JUDGMENT Per Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. :- The petitioner, an erstwhile employee of the High Court working as an ad hoc assistant, is aggrieved by the departmental proceedings initiated against him which have culminated in two punishments. The first punishment is imposed by the Order dated 23.8.1986 withholding three time scale increments with cumulative effect from 18.8.1986 and the Order dated 19.8.1986 imposing punishment of dismissal from service. The petitioner started his career as an LDC on 6.2.1968 and earned his promotion as an ad hoc Assistant on 17.12.1979. A complaint was made by one Sh. V. B. Aggarwal, the then Assistant, on 12.1.1984 alleging that the petitioner had exhorted Mr. Laxman Dass Kondal to physically assault Mr. Aggarwal which resulted in the said assault and in view of the complaint, the then Chief Justice suspended both Sh. Raghubir Singh and Mr. Laxman Dass Kondal and directed a regular inquiry. On the same date, a complaint was also made by Sh. D. S. Thakur and Sh. S. S. Kohli against the petitioner and Sh. Laxman Dass Kondal while on the other hand the petitioner made a complaint against Sh. V. B. Aggarwal of misbehaviour. The memorandum dated 16.1.1984 was issued forwarding the Memorandum, Articles of Charge, Statement of Imputation, List of Documents and List of Witnesses. Article of Charges reads as under : "1. That the said Sh. Raghubir Singh while functioning as a permanent LDC/Ad hoc Assistant left his branch (Criminal Branch) and went unauthorizedly to the Accounts Branch accompanied by Sh. Laxman Dass Kondal, temporary Peon on 12.01.1984 at 11.55 a.m. 2. That he so exhorted Sh. Laxman Dass Kondal that Sh. Laxman Dass Kondal physically assaulted Sh. V. B. Aggarwal, Assistant in the Accounts Branch on 12.01.1984 at 11.55 a.m. causing the said Shri V. B. Aggarwal injury." Sh. Dinesh Dayal then a member of the Delhi Judicial Service was appointed as an Inquiry Officer and Sh. R. C. Nangia, Deputy Registrar, as a Presenting Officer on 17.10.1984 and the Chief Justice directed that the disciplinary action against both the officials would be in a common proceeding with a procedure prescribed in Rule 14, CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 ("the said Rules" for short) to be followed. On the inquiry being concluded, the petitioner was found not guilty of the first charge but guilty of the second charge. On the inquiry being concluded, the petitioner was found not guilty of the first charge but guilty of the second charge. The petitioner was consequently issued a Memorandum dated 25.7.1985 proposing to impose the penalty of withholding of three-time scale increments and giving an opportunity to the petitioner to respond to the same The petitioner sent replies dated 20.8.1985 and 24.9.1985 and ultimately the Chief Justice by an Order dated 23.8.1986, after considering the representation, imposed the penalty of withholding of three increments with cumulative effect with effect from 18.8.1986. The more serious charge arose on account of the Memorandum issued on 14.5.1984 arising from the strike by certain officials on 16.1.1984. The charges were as under : "1. That the said Sh. Raghubir Singh while working as an Ad hoc Assistant hatched a conspiracy on 13th and 14th January, 1984 along with S/Shri. Laxman Dass, Baldev Raj, Hari Kishan, Mohd. Salim, Radhey Sham and certain other officials to strike and incite others to go on strike from 16th January, 1984. 2. That the said Sh. Raghubir Singh along with S/Shri. Laxman Dass, Baldev Raj, Hari Kishan, Mohd. Salim, Radhey Sham and certain other officials prevented the Trashes, Chowkidars and Sweepers from entering the High Court premises on 16th January, 1984 with the result that the Court could not start functioning before 12 noon." The Presiding Officer and the Presenting Officer were the same. It may also be noticed that the entry of the petitioner and five others was banned in the High Court from 31.1.1984 in view of the nature of charges unless summoned and without the specific permission of the Registrar. This was followed up by another Memorandum dated 10.2.1984 in view of a request made by the petitioner whereby the petitioner was permitted to take a legal advice from anyone he likes but not in the High Court premises and permitting him to attend the hearing of the cases on the dates fixed. An order was also passed on 27.9.1984 directing that a common proceeding would be taken out against the petitioner and 10 other persons and the procedure under Rule 14 of the said Rules would be followed. The petitioner sought permission to have services of an advocate instead of a government servant by a letter dated 8.10.1984 since the Presenting Officer was a legally qualified person and well conversant with law. The petitioner sought permission to have services of an advocate instead of a government servant by a letter dated 8.10.1984 since the Presenting Officer was a legally qualified person and well conversant with law. This request of the petitioner was, however, rejected by an Order dated 15.10.1984 with the direction that the petitioner can take assistance from any official in the High Court who is in service or has even retired. The reason for rejection of the request of the petitioner was stated to be in accordance with Rule 14(8)(a) and (b) of the said Rules, which read as under : "8(a) The government servant may take the assistance of any other government servant to prevent the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner, or the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits. Note : The government servant shall not take the assistance of any other government servant who has two pending disciplinary cases on hand in which he has to give assistance. (b) The government servant may also take the assistance of a retired government servant to present the case on his behalf, subject to such conditions as may be specified by the President from time to time by general or special order in this behalf." It was the opinion of the Chief Justice that though the Deputy Registrar may be holding a legal degree, he was not a legal practitioner. The petitioner on 19.11.1984 requested the Inquiry Officer for legal assistance from Sh. P. P. Kalra, Assistant, whose services were made available to the petitioner. The inquiry proceeded and the petitioner was found guilty of the first charge by the Inquiry Officer in the report dated 10.6.1985. These proceedings culminated in an Order dated 19.8.1988 of the Chief Justice terminating the services of the petitioner. P. P. Kalra, Assistant, whose services were made available to the petitioner. The inquiry proceeded and the petitioner was found guilty of the first charge by the Inquiry Officer in the report dated 10.6.1985. These proceedings culminated in an Order dated 19.8.1988 of the Chief Justice terminating the services of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner during the course of arguments confined her submissions, as recorded in the Order dated 18.9.2008, to two aspects : (i) The petitioner having sought assistance of a Legal Assistant in the form of a qualified lawyer on account of the fact that the Presenting Office was a law graduate and the same being declined, there was lack of adequate opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself; and (ii) The punishment imposed on the petitioner was disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the fact that Sh. R. C. Nangia, Deputy Registrar, who was the Presenting Officer had a LLB degree. Not only that in the capacity of a Deputy Registrar, he was performing certain judicial functions. It was thus submitted that a restrictive meaning to the relevant rule as given aforesaid cannot be accepted that the Presenting Officer was not a legal practitioner Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendrnath Nadkarni and Ors.; AIR 1983 Supreme Court 109. The employer in the said case was represented by a legally trained officer in inquiry and the request of the employee to be represented by a lawyer was refused. It was held that there was denial of a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the employee. To the effect are the observations made in C. L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin; (1972) 3 SCR 485 . The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid judgment is not in doubt that if a legal practitioner appears for the Department, the charged officer must also be permitted to avail of the service of a legal practitioner, if so desired, so that there is no disparity in the competence of the persons prosecuting and defending the case. The peculiar fact of the present case is that the Presenting Officer was not a legal practitioner though he had the legal qualifications and was performing certain judicial functions. The peculiar fact of the present case is that the Presenting Officer was not a legal practitioner though he had the legal qualifications and was performing certain judicial functions. It could not really thus be said that he was a novice in law. This would require the petitioner to be given an adequate opportunity through a proper and competent person. The orders passed by the competent authority, however, did give the petitioner an opportunity to engage the services of anyone from the High Court including a retired personnel. It is not in question that there were a number of people with law qualifications who may be in service or who may have retired at the relevant period of time and the petitioner had full opportunity to engage a person with law background to be at parity with the Presenting Officer. The petitioner chose to have the assistance of Sh. P. P. Kalra and thus it cannot be said that there was lack of adequate opportunity to the petitioner. The petitioner exercised the option for Sh. P. P. Kalra as against any other person in the High Court serving or retired having the legal qualifications. The second aspect urged is on the proportionality of sentence. There is no doubt that the petitioner has had a career of almost 18 years when he was dismissed from service. The petitioner had not oven served the minimum 20 years of pensionable service and thus even conversion of the sentence into one of compulsory retirement would not benefit the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner did seek to contend by relying upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Sube Singh (Ex. Sepoy) v. UOI and Ors.; 140 (2007) DLT 26 that the course of action of deeming the petitioner to be in service without pay and allowances could be followed and thus the petitioner would earn his pensionable service. This aspect was re-examined by the present Chief Justice on the matter being referred by this Court but he has not found it feasible to either do so or to grant any kind of pensionable benefits taking a sympathetic view of the matter in view of the fact that the offences for which the petitioner was charged are serious. In SC. Chaturvedi v. Union of India 1996 I CLR 389 SC, it was observed as under : "18. In SC. Chaturvedi v. Union of India 1996 I CLR 389 SC, it was observed as under : "18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." The above mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court explains the scope of judicial review of an Order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority The scope of interference on the judicial side is more restrictive than on the administrative side as only if the issue of disproportionality of sentence stands the test of the parameters of judicial scrutiny would an in reference be called for. If we examine the matter within the scope, there could be no doubt that the offence charged is extremely serious. The petitioner has been found to be guilty of conspiracy to cause the staff of the High Court to go on strike resulting in stoppage of work till 12 noon. The stream of justice itself was affected by such action of the petitioner who was found to be the kingpin in the whole episode. The functioning of the Court cannot be brought to a standstill in this manner and thus undoubtedly the offence is extremely serious. Taking into consideration the seriousness of the offence, one cannot say that the sentence is so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience of the Court. We, however, make it clear that the present order would not come in the way of the competent authority, if it so chooses, to entertain the representation of the petitioner for reduction of sentence. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we find no ground to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Dismissed. We, however, make it clear that the present order would not come in the way of the competent authority, if it so chooses, to entertain the representation of the petitioner for reduction of sentence. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we find no ground to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Dismissed. [Referred] 1995-(LB2)-GJX -0722 -SC B. C. Chaturvedi, Petitioner V. Union Of India & Ors., Respondents.