Judgment ( 1. ) THEY are heard. The present petition is filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 12. 12. 06 which is Annexure P/33 to the petition. By this order the respondents have cancelled the absorption of the petitioner and also directed for his repatriation to his parent department. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 20. 12. 06 passed by the respondents which is annexure P/32 whereby the respondents have refused to accept the joining of the petitioner and directed the petitioner to report for duty to his parent department. ( 2. ) IN the present case this Court passed an order on 15. 12. 06 to maintain the status-quo and according to the respondents the absorption of the petitioner was already cancelled before passing of the said order. ( 3. ) THE facts leading to the present case are that petitioner was working as Front Office Assistant in M. P. State Tourism Development Corporation ltd. , Bhopal. The petitioner got his posting for reception and management of various Hotels of the Corporation. A letter was issued on 17. 3. 99 to the corporation by the respondent No. 1 for sending the petitioner on deputation of the petitioner. The same was accepted and the petitioner by an order annexure P/2 dated 22. 3. 99 was attached in the Vidhan Sabha Secretariat. The petitioner joined his services on 24. 3. 99 with the Respondent No. 1. Subsequently again on behalf of respondent no. 1, a request was made to parent employer of the petitioner i. e. Corporation to extend the services of the petitioner in Vidhan Sabha Secretariat. By an order dated 18. 8. 2000 (Annexure P/6), the petitioner was appointed on deputation on the post of assistant Protocol Officer with the Respondent No. 1 in the pay scale of rs. 5000-9000/ -. According to the petitioner, the post of Assistant Protocol officer with the respondent no. 1 was sanctioned with the permission of the state Govt. and the necessary permission was also sought from the Tourism development Department Corporation to absorb the petitioner with the respondent no. 1 and the said Corporation gave "no Objection Certificate". Respondents thereafter passed an order on 08. 10. 02 (Annexure P/10) whereby the petitioner was absorbed as Assistant Protocol Officer. On his absorption the name of the petitioner was included in the seniority list. ( 4. 1 and the said Corporation gave "no Objection Certificate". Respondents thereafter passed an order on 08. 10. 02 (Annexure P/10) whereby the petitioner was absorbed as Assistant Protocol Officer. On his absorption the name of the petitioner was included in the seniority list. ( 4. ) SUBSEQUENTLY, a letter was issued on 05. 10. 06 (Annexure P/12) whereby certain information pertaining to service record of the petitioner was required along with the details relating to appointments, qualifications etc. The petitioner took time to file its reply and again the petitioner was issued two letters on 09. 11. 06 which are Annexure P/16 and P/17. The petitioner submitted reply to the same on 14. 11. 06 (Annexure P/18 ). After considering the reply of the petitioner, the respondents came to the conclusion that absorption of the petitioner was arbitrary and was illegal, therefore, a decision was taken by the respondents by passing the impugned order annexure P/33 to cancel the absorption of the petitioner and also to repatriate him to his parent Corporation. ( 5. ) ON the basis of the aforesaid facts learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order impugned Annexure P/33 is malafide exercise of powers as because of the changed political scenario in the State of M. P. , the action has been taken to repatriate the petitioner after canceling his absorption and the order impugned Annexure P/33 is without any jurisdiction and authority as the same has not been passed with the approval of the speaker. ( 6. ) IT is contended that the order impugned Annexure P/33 since has been passed by the Under Secretary, therefore, in view of the amendment of the rules regulating the recruitment which has been amended by way of notification dated 6th March, 2007 with effect from 11th November, 2002 is without jurisdiction and authority. ( 7. ) RESPONDENT No. 1 has filed its return and in the return, it is stated that absorption of the petitioner was not in accordance with the rules. It was contended that petitioner was arbitrarily absorbed. It was the case of the respondent no. 1 that the petitioner"s initial appointment was on Lower division Clerk with the Corporation and after his absorption, he has been given undue benefit by absorbing him five grades above than his original post of appointment. It is also contended by the respondent no. It was contended that petitioner was arbitrarily absorbed. It was the case of the respondent no. 1 that the petitioner"s initial appointment was on Lower division Clerk with the Corporation and after his absorption, he has been given undue benefit by absorbing him five grades above than his original post of appointment. It is also contended by the respondent no. 1 that there is no provision for absorption under the rules/regulations of the recruitment, on the post. ( 8. ) THE recruitment on the post in the Secretariat of Respondent no. 1 is governed by the M. P. Vidhan Sabha Secretariat (Recruitment and Condition of services) Rules, 1990, which were brought into force with effect from 8th may, 1981. It is also contended that the post of Assistant Protocol Officer was created de hors to the rules so as the absorption. ( 9. ) BEFORE considering the submissions so made by learned counsel for the petitioner it will be appropriate to refer to the relevant recruitment as. Rule 7, 13 and 18 which are relevant and reproduced as under: "7. Control and Discipline- (1) All officers and employees shall remain under the control and superintendence of the Speaker. (2) Under the authority of the Speaker, the secretary, Under Secretary or Special secretary may exercise all or any such power of the Head of the Department in the administrative and financial matters of the secretariat, as may be entrusted into them by the Speaker, from time to time by general or special order. " "13. Appointing Authority (a) Powers of recruitment and promotion on all Gazetted Posts shall vest in speaker. (b) Powers of recruitment and promotion on all other posts shall vest in secretary subject to the Authority of the Speaker. (c) Power to hold disciplinary control and imposition of punishment on the persons appointed on the Gazetted posts shall vest in Speaker and power to hold disciplinary control and imposition of punishment on the persons appointed on other posts shall vest in Secretary subject to the authority of the Speaker. Note :-The word Principal Secretary was substituted in Rule 7 and 13, by way of amendment dtd 06/03/2007 w. e. f 11/12/2002. "18. Note :-The word Principal Secretary was substituted in Rule 7 and 13, by way of amendment dtd 06/03/2007 w. e. f 11/12/2002. "18. Powers of the Speaker to issue orders- (A) The Speaker, from time to time by general or special order, may frame such scheme or schemes whereby recruitment/promotion, absorption or any post or class of posts may be made and there shall also be required qualification for appointment or posting on such categories of posts, which shall be determined by the speaker from time to time. (B) General or Special Order as mentioned in the previous Para shall be issued by the secretary, after deliberation, upon the recommendation of the Special Committee of the Legislative Assembly constituted for this. " ( 10. ) TO appreciate the contentions with reference to the relevant rules it is seen that the power of Control was vested with the Speaker by virtue of Rule 7 of the aforesaid rules and the Secretary, Under Secretary as well as Special secretary were empowered to take an action under the control and supervision of the Speaker. It also includes the administrative as well as financial control. Rule 7 and 13 were amended by way of a notification dated 6th March 2007, Accordingly, a Principle Secretary shall exercise the powers of control and supervision under the control of Speaker. The effect of such amendment has been that the Secretary, Under Secretary and Special secretary were not entitled to exercise any powers. Similar is the position with reference to Rule 13 which was also amended and in the said rule the word "secretary" has been substituted by the word "principle Secretary" and accordingly the Principle Secretary shall take action subject to approval by the Speaker. ( 11. ) ON the basis of the same, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the order impugned Annexure P/33 was passed on 12. 12. 06 and the rules were amended on 6. 3. 07 with effect from 11th of November, 2002, therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Under secretary was not empowered to take an action but the power to take action was vested with the Principal Secretary subject to approval by the Speaker. In the present case since the order has been passed by the Under Secretary, therefore, the order impugned is without any jurisdiction. ( 12. In the present case since the order has been passed by the Under Secretary, therefore, the order impugned is without any jurisdiction. ( 12. ) TO appreciate the aforesaid submission so made by learned counsel for the petitioner, the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted a note sheet to this Court and in the note sheet, approval of the speaker has been recorded. A proposal was submitted on 11. 12. 06 and the same was approved by the Speaker. On the basis of the note-sheet it is clear that the order has been passed with the approval of the Speaker, therefore, in this reference it cannot be said that there had been no approval by the speaker to cancel the absorption of the petitioner and also to repatriate him. The note sheet is taken on record. ( 13. ) THE further submission which the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the amendment in the recruitment rules were brought into force with effect from 11th November, 2002 by way of notification dated 6th March 2007, therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner since the amendment has come into force with effect from 11th of November, 2002, therefore, the effect of the notification dated 6th March 2007 is that the powers could not have been exercised by the Under Secretary with the approval of the Speaker. The powers could be only exercised by the Principle secretary with the approval of the Secretary. In the instance case under the secretary has exercised the powers and approval has been granted by the speaker, therefore, the action is not in accordance with Rule 7 and 13. ( 14. ) IN the present case Rule 13 has no application because the Rule 13 only defines the powers of recruitment and promotion for the Gazetted posts are vested with the Speaker and for the other posts which the power as such could be exercised by Secretary under the control of Speaker. Rule 13 (c)after the amendment provides with respect to the Discipline, Control and to impose the penalty. According to sub-rule (2) of Rule 13, the power is vested with the Secretary subject to control of Speaker. Thus, according to the same, the said rule will have no application in the present case. Rule 13 (c)after the amendment provides with respect to the Discipline, Control and to impose the penalty. According to sub-rule (2) of Rule 13, the power is vested with the Secretary subject to control of Speaker. Thus, according to the same, the said rule will have no application in the present case. In this reference rule 7 would be relevant which has the application in the present case wherein it is stated that all Govt. Officers and employees shall remain under the control and supervision of the Speaker. Sub Rule 2 of Rule 7 before amendment prescribed that in all administrative and financial matters, the secretary, Under Secretary or Special Secretary shall have power but the said rule has been amended with effect from 11th of November, 2002 by way of a 6th notification dated of March, 2007, therefore, in view of the said amendment, the question is whether on the date when the order impugned annexure P/33 dated 12. 12. 06was passed, the Under Secretary whether was having the administrative and financial control subject to approval of the speaker. ( 15. ) THERE was no amendment in the said rule on the date when the action was taken. The said rule has been amended subsequently by way of notification dated 6th March 2007 with effect from 11th of November, 2002 then in the instant case de-facto doctrine would have the application because on that date when the Secretary has exercised its power he has having lawful authority with him under unamended rules and also under Rule 13 even assuming that Rule 13 will have the application. Thus, the Under Secretary holding the lawful authority on the date when the action was taken, the action taken by him shall be valid even though the rule has been amended subsequently with effect from the date which is prior to the taking of the action by Under Secretary. ( 16. ) IN this reference, it will be appropriate to refer to the judgment passed by the Apex Court which is reported in the case of M/s Beopar Sahayak (P)Ltd. and Others Vs. Vishwa Nath and Others 1987 (3) SCC 693 and also in 1987 (3) SCC 397 (M/s Beopar Sahayak (P) Ltd. Vs. ( 16. ) IN this reference, it will be appropriate to refer to the judgment passed by the Apex Court which is reported in the case of M/s Beopar Sahayak (P)Ltd. and Others Vs. Vishwa Nath and Others 1987 (3) SCC 693 and also in 1987 (3) SCC 397 (M/s Beopar Sahayak (P) Ltd. Vs. Vishwa Nath and others) wherein law has been laid down by the Apex Court that a person holding lawful office under the colour of lawful authority, even if such person is not fully qualified to hold the office, orders passed by him in his official capacity cannot be challenged on ground of lack of his jurisdictional competence. ( 17. ) IN view of the De-facto doctrine, on the date when the action against the petitioner was taken by the Under Secretary, he was having a lawful authority unamended under Rule 7 as well as under Rule 13 with reference to administrative control subject to approval by the Speaker. Thus the subsequent notification according to me shall not have the effect to invalid action taken by the Under Secretary particularly on the date when he was having a lawful authority under the statutory rules. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that merely because Rules 7 and 13 were amended subsequently would have any effect to nullify the action already taken by the Under Secretary on the date when this amendment was there. ( 18. ) THE next question which arises in the present case keeping in view the nature of order that in the order impugned it has been stated that petitioner"s absorption was not in accordance with law and the petitioner was given a back door entry. ( 19. ) THE respondents have filed a letter issued from the Joint Director, treasury and Accounts dated 14. 01. 05 which is Annexure R/1 wherein various objections have been taken by the Finance Department with reference to the absorption and regulation of the petitioner. It is stated that initial appointment of the petitioner with the Tourism Department had been without any qualification and the petitioner was in the pay scale of Rs. 1150-1800/ -. Subsequently the petitioner was brought on deputation in a higher pay scale of Rs. 5500-9000/-which is five grade higher than the post which the petitioner was holding. It is stated that initial appointment of the petitioner with the Tourism Department had been without any qualification and the petitioner was in the pay scale of Rs. 1150-1800/ -. Subsequently the petitioner was brought on deputation in a higher pay scale of Rs. 5500-9000/-which is five grade higher than the post which the petitioner was holding. It is also stated that no qualification was prescribed for appointment to the post of Assistant Protocol Officer so on that the pay scale after absorption was given to the petitioner of Rs. 5500-9000/ -. ( 20. ) ON this basis, the service book of the petitioner was called for its verification and the petitioner was also issued a letter, to clarify his position, on 5. 10. 06 which is Annexure P/12 to the petition. The petitioner submitted comments on 9. 11. 06 and also filed his reply on 14. 11. 06 which is Annexure p/18 and thereafter the same was forwarded to the Speaker along with the note sheet for an appropriate decision. Ultimately a decision was taken against the petitioner to cancel his absorption. ( 21. ) LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 1 and 2 submitted that absorption for the reasons stated in the order impugned was de hors to the rules as the petitioner was given undue advantage by way of his absorption. It is submitted that under rule 18 of 1990 rules, the Speaker has power time to time by general or special order to frame a scheme or schemes with reference to recruitment/promotion/absorption on any post or class of posts which may be made and there shall also be required qualification for appointment or posting on such categories of posts, which shall be determined by the Speaker from time to time. Sub rule 2 also prescribes for the exercise of the powers vested with the Speaker under sub rule 1 that it could only be exercised after deliberation, upon the recommendation of the special Committee of the Legislative Assembly appointed for the purpose. ( 22. ) ON the basis of the same, it is clear that Rule 18 is only a enabling provision for the purpose of framing the scheme or schemes with reference to recruitment, promotion and absorption which may also include qualification with reference to the categories of posts in which the promotion, absorption or recruitment has to be made. ( 22. ) ON the basis of the same, it is clear that Rule 18 is only a enabling provision for the purpose of framing the scheme or schemes with reference to recruitment, promotion and absorption which may also include qualification with reference to the categories of posts in which the promotion, absorption or recruitment has to be made. According to the mandate of sub rule 2, the power as such could be exercised by the Secretary after due deliberation upon the recommendation of the Special Committee of the Legislative Assembly. It is only an enabling power with the Speaker to frame rules. This rule does not give power to the Speaker to absorb or to promote or to recommend any person for absorption but cannot be exercised without framing any scheme made under sub rule 2 of Rule 18 and that too after due deliberation upon also by recommendation of the Special Committee of the Legislative assembly. ( 23. ) LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner fairly submitted that neither any Committee was constituted nor there had been any deliberation nor any scheme or schemes were framed for absorption. ( 24. ) RULES of 1990 as aforesaid do not provide a mode for absorption but only provides a mode for recruitment. Now the question is that if recruitment rules does not provide a mode for absorption and rule 18 provides for framing of a scheme by the Speaker after due deliberation and also after recommendations of the Special Committee and if any scheme or schemes is ever framed for absorption as there was no special Committee appointed by the Legislative Assembly for absorption, whether petitioner"s absorption is without following the procedure as contemplated under Rule 18 could be a valid exercise of powers. As I have already discussed that the counsels for both the parties have not stated that there had been any scheme ever framed for absorption, now the question is in the absence of any scheme for absorption how the petitioner"s absorption can be said to be a valid exercise of power particularly in the light of Rule 18. Rules of 1990 do not prescribe for absorption but only prescribes mode of recruitment. Framing of scheme was necessary for absorption under Rule 18. Rules of 1990 do not prescribe for absorption but only prescribes mode of recruitment. Framing of scheme was necessary for absorption under Rule 18. It was necessary to prescribe the qualification and also to identify the post or class of posts on which the absorption could be made. The said power could be exercised after deliberation and also after recommendation of the Special Committee then while accepting the recommendations of the Special Committee, the Speaker may exercise such powers. Since the procedure of framing a scheme under rule 18 was not at all followed, therefore, it is very difficult to come to a conclusion that on what basis before absorption the post of Assistant Protocol officer was identified for the absorption. There is nothing on record to justify that the petitioner who was working as Lower Division Clerk could be absorbed 5 grades above to his original post of appointment. In the absence of any exercise as such it is very difficult to hold that absorption of the petitioner had been in accordance with the rules. ( 25. ) IN this reference the judgments passed by the Apex Court in the case of Indu Shekhar Singh and Others Vs. State of U. P. and Others 2006 (8)SCC 129 is relevant wherein the Apex Court was considering the difference between transfer and deputation and after considering the same it is held in para 39 of the said judgment that a difference between transfer and deputation would be immaterial where an appointment by transfer is permissible, where personnel are drawn from different sources by way of deputation. It is one thing to say that a deputationist may be regarded as having been appointed on transfer when the deputation is from one department of the Government to another department, but it would be another thing to say that employees are recruited by different statutory authorities in terms of different statutory rules. ( 26. ) SINCE in the present case it is an appointment by way of transfer on deputation bringing a person on deputation from one department to another which is not permissible, therefore, this situation shall make a material difference in the present case. ( 27. ) THE Apex Court again in para 42 considered that where a provision for appointment by way of absorption on deputation exists then the situation shall be entirely different. ( 27. ) THE Apex Court again in para 42 considered that where a provision for appointment by way of absorption on deputation exists then the situation shall be entirely different. The Apex Court was considering this question with reference to grant of seniority to a person. The Apex Court held that if the recruitment rules permits absorption of a person who is on deputation then he may have a right for seniority. ( 28. ) THE Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vs. Uma Devi and Others 2006 (4) SCC 1 has further held that the appointments could only be made by adopting various modes as permissible under the rules, may be by way of absorption, regularization or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual or other employees. If the absorption is not permissible as a mode under the rules then that will have the effect of creating another mode of appointment which is not permissible under the rules. As I have already held earlier that the only permissible mode of recruitment under the rule is appointment and promotion and not by way of absorption. Rule 18 only provides for framing of scheme. The absorption could only be made after framing of scheme in the manner as prescribed under the said rules. ( 29. ) ON the basis of the aforesaid decisions which are referred hereinabove, it is to be seen that under the rule, once no power is vested with the authority under the recruitment rules then in the absence of power for absorption, how an authority can direct for the absorption of a person who was brought on deputation and particularly when the authority as such has absorbed the petitioner five grades above to the grade which he was holding. Even assuming that the power is prescribed to absorb then the power under rule 18 has to be exercised in the manner as prescribed under Rule 18. I have already held earlier that it has no power for absorption but is only an enabling clause and that enabling power has to be exercised in the manner as provided under the rule. ( 30. I have already held earlier that it has no power for absorption but is only an enabling clause and that enabling power has to be exercised in the manner as provided under the rule. ( 30. ) ADMITTEDLY, in the present case there is no deliberation, no recommendation of the Special Committee or Legislative Assembly, nor their identification of the post, no qualification for the post then under the circumstances the power of absorption cannot be said to be a valid exercise of power and thus the absorption of the petitioner was contrary to the rules. The objection was taken by the Finance Department in the present case. ( 31. ) ON the basis of the overall discussion as aforesaid, I am of the view that in the present case there had been no absorption of the petitioner in accordance with law and absorption of the petitioner is de hors to the rules. ( 32. ) THE next question which arises for consideration is that after when the order of petitioner"s appointment on the post of Assistant Protocol Officer in passed, then there is correspondence on record from the M. P. State Tourism development Corporation which is annexure R/1 dated 17. 1. 07. The said corporation has expressed its desire to continue the lien services of the petitioner in his parent department subject to joining of his services in the parent corporation. Thus it is not a case where lien of the petitioner from the parent department is lost. The parent corporation has also expressed his willingness to accept the services of the petitioner after his repatriation. Thus, under the circumstances I do not find that the judgment passed by the Apex court in 2006 (10) SCC 214 (Surendra Singh VS. State of M. P.) applies to the present case. ( 33. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner also made a submission that because of the change in the political scenario in the State of M. P. , action has been taken, therefore, it is malafide exercise of power. This submission is considered. Once the allegation with reference to malafide was made then the petitioner ought to have impleaded the person who has acted malafidely to take action against him. No person as such has been impleaded by name by him who has acted malafidely. This submission is considered. Once the allegation with reference to malafide was made then the petitioner ought to have impleaded the person who has acted malafidely to take action against him. No person as such has been impleaded by name by him who has acted malafidely. Merely because there had been a change in the political scenario, that by itself would not be sufficient to hold the action malafide. The pleadings does not establish the fact with regard to malafide and, therefore, the pleadings as such are vague. Thus, the submission so made by learned counsel for the petitioner that because of the change in political scenario in the State of M. P. , the action has been taken against the petitioner cannot be accepted and also for the reasons that I have held the action valid. ( 34. ) IN this reference it has to be seen whether merely because there had been a change in political scenario whether the action against the petitioner is malafide. The question in this regard has been considered by the Apex Court firstly in AIR 1969 SC 215 (P. V. Jagannath Rao and others Vs. State of orissa and others) and in paragraph 7 and 8 the following law has been laid down which is reproduced as under:we pass on to consider the next question arising in these appeals, namely whether the power was exercised by the State Government for a purpose alien to the statute. It was contended by Mr. Asoke sen that there was a bitter political rivalry between the appellants on the one hand and Shri Pabitra mohan Pradhan, Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri sigh Deo and the other persons who are at present in charge of the Orissa administration. Reference was made by Mr. Asoke Sen to the political history of the state of Orissa from 1947 up to the General elections, 1967 and in particular to the rivalry between Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Singh Deo who was the leader of Opposition in the previous government and also to the internal rivalry between the two political groups in the Congress Legislative party, one led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab and the other led by Shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra. It was urged that the Commission was set up by the present Orissa Government not in the public interest but for a collateral purpose, namely, for getting rid of shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and driving them out of the political life of Orissa. Mr. Asoke Sen said that the object of the enquiry was character assassination of Shri Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra and so the Commission was set up for a collateral purpose and the notification must be struck down as illegal and ultra vires. It is not possible, in our opinion, to accept this argument as correct. It is admitted that there is political rivalry in Orissa between the appellants and the present Chief minister of Orissa Shri R. N. Singh Deo and also as between the appellants and the group of Congress dissidents led by Shri Harekrushna Mahtab, Shri nabakrushna Choudhury, Shri Pabitra Mohan pradhan, Shri Santanu Kumar Das and Shri surendranath Patnaik. But we do not think that the existence of political rivalry is in itself sufficient to hold that the appointment of the Commission of inquiry is illegal. Having perused the affidavits of the appellants and also those filed by the respondents in this case we are of opinion that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was not due merely to the existence of political rivalry of the parties but was impelled by the desire to set up and maintain high standards of moral conduct in the political administration of the State. As we have already pointed out, the object of appointing the Commission is stated in the notification itself as "the rectification and prevention of recurrence of such lapses and securing the ends of justice and establishing a moral public order in future". In the affidavit of Shri Pabitra mohan Pradhan it is stated that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was one of the items of the common programme on which the Jana Congress and the Swatantra Party contested the General elections of 1967. In the affidavit of Shri Pabitra mohan Pradhan it is stated that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry was one of the items of the common programme on which the Jana Congress and the Swatantra Party contested the General elections of 1967. As a result of the popular mandate the Swatantra Party and the Jana Congress coalition took charge of the reins of Government and in accordance with the solemn promise made by those parties to the people of Orissa the Government decided to appoint a Commission of Inquiry in order to investigate the widespread corruption practised by the persons named in the Schedule to the impugned notification. The decision to appoint a Commission was also announced in the first address of the governor to the Orissa Legislative Assembly after the 1967 General Elections. In paragraph 17 of the affidavit, Shri Pabitra Mohan Pradhan has further said that the object of the Jana Congress and the swatantra Party was "to set up a clean administration, so that the States resources should not go into the pockets of the corrupt group led by shri Biju Patnaik and Shri Biren Mitra but should be used for giving a better life to the people of the state". In para 6 of the affidavit Shri Pabitra Mohan pradhan further states: "i have always believed and still believe that politics is not for the purpose of serving the selfish ends and to satisfy the greed of any politician or any person or any group of persons. Politics is for the service of the people and involves sacrificing ones life and comforts for raising the living standard of the overwhelming poverty-stricken people of our State and our country so that they may enjoy a good life and hold up their heads with pride. " in para 5 he has denied that there was any intention on his part to carry on character assassination of shri Biju Patnaik, Shri Bireu Mitra and their group. " in para 5 he has denied that there was any intention on his part to carry on character assassination of shri Biju Patnaik, Shri Bireu Mitra and their group. It is true that the appointment of the Commission of inquiry may have been made partly on account of the political rivalry between the parties but having perused the affidavits filed by the appellants and the respondents in this case, we are satisfied that the main object of the appointment of the Commission inquiry was not to satisfy the political rivalry of the politicians at present in power in Orissa but to promote measures or maintaining purity and integrity of the administration in future in the Orissa state. We are accordingly of the opinion that Mr. Asoke Sen is unable to make good his argument that the impugned notification is a mala fide exercise of the statutory power and it should be struck down as illegal. 8. It is well settled that if a statutory authority exercises its power for a purpose not authorised by the law the action of the statutory authority is ultra vires and without jurisdiction. In other words, it is a mala fide exercise of power in the eye of law, i. e. , an exercise of power by a statutory authority for a purpose other than that which the Legislature intended (See The King v. Minister of Health, 1929-1 kb 619 ). But the question arises as to what is the legal position if an administrative authority acts both for an authorised purpose and for an unauthorised purpose. In such a case where there is a mixture of authorised and unauthorised purpose, what should be the test to be applied to determine the legal validity of the administrative act ? The proper test to be applied in such a case is as to what is the dominant purpose for which the administrative power is exercised. To put it differently, if the administrative authority pursues two or more purposes of which one is authorised and the other unauthorised the legality of the administrative act should be determined by reference to the dominant purpose. This principle was applied in Rex v. Brighton Corporation; ex parte Shoosmith, (1907) 96 lt 762. To put it differently, if the administrative authority pursues two or more purposes of which one is authorised and the other unauthorised the legality of the administrative act should be determined by reference to the dominant purpose. This principle was applied in Rex v. Brighton Corporation; ex parte Shoosmith, (1907) 96 lt 762. A Borough Corporation expended a large sum of money upon altering and paving a road, which was thereby permanently improved, but they decided to do the work at the particular time when it was done in order to induce the Automobile Club to hold motor trials and motor races upon it. The Court of Appeal (reversing the decision of the Divisional court), refused to intervene, and it was observed by fletcher-Moulton, L. J. at page 764 as follows:" it cannot be denied that the physical act of changing the surface of a road when the corporation thought fit and proper so to do was within their statutory powers and there is no case proved by the evidence which shows either that they wastefully used the public money or that they did so with improper motives. The case would be quite different if one came to the conclusion that under the guise of improvement of a road, certain moneys had been used really for diminishing the expenses of the automobile Club or anything of that sort and that there had been a turning aside of public moneys to illicit purposes". The principle was applied by Denning, L. J. in Earl fitzwilliams Wentworth Estate Co. Ltd. v. Minister of town and Country Planning, I951-2 KB 284. It was a case concerning the validity of a compulsory purchase made by the Central land Board, and confirmed by the Minister, under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, in respect of a plot of land, ripe for development, which the owner was not prepared to sell at the existing use value. The landowner applied to have the order quashed, as not having been made for any purpose connected with the Boards function under the Act, but for the purpose of enforcing the Boards policy of sales at existing use values. The landowner applied to have the order quashed, as not having been made for any purpose connected with the Boards function under the Act, but for the purpose of enforcing the Boards policy of sales at existing use values. The majority (consisting of Somerwell and Singleton, L. J.) held that, though the main purpose of the Board may well have been to induce landowners in general and the company, in particular, to adopt one of the methods of sale favoured by the Board, it was nevertheless in connection with their function as the authority operating the development charge scheme, and at any rate, "the case was not one in which it could be said that powers were exercised for a purpose different from those specified in the statute". Denning, L. J. disagreed with the majority and held that the dominant purpose of the Board was not to assist in their proper function of collecting the development charge, but to enforce their policy of sales at existing use value only. The dominant purpose being unlawful, the order was invalid, and could not be cured by saying that there was also some other purpose which was lawful. The Board and the Minister had misunderstood the extent of their compulsory powers and their affidavits showed that they had overlooked that their ultimate purpose in exercising their powers should be connected with the performance of the Boards functions under the act. At page 307 of the Report Denning L. J. observed as follows: "what is the legal position when the board have more than one purpose in mind ? In the ordinary way, of course, the courts do not have regard to the purpose or motive or reason of an act but. only to its intrinsic validity. For instance, an employer who dismisses a servant for a bad reason may justify it for a good one, so long as he finds it at any time before the trial. But sometimes the validity of an act does depend on the purpose with which it is done-as in the case of a conspiracy-and in such a case, when there is more than one purpose, the law always has regard to the dominant purpose. But sometimes the validity of an act does depend on the purpose with which it is done-as in the case of a conspiracy-and in such a case, when there is more than one purpose, the law always has regard to the dominant purpose. If the dominant purpose of those concerned is unlawful, then the act done is invalid, and it is not to be cured by saying that they had some other purpose in mind and which was lawful see what Lord Simon, Lord Maugham and lord Wright said in Crofter Hand Woven Harris tweed Co. v Veitch, (1942 AC 435, 445, 452-3, 469, 475 ). So also the validity of government action often depends on the purpose with which it is done. There, too, the same principle applies. If Parliament grants a power to a government department to be used for an authorized purpose, then the power is only validly exercised when it is used by the department genuinely for that purpose as its dominant purpose. If that purpose is not the main purpose, but is subordinate to some other purpose which is not authorized by law, then the department exceeds its powers and the action is invalid. " ( 35. ) THE aforesaid judgment has been considered by the Apex court in AIR 1969 SC 258 (Krishna Ballabh Sahay and others Vs. Commission of Inquiry and others) and in paragraph 8 it is held as under: 8. This brings us to the main question. As we pointed out above the first argument consists of two limbs. We shall examine them separately. The contention that the power cannot be exercised by the succeeding ministry has been answered already by this Court in two cases. The earlier of the two has been referred to by the High Court already. The more recent case is P. V. Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa, (Civil Appeals Nos. 1148-l150 of 1968, D/-30-41968)= ( AIR 1969 SC 215 ). It hardly needs any authority to state that the inquiry will be ordered not by the Minister against himself but by some one else. When a Ministry goes out of office, its successor may consider any glaring charges and may, if justified, order an inquiry. Otherwise, each Ministry will become a law unto itself and the corrupt conduct of its Ministers will remain beyond scrutiny. When a Ministry goes out of office, its successor may consider any glaring charges and may, if justified, order an inquiry. Otherwise, each Ministry will become a law unto itself and the corrupt conduct of its Ministers will remain beyond scrutiny. The High court has adequately dealt with this point and we see no error. ( 36. ) ON the basis of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court merely because there had been a change in the political scenario in the State of M. P. , the action taken by the respondents against the petitioner cannot be held to be bad particularly when I have already held that the absorption of the petitioner was contrary to the rules and was unauthorized. ( 37. ) IN the present case the petitioner was issued notices to file the reply and also to explain the circumstances. These are Annexure-12 dtd 05/10/2006. Thereafter the time was also given to him to supply the necessary information while accepting the request of the petitioner. The petitioner ultimately filed him reply (Annexure-P-12 ). Thus it is that case that the petitioner was given full opportunity. The learned counsel for the petitioner also has not addressed as to how no opportunity was given to the petitioner. ( 38. ) COUNSEL for the petitioner also cited the judgment dtd 18/05/2007 passed by me in W. P. No. 3863/2006 (S) (Harish Chandra Agrawal Vs. State of M. P. and others), but could not show as to how the said judgment applied to the petitioner"s case. ( 39. ) FOR the reasons stated hereinabove, I do not find any case on merits. No order as to the costs.