JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—By consent of the parties the appeal is heard on informal papers in the place and instead of formal paper book/s. 2. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant-insurance company from the judgment and order dated 5th April, 2005 passed by the concerned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jhansi giving an award of Rs. 1,60,000/- alongwith interest @ 6% per annum to the claimants on account of death of the deceased in a road accident. 3. The fact remains that when the deceased was going by a scooter it was hit by a bus from behind. The bus was running rashly and negligently. The bus was insured under the appellant-insurance company. The deceased was about 52 years old at the time of his death. He was unmarried. He was earning Rs. 400/- per month from agriculture. The claim petition was made under Sections 163-A as well as 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called as the ‘Act’) by the claimants, i.e. the brothers of the deceased, claimed compensation for a sum of Rs. 14,20,000/- alongwith interest. 4. The insurance company made an application under Section 170 of the Act in the Tribunal which was rejected by it giving reason that the Tribunal does not find any collusion in between the claimants and owner, therefore, there is no necessity to allow such application on the part of the insurance company to contest the claim. 5. In the appeal, amongst others, the appellant-insurance company raised three points i.e. (a) claimants are not entitled to claim compensation being the brothers of the deceased; (b) the owner has not been fastened with liability to pay compensation, and (c) the Tribunal has illegally rejected the application under Section 170 of the Act on 7th February, 2005 by holding that there was no collusion amongst the owner and the claimants. 6. We have to deal with the last point at first because it relates to maintainability of the appeal of the insurance company. We have already held in 2007 (4) ADJ 101 , Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Manju and others, relying upon the judgment reported in AIR 2002 SC 3350 , National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and others, that the insurance company has no right of appeal inspite of rejection of application under Section 170 of the Act. We have already held in 2007 (4) ADJ 101 , Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Manju and others, relying upon the judgment reported in AIR 2002 SC 3350 , National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and others, that the insurance company has no right of appeal inspite of rejection of application under Section 170 of the Act. Moreover, it cannot wait after rejection of the application under Section 170 of the Act till passing of the award by the Tribunal and when a decision goes against it then only it can prefer an appeal from the order of rejection as well as final award. If an insurance company feels itself really aggrieved by the order of rejection as aforesaid is not remedyless. It can make a revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution from the order of rejection. That apart it can also make an application for rectification of the award, if it feels that Insurance Company cannot be fastened with liability but the owner. 7. In a case of road accident primary liability lies with the driver of the vehicle when vicarious liability lies with the owner of the vehicle. Insurance company is indemnifier of the owner/s liability. Sometimes Tribunal takes a view that insurance company will pay the compensation to the claimant/s. Sometimes the order/s is/are being passed making both of them liable jointly or severally. Sometimes insurance company is directed to pay and recover. In a third situation the insurance companies cannot be said to be fastened with the liability. It is only a stop gap arrangement. Whether such insurance company will be reimbursed by the owner or not, the same can be considered by the Tribunal on a rectification application in the same proceeding on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case. But under no circumstances payment of compensation to the claimants can be stalled in a beneficial piece of legislation unless, of course, fraud or collusion is established beyond doubt or relationship between owner and insurance company is squarely hit by Section 149(2) of the Act. An indemnifier is no more than an agent of the principal i.e. the insured owner excepting statutory provision under Section 149(2) of the Act. An indemnifier is no more than an agent of the principal i.e. the insured owner excepting statutory provision under Section 149(2) of the Act. Whenever there is a dispute between owner and an insurance company under Section 149(2) of the Act, such dispute is no more a dispute between a “principal” and an “agent” but a dispute between a “principal” and a “principal”. But even in such circumstance the insurance company cannot be absolved from liability. The insurance company has to prove the case that it has no responsibility to pay the compensation in the given case in view of Section 149 (2) of the Act. In other words, insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches is/are so fundamental as found to have contributed to the cause of the accidents. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. In 2007 (4) T.A.C. 1 (SC), Mrs. Hafizun Begum v. Md. Ikram Haque and others; and (2004) 3 SCC 297 , National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and others, Supreme Court amply clarified this principle. The Supreme Court in Nicolletta Rohtagi (supra) followed by (2003) 3 SCC 524 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 762 : (2003) 1 SCR 567, Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., under no uncertain terms held that the defence available to an insurance company would be a limited one. 8. Therefore, when the Tribunal has come to a finding that there is no collusion between the owner and claimants, the Tribunal has rightly passed an order disallowing the insurance company from contesting the claim. Therefore, the conduct of the insurance company to wait and watch the decision of the Tribunal after rejection of its application and prefer an appeal as a matter of course or taking a plea of Section 149(2) of the Act goes to show that at the time of receiving premium the insurance companies are becoming wiser but at the time of payment of compensation they are becoming miser. This attitude is against the policy of insurance. An exception of established case of fraud or collusion or apparent statutory embargo cannot depart general rule of compensation to be paid to the claimants. This attitude is against the policy of insurance. An exception of established case of fraud or collusion or apparent statutory embargo cannot depart general rule of compensation to be paid to the claimants. There would be difference of thoughts between developed countries and developing countries in case of recovery of the compensation from the Insurance Company. In the developed countries awareness in making insurance coverage and in getting compensation is clear unlike the developing countries. In the developing countries either due to illiteracy or due to non-availability of clear picture regarding insurance coverage, the insurer/s is/are suffering a lot. The agents of the insurance company are always desperate to get a vehicle insured to remain in competition. Only books of accounts can speak how much they are earning by way of premium and how much they are spending by way of compensation. A beneficial piece of legislation neither can be made idle formality nor counter productive. It is common knowledge that unscrupulous persons are trying to take advantage of the situation which should be stopped with iron hands. But in the cases of beneficial piece of legislation our outlook should be at first from the point of view of getting compensation and thereafter from the point of view of refusing compensation not vice versa. We are surprised with the submissions made on behalf of the insurance company that even in some cases where the insurance company is directed to pay compensation and recover as a stop gap arrangement but it cannot recover the amount. We are of the view that in this proceeding we are not called upon to adjudicate such factum. We have been called upon to analyse the facts and come to the conclusion when application under Section 170 of the Act of insurance company has been rejected. In consideration of such cause certain factors cannot be said to be overlooked. If the insurance company is failed to recover any sum from the insured, it is its mistake for which claimants being third party cannot be made to suffer. The only check and balance is that the process of getting compensation should not be misutilised or made a bonanza or profit making source fraudulently or otherwise. If the insurance company is failed to recover any sum from the insured, it is its mistake for which claimants being third party cannot be made to suffer. The only check and balance is that the process of getting compensation should not be misutilised or made a bonanza or profit making source fraudulently or otherwise. In this case the application under Section 170 of the Act was dismissed on the ground that there is no collusion between owner and the claimants which necessitated the insurance company to make party to the dispute in question. 9. In a case of application for compensation, Court will look at first the genuineness of the claim and how far the beneficial piece of legislation could be utilised with the riders, if any. Such application can be made either under Section 140 or under Section 163-A or under Section 166 of the Act. But if any application is made both, under Section 163-A or under Section 166 of the Act, the same cannot be allowed, meaning thereby that in a case of clubbing application Court will call upon the claimants to make a choice under which application he/she wants to proceed in the place and instead of rejecting the application on account of technicality. Similarly, whether the claimant is widow, son or daughter, father or mother, brother or sister of the deceased is to be taken into account from their available right in seriatim following the rule of succession. No one can be said to be debarred absolutely but depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 10. The appeal is dismissed. Interim order, if any, is vacated. 11. However, no order is passed as to costs. 12. Incidentally, the appellant-insurance company prayed that the statutory deposit of Rs. 25,000/- made before this Court for preferring this appeal be remitted back to the concerned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal as expeditiously as possible in order to adjust the same with the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants, however, such prayer is allowed. Hon’ble Shishir Kumar, J.—I agree. ————