COMMON JUDGMENT :-In this writ petition, the petitioner assailed the validity of order dated 6.8.1994 passed by respondent No.2 and confirmed by order dated 31.3.2001 passed by respondent No.1, whereby he granted Occupancy Rights Certificate (for short "ORC") to respondent No.3 in respect of Acs.3.23 guntas of land in Survey Nos.469, 470 and 471 of Budvel Village, Rajendranagar MandaI, Ranga Reddy District WP No.2722 of 2005: 2. Respondent No.1 before the Revenue Divisional Officer (Respondent No.2 herein) and appellant in the appeal filed before respondent No.1, filed this writ petition questioning the two orders dated 6.8.1994 and 31.3.2001 passed by respondents 2 and 1 respectively. 3. As both these writ petitions are filed questioning the common orders passed by respondents 1 and 2, they are heard and being disposed of together with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties. 4. For convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to as they are arrayed in Writ Petition No.18038 of 2001. 5. The facts, which are relevant for the purpose of disposal of these two writ petitions, are mentioned hereunder: Respondent No.3 filed a claim petition on 13.9.1998 for grant of ORC under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 (for short "the Act") in respect of Acs.6.09 guntas of land comprised in Survey No.468 and the above mentioned Survey Numbers, along with an application for condonation of delay. While condoning the delay, the claim petition was referred to the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rajendranagar, by respondent No.2 for sending a report after conducting preliminary enquiry. After obtaining report from the Mandal Revenue Officer, respondent No.2 held enquiry. Having considered the respective pleadings of respondent No.3, the petitioner and respondent No.4 and on the basis of the material available before him, including the statements of the parties recorded in the enquiry, respondent No.2 partly allowed the claim petition of respondent No.3 and declared that she is entitled for grant of ORC under Section 8 of the Act for an extent of Acs.3.23 guntas in Survey Nos.469, 470 and 471 of the said village. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner and respondent No.4 filed separate appeals under Section 24 of the Act, which were dismissed by respondent No.1 by a common order dated 31.3.2001. 6. The petitioner and respondent No.4 filed Writ Petition Nos.18038 of 2001 and 2722 of 2005 respectively against the said orders. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner and respondent No.4 filed separate appeals under Section 24 of the Act, which were dismissed by respondent No.1 by a common order dated 31.3.2001. 6. The petitioner and respondent No.4 filed Writ Petition Nos.18038 of 2001 and 2722 of 2005 respectively against the said orders. The Respective Pleadings: 7. The case of respondent No.3 is that one Gokari Papaiah was the common ancestor. He had four sons, by name, Pedda Chennaiah, Chinna Chennaiah, Pedda Anthaiah and Chinna Anthaiah. Pedda Chennaiah died issueless. Chinna Chennaiah had three sons, viz., Sayanna, Mallaiah and Narayana, all of whom died. Pedda Antaiah had two sons, by name, Chennaiah and Lingaiah. Vittalaiah, the husband of respondent No.3, is the son of Gokari Chennaiah. Chinna Antaiah had one son by name Pentaiah. Respondent No.4 is the son of Gokari Mallaiah, who represents the branch of Gokari Chinna Chennaiah. The father-in-law of respondent No.3 was the protected tenant of the said land, which was an inam land, and there is a long standing dispute between her father-in-law and Gokari Mallaiah, the father of respondent No.4, regarding the protected tenancy. According to respondent No.3, her father-in-law had been in continuous possession of the said land as a protected tenant prior to the relevant date, viz., 1.11.1973 and also on the said date as a protected tenant. After the death of her father-in-law, her husband- Vittalaiah succeeded to the property and subsequent to the death of her husband, respondent No.3 has been in possession and enjoyment of the said property. 8. On the contrary, the case of the petitioner is that his Hither-Basharat AU was the inamdar. The property being mafi inam is not covered by the provisions of the Act. After the death of the petitioner's father, the petitioner came into possession of the land as inamdar and the same was cultivated by different tenants. Originally, the land was leased out to Gokari Chennaiah S/o. Papaiah. According to the petitioner, Gokari Chennaiah is the grandfather of respondent No.4 and not the father-in-law of respondent No.3 and the father-in-law of respondent No.3 was never in possession as a tenant. The land in question is a service inam and respondents 1 and 2 have no jurisdiction to grant occupancy rights at all. 9. The plea of respondent No.4 is similar to that of the petitioner. The land in question is a service inam and respondents 1 and 2 have no jurisdiction to grant occupancy rights at all. 9. The plea of respondent No.4 is similar to that of the petitioner. According to him, his grand-father Gokari Chennaiah S/o. Papaiah was the protected tenant and not the father-in-law of respondent No.3. The Contentions: 10. Sri E. Madan Mohan Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner, raised the following contentions: (1) Respondent No.2 failed to properly determine the true nature of inam. As the property is a service inam, the same is excluded from the purview of the Act. (2) Respondent No.2 committed a jurisdictional error in adjudicating the complicated issue of succession, which is not within his jurisdiction, and declaration of respondent No.3 as the person entitled to ORC on the basis of such adjudication, cannot be sustained in law; and (3) Even conceding the existence of such jurisdiction in respondent No.2, his finding, based on a report obtained from the Mandal Revenue Officer, cannot be sustained. 11. Sri K. Ramakanth Reddy, learned Counsel for respondent No.4, supported the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. He further contended that under Rule 6 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Rules, 1975 (for short "the Rules") it is the duty of respondent No.2 to make a suo motu enquiry even in the absence of any application filed by any person for grant of ORC and respondent No.2 failed to consider the issue from the said perspective. Respondent No.2, contends the learned Counsel, ought to have granted ORC in favour of respondent No.4 even in the absence of a formal application filed by him for the said purpose. 12. Respondent No.2, contends the learned Counsel, ought to have granted ORC in favour of respondent No.4 even in the absence of a formal application filed by him for the said purpose. 12. Sri M V. Durga Prasad, learned Counsel for respondent No.3, opposing the said contentions, submitted that respondent No.2 has gone into the nature of inam and gave a clear finding to the effect that Survey Nos.469 to 471 are Makhta lands, which are included within the definition of 'inam' in Section 2( c) of the Act; that the Act being a special enactment, which empowered the Tribunals constituted therein to adjudicate the respective claims and confer rights over the property, is a self-contained code and respondent No.2 is conferred with the specific power under Section 10 to examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which claims are made by inamdar, Kabiz-e-kadim, permanent tenant, protected tenant or non-protected tenant; and that the power of authorizing any officer not below the rank of Tahsildar to hold enquiries is also specifically conferred by Section 30 of the Act. He, therefore, contended that there is no illegality either in respondent No.2 deciding on the succession or in calling for a report from the Mandal Revenue Officer and placing reliance on the same, while deciding the issue of succession. The learned Counsel further submitted that the petitioner having not even made a claim for grant of ORC cannot be permitted to raise contradictory pleas by maintaining on the one hand that his father was the holder of inam and, hence, is entitled to grant of ORC and, on the other, respondent No.2 had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim for grant of ORC as the land is a service inam land which falls outside the purview of the Act. The Provisions of the Act: 13. Before dealing with the specific contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties, it is useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. 14. Finding that the Hyderabad Enfranchised Inams Act, 1952 (for short "the 1952 Act") was inadequate to protect the interests of inamdars, the Act is made by repealing the 1952 Act. Before dealing with the specific contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties, it is useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. 14. Finding that the Hyderabad Enfranchised Inams Act, 1952 (for short "the 1952 Act") was inadequate to protect the interests of inamdars, the Act is made by repealing the 1952 Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons shows that the Act is provided for: (1) abolition of all inams other than village service inams and inams held by religious and charitable institutions; (2) full assessment being charged for such abolished inams; (3) the retention by the inamdar as well as his tenants of lands under their personal cultivation to the maximum extent of the land allowed under the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950; and (4) giving adequate compensation for the lands resumed from them. 15. The definitions of inam, inamdar, Kabiz-e-kadim, non-protected tenant, permanent tenant and protected tenant, defined under Sections 2(1)(c), (d), (e) (g) (h) and G) respectively, read as under: "2(1) (c). 'Inam' means land held under a gift or a grant made by the Nizam or by any Jagirdar, holder of a Samsthan or other competent grantor and continued or confirmed by virtue of a muntakhab or other title deed, with or without the condition of service and coupled with the remission of the whole or part of the land revenue thereon and entered as such in the village records and includes- (i) arazi maktha, arazi agrahar and seri inam; and (ii) lands held as inam by virtue of long possession and entered as inam in the village records: Provided that in respect of former Jagir areas the expression inam shall not include such lands as have not been recognized as inams by Government after the abolition of the Jagirs. (d) 'Inamdar' means a person holding as inam or a share therein, either for his own benefit or in trust and includes the successor in interest of an inamdar, and- (i) where an inamdar is a minor or of unsound mind or an idiot, his lawful guardian, (ii) where an inamdar is a joint Hindu family, such joint Hindu family; (e) 'Kabiz-e-Kadim' means the holder of inam land, other than an inamdar, who has been in possession of such land at the time of the grant of inam or has been in continuous possession of such land for not less than twelve years before the date of vesting and who pays the inamdar only the land revenue. (g) "Non-protected tenant" means a tenant other than a permanent tenant or "protected tenant". (h) "Permanent Tenant" means a person who, from the date prior to 10th June, 1950, has been cultivating the inam land on a permanent lease from the inamdar whether under an instrument or an oral agreement; and (i) "Protected Tenant" means the protected tenant as defined in the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950." 16. Section 3 provides for abolition and vesting of inams in the State with effect from the date of vesting and also provides for consequences of such vesting. 17. Section 4(1) provides for registration of inamdars as occupants of all inam lands other than the lands mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. Clause (b) excludes lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be registered under Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Act from being registered in favour of the inan1dars. An inamdar is entitled to such registration in respect of the lands, which were under his personal cultivation immediately before the date of vesting subject to the limit, as regards the extent, prescribed therein. An inamdar is entitled to such registration in respect of the lands, which were under his personal cultivation immediately before the date of vesting subject to the limit, as regards the extent, prescribed therein. First proviso to Section 4(1), which was added by A.P.(Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams (Amendment) Act, 1994 (for short "the 1994 Amendment Act"), which is relevant for the present purpose, reads as under: "Provided that where inams are held by or for the benefit of charitable and religious institutions no person shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant under Section 5, 6, 7 and 8 and the institution alone shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all inam lands other than those specified in clauses (a) and (c) above without restriction of extent to four and half times the family holding, and without the condition of personal cultivation". 18. Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 enable Kabize-kadim, permanent tenants, protected tenants and non-protected tenants to get registered as occupants of the lands in respect of the inam lands, which were in their respective possession and their personal cultivation subject to the limit regarding the extent as prescribed in the said provision. 19. Section 10, which empowers the Collector to examine the nature and history of the lands while considering the claims for registration as occupants, reads as under: " 10. Enquiry by Collector in certain cases: The Collector shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which an inamdar, Kabiz-e-kadim, permanent tenant, protected tenant or non-protected tenant, claims to be registered as an occupant under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 as the case may be, and decide- (a) In whose favour, and in respect of which inam lands, the claims should be allowed; (b) The land revenue and the premium payable in respect of such lands." 20. Section 24 provides for appeals from orders passed under Section 10 to the prescribed authority and the decision rendered by the appellate authority under the said provision shall be final. 21. The rules provide for procedure to be followed in the matter of entertaining applications for and holding enquiries into grant of ORC. Rule 6 prescribes the procedure for making enquiries either suo motu or on receipt of application by the Collector into the claim for grant of ORC. Analysis: 22. 21. The rules provide for procedure to be followed in the matter of entertaining applications for and holding enquiries into grant of ORC. Rule 6 prescribes the procedure for making enquiries either suo motu or on receipt of application by the Collector into the claim for grant of ORC. Analysis: 22. Let me now consider the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The first contention is based on the premise that if the land was a service inam or an inam held by a religious and charitable institution, respondent No.2 is denuded of the jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition and grant ORC. 23. This contention is based on the Statement of Objects and Reasons contained in the Act, which, however, overlooked the first proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act, which is reproduced supra. Under the said provision if the land was an inam held by or for the benefit of a charitable and religious institution, the institution alone shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all inam lands other than those specified in clauses (a) and (c) of Section 4(1) of the Act. As noticed above, the said proviso was inserted by the 1994 Amendment Act and though the Statement of Objects, and Reasons expressed the intention of the Legislature to exempt the village service inams and inams held by religious and charitable institutions from abolition, in the face of this specific provision introduced by way of the aforementioned proviso it is not open to the petitioner to plead exclusion of the jurisdiction of respondent No.2 to consider grant of ORC even in respect of inams held by the institution. The only limitation placed by the Act in respect of such inams is that except the institution, no other person is entitled to be registered as an occupant. 24. In Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 , Patanjali Sastri, C.J., speaking for the majority of the Court, held that the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill should be ruled out as an aid to the construction of a Statute. This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal, AIR 1954 SC 92 and Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12 . This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal, AIR 1954 SC 92 and Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12 . In State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 , the Supreme Court held : "It is, however, well-settled that the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Bill, when introduced in Parliament, cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the Statute. They cannot be used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation." In view of the settled legal position as above, the intended exclusion of the inam lands held by the religious or charitable institutions is not conclusive and the lands in question, even if they were held by such an institution, falls within the purview of the Act. The nature of the lands: 25. A perusal of the order of respondent No.2 shows that he called for a report from the Mandal Revenue Officer and considered the report sent by the latter. He referred to the entries in the P.T. Register for the year 1951 showing the lands in Survey Nos.468, 469, 470 and 471 as 'Patta' in the name of Mir Mahmood Ali; Sethwar of Budvel Village for the year 1963 summoned from the Assistant Director of Survey and Land Records, which classified Survey No.468 as 'Sarkari' and Survey Nos.469, 470 and 471 as 'Panmakhta'; and certified copy of Khasra Pahani showing Survey No.468 as 'Patta' in the name of Mir Mahmood Sha Pahadi, and Survey Nos.469, 470 and 471 as "Mafi lnam" standing in the name of Mir Mahmood Sha Pahadi. On the basis of these entries in the revenue records and also report dated 19.8.1989 sent by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rajendranagar, respondent No.2 concluded that while the land in Survey No.468 is 'Sarkari', the land comprised in rest of the three survey numbers, referred to above, is classified as 'Panmakhta'. He relied on the definition of inam in Section 2(c) and held that 'inam' also includes 'Makhta'. 26. He relied on the definition of inam in Section 2(c) and held that 'inam' also includes 'Makhta'. 26. Sri E. Madan Mohan Rao, however, relied on the order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rajendranagar in proceedings dated 19.8.1989 between respondents 3 and 4, wherein, while holding that the father of respondent No.4 was never in possession of the lands and that Sri Gokari Chennaiah is entitled for Protected Tenancy Certificate and the respondents therein (branch of Respondent No.3) were in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the land for over more than four decades, the Mandal Revenue Officer declined to grant P.T. Certificate on the ground that the lands were recorded as "Mafi lnam" in the revenue records; and held that in view of the bar contained in Section 102(c) and (d) of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short "the 1950 Act") the proper remedy for the parties was to approach the Inams Tribunal to get patta rights in respect of the land. 27. It is no doubt true that, as per the finding of the Mandal Revenue Officer, the land was 'Mafi lnam" and treated as belonging to charitable institution. But the fact remains that no charitable institution has come forward to claim ORC. Indeed, the petitioner is not asserting his right through the charitable institution. His claim is that his father was the inamdar. So long as he does not either represent the charitable institution or make a claim through it, the finding of respondent No.2 that the land is an inam land falling under the provisions of the Act does not in any manner affect his rights. If the petitioner's father were to be the inamdar, as claimed by the petitioner, nothing prevented him from applying for ORC. If we closely analyze his stand as reflected from the affidavit, while claiming that his father was the inamdar, he admitted that Gokari Chennaiah S/o Papaiah was the tenant. 28. The petitioner's stand is rather equivocal and self-defeating. As discussed above, in order to get ORC, he should plead and prove that he represents the inamdar, who was in personal cultivation of the property as on the notified date. While he raised a vague plea that his father was the inamdar, he admitted that Gokari Chennaiah was in personal cultivation. The petitioner's stand is rather equivocal and self-defeating. As discussed above, in order to get ORC, he should plead and prove that he represents the inamdar, who was in personal cultivation of the property as on the notified date. While he raised a vague plea that his father was the inamdar, he admitted that Gokari Chennaiah was in personal cultivation. This plea itself disentitles the petitioner to claim ORC, because even if his claim that his father was the inamdar is accepted, in the face of his own admission that Gokari Chennaiah was in occupation of the land, he fails to satisfy the essential condition of being in personal cultivation stipulated under Section 4(1) of the Act. Added to this, the petitioner complicated his own case further by advancing a self-defeating contention based on the finding of the Mandal Revenue Officer in the proceedings under the 1950 Act between respondents 3 and 4 that the religious institution is the inamdar and that, therefore, respondent NO.2's jurisdiction is ousted. In either case, the petitioner is not entitled to the grant of ORC as he does not satisfy the requirement of being in personal cultivation to claim ORC under Section 4, if his plea as inamdar is accepted; and he not being the inamdar, if the institution is held to be the inamdar. 29. Irrespective of who between respondents 3 and 4 represents the branch of Gokari Chennaiah, who was in personal cultivation of the land in question, the petitioner is not entitled to grant of ORC, in either of the two events as discussed above. 30. In this view of the matter, the question whether the nature of the inam was a service inam or an inam granted for the benefit of a charitable institution or not pales into insignificance qua the petitioner and it is not necessary for this Court to interfere with the finding of respondent No.2 to the effect that the land being a "Panmakhta Inam" falls within the definition of 'Inam' at the instance of the petitioner. This contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, rejected. 31. This contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is, therefore, rejected. 31. As regards the second contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the provisions of the Act provide for adjudication of the claims of the inamdars, Kabiz-ekadim and tenants, both protected and non-protected, and confer occupancy rights on those who are found to be entitled to grant of such rights. The Act is, thus, a substantive piece of legislation, which provides for abolition of inams and confers rights over them after abolition. For adjudicating the competing claims, the Collector is empowered under Section 10 of the Act to examine the nature and history of all lands and decide in whose favour, and in respect of which inam lands, the claims should be allowed; and the land revenue and the premium payable in respect of such lands. The decision of the appellate authority is given finality under Section 24 of the Act. 32. While dealing with the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 a Larger Bench, consisting of five Judges, of this Court in T. Munuswami Naidu (died) and others v. R. Venkata Reddy and others, AIR 1978 AP 200 , held that the said Act was intended to be a self-contained Code and to be self-sufficient for carrying out all the purposes of the Abolition Act; and that the Legislature wanted to make a self-contained enactment for abolition of the estates and for introduction of ryotwari settlement. The Larger Bench in that case was concerned with the question whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to enquire into the question of title and possession when once the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal decides the question as to who the "lawful ryot" is and as a consequence thereof a patta is granted to the person in whose favour the decision is rendered. Answering the said question, the Bench held: "18. It is true that Sections II to 14 do not say that it is the Settlement Officer who is entrusted with the task of adjudicating upon the rights of ryots and landholders for getting pattas. But there can be no doubt, going by the scheme of the Abolition Act, that it is the Settlement Officer that will have to first adjudicate upon those rights. But there can be no doubt, going by the scheme of the Abolition Act, that it is the Settlement Officer that will have to first adjudicate upon those rights. We have already referred to Section 5, which refers to appointment and functioning of the Settlement Officer, which says that the Settlement Officers appointed under it were to carry out the functions and duties assigned to them under the Act. We have also referred to the proviso to Section 3(d) that the Government while taking possession of the notified estate, shall not dispossess any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta, pending the decision of the Settlement Officer as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta. Reading Sections 11 to 14 in the light of Section 5 read with the proviso to Section 3( d), it is abundantly clear that it is the Settlement Officer that will have to decide as to who is entitled to ryotwari patta under Sections 11 to 14, be he a ryot or a landholder. 19. This conclusion is further reinforced by the provisions of Section 15 which says that the Settlement Officer shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the land-holder claims a ryotwari patta under Sections 12, 13 or 14, 18 as the case may be, and decide in respect of which lands the claim should be allowed. When the Settlement Officer is constituted as the authority to decide the question of lands in respect of which landholder claims pattas under Sections 12, 13 or 14, it is unthinkable that some other authority is contemplated to decide the claims of ryots for ryotwari pattas under Section 11. Further, the other provisions of the Abolition Act would also demonstrate that the Settlement Officer is constituted as the basic authority to decide questions which arise after the abolition of the estates. Therefore, we have no doubt whatever that it is the Settlement Officer that will have to declare the rights of ryots to get ryotwari pattas under Section 11. Moreover, right from 1949 it has been invariably accepted by all Courts that the Settlement Officer decides the questions which arise under Section 11. Therefore, we have no doubt whatever that it is the Settlement Officer that will have to declare the rights of ryots to get ryotwari pattas under Section 11. Moreover, right from 1949 it has been invariably accepted by all Courts that the Settlement Officer decides the questions which arise under Section 11. What is more, the Settlement Officer may adjudicate upon the questions not only on the application filed by a ryot or ryots but also suo motu." While dealing with the question whether the Settlement Officer has jurisdiction to decide as to who is entitled to a ryotwari patta, the Bench relied on Section 56(1)(c) and held that under Section 11 the Settlement Officer will have to decide whether the lands in respect of which the pattas are sought are ryoti lands and if more than one person claim to be the lawful ryot in respect of any holding, then there must be some way for deciding that question as well; and that since it is not provided in Section 11, the Legislature intended to include such a provision in some other part of the Abolition Act i.e., Section 56. The Bench held that if such a power is not conferred on the Settlement Officer, the very purpose of the Act is defeated. 33. Applying the same analogy as could be deciphered from the above mentioned judgment to the provisions of the Act under consideration, I have no doubt, in my mind that the scope and power conferred on the Collector under Section 10 is wide enough to take within its sweep the power to enquire into and adjudicate not only the nature and history of all lands in respect of which claims for ORC are made, but also to decide in whose favour and in respect of which inam land the• claim should be allowed. The expression "in whose favour" used in Section 10(a) is of wide amplitude, which comprehends all disputes concerning devolution of interest in the claimants through succession etc. The expression "in whose favour" used in Section 10(a) is of wide amplitude, which comprehends all disputes concerning devolution of interest in the claimants through succession etc. As provided in Sections 9, 10, 15 and 56(2) of the Estates Abolition Act, which declared the decision of the Tribunal in appeal as final and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law - which weighed with the Larger Bench in coming to the conclusion that the Act is a self contained Code and empowered the functionaries therein to decide all the disputes concerning abolition of estates and grant of ryotwari pattas - Section 24 of the Act, in the instant case, makes a similar declaration that the order passed by the appellate authority against the decision under Section 10 shall be final. 34. This judgment of the Larger Bench received affirmation by the Apex Court in Muddada Chayanna v. Karnam Narayana, AIR 1979 SC 1320 . In that case, the Supreme Court, while repelling the contention that Section 56(1)(c) did not enable the Settlement Officer to decide whether as to who was the lawful ryot of the holding, held that the Larger Bench in T. Munuswami Naidu's case (supra), after a thorough and exhaustive consideration of the question, overruled the Full Bench Judgment in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya, AIR 1974 AP 85 and endorsed the view of the Larger Bench. It held : "It would indeed be anomalous and ludicrous and reduce the Act to an oddity, if the Act avowedly aimed at reform by the conferment of ryotwari pattas on ryots and the abolition of intermediaries is to be held not to contain any provision for the determination of the vital question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding. The object of the Act is to protect ryots and not to leave them in the wilderness. When the Act provides a machinery in Section 56(1)(c) to discover who the lawful ryot of a holding was, it is not for the Court to denude the Act of all meaning by confining the provisions to the bounds of Sections 55 and 56(1)(a) and (b) on the ground of 'contextual interpretation'. Interpretation of a statute, contextual or otherwise must further and not frustrate the object of the statute. Interpretation of a statute, contextual or otherwise must further and not frustrate the object of the statute. We are, therefore, of the view that Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya, AIR 1974 AP 85 (FB), was wrongly decided insofar as it held that ambit of Section 56(1)(c) was controlled by Sections 55 and 56(1)(a) and (b)". The Supreme Court quoted the observations of Subba Rao, C.l., in Appanna v. Sriramamurthy, 1958 (1) An.WR 420, which read as under: "Where a special Tribunal, out of the ordinary course is appointed by an Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that Act, then except so far as it otherwise expressly provided or necessarily implied, the Tribunal's jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive. Under the Act, old rights were abolished and new rights were created. A lawful ryot is entitled to a patta. When a question arises whether a person is a lawful ryot or not, that question falls to be decided by the special Tribunal created by the Act". The ratio laid down in the above two judgments applies in all fours to the case on hand. 35. In my considered view, respondent No.2 is, therefore, conferred with the power of deciding all the issues, which arise in the course of enquiring into the claims under Sections 4 to 8, including the issue relating to succession, and it is not necessary to relegate the parties to the Civil Court for adjudication of the issue of succession, as such a course would defeat the very purpose and object of creating the hierarchical machinery by the Act and conferring wide powers on them. 36. The judgment in Syed Abdul Majeed v. Joint Collector-II, Ranga Reddy District, 2006 (5) ALD 348 = 2006 (5) ALT 754 , relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, pertains to a case arising under the 1950 Act. In that case, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the - issue of succession to the deceased protected tenant under Section 40 of the Tenancy Act is required to be adjudicated by a competent Civil Court and that the Mandal Revenue Officer/ Tahsildar is not competent to decide such questions. In that case, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the - issue of succession to the deceased protected tenant under Section 40 of the Tenancy Act is required to be adjudicated by a competent Civil Court and that the Mandal Revenue Officer/ Tahsildar is not competent to decide such questions. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge relied on two unreported judgments of this Court and also had drawn analogy from the provisions of A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971. 37. Sri M V. Durga Prasad, learned Counsel for respondent No.3, contended that in drawing this conclusion, the learned Judge has not properly considered the true purpose and object of the 1950 Act, the provisions of which are substantive in nature creating rights over the agricultural lands and self-contained. He also pointed out that the above mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court and the Larger Bench of this Court were not placed before the learned Single Judge. The learned Counsel submitted that the said judgment requires reconsideration. 38. The learned Counsel for respondent No.3 relied on the judgment of another learned Single Judge of this Court in Madipeddi Rajalingam v. Rudroji Chinna Somaiah, 2006 (6) ALD 169 , who took a diametrically contrary view on the scope of the enquiry into the determination of lineal descendants or legal heirs of the protected tenant under the 1950 Act. The learned Judge held: "However, once the record discloses that the suit land is the subject-matter of protected tenancy and the defendant claims the rights of the protected tenant, the suit gets barred under Section 99 of the T.P. Act. Even the enquiry as to whether the appellant herein is the lineal descendant or legal heir of the recorded protected tenant, is a matter which is required to be dealt with under the Tenancy Act and not in the proceedings in the Civil Courts. Therefore, the finding recorded by the trial Court that the suit is barred under the Act deserves to be sustained", 39. For the purpose of deciding the present case it is not necessary for me to delve into the conflicting opinions reflected in the above mentioned two judgments of this Court. As noted supra, the said judgments were not rendered on the interpretation of the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. 40. For the purpose of deciding the present case it is not necessary for me to delve into the conflicting opinions reflected in the above mentioned two judgments of this Court. As noted supra, the said judgments were not rendered on the interpretation of the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. 40. On the analysis as above, I hold that the Act under consideration is self-contained one providing for internal mechanism to resolve every dispute arising thereunder and respondent No.2 has not committed any jurisdictional error in identifying the tenant in occupation and his successor in interest entitled to the grant of ORC. 41. Coming to the third contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, he placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Kalari Nagabhushana Rao v. The Collector, Panchayat Wing, Guntur, AIR 1978 AP 444 , in support of his contention that the judicial authority or a quasi-judicial Tribunal has to exercise the statutory appellate powers by itself on a consideration of the material before it and on the representations made by the concerned parties without any interference from any outside authority. 42. The brief facts of that case are that a Sarpanch was dismissed by the District Collector under Section 50(1) of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act, 1964. The said order was questioned in appeal under Section 50(4) of the said Act by the aggrieved Sarpanch. The Government, in the course of deciding the appeal, called for parawise remarks from the District Collector, against whose order the appeal was filed, and who was not a party to the appeal. The Division Bench held that, while deciding the appeal, the State Government exercises quasi-judicial powers; and unlike in administrative matters the State Government, while deciding the appeal, cannot call for remarks or reports. The Division Bench held: "The very practice of calling for reports or parawise remarks on the appeal memorandum by the statutory quasi-judicial appellate Tribunal or authority unless specifically provided for in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, must be deprecated. Such a procedure is not only unjust and improper but would also prejudice to a great extent the case of the very person who had come to the appellate Tribunal with a definite case that what has been done by the original authority was illegal, incorrect and unjust". (Emphasis added). Such a procedure is not only unjust and improper but would also prejudice to a great extent the case of the very person who had come to the appellate Tribunal with a definite case that what has been done by the original authority was illegal, incorrect and unjust". (Emphasis added). This judgment does not help the petitioner because this case falls within the exception contained in the above reproduced portion of the judgment. Section 30 of the Act provides that the Collector may, by general or special order, authorize any officer not below the rank of a Tahsildar subordinate to him to hold enquiries on his behalf under the Act. Thus, the Act itself authorizes the Collector to delegate his power of holding enquiry to the authorities specified in the said provision and report dated 22.9.1992 sent by the Mandal Revenue Officer in the instant case is traceable to the said provision. The Act having thus itself authorized entrustment of such enquiry by respondent No.2, the action of respondent No.2 is inconformity with the ratio contained in the above mentioned Division Bench judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 43. Respondent No.2 carefully analyzed the report submitted by the Mandal Revenue Officer and considered in detail the statements of various persons recorded during the enquiry and came to the conclusion that Gokari Chennaiah, the tenant in occupation of the property, is son of Pedda Anthaiah and father-in-law of respondent No.3 and not the son of Papaiah as claimed by the petitioner and respondent No.4. Indeed, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and respondent No.4 have not advanced specific contentions, and in my view rightly, on the correctness of the finding of respondent No.2 in this regard because this being a finding of fact, this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not reexamine and substitute its view by re-appreciating the evidence on record even if another view is possible. 44. Though the learned Counsel for respondent No.4 relied on Rule 6 in support of his contention that even if his client has not applied for ORC, respondent No.2 ought to have considered the claim of respondent No.4 as well and granted ORC in his favour. 44. Though the learned Counsel for respondent No.4 relied on Rule 6 in support of his contention that even if his client has not applied for ORC, respondent No.2 ought to have considered the claim of respondent No.4 as well and granted ORC in his favour. I do not find any merit in this contention, as respondent No.2, after indepth consideration of the respective claims of all the three parties, viz., respondent No.3, the petitioner and respondent No.4, held that respondent No.3 is entitled to be registered as the occupant. Even if a formal application was filed by respondent No.4, that would have been rejected on the strength of the said finding of respondent No.2. Conclusion: 45. On the premises as above, neither the petitioner nor respondent No.4 could make out any case warranting this Court's interference with the order passed by respondent No.2 and confirmed by respondent No.1. 46. In the result, both the writ petitions are dismissed. 47. As a sequel to dismissal of both the writ petitions, WPMP Nos.22593 of 2001 and 13036 of 2006 in Writ Petition No.18038 of 2001; and WPMP No.3849 of 2005 in Writ Petition No.2722 of 2005 are dismissed as infructuous.