JUDGMENT : H.K. Rathod, J. Heard learned advocate Mr. Joy Mathew for the petitioner. In the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the award passed by the Labour Court, Bharuch in Reference No.25 of 1994 dated 30.3.2007 whereby the Labour Court, Bharuch has granted lumpsum amount being compensation of Rs.60,000/- in favour of respondent with cost of Rs.1000/-. 2. Learned advocate Mr. Mathew appearing for the petitioner raised contention that the person, who has not been employed by following regular recruitment procedure and in case of termination challenged, then, Section 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 is not applicable. He placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. v. Intazam Ali Jakuri, reported in 2006 (110) FLR 773 (SC). Relying upon Para.4 of the aforesaid decision, he submitted that when initial appointment itself is void then, provisions of Section 25 of the I.D.Act,1947 are not applicable while terminating the service of the workman. 3. I have considered the submissions made by learned advocate Mr. Mathew and have also considered the decision which has been relied by him. The respondent workman was appointed with the petitioner on 1.4.1991 as an Accountant. Thereafter, he was appointed as Auction Clerk w.e.f. 1.3.1993 and his service was terminated on 30.7.1993. That at the time of terminating the service, admittedly, Section 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 is not followed by petitioner. Against this termination, dispute was raised which referred for adjudication on 12.1.1994. Before the Labour Court, vide Exh.4, statement of claim was filed and vide Exh.18 written statement was filed by the petitioner. The contention raised by petitioner before the Labour Curt in written statement that there was no permission given by the Director to appoint the respondent in service and according to staff schedule sanctioned by the Director on 22.1.1992, four posts namely Secretary, Clerk-cum-Inspector, Clerk and Peon-cum-Watchman. Therefore, a specific contention was raised that petitioner has no authority to appoint any employee on permanent basis. Therefore, the respondent was appointed without following the recruitment rules, not entitled any relief from the Labour Court. Before the Labour Court, the petitioner has produced certain documents vide Exh.20 where a resolution passed by petitioner appointed the respondent was produced before the Labour Court as well as second resolution giving appointment to the respondent dated 20.2.1993 was also produced. Therefore, the respondent was appointed without following the recruitment rules, not entitled any relief from the Labour Court. Before the Labour Court, the petitioner has produced certain documents vide Exh.20 where a resolution passed by petitioner appointed the respondent was produced before the Labour Court as well as second resolution giving appointment to the respondent dated 20.2.1993 was also produced. The respondent has given application vide Exh.21 with a prayer to direct the petitioner to produce certain documents on record. Vide Exh.24 certain documents were produced on record by the petitioner and respondent has also produced certain documents on record. Vide Exh. 28 the workman was examined before the Labour Court and on behalf of petitioner, Shri Maheshbhai Lalbhai Patel was examined. Thereafter, certain decisions are relied upon by both the parties and the Labour Court has framed the issues and examined the merits of the matter. The Labour Court has discussed the evidence on record and after considering all the documentary evidence on record, the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that during 12 months period from July, 1993 to July, 1994 the workman has completed more than 307 days continuous service. The Labour Court has come to the conclusion that petitioner is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act, 1947. The respondent has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court wherein it is observed that when daily wager completed 240 days continuous service then his service should not have to be terminated by violating Section 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947. The workman also relied upon the decision of Apex Court in case of Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Rakesh Kumar, 2006 (108) FLR 592 (SC). The Labour Court relied upon the evidence produced by the petitioner - copy of presence register vide Mark-24/31. The respondent has also relied upon another decision of Apex Court reported in 2007 (112) FLR 162 in case of District Rehabilitation Officers and others v. Jay Kishore Maity and others where the Apex Court has taken the view that if the daily wager who has completed 240 days continuous service then, such service should not have to be terminated by violating Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947. The Labour Court has also relied upon the decision of Apex Court reported in case of Gujarat Agriculture University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar and others, 2001 (89) FLR 18 (SC). The contention of petitioner that workman has not completed 240 days continuous service has been rejected on the ground that documents which have been produced by petitioner vide Exh.24, Mark-24/31, the total period of 307 days is proved during 12 months period. Therefore, that contention was rejected by the Labour Court. This decision of Apex Court in case Rajasthan Tourism Development Ltd. (supra) which has been relied upon before this Court, was also relied upon by the petitioner before the Labour Court. After considering the submissions and discussion in respect to the evidence before the Labour Court, the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that merely completion of 240 days continuous service, the workman is not entitled for regularisation of his service. But in case when daily wager who completed 240 days continuous service, Section 25F of the I.D. Act,1947 is to be complied with by the employer. The Labour Court has also considered the decision of the Apex Court in case of Municipal Council, Sujanpur v. Surinder Kumar, reported in 2006 (110) FLR 198 (SC) where the Apex Court has observed that in case when Section 25F of the Act is violated then normal relief by way of reinstatement with full back wages would be lawful, it would not mean that the same would be granted automatically but, the Labour Court should have to consider the nature of appointment, the purpose for which such appointment has been made and duration/tenure of work, the question whether the post was a sanctioned one, being relevant facts, must be taken into consideration. 4. It is necessary to note one important aspect that respondent was not orally appointed and it was not the back door entry in the petitioner. In fact, the respondent was appointed by petitioner while issuing appointment order in his favour as Accountant and then Auction Clerk. These appointment orders were produced on record. It is also relevant that vide Exh.20 a resolution was produced by the petitioner wherein the respondent was appointed. Similarly, second resolution also placed on record by the petitioner dated 20.2.1993. Meaning thereby that respondent was not a daily wager. He was appointed by issuing resolution by the petitioner and accordingly, appointment was made. It is also relevant that vide Exh.20 a resolution was produced by the petitioner wherein the respondent was appointed. Similarly, second resolution also placed on record by the petitioner dated 20.2.1993. Meaning thereby that respondent was not a daily wager. He was appointed by issuing resolution by the petitioner and accordingly, appointment was made. It may be correct that Director has not given permission and his appointment is not against the sanctioned posts but that does not mean that he was daily wager working with the petitioner. On the contrary, the respondent was working with the petitioner after issuing resolution in favour of respondent by the petitioner. Therefore, workman who remained in service from 1.4.1991 upto 30.7.1993, his service was terminated without any justification by the petitioner. The petitioner has not made clear before the Labour Court that why his service was terminated by the petitioner and what was the justification in terminating the service of the respondent. Therefore, contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Mathew relying upon the decision in case of Rajasthan Tourism Development Ltd. (supra) that in case when initial appointment itself is void, then, the provisions of Section 25F of the I.D. Act, 1947 are not applicable. But, in the present case, initial appointment cannot be considered to be bad or illegal because respondent was appointed by petitioner by issuing resolution in his favour on both the occasions and accordingly, he was working with the petitioner. Therefore, some sort of procedure was followed by petitioner and accordingly, respondent was appointed. Therefore, the decision which has been relied upon by learned advocate Mr. Mathew is not applicable to the facts of this case. Ultimately, the Labour Court, relying upon the decision of Apex Court, has not granted reinstatement in favour of workman but considering the date of termination - 30.7.1993 and that the matter remained pending before the Labour Court for about more than 13 years and duration of service of the respondent about 2 years, the Labour Court has thought it fit and exercised discretionary power and not granted the reinstatement in favour of respondent workman and in lieu of reinstatement and back wages, the Labour Court has granted only Rs.60,000/- being compensation in favour of respondent workman. 5. Therefore, according to my opinion, the Labour Court has rightly exercised the discretionary power in favour of respondent. 5. Therefore, according to my opinion, the Labour Court has rightly exercised the discretionary power in favour of respondent. The Labour Court has considered some part of gainful employment against the respondent. Therefore, the Labour Court has given cogent reasons in support of its conclusion. There is no infirmity pointed out by learned advocate Mr. Mathew in the award of the Labour Court. Therefore, according to my opinion, the Labour Court has not committed any error which requires interference by this Court while exercising the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Hence, there is no substance in the present petition. Present petition is dismissed accordingly. Petition dismissed.