JUDGMENT D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J: The Life Insurance Corporation of India (for short 'the Corporation'] is the appellant in this appeal under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act directed against the order dated 4.3.2008 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in writ petition No. 8047 of 2006 where under the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition of the Corporation. 2. Writ Petition itself was directed against the Award dated 13.3.2006 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal in CR No. 71 of 1999 wherein reference had been answered in favour of the workman respondent in the appeal as well as in the writ petition - a person who is working as a driver in the divisional office of the Corporation at Raichur. 3. The dispute was as to whether the drivers like the respondent who were required to work beyond the office hours i.e., stipulated eight works and in connection with the official work were entitled to claim overtime and the contention on the part of the workmen was that the drivers having stayed beyond working hours at the office and even though were driving the vehicle were not being paid overtime allowance as is normally paid to the other employees of the organisation. 4. It appears this stand was countered by the employer - Corporation with reference to a circular bearing No. ZD/211/ASP/71 dated 9.11.1971 where under such drivers had been provided with what was known as 'discomfort allowance' at the rate of one rupee per day or Rs.30/- per month whenever drivers were required to go out of station in connection with the official work. 5. Such circulars had come to be revised and one such Subsequent circular placed before the Court by Smt. Preethi S. Melkundi learned Counsel for the appellant - Corporation is the circular bearing No. ZD/ 589/ ASP/ 85 dated 4.7.1985 under which the 'discomfort allowance' it appears had been enhanced to three rupees per day subject to a maximum of Rs.45/- in the calendar month and so far as the overtime allowance is concerned, it reads as under. "Overtime payable to drivers who are in receipt of discomfort allowance will be only for the number of hours for which drivers are required to drive jeep or mobile van in excess of 8 hours." 6. "Overtime payable to drivers who are in receipt of discomfort allowance will be only for the number of hours for which drivers are required to drive jeep or mobile van in excess of 8 hours." 6. It is in the wake of this stand of the employer the Tribunal had occasion to look into the facts and circumstances of the case and passed the Award dated 13.3.2006. 7. In doing so, the Tribunal examined the clause of the circular referred to above and was also guided by the fact that the Tribunal itself 1130 taken such a view earlier and following a like view taken by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta in Reference No.21/1979. The Tribunal decided to ad here to the view taken in these two earlier awards, in the absence of any material to indicate that such earlier view of the Tribunal had been found fault with by the Higher Courts by setting and", those awards. 8. The Tribunal was of the view that in the wake of such examination, the circulars relied upon by the management was of no avail to deny overtime entitlement to the drivers who have actually put in more than eight hours and have actually driven the vehicle beyond the normal working hours cannot be denied overtime allowance only for the reason they have received 'discomfort allowance' and therefore the management was directed to work out the overtime wages to be paid to the workmen ill the light of the logbooks maintained and the statement as furnished by the workmen who had claimed overtime and answered the question accordingly. 9. It was aggrieved by this award, the Corporation had preferred the writ petition in WP No. 8047 of 2006. 10. The learned Single Judge, on examining the writ petition, found that there is no merit in the writ petition warranting interference with the Award of the labour Court and in the wake of an earlier decision of this Court dated 3.8.2004 rendered in writ petition No. 15990 of 1999, there is no merit in the contention of the management that the Tribunal had no jurisidiction to entertain the reference and accordingly dismissed the writ petition. 11. It is against such order the present writ appeal. 12. Appearing on behalf of the appellant - Corporation Smt. Preethi S. Melkundi, learned Counsel has pur forth several contentions. 13. 11. It is against such order the present writ appeal. 12. Appearing on behalf of the appellant - Corporation Smt. Preethi S. Melkundi, learned Counsel has pur forth several contentions. 13. It is firstly contended that the drivers are not entitled for any overtime allowances in the wake of the circulars referred to earlier. 14. It is alternatively contended that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain a reference under the provisions of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as it has been held on authority trial in respect. of service conditions of the employees of the Corporation, the provisions of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are not attracted and in support of this submission has placed reliance on the decision of the supreme Court in the case of 'A. V. Nachane Vs. Union of India' reported in AIR 1982 SC 1126 . 15. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of 'M. Venugopal Vs. Divisional Manager, LIC of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh and Another, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1343 which according the learned Counsel supports the view that the employees of the appellant - Corporation can no longer seek protection under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to claim overtime allowance in respect of matters touching upon their service conditions. 16. It is true that the Supreme Court had occasion to examine the question the question as to whether the provisions under the Life Insurance Corporation Act and the rules framed thereunder touching upon the service, conditions of the employees of the corporation which had been made subject matter of challenge on the ground of the provisions being discriminatory by excluding the employees of the corporation from the purview of certain provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 but the Supreme Court. 1947 but the Supreme Court. opined that the provisions were not discriminatory having regard to the fact that some of the service conditions of the employees of the Corporation had been varied and that being an action through proper law made in this regard and the law being one made in respect of employees of the Corporation who formed a distinct and separate class of employees there is no discrimination and upheld the provisions such as Section 48(2)(cc) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 providing for variations of the service conditions of the employees in class III and IV categories so far as it relates to bonus and dearness allowance payable to such employees. 17. While it is true that if service conditions of any of the employees of the Corporation had been varied and if to that extent under the very law the applicability of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in respect of such matters was excluded, the validity of the provision excluding the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been upheld by the Supreme Court, but that does not mean the entitlement under tine very circular issued by the Corporation is also excluded for the same reason. Also in the present situation, learned Counsel for the appellant is unable to show any special previsions whereunder the provisions of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are excluded, particularly, for entitlement of the overtime allowances payable to the drivers who have actually worked on their duty beyond eight hours. 18. In this view of the matter, there is no merit in the appeal to contend that either the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are not attracted to the present situation or that the drivers who have driven the vehicles such as jeep and maxicabs of the Corporation while on duty and beyond eight hours are not entitled for payment of any overtime wages in the wake of the circulars referred to above. 19. Learned Counsel for the appellant has also drawn our attention to the fact that in respect of such orders, the corporation has taken up the matter to the Supreme Court and has sought for special leave to appeal and one such special leave petition is actually pleading before the Supreme Court since the year 2004 and therefore also has urged. Learned Counsel for the appellant has also drawn our attention to the fact that in respect of such orders, the corporation has taken up the matter to the Supreme Court and has sought for special leave to appeal and one such special leave petition is actually pleading before the Supreme Court since the year 2004 and therefore also has urged. that this writ appeal may be admitted and kept pending awaiting the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter which the Corporation has alreadt taken up before the Supreme Court. 20. We are of the view that this Court need hot await the outcome as the proceedings are still said to be at the special leave petition stage and it is not as though leave has been granted and it has been converted into an appeal. 21. The award of the Tribunal is just and correct, particular with the Tribunal having directed the employer-Corporation to work out the entitlement of the drivers based on the logbook entries to indicate as to the number of hours the drivers have actually driven beyond the normal working tune of eight hours. That being a question of fact, it is a matter within the knowledge and domain of the employer-Corporation and the employer-Corporation is bound to give effect to the direction issued by the Tribuna1 and the mere fact that the employee might have claimed overtime for any length of time in it self is not any criteria. The corporation is bound to calculate the overtime allowances on the basis of the records and pay the amount. 22. In the circumstances, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed levying cost of Rs 5,000/- on the appellant - Corporation payable to the respondent - employee of the Corporation.