Honble RAFIQ, J.–Heard learned counsel for the parties. (2). This writ petition has been filed challenging the judgment dated 25.8.2007 passed by Rajasthan State Cooperative Tribunal, Jaipur (for short-the Tribunal). The Tribunal by the said judgment had quashed and set award passed by the Arbitrator under Section 58 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 2001 (for short- `the Act) and allowed the appeal. (3). The dispute pertains to the election of the Office of President of Bassi Gram Seva Sahakari Samiti Ltd. Petitioner Nathu Lal Sharma as well as respondent No. 2 Suraj Mal both were elected as Directors of the said society on 9.12.2006 and they both contested the election of the office of the President of the society which was held on 10.12.2006. Both petitioner as well as respondent Suraj Mal secured five votes and one vote was rejected. Respondent Suraj, Mal was declared elected by draw of lottery. A dispute was raised by the petitioner under Section 58 of the Act that one of the votes which was cast in his favour was illegally rejected by the Election Officer on the ground that it contained two seals, one in the column of the petitioner and another in the blank column and therefore the said vote was liable to be counted in his favour. The Assistant Registrar, who acted as Arbitrator in the scope of Section 58 allowed the dispute in favour of the petitioner by award dated 23.3.07 thereby declaring election of respondent Suraj Malas illegal and holding that one vote which was cast in favour of the petitioner, was illegally rejected by the Election Officer and that being the position, the petitioner was elected on the post of President of the Society. The said award was challenged by the respondent Suraj Mal by filing appeal before the Tribunal under Section 105 of the Act of 2001. The Tribunal by its judgment dated 25.8.2007 while allowing the appeal, set aside the award of the Arbitrator dated 23.3.07 holding that disputed vote was rightly rejected by the Election Officer as the ballot paper had two seals due to which the elector could be identified. Hence this writ petition. (4). I have heard Shri Chandra Shekhar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Sandeep Mathur, learned counsel for respondent No. 3. (5). Hence this writ petition. (4). I have heard Shri Chandra Shekhar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Sandeep Mathur, learned counsel for respondent No. 3. (5). Shri Chandra Shekhar Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the Tribunal has failed to correctly appreciate the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Rules, 2003 (for short-`Rules of 2003) which inter alia provides that a ballot paper shall be rejected if it bears any mark by which the member who voted, can be identified. It is argued that the election to the various Village Cooperative Societies through out the State were held on the basis of common election programme declared by the respondent State. A common/similar ballot paper was supplied to all such cooperative societies with seven symbols indicated therein from S.No. 1 to S.No. 7. Even society was therefore required to make use of such ballot papers for filling up of names of candidates in each of such columns. In the case of election to the Bassi Gram Seva Sahakari Samiti, there were only two candidates and therefore only two columns were made use of. Rent of the columns were to be left blank. It was argued that name of Nathulal was mentioned at S.No. 1 with the symbol of aeroplane mentioned thereagainst whereas name of Suraj Mal was mentioned at S.No. 2 of ballot paper with the symbol of Almirah. The disputed ballot clearly contained the seal against the name of petitioner Nathulal Sharma on the symbol of aeroplane. The concerned elector However erroneously also affixed the seal in column No. 4 which was blank and did not have name of any candidate. Learned Arbitrator rightly took the view that the seal additionally affixed in a blank column was inconsequential because the elector had clearly indicated his desire of voting in favour of petitioner by categorically affixing the seal in column No. 5 on the symbol of aeroplane. There was no clear indication, nor was it is possible to identify the elector. The learned Tribunal however erred in law in holding that such additional seal would make the identification of the elector possible and would therefore render the ballot/vote to be rejected. (6). Shri Chandra Shekhar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate true ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment of Supreme Court in Dr. (6). Shri Chandra Shekhar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate true ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment of Supreme Court in Dr. Anoop Singh vs. Shri Abdl Ghani & Ors. reported in AIR 1965 SC 815 , according to which, vote could be rejected on such ground only if the ballot contains mark or writing other than what is permitted in law and that the mark or writing should be such that the elector can be identified because of it. In the present case, however, the same seal which was used by the elector while indicating his choice of vote in favour of petitioner was additionally used in blank column No. 4 as well. It cannot be treated as a mark or writing so as to make identification of the elector possible. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in Mangi Lal vs. Subhash & Anr. reported in 1997 (1) WLC 327 and argued that in the case of equality of votes, draw of lots cannot be mechanically adopted by the Returning Officer who is under the statutory obligation to correctly undertake the work of counting of votes. Shri Chandra Shekhar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in Kumari Shradha Devi vs. Krishna Chandra Pant & Ors. reported in (1982) 3 SCC 389 (II) and argued that the mark or writing which would invalidate the ballot paper must be such as to itself unerringly point in the direction of or reasonably give indication of the identity of the voter and that the ballot paper cannot be rejected merely because there is some mark or writing. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgment of Election Tribunal, Ludhiana in Sohan Lal vs. Abinash Chander & Ors. reported in E.L.R. Vol. IV page 55. Learned counsel also argued that the supply of proforma of the ballot paper and then filling up the names of the candidates in first two columns of the proforma, which had symbols in all its seven columns, created confusion in the mind of the electors. The affixation of additional seal in fourth column was therefore only a bona fide mistake. This did not however mean that the voter became identifiable for that reason. (7). The affixation of additional seal in fourth column was therefore only a bona fide mistake. This did not however mean that the voter became identifiable for that reason. (7). Per contra, Shri Sandeep Mathur, learned counsel for the respondent argued that elections of the Board of Directors of the society through out the State were held on 9.12.2006. In the present case, eleven Directors were elected on that day. Election for the office of President & Vice President took place on 10.12.2006. Complete process of the election of the office bearer including receipt of nomination paper, scrutinizing, voting, counting and declaration of result was completed in one single day. It was therefore not possible for the election officer to print the ballot papers after the receipt of the nomination papers on the same day. The blank ballot papers were used only to facilitate the election on the same date. Shri Sandeep Mathur, learned counsel for the respondent therefore denied that there was confusion for this reason. Although the respondent No. 3 sought time to file reply on three earlier occasions but he could not appear before the Arbitrator on 22.3.2007 due to illness and therefore sent the application for adjournment. Learned Arbitrator however refused to grant the adjournment and fixed the matter on 23.3.2007 and thereafter he without framing the issues and without recording any evidence decided the matter on the very same day. The award passed is therefore in any case liable to be set aside. It was argued that the present ballot paper made the identification of the voter possible because of its distinguishing feature that it was the only ballot which had two seals and similar ballot was followed by the said voter in the election for the office of Vice President too which also was held on the same day. His intention was clear that he wanted himself to be known to the candidate in whose favour he voted. His identification thus was disclosed at least to the candidate in whose favour he indicated his choice of vote. The Tribunal therefore has rightly held that the additional seal even affixed on the blank column made identification of the elector possible. Learned counsel for the respondent in this connection relied on the judgment of this Court in Mannalal vs. Mannalal -(1964) ILR 803 and Inder Singh vs. Sheonath Singh & Ors. (1968) ILR 68. The Tribunal therefore has rightly held that the additional seal even affixed on the blank column made identification of the elector possible. Learned counsel for the respondent in this connection relied on the judgment of this Court in Mannalal vs. Mannalal -(1964) ILR 803 and Inder Singh vs. Sheonath Singh & Ors. (1968) ILR 68. It was therefore prayed that the writ petition be dismissed. (8). I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, respectfully studied the cited case law and perused the material on record. (9). Sub-rule (21) of Rule 45 of the Rules of 2003, which is relevant for deciding the controversy involved in the present matter provides as to on what basis the ballot paper shall be rejected by the Election Officer. It would be therefore useful to reproduced sub-rule 21 of Rule 45 in extenso:- "(21) A ballot paper shall be rejected by the Election Officer- (a) if it bears any mark by which the member who voted can be identified; or (b) if it does not bear the seal of the society; or (c) if the mark indicating the vote thereon is placed in such manner as to make it doubtful to which the candidate the vote has been cast. (10). What is contended by the respondent and what has been upheld by the Tribunal is that the affixation of seal at two places; one in the column of the petitioner and another in the column which is blank has made it possible for the petitioner to identify the person who has cast the vote in his favour. The Tribunal has gone to the extent of holding that affixation of additional seal by such elector in blank column indicates that there was possibility of this voter being managed because if he wanted to cast his vote in favour of the petitioner, there was no necessity for him to affix another seal. The Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Dr. Anup Singh, supra, dealt with somewhat identical controversy wherein Rule 73(2)(d) of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petition) Rules, 1951 fell for interpretation of the Court. The Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Dr. Anup Singh, supra, dealt with somewhat identical controversy wherein Rule 73(2)(d) of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Elections and Election Petition) Rules, 1951 fell for interpretation of the Court. Rule 73(2) (d) inter alia provides that a ballot paper shall be invalid on which "there is any mark of writing by which the elector can be identified." In the case before the Supreme Court it was not in dispute that there were both a mark and writing other than the figure permitted by Rule 37-A on the subject ballot paper. The question was whether the mark and the writing present on the ballot paper are such that the elector can be identified because of them. While contention of the appellant was that mark or writing should be such that the elector could be actually identified because of them. The argument of the respondent was that it was not necessary that elector is actually identified by the presence of mark and writing but it is enough if the elector might possibly be identified by such mark or writing or at any rate, the mark or writing should be such as would make it reasonable and probable that the elector can be identified thereby. The Supreme Court held that when the legislature provides that the mark or writing should be such that the elector can be identified thereby, it was not providing for a mere possibility of identification. It was held that if this construction is accepted, "almost every additional mark or writing would not fall within the mischief of the provision." If that was the intention, the words would have been different. And if a mere possibility of identification had been enough to invalidate the ballot paper, clause (d) of Rule 73(2) would have read something like this; "that there is any mark or writing other than that permitted by Rule 37-A." But the words used by the legislature are ``any mark or writing by which the elector can be identified", and this implies that there should be something more than a mere possibility of identification, before a vote can be invalidated. This may happen when some pre- arrangement is either proved or the marks are so many and of such a nature that an inference of pre-arrangement may be safely drawn without further evidence. This may happen when some pre- arrangement is either proved or the marks are so many and of such a nature that an inference of pre-arrangement may be safely drawn without further evidence. Their Lordships in para 13 of the report further held that the words `can be identified imply something more than a mere possibility of identification; at the same time they do not require that before the ballot paper is rejected the electors identity must be actually established. Truly construed, therefore, the word mean that the mark or writing should be such that the elector can be identified thereby with reasonable probability. Thus, it is not the mere possibility of identification which will invalidate the vote under Rule 73(2)(d), nor is it necessary that there should be certain identification before the vote is invalidated. All that these words require is that there should be reasonable probability of identification by the mark or writing and if there is such a reasonable probability of identification, the ballot paper would be invalidated. It was held that when these words mean that there should be a reasonable probability of identification by means of the mark or writing, there would be a difference in the approach of the returning officer as well as of the Tribunal and of the Court when dealing with a mark as distinguished from a writing. So far as the mark is concerned it has by itself very little value for purposes of identification and therefore in the case of marks the returning officer or the Tribunal or the court may require evidence to show that there was arrangement between the elector and the candidate to put a certain mark on the ballot paper which would lead to his identification. But in the case of a writing the mere presence of the writing in certain circumstances would be sufficient to warrant the returning officer, or the Tribunal or the court to say that the elector can be identified by the writing. In para 22 of the report their Lordships held that besides the figures 1, 2 and 3 which were permissible under Rule 37-A, the ballot paper in question also bears crosses in each case. It was held that ``a cross however is in our opinion a slender basis on which the elector can be reasonably identified. In para 22 of the report their Lordships held that besides the figures 1, 2 and 3 which were permissible under Rule 37-A, the ballot paper in question also bears crosses in each case. It was held that ``a cross however is in our opinion a slender basis on which the elector can be reasonably identified. Therefore, we shall overlook the crosses." In addition to writing 1, 2 and 3, the ballot paper also had the indication of the choice by words One, Two, Three. The contention was raised that they were written only on the basis of an emphasis but that was not accepted by the Supreme Court holding that the writing is reasonably sufficient in extent to reaching to the identity of the elector particularly when this was a small constituency of 152 electors and it would be right to say that there was a reasonable probability of the identification of the elector by this writing which he had put on the ballot paper. (11). The Supreme Court in Kumari Shradha Devi has held that any mark or writing of an innocuous nature or meaningless import cannot be raised to the level of such suggestive mark or writing as to reveal the identity of the voter. It would imply that there must be some casual connection between the mark and the identity of the voter that looking at one, the other becomes revealed. The mark or writing itself must reasonably give indication of the voters identity. There must be extrinsic evidence from which it can be inferred that the mark was placed by the voter by some arrangement. Mark or writing which would invalidate the ballot paper must be such as to unerringly point in the direction of identity of the voter. In the absence of such suggested mark or writing the ballot paper cannot be rejected merely because there is some mark or writing on the ground that by the mark or writing, the voter may be identified. Their Lordships held that one has to bear in mind the difference between `can be identified and `might possibly be identified. Their Lordships in para 15 of the report further held as under: "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx And it must be remembered that every mark or writing does not result in invalidation of the vote. Their Lordships held that one has to bear in mind the difference between `can be identified and `might possibly be identified. Their Lordships in para 15 of the report further held as under: "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx And it must be remembered that every mark or writing does not result in invalidation of the vote. The mark of identification should be such as to unerringly reveal the identity of the voter and the evidence of prior arrangement connecting the mark must be made available. There is no such evidence. Therefore, the ballot-papers could not have been rejected on the ground mentioned in Rule 73(2)(d), such marks being in this case some erasures or a bracket." (12). In Sohan Lal, supra, the Election Tribunal held that addition of horizontal line after figure `1 indicating first preference vote would not invalidate the ballot paper unless the horizontal line was drawn so as to reveal the identity of the voter. In Mannalal, supra this Court rejected the appeal holding that the ballot papers bearing clear thumb marks of the voters are invalid under clause 52(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Election Order, 1960. In Inder Singh, supra also this Court while reiterating its earlier view in Mannalal held that ballot paper consisting of a clear thumb impression is invalid as it bears a mark by which the voter can be identified. (13). When the law as discussed above is applied to the facts of the present case, it would be evident that the Tribunal has proceeded on the footing that the affixation of additional seal in blank column 4 by one of the electors while opting to vote in favour of the petitioner made identification of such elector possible. In doing so, the Tribunal also assumed that if at all such elector had the intention of voting in favour of the petitioner alone, there was no need for him to have affixed another seal in column 4. It was quite possible that voter might have been managed for voting in favour of the petitioner. The Tribunal held so while reversing the award of the Arbitrator who while relying on clause 19(b)(1) of the Election Guidelines held that the ballot paper was liable to be rejected only if the elector has voted in favour of more than one candidates. The Tribunal held so while reversing the award of the Arbitrator who while relying on clause 19(b)(1) of the Election Guidelines held that the ballot paper was liable to be rejected only if the elector has voted in favour of more than one candidates. The Arbitrator further held that since there were only two candidates and column No. 3 to 7 were not part of ballot paper, which was valid only upto column No. 2, even if an additional seal was affixed on superfluous part of the ballot, that would be inconsequential; because even otherwise, according to the election guidelines the symbols beyond column No. 2 should be removed from the ballot paper. The ballot paper therefore created confusion for the electors which might have affixed the additional seal due to bona fide mistake. View taken by the Tribunal if examined in contra-distinction to what was held by the Arbitrator, would make it appear that the Tribunal has proceeded merely on the basis of the assumption that there was a possibility of identification of the elector whereas the law as contained in sub-rule (21) of Rule 45 provides that a ballot paper shall be rejected by the Election Officer only "if it bears any mark by which the member who voted can be identified." The voter `who can be identified and `who might possibly be identified have to be placed in two different categories. While in the case of former, it would require a greater degree of proof to connect the elector with the disputed ballot, the later category merely proceeds on possibility which also implies the possibility on the negative side of it in equal proportion. In the words of Supreme Court in Anoop Singh, supra, the words ``can be identified imply something more than the mere possibility of identification. This therefore would also imply that what might have been possible also may not have been possible. There was absolutely no basis with the Tribunal to proceed on the assumption that such a voter might have been managed before hand and further on that basis to observe that if he wanted to vote in favour of the petitioner, there was no need for him to have affixed additional seal. There was absolutely no basis with the Tribunal to proceed on the assumption that such a voter might have been managed before hand and further on that basis to observe that if he wanted to vote in favour of the petitioner, there was no need for him to have affixed additional seal. The Tribunal overlooked the fact that if what it assumed could be possible, then what was held by the Arbitrator that it could be a bona fide mistake due to non removal of the later part of the ballot beyond column No. 2 also clearly would be another possibility. If the first possibility cannot be ruled out, second possibility also could not be ruled out and for equally strong reasons. The additional seal, in my considered opinion, by itself does not link the ballot to the identity of the elector as it does in the case of writing of words or figures, or thump impression. This additional seal was in the nature of an innocuous and meaningful mark and could not be raised to the level of such a suggestive mark as to reveal identity of the voter. In order to connect elector with the ballot, the mark that is contained on the ballot paper should be such which must gave reasonable communication of the voters identity in the sense that looking at the one, the identity of the other is revealed. The mark must be such as to unerringly point in the direction of identity of the voter. When there are only two candidates and the choice of vote is indicated by the elector in favour of one of them in the relevant column, just because in a superfluous part of the ballot paper, far below column No. 2 another seal was affixed by such elector, would not invalidate the vote cast by him. Such additional seal on the facts of the case must be held to be inconsequential in nature. (14). In view of what has been discussed above, the judgment of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside. The award of the Arbitrator holding the petitioner elected as President of Bassi Gram Seva Sahakari Samiti is restored. (15). The writ petition is accordingly allowed in the terms indicated above though with no order as to costs.