of the view that the learned Wakf Tribunal made a wrong assessment of the entire situation and repeatedly harpped on his view that the Board was not authorised to cancel an order passed by it earlier, by a subsequent order without going through the proceeding under Section 64 of the Wakf Act nor has any power to review having not so provided under Act. The learned Tribunal almost ignored the power and function of the Board as per provision of Section 32(1) of the Act and ignored to consider that the order of appointment of respondent No.3 as Mutwali by order dated 30.1.1995 has an inherent defect or error, in view of the desire of the Wakif in the Deed of Wakf. The learned Tribunal almost ignored the power and function of the Board as per provision of Section 32(1) of the Act and ignored to consider that the order of appointment of respondent No.3 as Mutwali by order dated 30.1.1995 has an inherent defect or error, in view of the desire of the Wakif in the Deed of Wakf. Neither the Board of Wakf nor the Wakf Tribunal can travel beyond the provisions made in the Deed of Wakf, in the administration and management of the Wakf Property as specified by the Wakif. If any specific provision is not provided in respect of such administration and management, then the Board of Wakf or Wakf Tribunal can assess the same by following the custom and usage followed in such Wakf. (61.) So in view of all the observations made above, I am of the view that the learned Wakf Tribunal made an illegal order in setting aside and canceling the resolution dated 14.10.1995 of the Board of Wakf and that order cannot be sustained. The judgment and order passed by the learned Wakf Tribunal, West Bengal in Appeal No. 6 of 2005 is thus set aside. (62.) The present application under Article 227 is hereby allowed, in consequence. (63.) I pass no order as to cost. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties as per usual undertakings. Later-Judgment in separate sheets, is pronounced today application is allowed. No order as to costs. Learned Advocate for the opposite party No.3 prayed for stay of the present order for extending an opportunity to the opposite party No.3 for seeking a Special Leave Petition before the Honble Appex Court. The prayer has been opposed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. However, the present order be stayed till two weeks after the puja vacation. Let urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the learned Advocate, appearing for the parties.