JUDGMENT : B.K. Patel, J. - This revision is directed against order dated 28.07.2006 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar in C.M.C. No. 61 of 2004 awarding maintenance at the rate, of Rs. 1,500/- per month in favour of each of the opposite parties payable by the Petitioner. 2. Parties are Muslims. Opposite party No. 1 is Petitioner's divorced wife. Opposite party No. 2 is their son. Petitioner is working as Administrative Officer with Oriental Insurance Company Limited. He has remarried. In the application for maintenance filed by the opposite parties u/s 3(2) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act (for short the 'Act'), it was averred that marriage between Petitioner and opposite party No. 1 was solemnized on 11.04.1993. At the time of marriage gold ornaments, scooter and other articles as well as cash of Rs. 20,000/-were given as dowry to the Petitioner. Being dissatisfied, the Petitioner demanded more. The father of opposite party No. 1 paid Rs. 70,000/- to the Petitioner to purchase a piece of land at Bhubaneswar as per his demand. Despite his undertaking to get the land registered in the name of opposite party No. 1, the Petitioner purchased the land in his own name on the plea that he had to obtain house building loan from his office. In the year 2001, the Petitioner and opposite party No. 1 shifted to the newly constructed house. However, the Petitioner developed illicit relationship with another woman and demanded Rs. 2.5 lakhs from opposite party No. 1's father. As such demand could not be met, opposite party No. 1 was physically and mentally tortured by him. On 27.10.2003 the Petitioner assaulted and drove her out after snatching her ornaments. Opposite party No. 1 returned after fifteen days as opposite party No. 2 was studying in D.A.V. School, Chandrasekharpur. She found that the Petitioner had taken away documents and cash etc. from the house. She was compelled to lodge F.I.R. against her husband. Thereafter, on 07.11.2003 the Petitioner divorced opposite party No. 1. As Petitioner neglected and refused to maintain the opposite parties though he had sufficient means, the opposite parties claimed maintenance of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 2,000/- respectively per month. The Petitioner filed rejoinder denying the allegations and made counter allegations that opposite party No. 1 used to misbehave him and his relations. As Petitioner neglected and refused to maintain the opposite parties though he had sufficient means, the opposite parties claimed maintenance of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 2,000/- respectively per month. The Petitioner filed rejoinder denying the allegations and made counter allegations that opposite party No. 1 used to misbehave him and his relations. It was also averred by the Petitioner that the opposite party No. 1 left the house on her own accord and thereafter forcibly occupied the house which he had constructed by obtaining loan from office. Inspite of such allegations and counter allegations, in view of nature of controversies raised in this revision, the incidents proceeding divorce between the Petitioner and opposite party No. 1 is not material. The status and relationship between the parties, which are relevant, have not been disputed in any manner. In order to substantiate their case, the opposite parties examined four witnesses including opposite party No. 1 as P.W. 1, her father as P.W.2, mother as P.W.3 and an officer of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. as P.W.4. Documents marked Exts. 1 to 10 were also relied upon by them. The Petitioner examined himself only as O.P.W.1 apart from relying upon Exts. 'A' to 'D'. Rival contentions made on behalf of the parties mainly related to interpretation of provisions under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act Interestingly decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Noor Saba Khatoon Vs. Mohd. Quasim, and Danial Latifi and Another Vs. Union of India, were cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner as well as learned Counsel for the opposite parties. That apart, learned Counsel for the Petitioner also sought to derive assistance from the decision of T.K. Abdulla v. Subaida and Anr.: II (2007) CCR 101 of the Kerala High Court whereas learned Counsel for the opposite parties relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raiathi v. C. Ganesan: 1999 (3) CCC 2 (S.C), Raj Pal and Ors. v. State of U.P.: 2003 (2) CRJ 87 of the Mohammed Abdul Hai alias Farooq Pasha Vs. Saleha Khatoon and Others, of the Bombay High Court. 3. v. State of U.P.: 2003 (2) CRJ 87 of the Mohammed Abdul Hai alias Farooq Pasha Vs. Saleha Khatoon and Others, of the Bombay High Court. 3. Though in course of hearing learned Counsel for the Petitioner made an attempt to reopen the entire case, and produced different documents also, to urge that opposite parties have sufficient means to maintain themselves whereas the Petitioner is unable to pay the maintenance as awarded by the learned court below, as has been pointed out by this Court in Rabindra Sethi v. Premalata Sethi: 1989 (II) OLR 548, that The established principle of law is that the revisional jurisdiction is not to be ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record. (See Thakur Das (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another and, Duli Chand Vs. Delhi Administration, ) If the revisional Court on appreciation of the evidence on record and reappraisal of the evidence, takes a view different from and contrary to the view taken by the lower Court, then also it cannot be a ground for interfering in revision. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner also made a feeble attempt to find fault with the order of granting maintenance to opposite party No. 1 beyond the iddat period. However, in the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Danial Latifi and Another Vs. Union of India relied upon on behalf of the Petitioner as well as the opposite parties, it has been categorically held: (1) a Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such a reasonable and far provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act, (2) liability of Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising u/s 3(1)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to iddat period. xx xx xx xx 5. It was further argued by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that opposite parties have failed to adduce evidence that they are unable to maintain the mselves. However, the evidence of opposite party No. 1 is supported by her parents. The Petitioner has adduced rebuttal evidence by examining himself only. xx xx xx xx 5. It was further argued by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that opposite parties have failed to adduce evidence that they are unable to maintain the mselves. However, the evidence of opposite party No. 1 is supported by her parents. The Petitioner has adduced rebuttal evidence by examining himself only. Though stand was taken by the Petitioner that opposite party No. 1 is employed with a hotel and also earning some amount by preparing and selling cakes, the Petitioner has not adduced any evidence to substantiate such assertion. In Rajathi v. C. Ganesan: 1999 (3) CCC 2 (S.C.), it has been observed: statement of the wife that she is unable to maintain herself is enough and it would be for the husband to prove otherwise. Moreover, Section 3(3)(a) obliges a Muslim husband who has sufficient means, but has failed and neglected to make or pay reasonable and fair provision and maintenance for her and the children, to pay such reasonable and fair provision and maintenance. The provision does not make inability of the wife to maintain herself as a condition precedent for award of provision and maintenance by the Magistrate. 6. It was strenuously contended that in an application filed under the Act, the learned Magistrate could not have awarded maintenance to opposite party No. 2 for more than a period of two years. It was argued that while dealing with the application for maintenance under the Act, the Magistrate has no scope to exercise power u/s 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, it is well settled that wrong nomenclature of a petition is not binding on the Court. In Raj Pal and Ors. v. State of UP.: 2003 (2) CRJ 87, it has been held by the Allahabad High Court that it is well settled that labeling a wrong section will not oust the jurisdiction of the Court, it can be traced. In Hazi Farzand Ali Vs. Mst. Noorjahan joint application for maintenance filed by divorced Muslim woman on her behalf and on behalf of her children was treated by Rajastan High Court as an application for maintenance by each of her minor children u/s 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure. where as her application was decided in accordance with the Act It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal Bano Vs. where as her application was decided in accordance with the Act It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal Bano Vs. State of U.P. and Another, that proceedings u/s 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. are civil in nature and even if the Court noticed that there was a divorced Muslim woman who had made an application u/s 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure., it was open to the Court to treat the same as a petition under the Act considering the beneficial nature of the legislation especially since proceedings u/s 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. and under the Act are tried by the same Court. 7. Right of maintenance of children of a Muslim father is not confined to the provision under Act only. In Noor Saba Khatoon Vs. Mohd. Quasim it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that both under the personal law and the statutory law (Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure.) the obligation of a Muslim father having sufficient means to maintain his minor children unable to maintain themselves till they attain majority and in case of females till they get married is absolute notwithstanding the fact that the minor children are living with the divorced wife. 8. In Mohammed Abdul Hai alias Farooq Pasha Vs. Saleha Khatoon and Others it has been held by the Bombay High Court that as far as children are concerned, it is clear that if the divorced Muslim woman claims maintenance for the minor children u/s 3(1)(b), the former husband is bound to provide maintenance for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children. Right u/s 3(1)(b) is given to the divorced woman. In fact, the Act itself is enacted for the protection of certain rights of Muslim Woman on their divorce. The Act has no relevance to the rights of the children to claim maintenance from their father. Their rights are covered by Section 125. Code of Criminal Procedure. and that right is not taken away by the provisions of Section 3(1)(b) of the Act. 9. In course of hearing learned Counsel for the Petitioner strenuously urged that it was an error on record on the part of learned Magistrate to observe that the Petitioner admitted to be getting salary of Rs. 19,000/- per month. Code of Criminal Procedure. and that right is not taken away by the provisions of Section 3(1)(b) of the Act. 9. In course of hearing learned Counsel for the Petitioner strenuously urged that it was an error on record on the part of learned Magistrate to observe that the Petitioner admitted to be getting salary of Rs. 19,000/- per month. However, deposition of Petitioner O.P.W. 1 in his cross-examination goes to show that on being asked about his salary, the Petitioner avoided to give answer to the question by saying that he does not remember his present gross salary. Thereafter, he denied to the suggestion that he was getting Rs. 19,000/- per month. In such circumstances, there appears no infirmity in the observation that the Petitioner admitted his salary to be Rs. 19.000/-per month. Moreover, salary slips of the Petitioner from the month of November, 2003 to August, 2005 go to show that the Petitioner used to get gross salary of approximately Rs. 12,000/- to Rs. 14,500/- during that period. His gross salary in the months of May and June, 2005 was Rs. 14,443/- In such circumstances, award of maintenance amount Rs. 1,500/- each per month to the opposite parties does not appear to be unreasonable especially, in view of periodical revisions and increments in salary. Even if a wife-has some income that does not debar her from claiming maintenance. A divorced wife is entitled to lead a life commensurate with her hasband's status. Sub-Section 3 of Section 3 of the Act provides that quantum of fair provision and maintenance is to be determined having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, the standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of her former husband. In T.K. Abdulla v. Subaida and Anr.: 2 (2007) CCR 101, it has been held by the Kerala High Court that even a millionaire wife will be entitled to claim amounts u/s 3 of Act from her billionaire husband. The fact that divorced Muslim wife is able to maintain herself and is not unable to maintain herself can have no bearing on her right u/s 3(1)(a) though it may have relevance while ascertaining the quantum. 10. In view of the above discussion, I find no merit in the revision. Hence, the revision is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed