St. Anthonys Girls Sen. Sec. School v. Govt. of N. C. T. of Delhi
2008-10-24
S.L.BHAYANA, VIKRAMAJIT SEN
body2008
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Vikramajit Sen, J. 1. By this Judgment we shall decide the challenge to the vires of the Recruitment Rules for the post of Principal and Vice Principal in the Petitioners Schools which are avowedly minority aided institutions. The Recruitment Rules(RRs) specify the scale of pay, the age limit for Direct Recruits, educational qualifications, period of probation, method of recruitment, post from which promotions are to be made and composition of the Selection Committee. The RRs for both Principal as well as Vice Principal, mentioned in Column 3, specifically state that both these posts are selection posts. Column 8, however, indicates that the method of recruitment is by promotion, failing which by direct recruitment. In the case of recruitment for the post of Principal, Column 9 prescribes that it shall be by promotion out of Vice Principals/PGTs; and in the case of Vice Principal by promotion out of (i) PGT/AM of the same school with at least five years experience as PGT/TGT (ii) – with at least ten years experience as TGT in the case of secondary schools. In the St. Anthony School the Principal is the Head of the Institution. In Khrist Raja School the Vice Principal is the Head of the Institution since it is upto Xth Class and is a secondary School only. The Petitioners contend that the RRs are ultra vires the Constitution of India inasmuch as they require recruitment to be carried out by promotion, failing which by direct recruitment, (even though the RRs themselves state that it is a selection post). The second challenge is to the effect that the Selection Committee is required to be constituted and has to conform to the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973 (DSE Rules for short). The Petitioners contend several other reliefs which we decline to go into for the reason that the challenge principally pertains to the post of the Head of the Institution. 2. On 15.10.2008 we had passed the following Order – "After some hearing, we direct the Director of Education to be personally present in Court since the stand taken by the Respondents, prima facie, is contrary to several judgments of the Supreme Court and most recently to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in St. Stephens College v. University of Delhi WP(C) 5226/2008, decided on 21st August, 2008, which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Stephens College v. University of Delhi WP(C) 5226/2008, decided on 21st August, 2008, which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. List on 20th October, 2008". These Orders had been passed by us for the simple reason that it appeared palpably clear to us that the stance of the Education Department was completely contrary to the plethora of precedents of the Supreme Court and the decision of the Division Bench presided over by Honble the Chief Justice in WP(C) No. 5226/2008 titled St. Stephens v. University of Delhi pronounced on 21.8.2008. Unfortunately, a full day’s hearing has been taken up because of the obduracy of the Respondent/Education Department which has sought to justify their impugned actions requiring the constitution of a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC). 3. On the issue of the recruitment of the Head of the Institution learned Counsel for the Education Department have primarily relied on Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0088/1974 : [1975]1SCR173 . Learned Counsel for the Respondents have also relied on the following passage from All Saints High School v. Govt. of A.P. [1980]2SCR924 : 65. Thus, on an exhaustive analysis of the authorities of this Court and the views taken by it from time to time during the last two decades on various aspects, shades and colours, built in safeguards, guarantees, scope and ambit of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 30(1), the principles and propositions that emerge may be summarised as follows: .(1) That from the very language of Article 30(1) it is clear that it enshrines a fundamental right of the minority institutions to manage and administer their educational institutions which is completely in consonance with the secular nature of our .democracy and the directives contained in the Constitution itself. .(2) That although unlike Article 19 the right conferred on the minorities is absolute, unfettered and unconditional but this does not mean that this right gives a free licence for maladministration so as to defeat the avowed object of the Article, namely, to advance excellence and perfection in the field of education.
.(2) That although unlike Article 19 the right conferred on the minorities is absolute, unfettered and unconditional but this does not mean that this right gives a free licence for maladministration so as to defeat the avowed object of the Article, namely, to advance excellence and perfection in the field of education. .(3) While the State or any other statutory authority has no right to interfere with the internal administration or management of the minority institution, the State can certainly take regulatory measures to promote the efficiency and excellence of educational standards and issue guidelines for the purpose of ensuring the security of the services of the teachers or other employees of the institution. .(4) At the same time, however, the State or any university authority cannot under the cover or garb of adopting regulatory measures tend to destroy the administrative autonomy of the institution or start interfering willy nilly with the core of the management of the institution so as to render the right of the administration of the management of the institution concerned nugatory or illusory. Such a blatant interference is clearly violative of Article 30(1) and would be wholly inapplicable to the institution concerned. .(5) Although Article 30 does not speak of the conditions under which the minority educational institution can be affiliated to a college or university yet the Section by its very nature implies that where an affiliation is asked for, the university concerned cannot refuse the same without sufficient reason or try to impose such conditions as would completely destroy the autonomous administration of the educational institution. .(6) The introduction of an outside authority however high it may be either directly or through its nominees in the governing body or the managing committee of the minority institution to conduct the affairs of the institution would be completely destructive of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution and would reduce the management to a helpless entity having no real say in the matter and thus destroy the very personality and individuality of the institution which is fully protected by Article 30 of the Constitution.
Perhaps there may not be any serious objection to the introduction of high authorities like the Vice-Chancellor or his nominee in the administration particularly that part of it which deals with the conditions of service of the teachers yet such authorities should not be thrust so as to have a controlling voice in the matter and thus over-shadow the powers of the managing committee. Where educational institutions have set up a particular governing body or the managing committee in which all the powers vest, it is desirable that such powers should not be curbed or taken away unless the Government is satisfied that these powers are grossly abused and if allowed to continue may reduce the efficacy or the usefulness of the institution. .(7) It is, therefore, open to the government or the university to frame rules and regulations governing the conditions of service of teachers in order to secure their tenure of service and to appoint a high authority armed with sufficient guidance to see that the said rules are not violated or the members of the staff are not arbitrarily treated or innocently victimised. In such a case the purpose is not to interfere with the internal administration or autonomy of the institution but it is merely to improve the excellence and efficiency of the education because a really good education can be received only if the tone and temper of the teachers are so framed as to make them teach the students with devotion and dedication and put them above all controversy. But while setting up such an authority care must be taken to see that the said authority is not given blanket and uncanalised and arbitrary powers so as to act at their own sweet will ignoring the very spirit and objective of the institution. It would be better if the authority concerned associates the members of the governing body or its nominee in its deliberation so as to instil confidence in the founders of the institution or the committees constituted by them. .(8) Where a minority institution is affiliated to a university the fact that it is enjoined to adopt the courses of study or the syllabi or the nature of books prescribed and the holding of examination to test the ability of the students of the institution concerned does not violate the freedom contained in Article 30 of the Constitution.
.(8) Where a minority institution is affiliated to a university the fact that it is enjoined to adopt the courses of study or the syllabi or the nature of books prescribed and the holding of examination to test the ability of the students of the institution concerned does not violate the freedom contained in Article 30 of the Constitution. .(9) While there could be no objection in setting up a high authority to supervise the teaching staff so as to keep a strict vigilance on their work and to ensure the security of tenure for them, but the authority concerned must be provided with proper guidelines under the restricted field which they have to cover. Before coming to any decision which may be binding on the managing committee, the head of the institution or the senior members of the managing committee must be associated and they should be allowed to have a positive say in the matter. In some cases the outside authorities enjoy absolute powers in taking decisions regarding the minority institutions without hearing them and these orders are binding on the institution. Such a course of action is not constitutionally permissible so far as minority institution is concerned because it directly interferes with the administrative autonomy of the institution. A provision for an appeal or revision against the order of the authority by the aggrieved member of the staff alone or the setting up of an Arbitration Tribunal is also not permissible because Ray, C.J., pointed out in St. Xavier case that such a course of action introduces an arena of litigation and would involve the institution in unending litigation, thus impairing educational efficiency of the institution and create a new field for the teachers and thus draw them out of purely educational atmosphere of the minority institutions for which they had been established. In other words, nothing should be done which would seek to run counter to the intentions of the founders of such institutions. 4. Learned Counsel for the Respondent have also relied on this passage from Frank Anthony Public School Employees Assn. v. Union of India [1987]1SCR238 : 16. The excellence of the instruction provided by an institution would depend directly on the excellence of the teaching staff, and in turn, that would depend on the quality and the contentment of the teachers.
4. Learned Counsel for the Respondent have also relied on this passage from Frank Anthony Public School Employees Assn. v. Union of India [1987]1SCR238 : 16. The excellence of the instruction provided by an institution would depend directly on the excellence of the teaching staff, and in turn, that would depend on the quality and the contentment of the teachers. Conditions of service pertaining to minimum qualifications of teachers, their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service which ensure security, contentment and decent living standards to teachers and which will consequently enable them to render better service to the institution and the pupils cannot surely be said to be violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The management of a minority Educational Institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution, to oppress or exploit its employees any more than any other private employee. Oppression or exploitation of the teaching staff of an educational institution is bound to lead, inevitably, to discontent and deterioration of the standard of instruction imparted in the institution affecting adversely the object of making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. The management of minority institution cannot complain of invasion of the fundamental right to administer the institution when it denies the members of its staff the opportunity to achieve the very object of Article 30(1) which is to make the institution an effective vehicle of education. .5. Reliance has also been placed by the Respondents on paragraph 12 of Y. Theclamma v. Union of India [1987]2SCR974 which reads thus: .12. It cannot be doubted that although disciplinary control over the teachers of a minority educational institution is with the management, regulations can be made for ensuring proper conditions of service for the teachers and also for ensuring a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action. As the court laid down in Frank Anthony Public School case [1987]1SCR238 the provision contained in Subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act is designed to afford some measure of protection to the teachers of such institutions without interfering with the Managements’ right to take disciplinary action.
As the court laid down in Frank Anthony Public School case [1987]1SCR238 the provision contained in Subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act is designed to afford some measure of protection to the teachers of such institutions without interfering with the Managements’ right to take disciplinary action. Although the court in that case had no occasion to deal with the different ramifications arising out of Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act, it struck a note of caution that in a case where the management charged the employee with gross misconduct, the Director is bound to accord his approval to the suspension. It would be seen that the endeavour of the court in all the cases has been to strike a balance between the constitutional obligation to protect what is secured to the minorities under Article 30(1) with (sic and) the social necessity to protect the members of the staff against arbitrariness and victimisation. .6. Attention has also been drawn by learned Counsel for the Respondents to these extracts from Eleven-Judge Constitution Bench which decided T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka AIR2003SC355 : 1.82. Article 25 gives to all persons the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion. This right, however, is not absolute. The opening words of Article 25(1) make this right subject to public order, morality and health, and also to the other provisions of Part III of the Constitution. This would mean that the right given to a person under Article 25(1) can be curtailed or regulated if the exercise of that right would violate other provisions of Part III of the Constitution, or if the exercise thereof is not in consonance with public order, morality and health. The general law made by the Government contains provisions relating to public order, morality and health; these would have to be complied with, and cannot be violated by any person in exercise of his freedom of conscience or his freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion. For example, a person cannot propagate his religion in such a manner as to denigrate another religion or bring about dissatisfaction amongst people. 2.91. The right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions is provided for by Article 30(1). To some extent, Article 26(1) ...
For example, a person cannot propagate his religion in such a manner as to denigrate another religion or bring about dissatisfaction amongst people. 2.91. The right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions is provided for by Article 30(1). To some extent, Article 26(1) ... (a) and Article 30(1) overlap, insofar as they relate to the establishment of educational institutions; but whereas Article 26 gives the right both to the majority as well as minority communities to establish and maintain institutions for charitable purposes, which would, inter alia, include educational institutions, Article 30(1) refers to the right of minorities to establish and maintain educational institutions of their choice. Another difference between Article 26 and Article 30 is that whereas Article 26 refers only to religious denominations, Article 30 contains the right of religious as well as linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. ... 107. The aforesaid decision does indicate that the right under Article 30 (1) is not so absolute as to prevent the Government from making any regulation whatsoever. As already noted hereinabove, in Sidhajbhai Sabhai case [1963]3SCR837 it was laid down that regulations made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality and public order could be imposed. If this is so, it is difficult to appreciate how the Government can be prevented from framing regulations that are in the national interest, as it seems to be indicated in the passage quoted hereinabove. Any regulation framed in the national interest must necessarily apply to all educational institutions, whether run by the majority or the minority. Such a limitation must necessarily be read into Article 30. The right under Article 30(1) cannot be such as to override the national interest or to prevent the Government from framing regulations in that behalf. It is, of course, true that government regulations cannot destroy the minority character of the institution or make the right to establish and administer a mere illusion; but the right under Article 30 is not so absolute as to be above the law. It will further be seen that in Sidhajbhai Sabhai case no reference was made to Article 29(2) of the Constitution. This decision, therefore, cannot be an authority for the proposition canvassed before us. .7.
It will further be seen that in Sidhajbhai Sabhai case no reference was made to Article 29(2) of the Constitution. This decision, therefore, cannot be an authority for the proposition canvassed before us. .7. A precise and perspicuous distillation of the numerous decision of the Supreme Court is now available in Secy., Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose AIR2007SC570 : .19. The general principles relating to establishment and administration of educational institution by minorities may be summarised thus: .(i) The right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice comprises the following rights: .(a) to choose its governing body in whom the founders of the institution have faith and confidence to conduct and manage the affairs of the institution; .(b) to appoint teaching staff (teachers/lecturers and Headmasters/Principals) as also non-teaching staff, and to take action if there is dereliction of duty on the part of any of its employees; .(c) to admit eligible students of their choice and to set up a reasonable fee structure; .(d) to use its properties and assets for the benefit of the institution. .(ii) The right conferred on minorities under Article 30 is only to ensure equality with the majority and not intended to place the minorities in a more advantageous position vis-a-vis the majority. There is no reverse discrimination in favour of minorities. The general laws of the land relating to national interest, national security, social welfare, public order, morality, health, sanitation, taxation, etc. applicable to all, will equally apply to minority institutions also. .(iii) The right to establish and administer educational institutions is not absolute. Nor does it include the right to maladminister. There can be regulatory measures for ensuring educational character and standards and maintaining academic excellence. There can be checks on administration as are necessary to ensure that the administration is efficient and sound, so as to serve the academic needs of the institution. Regulations made by the State concerning generally the welfare of students and teachers, regulations laying down eligibility criteria and qualifications for appointment, as also conditions of service of employees (both teaching and nonteaching), regulations to prevent exploitation or oppression of employees, and regulations prescribing syllabus and curriculum of study fall under this category. Such regulations do not in any manner interfere with the right under Article 30 (1).
Such regulations do not in any manner interfere with the right under Article 30 (1). .(iv) Subject to the eligibility conditions/qualifications prescribed by the State being met, the unaided minority educational institutions will have the freedom to appoint teachers/lecturers by adopting any rational procedure of selection. .(v) Extension of aid by the State does not alter the nature and character of the minority educational institution. Conditions can be imposed by the State to ensure proper utilisation of the aid, without however diluting or abridging the right under Article 30(1) 8. The first question which we shall take up relates to the vires of Rule 96 of DSE Rules. Sub-rule (2) requires that the recruitment of the employees in each recognised private school shall be made on the Recommendations of the Selection Committee. Sub-rule (3) deals with the constitution of the Selection Committee which in the case of the recruitment of the Head of the School consists of (a) Chairman of the Managing Committee, (b) two educationists nominated by the Director out of whom at least one shall be a person having experience of school education and (c) a person having experience of administration of school to be nominated by the Director. Sub-rule 3(a) of Rule 96 thereafter lays down that persons mentioned in (a) and (b) above "shall act only as advisors and will not have the power to vote or actually control the selection of an employee". Rule 96 (3B) permits the Management of a minority school to nominate any number of persons to the Selection Committee. 9. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners contend that the requirement of constituting a Selection Committee infringes their Fundamental Rights bestowed by Article 30 of the Constitution of India. We are unable to find any merit in this submission. 10. Members of the Selection Committee nominated by the Director can play only an advisory role and as laid down in Sub-rule (3-A) they will not have the power to vote or actually control the selection of an employee. Therefore, if recourse is not taken of Sub-rule (3-B) this virtually means that the Chairman of the Managing Committee can select the Head of the school.
Therefore, if recourse is not taken of Sub-rule (3-B) this virtually means that the Chairman of the Managing Committee can select the Head of the school. If for any reason the Minority concerned including the Church or any Religious Order cannot repose total trust in the Chairman of the Managing Committee, it can also safeguard its interest and control by ensuring that the Selection Committee will comprise other members of the Managing Committee. In this fashion, therefore, the Minority concerned can always ensure that the selection of the Head of the institution is a person in whom they repose their trust. .11. In St. Xavier, the Vice-Chancellor had the power to nominate a representative to the Selection Panel which was struck down as it was felt that it impinges upon the minority rights enshrined in Article 30 of the Constitution of India. In St. Stephen College the Division Bench had observed that Section 7(2) of the Ordinance of Delhi University contemplated two Committees for appointing the Principal of a College (a) the Preliminary Selection Committee comprising the Vice-Chancellor, Pro Vice-Chancellor, a Nominee of the Visitor, Chairman of the Governing Body of the College and two Members of the Executive Council Committee nominated by it and (b) the Final Selection Committee. The Final Selection Committee could do no more than select one of the candidates chosen by the Preliminary Selection Committee. The Division Bench was of the view, with which we respectfully concur, that the constitution of these Committees took the control over the selection of the Principal of the College out of the hands of the minority community and into the complete control of the University. On a holistic reading of Rule 96 the only possible conclusion that we see is that the selection of the Head of the institution is always in the hands of the Managing Committee of the School. The presence of Advisors/Observers does not, in any way, militate against that power. Indeed, it is salutary in nature in that presence of the Representatives of the Director of Education would ensure that compliance is carried out of all other requirements such as age, educational qualification and experience of the incumbents. It is unreasonable for the Petitioners to assert that they possess arbitrary and untrammelled power to choose the Head of the institution even though they are recipients of grant-in-aid.
It is unreasonable for the Petitioners to assert that they possess arbitrary and untrammelled power to choose the Head of the institution even though they are recipients of grant-in-aid. We are fully mindful of the enunciation of the law by the Supreme Court to the effect that grant-in-aid cannot be used as a weapon or a tool to dilute or annihilate the exercise of minority rights under Article 30 of the Constitution of India but the presence of Advisors/observers, as we have already articulated, in no way wise, impedes or impinges upon the minority rights. Their absence may result in the Management ignoring some essential facets of the selection. The Constitution of India does not publish polarisation of communities. Instead, it protects minorities so that the minority community can retain its character and also co-exist peacefully with the majority. We, therefore, uphold the vires of Rule 96 of the DSE Rules. 12. The second question relates to the legality of the RRs which prescribe that the method of recruitment to be by promotion, failing which by Direct Recruitment. At the outset, it may be mentioned that there is incongruity in the RRs themselves inasmuch as in the third column the post of Principal as well as of the Vice Principal is stated to be a selection post. We have already extracted the portions of the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court on which reliance has been placed by the Respondents. It is trite that the ratio of a Judgment relates to what falls for determination before the Court. In these Petitions we are not concerned with the recruitment of teachers and other staff of aided minority schools. The precise question before us is whether the Director of Education can control or interfere in the selection of the Head of the school. This aspect of the law is no longer res integra. No useful purpose is served in reading the paragraph relied upon by learned Counsel for the Respondents in view of the specific findings contained in paragraph 29 of Malankara.
This aspect of the law is no longer res integra. No useful purpose is served in reading the paragraph relied upon by learned Counsel for the Respondents in view of the specific findings contained in paragraph 29 of Malankara. Their Lordships have held that since Section 57(3) of the Kerala University Act, 1974 provides that the post of Principal, when filled by promotion, shall be made on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness, it trammels "the right of the management to take note of merit of the candidate, or the outlook and philosophy of the candidate which will determine whether he is supportive of the objects of the institution. Such a provision clearly interferes with the right of the minority management to have a person of their choice as head of the institution and thus violates Article 30(1). Section 57(3) of the Act cannot therefore apply to minority run educational institutions even if they are aided". In P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537 the Seven-Judge Bench opined that "Conditions which can normally be permitted to be imposed on the educational institutions receiving the grant must be related to the proper utilization of the grant and fulfillment of the objectives of the grant without diluting the minority status of the educational institution, as held in Pai Foundation (See para 143 thereof)". This is what impels us to uphold the legality of Rule 96 of the DSE Rules on the one hand, but strike down the impugned RRs on the other. In the first case, it is imperative that even minority schools receiving grant-in-aid must comply with the stipulations pertaining to educational qualification and experience of Principals, Vice-Principals and the teaching faculty, as well as directions ensuring the proper use of the grant-in-aid. In the second case, inasmuch as the RRs prescribe recruitment of the Head of the institution by promotion, they directly deracinate the Fundamental Rights contained in Article 30 of the Constitution of India. In St. Xavier the Nine-Judge Bench has made the following enunciation: 182. It is upon the principal and teachers of a college that the tone and temper of an educational institution depend. On them would depend its reputation, the maintenance of discipline and its efficiency in teaching.
In St. Xavier the Nine-Judge Bench has made the following enunciation: 182. It is upon the principal and teachers of a college that the tone and temper of an educational institution depend. On them would depend its reputation, the maintenance of discipline and its efficiency in teaching. The right to choose the principal and to have the teaching conducted by teachers appointed by the management after an overall assessment of their outlook and philosophy is perhaps the most important facet of the right to administer an educational institution. We can perceive no reason why a representative of the University nominated by the Vice-Chancellor should be on the Selection Committee for recruiting the Principal or for the insistence of head of the department besides the representative of the University being on the Selection Committee for recruiting the members of the teaching staff. So long as the persons chosen have the qualifications prescribed by the University, the choice must be left to the management. That is part of the fundamental right of the minorities to administer the educational institution established by them. 13. To the same effect their Lordships have observed in N. Ammad v. Emjay High School AIR1999SC50 : 18. Selection and appointment of Headmaster in a school (or Principal of a college) are of prime importance in administration of that educational institution. The Headmaster is the key post in the running of the school. He is the hub on which all the spokes of the school are set around whom they rotate to generate result. A school is personified through its Headmaster and he is the focal point on which outsiders look at the school. A bad Headmaster can spoil the entire institution, an efficient and honest Headmaster can improve it by leaps and bounds. The functional efficacy of a school very much depends upon the efficiency and dedication of its Headmaster. This pristine precept remains unchanged despite many changes taking place in the structural patterns of education over the years. 14. We shall abjure from mentioning any further precedents since it is manifest that the selection of Head of the institution has, time and again, been held by the Supreme Court to be the preserve of the minority community. No purpose will be served in reproducing the several passages extracted by the Division Bench in St. Stephens. It brooks no dilution.
We shall abjure from mentioning any further precedents since it is manifest that the selection of Head of the institution has, time and again, been held by the Supreme Court to be the preserve of the minority community. No purpose will be served in reproducing the several passages extracted by the Division Bench in St. Stephens. It brooks no dilution. The Management must be left to consider or to ignore any member of its Teaching Faculty. Therefore, the impugned RRs are clearly ultra vires the Constitution of India and we strike them down. In fact, they go much beyond what is prescribed by the Act and the Rules. So long as the procedure laid down in Rule 96 of the DSC Rules is adhered to, the choice of candidates to be considered is left with the Selection Committee. 15. In St. Anthony a Meeting of the Staff Selection Committee (SSC) was held on 16.10.2000. The SSC was constituted in accordance with Rule 96. A perusal of the Minutes of the Meeting of the SSC discloses that the Government Nominees had concurred with the selection of Sister Elizabeth Joseph as the Principal. However, the Director’s Nominees had objected without any legal justification to the selection as is evident from a reading of the following Report: Reference to ADE (Schools) letter No. F.DE.23/School/Br./DEs Nominee/2K/6437 dated 10.10.2000 the undersigned went to attend the meeting of DPC for the post of Principal at St. Anthonys Girls Sr. Sec. School, Pahar Ganj, District Central on 16.10.2000. The School management informed that they have called candidates for holding interviews for filling the post of Principal by direct recruitment. The management did not produce any paper for holding DPC from among the eligible teacher from the feed cadre in the School. On insisting for holding DPC meeting to fill the vacant post of Principal, the Chairman and Manager of the School informed that their institution being the minority institution, there is a provision in D.S.E.A. & R, 1973 under Rule 96 to fill the post by direct recruitment. The management informed that since they already called the candidates for direct selection they would take interviews of candidates. The undersigned not agreed to the suggestion of management for holding interviews and have not participated in the interview. The school management also failed to produce any clearance from the department to fill the post of Principal by direct recruitment.
The management informed that since they already called the candidates for direct selection they would take interviews of candidates. The undersigned not agreed to the suggestion of management for holding interviews and have not participated in the interview. The school management also failed to produce any clearance from the department to fill the post of Principal by direct recruitment. Submitting for information and further necessary action and for seeking clarification, if the post of Principal in minority institution could be filled by direct recruitment even if the eligible candidates are available in the school for holding the DPO. These observations are totally untenable and contrary to the law enunciated by the Supreme Court of India. 16. The conduct of the Director of Education in Khrist Raja is also totally unacceptable. On 21.9.2006 the request of the School for appointment of the Vice-Principal (Head of the Institution) through Direct Recruitment was rejected; the School was directed to fill-up the post through a DPC after considering the eligible candidates amongst the teachers of the School. In order to expedite the selection the School had considered/invited the eligible TGTs, all of whom declined in writing to apply for the post. In the letter dated 25.1.2008 addressed to the Director of Education, Delhi, the Manager of the School expressed the preference for appointment of a "religious minority candidate as Vice-Principal/Head of the School". The conduct of Shri B.D. Kaushik, Education Officer, is entirely inexplicable in that he had directed the appearance before him of the four TGT teachers who had declined to be considered to the post of Vice-Principal. Mr. Kaushik has been present in Court throughout the hearing and in response to our query as to why these teachers were asked to appear before him on a school working-day, no explanation, whatsoever, is forthcoming. It was brought to the notice of Mr. Kaushik, by letter dated 9.7.2008, that a DPC was held on 19.1.2008 at which Mrs. Ritu Marwah, DDE (New Delhi), Mrs. Satinder Kaur, DDE (South West-A) and Mrs. Mona Sahni, Education Officer (Zone 24) were present. It was in front of these persons that the four teachers had declined to be considered to the post of Vice-Principal. Nevertheless, the Directorate had not acceded to the request of the School for appointment of a person from the Faith of the Minority concerned as the Vice-Principal. It is significant that Mrs.
It was in front of these persons that the four teachers had declined to be considered to the post of Vice-Principal. Nevertheless, the Directorate had not acceded to the request of the School for appointment of a person from the Faith of the Minority concerned as the Vice-Principal. It is significant that Mrs. Mona Sahni, author of the letter dated 21.9.2006, was one of the persons who was present at the DPC held on 19.1.2008. It was for this officer to record her objection in case the four TGTs had been coerced by the Management of the School into showing reluctance/refusal for selection to the post of the Vice-Principal. We censure the interference in the Management of the School perpetrated by Mr. Kaushik. We clarify that the Management of the School has the untrammelled and unbridled powers to choose any person who meets with the qualifications set-down for a Vice-Principal and who is chosen by a Selection Committee constituted in consonance with Rule 96. 17. In this analysis, we strike down Column 8 of the impugned RRs. The effect is that, as recorded in Column 3 thereof, these posts shall be filled-up by selection from amongst persons who have offered their candidatures. 18. Since the conduct and position adopted by the Director of Education is meritless, and is in variance with the repeated enunciation of the law reiterated by the Supreme Court in several cases, the Director of Education shall pay costs of these proceedings quantified at Rupees 50,000/-. Out of this sum, Rupees 15,000/- to be paid to each of the Petitioners and the balance Rupees 20,000/-shall be deposited with the Prime Minister Relief Fund within thirty days from today.