Judgment :- C.M.S.A.Nos.30 to 34 of 2006 are focussed as against the common judgment and decrees dated 28.10.2005 passed in A.S.Nos.32, 33, 34, 36 and 38 of 2005 by the learned Principal District Judge, Thanjavur District, in confirming the order dated 23.03.2005 passed in E.A.Nos.13, 14, 15, 17 and 19 of 2004 in E.P.No.50 of 1988 in O.S.No.64 of 1969 by the learned Sub Judge, Pattukottai. 2. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status before the trial Court. 3. A resume of facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of these Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeals would run thus: O.S.No.64 of 1969 was filed by as many as three plaintiffs viz, Muthusami Pillai, Marimuthu Pillai and Chinnammal Achi as against the defendants therein viz., K.O.K.Vaithinathan Chettiar and Kootharasu, relating to the suit property for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The suit ultimately decreed after prolonged delay and it became an executable decree. E.P.No.50 of 1988 was filed for recovery of possession and the delivery order was passed. At that juncture, the appellants in all the five second appeals filed obstruction petition under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which accordingly, came to be heard by the executing Court and ultimately, those petitions were dismissed. 4. Challenging the same, the appellants herein preferred appeals and the first appellate Court confirmed the finding of the executing Court. 5. Animadverting upon the decision of both the Courts below, these appeals have been filed on the following grounds inter alia thus: Both the Courts below fell into error in interpreting Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure as though a third party cannot file an obstruction petition for delivery. They failed to countenance that the petitioners in the obstruction petitions are tenants under K.O.K.Vaithinathan Chettiar, the original judgment debtor and thereafter, under his son Nagarajan, the ninth respondent herein. The petitioners have been occupying the premises for a pretty long time and their right as tenants could have been recognised by both the Courts below. However, they held that the appellants herein were trespassers and dismissed their petitions. The relevant additional grounds as set out in the Grounds of Appeal are extracted hereunder: "(vii) The property originally belonged to Chinnayapillai who died in the year of 1943 leaving his wife Sundaratchi, who became life estate holder. However, they held that the appellants herein were trespassers and dismissed their petitions. The relevant additional grounds as set out in the Grounds of Appeal are extracted hereunder: "(vii) The property originally belonged to Chinnayapillai who died in the year of 1943 leaving his wife Sundaratchi, who became life estate holder. She died intestate on 10.03.1962. She was issueless. Hence, Mr.Ayyakkannupillai, the surviving brother of late Chinnayyapillai got right over the property in his capacity as a reversioner. Ayyakannupillai died intestate leaving his wife Chinnammalatchi, Muthusamypillai (son) and Marimuthupillai (son). The respondents 1 to 3 and 4 to 7 are the surviving legal heirs of the Marimuthupillai and Muthusamypillai respectively. (viii) During her life time Sundaratchi is alleged to have executed a sale deed in favour of K.O.K.Vaithiyanathan Chettiar through whom the appellant is deriving right. The respondents 8 to 12 are the surviving legal heirs of K.O.K.Vaithiyalinga Chettiar. (ix) O.S.No.64 of 1969 was filed against K.O.K.Vaithiyanathan Chettiar by the legal heirs of Ayyakannu Pillai and the same has been decreed. (x) The Subordinate Judge, Pattukottai dismissed the E.A filed by the appellant on the ground that the appellant is a 3rd party and his petition under Section 21 Rule 97 and 101 and Section 151 of CPC is not maintainable and that he is only a stranger. Further held that the appellant has to surrender possession before instituting any legal proceeding to the decree holder and the lower Court refused to entertain any other submission." Accordingly, they prayed for setting aside the orders of both the Courts below and for upholding and sustaining their obstructions. 6. At the time of admitting these second appeals, my learned Predecessor framed the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether the appellants who are the third parties can maintain a petition under Order 21 Rule 97 without surrendering possession? 2. Whether the lower Courts have relied on the decision reported in AIR 1992 Allahabad 198 which has been over-ruled by the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court?" 7. Heard both sides 8. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would develop his arguments to the effect that both the Courts below wrongly understood Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure by placing reliance on decision reported in AIR 1992 Allahabad 198. Even though, the recent decision of the Honourable Apex Court is to the contrary. 9. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would develop his arguments to the effect that both the Courts below wrongly understood Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure by placing reliance on decision reported in AIR 1992 Allahabad 198. Even though, the recent decision of the Honourable Apex Court is to the contrary. 9. At this juncture, I would like to point out that both the Courts below while dismissing the petition gave a finding that the petitioners happened to be mere trespassers and not tenants and also remarked wrongly as though Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not enable a trespasser to file an application. As such, here, due allowance has to be given to their peculiar way of both the Courts below in expressing themselves and also their singularly singular way of perceiving and putting it in their respective orders. 10. The perusal of their judgment would clearly show that they considered the case of the obstructors and clearly arrived at the factual conclusion that they are not the tenants even though they claimed to be tenants under K.O.K.Vaithinathan Chettiar and his son Nagarajan, the ninth respondent, and thereby they could have done well by simply dismissing the obstruction petitions. Both the Courts below went further in observing as though such trespassers are having no right to file an application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is one thing to have a right to file an obstruction petition under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the person in possession and yet, it is another thing, the Court holding that such an obstructor is a trespasser. 11. In my opinion, they are not posited with the following recent decisions of the Honourable Apex Court: (i) Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal reported in AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 856. An excerpt from it, would run thus: "5. In short the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order 21 lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of the decree for possession obtained by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather. An excerpt from it, would run thus: "5. In short the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order 21 lay down a complete code for resolving all disputes pertaining to execution of the decree for possession obtained by a decree-holder and whose attempts at executing the said decree meet with rough weather. Once resistance is offered by a purported stranger to the decree and which comes to be noted by the executing court as well as by the decree-holder the remedy available to the decree-holder against such an obstructionist is only under Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (1) and he cannot bypass such obstruction and insist on reissuance of warrant for possession under Order 21, Rule 35 with the help of police force, as that course would amount to bypassing and circumventing the procedure laid down under Order 21, Rule 97 in connection with removal of obstruction of purported strangers to the decree. Once such an obstruction is on the record of the executing court it is difficult to appreciate how the executing court can tell such obstructionist that he must first lose possession and then only his remedy is to move an application under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC and pray for restoration of possession. The High Court by the impugned order and judgment has taken the view that the only remedy available to a stranger to the decree who claims any independent right, title or interest in the decretal property is to go by Order 21, Rule 99. This view of the High Court on the aforesaid statutory scheme is clearly unsustainable. It is easy to visualise that a stranger to the decree who claims an independent right, title and interest in the decretal property can offer his resistance before getting actually dispossessed. He can equally agitate his grievance and claim for adjudication of his independent right, title and interest in the decretal property even after losing possession as per Order 21, Rule 99. Order 21, Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior to the actual execution of the decree for possession wherein the grievance of the obstructionist can be adjudicated upon before actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder. Order 21, Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior to the actual execution of the decree for possession wherein the grievance of the obstructionist can be adjudicated upon before actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder. While Order 21, Rule 99 on the other hand deals with the subsequent stage in the execution proceedings where a stranger claiming any right, title and interest in the decretal property might have got actually dispossessed and claims restoration of possession on adjudication of his independent right, title and interest dehors the interest of the judgment-debtor. Both these types of enquiries in connection with the right, title and interest of a stranger to the decree are clearly contemplated by the aforesaid scheme of Order 21 and it is not as if that such a stranger to the decree can come in the picture only at the final stage after losing possession and not before it if he is vigilant enough to raise his objection and obstruction before the warrant for possession gets actually executed against him. With respect the High Court has totally ignored the scheme of Order 21, Rule 97 in this connection by taking the view that only remedy of such stranger to the decree lies under Order 21, Rule 99 and he has no locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder in the execution proceedings. The view taken by the High Court in this connection also results in patent breach of principles of natural justice as the obstructionist, who alleges to have any independent right, title and interest in the decretal property and who is admittedly not a party to the decree even though making a grievance right in time before the warrant for execution is actually executed, would be told off the gates and his grievance would not be considered or heard on merits and he would be thrown off lock, stock and barrel by use of police force by the decree-holder. That would obviously result in irreparable injury to such obstructionist whose grievance would go overboard without being considered on merits and such obstructionist would be condemned totally unheard. Such an order of the executing court, therefore, would fail also on the ground of non-compliance with basic principles of natural justice. That would obviously result in irreparable injury to such obstructionist whose grievance would go overboard without being considered on merits and such obstructionist would be condemned totally unheard. Such an order of the executing court, therefore, would fail also on the ground of non-compliance with basic principles of natural justice. On the contrary the statutory scheme envisaged by Order 21, Rule 97 CPC as discussed earlier clearly guards against such a pitfall and provides a statutory remedy both to the decree-holder as well as to the obstructionist to have their respective say in the matter and to get proper adjudication before the executing court and it is that adjudication which subject to the hierarchy of appeals would remain binding between the parties to such proceedings and separate suit would be barred with a view to seeing that multiplicity of proceedings and parallel proceedings are avoided and the gamut laid down by Order 21, Rules 97 to 103 would remain a complete code and the sole remedy for the parties concerned to have their grievances once and for all finally resolved in execution proceedings themselves." (ii) Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd., v. Rajiv Trust reported in AIR 1998 SUPREME COURT 1754. An excerpt from it, would run thus: "10. ... The words “all questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97” would envelop only such questions as would legally arise for determination between those parties. In other words, the court is not obliged to determine a question merely because the resister raised it. The questions which the executing court is obliged to determine under Rule 101, must possess two adjuncts. First is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and the second is, such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties, e.g., if the obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. Similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the questions raised by the resister or the obstructor must legally arise between him and the decree-holder. Similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during execution proceedings. Hence, it is necessary that the questions raised by the resister or the obstructor must legally arise between him and the decree-holder. In the adjudication process envisaged in Order 21 Rule 97(2) of the Code, the execution court can decide whether the question raised by a resister or obstructor legally arises between the parties. An answer to the said question also would be the result of the adjudication contemplated in the sub-section. 11. In the above context we may refer to Order 21 Rule 35(1) which reads thus: “35. (1) Where a decree is for the delivery of any immovable property, possession thereof shall be delivered to the party to whom it has been adjudged, or to such person as he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf, and, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property.” 12-13. It is clear that the executing court can decide whether the resister or obstructor is a person bound by the decree and he refuses to vacate the property. That question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory process contemplated in Order 21 Rule 97(2) of the Code. The adjudication mentioned therein need not necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or collection of evidence. The court can make the adjudication on admitted facts or even on the averments made by the resister. Of course the court can direct the parties to adduce evidence for such determination if the court deems it necessary." As such, it is apparently and obviously clear that the decision in Nisar Ahmad v. V Additional District Judge, Azamgarh reported in AIR 1992 Allahabad 198 automatically is no more good law. 12. From the perusal of the aforesaid extracts, it is very clear that any person in possession of the property could file obstruction petition and such an obstruction petition should be dealt with like a suit and disposed of and there should not be any multiplicity of proceedings so as to cause harm to the genuine decree holder. 12. From the perusal of the aforesaid extracts, it is very clear that any person in possession of the property could file obstruction petition and such an obstruction petition should be dealt with like a suit and disposed of and there should not be any multiplicity of proceedings so as to cause harm to the genuine decree holder. The thought process on the part of both the Courts below is not convincing on that aspect, perhaps they have correctly understood that a person who is not connected with the suit property is having no right to obstruct the delivery and that it should not cause unnecessary harm to the genuine decree holder. Having that in mind, they went to the extent of dilating further unnecessarily and observing as though such trespassers petition under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure is technically not tenable. What both the Courts below intended was that trespasser had no substantial right to obstruct a genuine decree for delivery. 13. Hence, simply because they expressed their views in so many wrong words, their entire judgments cannot held to have got vitiated. 14. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would entreat and implore that the first appellate Court owing to misconception alone failed to remand the matter for enabling the obstructors to adduce evidence. In my opinion, that may not be the correct, because the first appellate Court in its judgment, dealt with the past history involved in it and held that they are only mere trespassers and not tenants and that ample opportunity was given to the obstructors to adduce evidence. Such a finding of fact has became final and no second appeal would lie as against it. 15. The first appellate Court also clearly and categorically held that no more further opportunity need be given as already ample opportunity was given. In my opinion, it is clearly understandable from the records that those petitioners/obstructors were given enormous time over and above what was required under law and as such, they had chosen not to adduce oral evidence. Now, they cannot veer round and take a plea that once again, an opportunity has to be given for them before the trial Court to adduce evidence. There is nothing to show that they are deprived of their due opportunity. 16. Now, they cannot veer round and take a plea that once again, an opportunity has to be given for them before the trial Court to adduce evidence. There is nothing to show that they are deprived of their due opportunity. 16. As such, I am of the considered opinion that this second appeal is not sustainable. Accordingly, the substantial question of law No.(i) is answered to the effect that in view of the decisions of the Honourable Apex Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal reported in AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 856 and Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd., v. Rajiv Trust reported in AIR 1998 SUPREME COURT 1754, the decision in Nisar Ahmad v. V Additional District Judge, Azamgarh reported in AIR 1992 Allahabad 198 is no more good law and that petitions filed under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure deserve to be dismissed not on the ground that Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable without surrendering possession, but on the ground that the petitioners had no right to resist the decree obtained by the respondents/plaintiffs on merits. The Substantial question of law No.(ii) is also decided on the same line as aforesaid. 17. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in an extempore manner would submit that sufficient time may be given for the appellants herein to vacate the premises. For several decades, the decree holders have been waiting to take delivery. Pro et contra, I am of the considered opinion that nine months could be given from this date for vacating the premises and handing over the possession of the suit property concerned. 18. In the result, all the second appeals are dismissed. No costs.