JUDGEMENT Mihir Kumar Jha, J. 1. Heard counsel for the petitioner and counsel for the State. 2. Initially when this writ petition was filed on 29.4.2003, a prayer was made to quash the order of suspension dated 4.8.1999 issued by the Joint Secretary, Road Construction Department, Bihar, Patna subsequently by I.A. No. 3132 of 2003 filed on 28.7.2003, the petitioner has also sought leave to assail the order of punishment dated 30.5.2003 issued under the penal signature of Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department, Patna whereby and whereunder the petitioner had been dismissed from service as also subjected to recovery of Rs. 95,266/- and Rs. 90,500/- for the loss caused to the State exchequer by way of cost of bitumen and charges for road roller respectively. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of punishment cannot be sustained inasmuch as the enquiry officer had not found any of the charges framed against the petitioner to have been proved. He also submits that the disciplinary authority could not have inflicted such punishment against the petitioner without differing with the report of enquiry officer. Counsel also submits that the order of dismissal allegedly passed on 30th May, 2003 did not come into force till the date of retirement of the petitioner as the same was never served on him in the active period of his service till 31.5.2003 when he had retired from the service while continuing under the orders of suspension dated 4.8.1999. Counsel summed up his submission by taking a plea that the order of dismissal from service dated 30.5.2003 was actually served on him sometime in June 2003 and therefore now even if there be any justification to continue with such enquiry in terms of Rule 43(b) of Bihar Pension Rules, the same should not be permitted by this Court keeping in view that the petitioner is a retired man who stands deprived of his salary, emolument and pensionary benefits for the period of 10 years. 4. 4. Counsel for the State, on the other hand, would first submit that after the departmental proceeding was initiated by a memo of charge dated 17.8.1999, the enquiry officer had submitted his report on 9.1.2001 whereafter the petitioner was given a show-cause notice on 16.6.2001 and when the petitioner had submitted his reply on 7.5.2002 seeking an opportunity of personal hearing, that too was extended to him by fixing the date of hearing on 24.2.2003. The petitioner however had consumed a period of two months in filing of his additional reply and had filed the same on 21.4.2003. It was thus sought to be projected by him that the petitioner being aware of the fact that he was reaching nearer to the date of his retirement had been deliberately avoiding the passing of the final order and in the aforesaid circumstances, the order of punishment was passed on 30.5.2003 and also communicated on the same day to the petitioner to the last place of posting being the headquarters fixed in the period of suspension as well as on his permanent address. 5. This Court would first take up the issue of the order of punishment of dismissal of service becoming ineffective on account of its being not served on the petitioner before the date of his superannuation i.e. 31.5.2003. In this regard from a bare perusal of the order dated 30.5.2003 as contained in Annexure-7 to the interlocutory application it is found that Engineer-in-Chief had not only passed such order of punishment but had also issued the same by his Memo No. 1831(E) dated 30.5.2003 to all concerned including the petitioner at his last known official address, the headquarter during the period of his suspension in the office of Superintending Engineer, Central Circle, Road Construction Department, Patna as also his permanent address in Mohalla-Kashi Takia, P.O.-Biharsharif, District-Nalanda. In that view of the matter, this Court would hold that the order of punishment was duly communicated to the petitioner on 30.5.2003 at his last known official address by the Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department. In that view of the matter, this Court would hold that the order of punishment was duly communicated to the petitioner on 30.5.2003 at his last known official address by the Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department. Learned counsel for the State in fact has also produced the copy of letter No. 1050 dated 31.5.2003 from which it becomes clear that since the petitioner was not present in the headquarters fixed during the period of his suspension at Patna and as such the intending Engineer of Central Circle of the Road Construction Department had also separately sent a copy of the order of dismissal of his service dated 30.5.2003 passed by the Engineer-in-Chief of the Road Construction Department by registered post at his permanent address in Mohalla-Kashi Takia, P.O.-Biharsharif-District-Nalanda. Thus, in these circumstances if the petitioner had avoided service of order of his dismissal by not remaining present in the Headquarters fixed under the order of his suspension, he cannot take advantage of his own smartness specially when there are overwhelming evidence on record to show that the order of dismissal of service on him was already sent to him at his all known address both by the Engineer-in-Chief and Superintending Engineer separately. 6. The over emphasised submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of dismissal of service of the petitioner could come into force only with effect from the date of his personal service on the petitioner by placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab V/s. Amar Singh Harika reported in AIR 1996 SC 1313 is equally misconceived. From a bare reading of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Amar Singh Harika (supra) it would be clear that the order of dismissal in that case was passed but kept in the file without its being ever communicated to Amar Singh. In that context, the Apex Court had held that the order of dismissal of service could take effect from the date of which the same was communicated by any mode including its being published in newspaper. In that context, the Apex Court had held that the order of dismissal of service could take effect from the date of which the same was communicated by any mode including its being published in newspaper. One would fail to see the applicability of the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Amar Singh Harika (supra) in the present case inasmuch as the order of punishment of the petitioner was not only passed by the Engineer-in-Chief but was also communicated to all concerned including the petitioner on his both last known address being address of his place of posting i.e. the office of Superintending Engineer, Central Circle, Patna where his headquarter was fixed during the period of his suspension and his permanent address at Biharsharif. The fact that such order was communicated to all concerned including the petitioner is amply proved even from the resultant communication of the Superintending Engineer of Central Circle, Patna by his letter No. 1050 dated 31.5.2003 separately on finding that the petitioner was not present in the headquarters. In that view of the matter, this Court must hold that the order of punishment had already been communicated to the petitioner and as such the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Amar Singh Harika (supra) would not be applicable. 7. This Court, however would find considerable force in the second part of submission of learned counsel for the petitioner as with regard to infirmity in the order of punishment on account of nondisclosure of the reasons that in the order of punishment specially when the same was based on the enquiry report in which the enquiry officer had not categorically recorded a finding of any of the charges to have been proved against the petitioner. From a bare perusal of the second show cause as contained in Annexure-9, letter no. 4017 dated 20.6.2001 it would be found that the disciplinary authority had claimed that all the charges against the petitioner had been found to be proved in the enquiry report of the enquiry officer dated 9.1.2001. From a bare perusal of the second show cause as contained in Annexure-9, letter no. 4017 dated 20.6.2001 it would be found that the disciplinary authority had claimed that all the charges against the petitioner had been found to be proved in the enquiry report of the enquiry officer dated 9.1.2001. Such enquiry report is on record and from its perusal it would be found that enquiry officer had not held the petitioner guilty in respect of any of the five charges as can be culled out from the respective charges and the findings recorded by the enquiry officer which reads as follows: " 3iRtr wair-1 -3frMqar gg*sr- ^?- 3t %r 3ifSpTcfr gt ^sn?nT srernar, t%src sifrrf *t T3?qrft?r fiwr w 3fR »5t 3TPR" *fit gra^H^r i q? ^ M ^iRri %ir W Rhj ^mnwRri st% % WKg *ft # ?*RR 3Tg^ % «q% STfiR«rF% tfit STHR ^£f #TN ^f SRJR s^T 3TBT? ^ ^R% cjRT 31^ tl f^2fnf-i-??r rRg- 3ml%r q?rfireFRT #t ^3% % W£" Btin fc sat ?*RR 3f?*r?, *FT%f 3rntyr RI^h 3n^9it & ri?rr f%ir ^rar ?st ^ 3ff^r 3n^9T ^i4mh+ 3?fSpraT £ *ini* 1458 faTHP 15.10.1998 (^ 204-203/7 ^ 3JIHI* *f ?$m tifipm ^ ? >To3rfo 3R°qT 47 flSHfarr S1W 1051 fl^TRF 20.6.98 *fit writ tr% § ^i r 3Fg7r?R *# 1R% # >" fMcT ^Rt J«Kt1T ^ 3H%# % RMRd fam vim jm t fire^ for 3^ ^5t ^t?t flHT ^1T ^T^rir f I l^T 5Rf ^ftf% ^tT fttlW f%^ ^FIT t|#iTI 31RVT *R5qr-2-UPT 3lf^r^r WT5*t grpf SPT5H, ftlTC 91^ ^t tfij^im ^H t sat 31CT? SRT 90,500/- ^^ ^T RFT ^T gg# «fr% If 3U^fr f¥kf fem iqr, t?^; «at 3re*i? SRT 90,500/- ^^ ^T RFT ^T gg# «fr% If 3U^fr f¥kf fem iqr, t?^; «at 3re*i? irt ^jpt arf^pr^r ^msn gn*f g^eT, feR5RK ^f 3R% H^lRd ^FSfFT W 7HR ^ft #1T, lb P % ^IHlTiRd ?t% ^51 JH*I 3tf%T %rR TlM 1^ f%^frT ^# f^lT mi 3k i?r ^^tt 90,500/- wit ^t ^# >at 3mfcr % 3iw w ^ Bt ^icftt ti ??r 15RRR sat 3?5*rc % f^S 90,500/- *R3F# Trf^T 15FT ^R% ^iT STRtTT f I g?sr 3if^Rrar (3f} >a=iui), i^r-f^iW f^iR % ^r yft^H (^& 6-i/to) ^ 3iraR *K 3HUlRrT tl 90,500/- ^o ^t Tlflr ?H aRi^H 3i«rar flvnT 3r srt 3hh«t ^i^t ^ VJ % 3TH«I ^it ^RRT W t 3k ^IT it 3irctfaT qRltoiRt SRT 3R% W^R TO *t $t 3fPl^3t g?t - ^o ^t ^ifgv ^t m 3fl&3i f%% %qr ht ti g^rarf ^ *i ^f f^»mr ^gnr ^tf an%gr ^Rt gf% ~3*ivm ^ ^Rlf if f¥P ^RT ^W 90,500/- ¥0 gir *Rjcft 3n^r ^s ^i?T ft% ^t w f^t t # 3f«r 3int ?*r f%^; tt ^iNr =fit 3uw+dr ^qt lit ??r f^f qr f%HRT ^q1 igcj gt^R 3TPt ^t * >\U\$ gRI ^ rf^T 3#1 q^R SR1W TW WT 3lf5Tq^r ^ttsvt gjtSH, R?R?RK ^JRT ^ff »t^t w^ giT sim t ^r #j Tf g^Rm ^t4 SRSH ^)T cflfqr^ *ff fe 31Rt%T M f 5lft^ #q% q > ^ iWftm SPTSH % sat 3H1? ^ 3lf%1 ^PT OTFT R ^ 1RT ^R^l 3lf^F»T %?R STTPT T^T Jf jit »lt *el1ri) it gf5r%r Trftr «it ^3% 3rr%rr ^r% ht *i4hh+ 3rfairrr, i«f sttsh, Rgi«i ) ire^ ^ w ^r ^rr ft 3TRrrqcr m^iI^cm ^raf foqr ^irt ^JifB^ «ffi 31RW ^Roqr-3-T*T SPT3H, f%R3RK ^ M^NH gilH *f # ?«RR 3fSKTcT SRT 1445.60 *RFT ?^T t*f5 R^PH ^ 1806.038 *RIT ^T «J^F R^PH *g5T 3251.638 £H StFrT felT W, $-3-vim r biw Wfad ^if ^ *£ *ra^ «t^pf r^rY *f RRxld Pi **+ > $ TT TlNl% ^ f^PT ^t «W ; ^r "frsta 3t^wt" **Rr ^rr aiw* ti ^raf ^^7 ^rt^ i^ ^iq? ^t y*#i*-«T 3rt tot t ^r ^ratr 3f f%HFr fo# 3^T T5lftnSR > 3W?T *rf%f% iferT ^T yR^ ^i f%?ta 31^5^ ^ ^RFf 1^ *prq? ^t y*#l*dl *£t ^Nr % 3*Rtfar h *i(£i*k| c& ^m-wr IH^Rt, 92 % Rfl*«K, 96 rl^T W4lRd M^i(^+iR4i ^t 3qf >m tft # # *pst ^ar ^rerar ti 31Rt? ^t y*#i*-«T 3rt tot t ^r ^ratr 3f f%HFr fo# 3^T T5lftnSR > 3W?T *rf%f% iferT ^T yR^ ^i f%?ta 31^5^ ^ ^RFf 1^ *prq? ^t y*#l*dl *£t ^Nr % 3*Rtfar h *i(£i*k| c& ^m-wr IH^Rt, 92 % Rfl*«K, 96 rl^T W4lRd M^i(^+iR4i ^t 3qf >m tft # # *pst ^ar ^rerar ti 31Rt? *R°qr-4-^13%, 92 % Rfl+«K, 96 q*r srw RwR^Rta" ^ q ^im griH ^ «at ism m*tz, ^%t 3#r!TriT srt 3iftpT # iqri ?a% qit f^nf R^Hdi t fo tihw W % sat 3fg^- SRT 3lfiPT ^¥7 # 1# ?# ^T I^T feqr TqTI 5CT 3lf^qrTT (^sa^T) W {^TR5" 9.1.99 3)" gJfl^r-6 ^ 3?l^r % 3JR >T ^17-4 ^f 15^T felT I^TI 3IRt%T T^lflRFnt ^T ^HT t % ^3R#, 92 % R*I*«K, 96 rRT ^T^ isms ?rrwr ?rw *mmr 3ri^rar gn wgr 581 fcm 15.10.99 (^ 17/To) ^fitst 9frT tf^FTd ^t if 1% ^T^ ^RT &f& ^ 31c) * > 3Tf^RTrn" ^ I?T T5T ^ 3lf^feRT ^tf 3RT 3if^3 #sra^fe ??^r r? ?rcf% ^r% 3f^r TlfST ^TPltf^RT ^R% ^tT H 5hh *igw+ 3tf*prar g^r «R^h T5n^ 58i Rh|+ 15.10.99 ^ elkjfM^ T? 3^UliRiR > ^rt ^ry5? ^ yl^^n sn^ ^r f^TRT 31rrt fWpt 3fi 31RH ?R5qT-5-TfRT 3rf^RT5PiT ^RTS^T 3ipf y^ug rr #r Tg^FT^r 3raf£r ^ # 3T?^" SRT ?PTH*r ^o 95,226/- ^ ^T ?rr Tl¥ ^?r ^rt awn w& ^vc ^et flqr ^ftt tl fa*9F >if-5-flMRlita 31RH ^ W >1 ^t *nwr ^prfqw fe^T i^ t 3*Rf ^ ^?r % - ¥o ^T ^" «IMtf) ITW q^: %rf% ^ ^tr W ^if 3o^ ^# ti 31RWH HcJ|(^*|^ gTr ^l^T t % 3F ftRf %? ^c=R % ^RjrT t ¥1^ ^ tl% ^ ^HrT ^tr ^it ^m=r ^f f3ir ti fcHRfcr 3ir >t ^ ^FT # WW mR 3 %T 1^ t 3?RT f?T 3tr >t ^t ^rar ^§i t rrr it yn^il % ?rpt ¦^r f^; tt f^MRT ^rr tst w^ {%fqr wi ^§f TRR^frT ^f 31RtftW H p > 8. From the aforementioned finding of the enquiry officer in respect of the five charges, this much is clear that he had not conclusively held the petitioner guilty in any respect any one of them and yet the disciplinary authority by his second show cause notice dated 20.6.2001 (Annexure-9) had held the petitioner guilty in the following terms. "*NMH M p > 9. "*NMH M p > 9. It has to be also taken into account that when the aforementioned defective show-cause notice dated 20.6.2001 was served on the petitioner, he had submitted his exhaustive show-cause reply wherein he had relied himself on the finding of the enquiry officer as is noted above wherein there was nothing by way of disclosure in the second show-cause notice beyond the report of the enquiry officer which could have elicited an effective response from the petitioner. As a matter of fact if in this background, the order of punishment against the petitioner it would be found that for the first time the disciplinary authority had in a round about manner admitted that none of the charges against the petitioner was found to be proved by the enquiry officer which would be evident from the following passage of the order of punishment dated 30.5.2003: "«MI T ^o 1 rim 5 £f 9*nf"ld ^TSf THT ^TI% T ^t Tr%Hr *&" 3TRi^r *f f^r 3T3 >rT %3r ^ 3pfrnr qrar ww 3?r rT33n#^ 3f feR xtc[ ;jifm 3jcR %gif (3fg9IKFT tjef 3T%T) f^Wra#, 1935 $ f^T FfW 49 *£ t^tft qr ?ra?H *rero ^ w*r qiriteR- ^t ^FTT gf% *f?FT *fR f^HRR W^ 4017 (^ff) 3FJo f%vifcfr 20.6.2001 SRT fl#T *RR0T 3^r $t *r*mr ^mtefrRRT ^rs- qrcr jpit f% 3TRr7 Eft ^tPRkIT ^ 3^ *f # 3fS*P? srt ^T| ^rr t * sta ?twt ?Ri% ^ f^qr ^ran 3T#far i=qpr ^ |fe^Vr % ^t 3fs*r? *fit %fmfa q^rcfr 633 (..) f^rrar 19.2.03 srt ^gf^f% wsr 3R% f? 3=f few 24.2.2003 *fit 3ri^frir SR^ ^ ^FTT?FT *RT 3f o^tTHH ^raif % £ jf f%Mmk *iRi*i ^ F*f%rT ?r^, R^uR*)^ ?rqrf§" ^RT y*#ld 3T«rar 3rf^y*)lf"ld 51% ^% 3Rf: qfoRf 3M^cM cT»^ Xfcf qf^rfM ^ ^ W*l?l %^T ^ 3TCF*r ^f%?T gRd §^ f%FR ^ 3|raT SRT %^lf (3RJ51RH ^ 3iqt?T) RilHNHl, 1935 ^f HlFW hVt 49 ^ ^5rf ^t ?^R 3{F^-, ^%T 3rf^mrTT, (pMRd) 3rateraT 3rf^RlT, ^tzT 3T^FT, *W RRlW % *k*i?1 %^nr % Wtrt f%qr ^mr f ^r«r # JM^4d 3251.638 ^o r^T R^T ^ ^T mo3To?fo ^TiJ SR3H, R^I«l - W^ ^ ^te %R % ^wRftT 95,226/- ^o cpt g?T# $\ ffiTR % W grar ^r% ^r 3n^snr feir ^irrr fi" (Underlining for emphasis) 10. This, court therefore would find that the order of punishment is based on such materials and such considerations which were never disclosed to the petitioner either in the enquiry report or in the second show-cause notice dated 20.6.2001. The disciplinary authority in fact had accepted that the Charge Nos. 1 and 5 were not found to be proved by the Enquiry Officer and for the rest of the three charges i.e Charge Nos. 2, 3 and 4 the Enquiry Officer had left the matter to be decided by the Disciplinary Authority himself. In such circumstances, if the Disciplinary Authority had found materials on which the five charges were found to be proved as is recorded in the aforementioned extracted portion of the order of punishment it was obligatory on the part of disciplinary authority to give his separate reasons differing with the findings of the Enquiry Report. This aspect of the matter also stands settled in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. V/s. Kunj Bihari Misra, reported in (1998)7 SCC 84 , and following the ratio of that judgment there would be no difficulty in holding that the order of punishment against the petitioner being in violation of the principles of natural justice cannot be sustained. 11. This Court in this regard does not find any force in the submission of Mr. Rabindra Kr. Chaubey, Government Pleader No. 7 that since the department and the disciplinary authority had given opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner and the petitioner had also filed an additional show-cause reply on 21.4.2003, it would be presumed that the petitioner was aware of the reasons for recording difference of opinion with the findings of the enquiry report. 12. In the opinion of this Court, firstly such presumption on fact is wholly unsustainable in absence of any communication to the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority intimating the fact with regard to his not accepting the findings of the enquiry report or differing with the findings of the enquiry report. Secondly, the impugned order by itself is a proof of the fact that when the petitioner had in fact wanted to know the reasons recorded in the file for differing with the enquiry report, such reasons were not supplied by taking recourse to the provision of Rule 332 of the Records Manual. Secondly, the impugned order by itself is a proof of the fact that when the petitioner had in fact wanted to know the reasons recorded in the file for differing with the enquiry report, such reasons were not supplied by taking recourse to the provision of Rule 332 of the Records Manual. The provision of such record manual has been brought on record which would go to show that they are with regard to Public documents. The provisions made therein in fact cast an obligation on the authority to supply a copy of public documents to the applicants even if they are capable of being used as evidence against the Government. The Rule 332 of Record Manual while enumerating public documents and segregating them from noting in the files or opinions as they cannot be used as legal evidence in Court lays down that no one has a right to look into those notings in the file or opinions recorded by the officials prior to taking of the decision. One would really fail to appreciate as to why and how the difference of opinion recorded by the authorities with regard to enquiry report if at all available in the file by means of notings in the file can be classified as confidential documents and thus impermissible for its supplied to the delinquent. In the opinion of this Court such documents in the file cannot be withheld even under Right to Information Act much less to a delinquent facing departmental proceeding whose whole service career has been put at stake in the ongoing departmental proceeding. Much water has by now flown in the Gangaes on the issue as with regard to confidentiality of documents and no such privilege can be claimed by the Government even in court as with regard to productions of such documents containing service history or annual confidential report of an employee/ officer of the Government. This issue in fact remains clinched and closed for ever in view of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of S.P. Gupta V/s. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 SC 149 . 13. This issue in fact remains clinched and closed for ever in view of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of S.P. Gupta V/s. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 SC 149 . 13. That apart, a bare perusal of the impugned order of punishment dismissing the petitioner from service would itself go to show that it is in fact a cryptic and non-speaking order wherein no part of explanation offered by the petitioner in his second show-cause reply or the additional reply filed by him on 24.4.2003 have been taken into consideration. The mere recording of the fact that the explanation furnished by the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory in fact is no consideration in the eyes of law. It is well settled that a departmental proceeding is a quasi judicial proceeding and any order of punishment passed therein must be speaking order specially when the same is by way of recording difference of opinion from a finding recorded in the enquiry report. This aspect of the matter also stands resolved in a large number of decisions of the Apex Court and reference in this connection can be made ia the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Assam and Another V/s. Bimal Kumar Pandit reported in AIR 1963 SC 1612 , in the case of Siemens Engineer and Manufacturing Corporation of India Ltd. V/s. Union of Indian & Anr. reported in AIR 1976 SC 1785 and in the case of S.N. Mukherjee V/s. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1984 . Recording of reasons after considering the explanation furnished by the delinquent in fact is necessary concomitant of compliance of principles of natural justice and in absence thereof the order of punishment by itself can be held to be vitiated. 14. This Court having held that the order of punishment against the petitioner is absolutely unsustainable either on fact or in law on account of violation of principles of natural justice cannot however absolve the petitioner in all respect inasmuch as some of the charges as noted above are quite serious. They also relate to causing loss to the Government exchequer for which an order of recovery to the tune of Rs. 1,85,766/- in all had been passed while dismissing him from service. They also relate to causing loss to the Government exchequer for which an order of recovery to the tune of Rs. 1,85,766/- in all had been passed while dismissing him from service. Thus, charges against the petitioner are very serious inasmuch as they relate to causing financial loss to the Government and can be made subject matter of a proceeding under Rule 43(b) of Bihar Pension Rules. In such circumstances, the end of justice would be met if the departmental proceeding against the petitioner is undertaken afresh from the stage of submission of enquiry report as is normally directed in any and every case where the order of punishment in a departmental proceeding set aside on technical ground including violation of principles of natural justice. 15. Thus, on an overall consideration of the materials on record this Court while quashing the order of punishment dated 30.5.2003 as contained in Annexure-7 to the writ application would direct the Engineer-in-Chief to proceed afresh from the stage of submission of enquiry report. In view of the fact that the Enquiry Officer had not found any of the charges against the petitioner to be proved against him, the Engineer-in-Chief within three months of the receipt of this order would serve on the petitioner a compact second show- cause notice disclosing the tentative reasons and connected materials on which he would proceed to hold that the five charges against the petitioner or any of them can be said to be proved. 16. The petitioner must submit his show-cause reply within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of such second show-cause notice. If the petitioner so desires for an opportunity of personal hearing, keeping in view that earlier such opportunity of personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority on 24.2.2003, he would be allowed to place his case by way of personal hearing in next six weeks on a date fixed by the Engineer-in-Chief whereafter, the Engineer-in-Chief being the disciplinary authority must pass his reasoned order within a period of one month from the date of conclusion of personal hearing afforded to the petitioner. 17. 17. It is made clear that since the petitioner was continuing in suspension since 4.8.1999 and the same was never revoked till the date of his superannuation i.e. 31.5.2003, his entire emoluments for the period of suspension as also pensionary benefits would remain subject to the final order to be passed in the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. Any order of punishment to be passed by the disciplinary authority, as the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation, must be in keeping with the provisions and ambit of Rule 43(b) of Bihar Pension Rules. It is however further made clear that as the departmental proceeding against the petitioner was continuing in view of the memo of charge dated 14.8.1999 as contained in Annexure-8 to the writ petition, there would be no need of converting the present proceeding into a proceeding under Rule 43. However, whatever actions have to be taken by the Engineer-in-Chief in terms of the aforementioned directions must be completed in the outer limit of nine months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. It would be the duty of the petitioner to produce a copy of this order before the Engineer-in-Chief of the Road Construction Department and the period of nine months would start running from the date such order is served by the petitioner on the Engineer-in-Chief of Road Construction Department. It would however be also open to the Engineer-in-Chief, Road Construction Department to pass his final order in case the petitioner does not co-operate and/or abstain from filing reply to the show-cause notice or would refuse to avail the opportunity of personal hearing as directed above. 18. In the result this application is allowed to the extent indicated above and the impugned order of punishment dated 30.5.2003 is quashed and the matter is remitted back to the Engineer-in-Chief Respondent No. 4 to pass fresh orders in the light of aforesaid observations and directions. There would be however no order as to costs.