JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—These two writ petitions raise similar questions, have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Heard Sri Sunil Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents. 3. In view of the order, which is being passed in the writ petition, no notices have been issued to respondents No. 4 and 5. 4. Writ Petition No. 13548 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the first writ petition) has been filed praying for quashing the order dated 30th April, 2007 passed by the Additional Collector holding that application under Section 198(4) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 filed by respondent No. 4 is maintainable and the date was fixed for hearing the parties on merits. Against the order dated 30th April, 2007 a revision was filed by the petitioners, which has been dismissed by the order dated 29th February, 2008. 5. In Writ Petition No. 14110 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the second writ petition) petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 30th April, 2007 passed by the Additional Collector taking the view that applicants are eligible persons to maintain the proceedings under Section 198(4) and the parties may address arguments on merits. A revision was filed against the said order, which has been dismissed by the order dated 29th February, 2008 by the Additional Commissioner. 6. Brief facts of first writ petition are; the petitioners were granted agricultural lease by resolution dated 30th December, 1998 by the Land Management Committee, which was approved by Sub Divisional Officer on 22nd March, 1999. Respondents No. 4 and 5 filed an application for cancellation of the lease in favour of the petitioners under Section 198(4) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. The applications were presented before the Collector on 24th January, 2003, which was received by the Additional Collector on 27th January, 2003 by transfer. An order was passed for summoning the file and 21st February, 2003 was fixed for preliminary hearing. The order-sheet dated 26th February, 2003 notes that service of notice on respondents is sufficient. On 28th March, 2003 order-sheet notes that both the parties are present. Thereafter several dates were fixed in the case; on some dates both the parties were present and on some dates only applicants were present. The order-sheet dated 26th February, 2003 notes that service of notice on respondents is sufficient. On 28th March, 2003 order-sheet notes that both the parties are present. Thereafter several dates were fixed in the case; on some dates both the parties were present and on some dates only applicants were present. On 27th August, 2004 both the parties were absent. The District Government Counsel was heard. The Additional Collector noticed that show cause notice has not been issued to the respondents. An order was passed on 27th August, 2004 for issuing show cause notice to the respondents and 9th September, 2004 was fixed. An objection was filed by the petitioners in which the respondents also raised a ground that application is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 198(6) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. On 30th April, 2007 the Additional Collector heard the parties. The Additional Collector observed that the case was filed within time, same is maintainable and although there was delay in service of notice but that is not the responsibility of the applicants. A revision was filed. The revisional Court took the view that Additional Collector has only passed the order regarding issue of maintainability and the parties have opportunity to have their say on merits and the order of the trial Court being interlocutory in nature, no ground is made out to interfere with the order. The revision was dismissed. The first writ petition has been filed challenging both the orders. 7. The facts of second writ petition in brief are; petitioners claimed allotment of land by resolution dated 23rd February, 1997, which was said to be approved by the Sub Divisional Officer on 20th June, 1997. An application for cancelling the lease was filed on 19th January, 2005 before the Collector who directed registration of the case and transferred the case to Additional Collector. On 24th January, 2005 the Additional Collector directed for issuing notice. Several dates thereafter were fixed. The respondents appeared through Counsel. Absence of their Counsel was noted on 28th March, 2005. Both the parties were present on several dates. An objection was raised regarding maintainability of the application that application is barred by time. The Additional Collector on 30th April, 2007 heard the parties regarding maintainability of the application. Several dates thereafter were fixed. The respondents appeared through Counsel. Absence of their Counsel was noted on 28th March, 2005. Both the parties were present on several dates. An objection was raised regarding maintainability of the application that application is barred by time. The Additional Collector on 30th April, 2007 heard the parties regarding maintainability of the application. The Additional Collector observed that the land in dispute is a land covered under Section 132 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, which could not have been leased out, hence the question of eligibility of the lessee becomes irrelevant, and the case cannot be treated to be not maintainable. Against the said order revision was filed, which revision was rejected. The revisional Court also observed that land in dispute is a land covered under Section 132 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and the parties have opportunity to have their say in the trial Court, hence no ground is made out to interfere with the impugned order. 8. Sri Sunil Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioners, challenging the orders passed by the Additional Collector and the Revisional Court, contended, that applications filed by the respondents in both the cases were barred by time and no notice could have been issued to the petitioners in view of the provisions of Section 198(6) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. He submitted that Section 198(5) provides that no order of cancellation of an allotment or lease shall be made unless a notice to show cause is served on the person in whose favour allotment was made. He submitted that under sub-section (6) of Section 198 every notice to show cause mentioned in sub-section (5) may be issued in case of allotment of land made after 10th November, 1980 within five years from the said date. He submitted that in both the cases notices were issued after five years, hence proceedings are not maintainable. 9. In first writ petition, the submission of the petitioners was that from the order-sheet dated 27th August, 2004 it is clear that show-cause notice, for the first time, was issued on that date and the allotment which was under challenge having been made on 22nd March, 1999 and 27th August, 2004 being beyond five years, the proceedings are liable to be set-aside. With regard to second writ petition, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that even application was filed after five years from the date of allotment. Learned Counsel submitted that the date of filing of application is irrelevant and the relevant date for purposes of Section 198(6) is the date of issue of show cause notice. He further submitted that Additional Collector has wrongly stated that if the application is filed within time, the same cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation. He placed reliance on judgment of this Court reported in 1993 R.D. 233; Ram Naresh Lal v. State of U.P. and others and judgments of the Apex Court reported in A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1875; Dr. Ajay Pradhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others and (1992)3 S.C.C. 169 , Ashok Singh v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Calcutta and others. 10. Learned Standing Counsel refuting the submissions of Counsel for the petitioners, contended that in case application is filed within time as prescribed under Section 198(6), the application is maintainable even if order for issuing notice has been passed subsequently. He submitted that filing of the application within time under Section 198(4) is sufficient compliance of limitation and the issue of notice is an act upon which the applicant has no control, hence the rights of the applicant cannot be defeated by non-issue of notice or issue of notice with delay. In suppont of his submission, learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance on judgment of this Court reported in 1998(89) R.D. 450, Ajay Singh and another v. Board of Revenue, Allahabad and others. 11. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. The issue raised in the writ petition is as to whether question of limitation as prescribed under Section 198(6) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 will be computed from the date of issue of show cause notice or from the date of filing the application by the applicant. Before proceeding to consider the issue raised, it is relevant to note the provisions of Section 198(5) and (6). Section 198(5) and 198(6) are quoted below : “198. Order of preference in admitting persons to land under Sections 195 and 197.—(1).................................. (2) ............................................. (3) ............................................. (4) ............................................. Before proceeding to consider the issue raised, it is relevant to note the provisions of Section 198(5) and (6). Section 198(5) and 198(6) are quoted below : “198. Order of preference in admitting persons to land under Sections 195 and 197.—(1).................................. (2) ............................................. (3) ............................................. (4) ............................................. (5) No order for cancellation of an allotment or lease shall be made under sub-section (4), unless a notice to show cause is served on the person in whose favour the allotment or lease was made or on his legal representatives: Provided that no such notice shall be necessary in proceedings for the cancellation of any allotment or lease where such proceedings were pending before the Collector or any other Court or authority on August 18,1980. (6) Every notice to show cause mentioned in sub-section (5) may be issued: (a) in the case of an allotment of land made before November 10, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the said date, before the expiry of a period of [seven years] from the said date; and (b) in the case of an allotment of land made on or after the said date, before the expiry of a period of [five years from the date of such allotment or lease or up to November 10, 1987, whichever be later.]” 13. Section 198(5) provides that no order of cancellation of an allotment of lease be made unless a notice to show cause is served on the person in whose favour allotment or lease was made. The said provision contains the requirement of hearing a lessee before cancelling his lease. The most relevant provision, which is relied by the petitioners is Section 198(6), which provides that every notice to show cause mentioned in sub-section (5) may be issued in case of allotment of land made after 10th November, 1980 before expiry of the period of five years from the date of such allotment or up to November 10, 1987, whichever is later. 14. From the scheme of Section 198, it is clear that right has been given to any person aggrieved by allotment to make an application to the Collector, who may inquire in the manner prescribed in such allotment and if he is satisfied that allotment is irregular, he may cancel the allotment. It is in the power of the applicant to move an application. It is in the power of the applicant to move an application. In case an applicant files an application under Section 198(4) he has no control over the Collector with regard to issue of show cause notice in case where the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 198(6) is going to expire even on a day next. When an application is filed and entertained, the said application cannot be thrown out on the ground that the case could not be attended by the Collector or no order for issuing notice could be passed by the Collector. 15. The question as to whether a statute is directory or mandatory has been considered by this Court and the Apex Court in several cases. The test for statutory interpretation has been laid down. It is useful to refer the judgment of the Privy Council reported in AIR 1917 PC 142, Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin. The Privy Council laid down following : “When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such, that to hold null and void, acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons, who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time, would not promote the main object of the Legislature, such provisions are to be held to be directory only, the neglect of them though punishable not affecting the validity of the acts done.” 16. The Apex Court had occasion to consider the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 224, Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. The Workmen. Section 17 of the said Act provided that it is obligatory on the Government to publish an award within 30 days, the questions arose as to whether the provision is mandatory or not and whether an award published beyond 30 days is invalid? The Apex Court held that provision that award should be published within 30 days is not mandatory and an award published beyond 30 days is not invalid. Following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraph 3 of the said judgment : “Mr. The Apex Court held that provision that award should be published within 30 days is not mandatory and an award published beyond 30 days is not invalid. Following was laid down by the Apex Court in paragraph 3 of the said judgment : “Mr. Gokhale also referred us to the case of the State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Babu Ram Upadhyay (2) where there is an elaborate discussion as to whether the use of the word “shall” in a Statute made the provision mandatory. It was observed by Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speaking for the majority of the Court that : “For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature the Court may consider inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstances, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered.” Keeping the above principles in mind, we cannot but hold that a provision as to time in Section 17(1) is merely directory and not mandatory. Section 17(1) makes it obligatory on the Government to publish the award. The limit of time has been fixed as showing that the publication of the award ought not to be held up. But the fixation of the period of 30 days mentioned therein does not mean that the publication beyond that time will render the award invalid. It is not difficult to think of circumstances when the publication of the award within thirty days may not be possible. For instance, there may be a strike in the press or there may be any other good and sufficient cause by reason of which the publication could not be made within thirty days. If we were to hold that the award would therefore be rendered invalid, it would be attaching undue importance to a provision not in the mind of the legislature. If we were to hold that the award would therefore be rendered invalid, it would be attaching undue importance to a provision not in the mind of the legislature. It is well known that it very often takes a, long period of time for the reference to be concluded and the award to be made. If the award becomes invalid merely on the ground of publication after thirty days, it might entail a fresh reference with needless the parties. The non-publication of the award within the period of thirty days does not entail any penalty and this is another consideration which has to be kept in mind. What was said in the earlier passage from the judgment in Sirsilk Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1) merely shows that it was not open to Government to withhold publication but this Court never meant to lay down that the period of time fixed for publication was mandatory.” 17. A perusal of the scheme indicates that limitation for filing the application is prescribed but issue of notice is a requirement, which has to be read as directory. It is well settled that a requirement of statute, which cast a duty on a public official, on which applicant has no control, has to be read as directory. Any other interpretation shall defeat the object and purpose of the Act. The statute never intended that by inaction or not passing order on an application, which is filed within time, the rights be defeated. The view that notice is only directory and not mandatory can further be fortified by taking an example. In a case where application is filed for cancelling a lease within limitation by an applicant and the allottee put in appearance on the same date and contests the matter, there may not be any requirement of issuing notice to the allottee, he having been heard and contested- the matter. The above view of mine is fully fortified by the judgment of this Court in Ajay Singh’s case (supra) in which same clause of Section 198(6) has been interpreted. This Court laid down following in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment : “9. The second submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the notice was issued to the allottees on 18.11.1987 and therefore the entire proceeding under Section 198 of the Act was barred by limitation. This Court laid down following in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment : “9. The second submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the notice was issued to the allottees on 18.11.1987 and therefore the entire proceeding under Section 198 of the Act was barred by limitation. It is admitted that respondent No. 4 had filed application under Section 198(4) of the Act for cancellation of the lease. On the said application the trial Court is alleged to have issued notice on 16.11.1987. It is necessary to refer to sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) (a) and (b) : “[(4) The [Collector] may of his own motion and shall on the application of any person aggrieved by an allotment of land inquire in the manner prescribed into such allotment and if he is satisfied that the allotment is irregular, he may cancel the allotment and the lease, if any. (5) No order for cancellation of an allotment or lease shall be made under sub-section (4), unless a notice to show cause is served on the person in whose favour the allotment or lease was made or on his legal representatives: Provided that no such notice shall be necessary in proceedings for the cancellation of any allotment or lease where such proceedings were pending before the Collector or any other Court or authority on August 18, 1980. (6) Every notice to show cause mentioned in sub-section (5) may be issued: (a) in the case of an allotment of land made before November 10, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the said date, before the expiry of a period of [seven years] from the said date; and (b) in the case of an allotment of land made on or after the said date, before the expiry of a period of [five years from the date of such allotment or lease or up to November 10, 1987, whichever be later.] 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that under sub-section (6) the emphasis is with regard to issue of a notice under sub-section (5) of the Act which must be before the expiry of a period of seven years i.e. before November 10, 1980 as the allotment of the land was made before November 10, 1980. This provision must be read along with the provision of sub-section (4) of Section 198 of the Act. This provision must be read along with the provision of sub-section (4) of Section 198 of the Act. Under sub-section (4) of Section 198 the Collector may on his own motion and shall on the application of any person aggrieved by an allotment of land, inquire in the manner prescribed into such allotment. He can exercise power suo moto as well as on the application. If he exercises power suo moto he has to issue a notice to the person whose allotment of land is to be cancelled. He applies his mind when issues a notice after taking cognizance in the matter after perusal of the record or information received by him but in a case where an application is filed by a person under Section 198(4) of the Act, the issuance of notice is procedural. The date of the application shall be relevant and not the date of issue of notice. A person has right to file application under Section 198(4) of the Act for cancellation of lease granted to an allottee and the right cannot be defeated because the notice is not issued by the officer or its ministerial staff. It may be noted that application is filed in time, the officer does not get time to consider the application and passes an order for issue of notice after some time or there may be cases when officer has passed the order to issue notice but the clerk or the person who are to take the steps for service of notice, issues notice in compliance of the order of the officer after expiry of period of limitation. This will not make the application as barred by time. The notice has been issued on the application filed by respondent No. 2 under sub­section (4) of Section 198 of the Act. The application was filed within the period of limitation. Notice is alleged to have been issued on day after the prescribed date, i.e., 10.11.1987.” 18. It is also useful to refer the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2001)7 S.C.C. 549 , Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others. The Apex Court had occasion to examine Section 20 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 in the said case. Section 20 provides : “20. It is also useful to refer the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2001)7 S.C.C. 549 , Pallav Sheth v. Custodian and others. The Apex Court had occasion to examine Section 20 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 in the said case. Section 20 provides : “20. Limitation for actions for contempt.—No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.” 19. The issue before the Court was as to whether after expiry of one year even though the application for contempt has been filed within time the Court is debarred to initiate proceeding. The earlier view of the Apex Court as laid down in the judgment of Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal, (2000)3 S.C.C. 171 was that unless the Court applies its mind and initiates the proceeding, mere filing of application was inconsequential and the application will be barred by time. The said view of the Apex Court was overruled by three Judges Bench of the Apex Court holding that in the event an application is filed within time, the same cannot be rejected as barred by time even though the Court has not applied its mind or initiated proceeding within time. Following was laid down in paragraphs 41 and 42 of the said judgment: “41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act, which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the Court, a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Venugopal would mean that the Court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of the contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the Court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Venugopal would mean that the Court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of the contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the Court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigants as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the Court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the Courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in case of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided. 42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal case to the effect that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the Court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has been committed and issued notice to the contemner to show cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate Court is committed, a report is prepared whether on an application to Court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate Court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a High Court can take further action under Section 15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate Court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate Court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate Court or the High Court, making of a reference by a subordinate Court on its own motion or the filing of an application before an Advocate General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the Court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not be impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the Courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution.” 20. The view of the Apex Court in above case fully supports the view, which is being taken with regard to interpretation of Section 198(6) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. 21. The judgment, which has been relied by Counsel for the petitioners in Ram Naresh Lal’s case (supra) was a case where this Court did not deal with the issue, which is raised in the present writ petition. In the said case proceedings were initiated well within time and the Court rejected the contention. The Court in the said judgment held that both the proceedings were initiated within time and the show cause notice was also issued within the time prescribed, hence the same :was well within the time. Following was observed by this Court in paragraph 7 of the said judgment : “7. ........... The expression ‘before the expiry of a period of seven years from the said date’ employed in clause (a) of sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 198 refers to November 10, 1980 where the allotment of the land had been made before that date. In the instant case, proceedings under Sec. 198(4) of the Act were initiated well within two years of the relevant date, namely, November 10, 1980, and so was the show cause notice issued, as required by sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 198 refers to November 10, 1980 where the allotment of the land had been made before that date. In the instant case, proceedings under Sec. 198(4) of the Act were initiated well within two years of the relevant date, namely, November 10, 1980, and so was the show cause notice issued, as required by sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 198 of the Act. This is quit apparent from the impugned orders in which material dates have been referred. That part after the amendment was effected in sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 198 of the Act by U.P. Act No. 24 of 1986 substituting the period of seven years in place of two years and which shall always be deemed to have been substituted, the petitioner has no legs to stand. Both the initiation of proceedings for cancellation and show cause notice were well within seven years even from the date of allotment in favour of the petitioner. Considered from whatsoever angle the submission is without substance.” 22. The said observation did not support the petitioners’ case in any manner. The Court noticed both the expressions, i.e., initiation of proceedings as well as issue of notice. The Apex Court in Ajay Pradhan’s case (supra) laid down that if the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, the Court is bound to construe them in their ordinary sense and give them full effect. In Ashok Singh’s case (supra), this Court laid down that plain meaning of statute should be given effect to. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition of statutory interpretation as laid down in the, above two cases of the Apex Court. In the present case notice is required to be issued as required under Section 198(6). The question is that in case an application is filed and notice has not been issued, what will be the consequence of non-issuing of notice? Whether issue of notice is directory or mandatory is to be looked into? As noted above, when a statute caste duty on a public authority and on performance of the duty, the applicant has no control, the said requirement of statute is always held to be directory. 23. Whether issue of notice is directory or mandatory is to be looked into? As noted above, when a statute caste duty on a public authority and on performance of the duty, the applicant has no control, the said requirement of statute is always held to be directory. 23. In view of the aforesaid discussions, it is to be held that in case an applicant files an application under Section 198(4) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 within time as prescribed under Section 198(6), the application cannot be rejected as barred by time even though no formal order has been passed for issue of notice. In first writ petition, the application was filed well within the time and notices were also issued on 27th January, 2003. The mere fact that subsequently again on 27th August, 2004 show cause notice was issued was inconsequential and no error has been committed by Additional Collector in holding the application to be maintainable by order dated 30th April, 2007. The revisional Court has rightly affirmed the said order. Writ Petition No. 13548 of 2008 is liable to be dismissed. 24. Now comes to the second writ petition. The Additional Collector in the impugned order has not adverted to the relevant facts of the case as required under Section 198(6). The Additional Collector has observed that land being covered under Section 132 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, the question of eligibility of lessee becomes inconsequential. The revisional Court has also refused to interfere on the ground that order of the trial Court was an interlocutory order. As far as the view of the trial Court that question of eligibility has become irrelevant when the land is covered under Section 132 and it could not have been leased out, no exception can be taken. However, in the second case since the question of application being barred by time under Section 198(6) has not been gone into and the application is pending for consideration on merits, it is appropriate that Additional Collector before proceeding further to decide the application under Section 198(4) filed by Roshan Lal and Bachchu shall consider the question of application being barred by time under Section 198(6) and when he is satisfied that the application is within time, only then he may proceed to hear the application on merits. 25. 25. In the result, the first writ petition (Writ Petition No. 13548 of 2008) is dismissed and the second writ petition (Writ Petition No. 14110 of 2008) is disposed of with the observation that Additional Collector before proceeding to hear the application on merits shall first consider the question of application being barred by time under Section 198(6) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. ————