JUDGMENT Mishra, Member -- 1. This order shall also govern the disposal of First Appeal 26/09 (Rajendra Guru v. Joint Registrar Sagar and others) for the order and the issue being identical. 2. Brief facts of the matter are such that the appellant being a member of the respondent No.2 Society was representing it in respondent No.3 Bank and he was holding the post of Director in respondent No.3 Bank. There was an allegation about a financial irregularity and an enquiry conducted by Assistant Registrar. The report was submitted to JR on 14.8.2008. The Joint Registrar thereupon issued a notice u/s 19-C (2) for him to show cause why he be not expelled from the membership of the society for six years. The appellant submitted a reply on 30.8.2008 but the Joint Registrar through the impugned order 23.9.2008 has expelled the appellant from the membership of respondent Society for six years. This is an appeal against this order. 3. Learned counsel Shri R.N. Nagre pleading for the appellant submitted that the JR had passed the impugned order in encroachment of the jurisdiction of Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies Damoh. As regards the financial irregularity, the appellant was not responsible. According to the learned counsel the order of the Joint Registrar is against the following judicial presidences in the matter -- FA 67/06 Brijwasi Prasad Mishra, former President Zila Thok Upbhokta Bhandar v. Joint Registrar Coop. Societies, Rewa. 2006 RN 217 Naresh Chandra Jain v. Sub Registrar. Coop. Society Raisen. Revision 309/99, 326/00 dated 24.11.2000, Khem Chand v. Joint Registrar Coop. Societies Ujjain and others. 1997 RN 345 Sohanlal v. Registrar Coop. Societies. 4. Learned counsel Shri Sanjay Bajpai appearing for respondent No.3 Bank submitted that the appeal is time barred as it has been presented on 15.12.2008 against the impugned order dated 23.9.2008. 5. Obviously there is an application u/s 5 of Limitation Act for the condonation of the delay. The appellant in this application has furnished the medical certificate about his illness from 27.9.2008 to 30.11.2008. It has also been urged that the delay caused was beyond his reasonable control. The condonation of delay in the matter being justifiable is allowed. 6. On the perusal of the record of the Joint Registrar it is apparent that the notice U/S 19C (2), 18.8.2008 has been issued to the appellant as well as to respondent No.2 Society. It has also been urged that the delay caused was beyond his reasonable control. The condonation of delay in the matter being justifiable is allowed. 6. On the perusal of the record of the Joint Registrar it is apparent that the notice U/S 19C (2), 18.8.2008 has been issued to the appellant as well as to respondent No.2 Society. The copy of it has been endorsed to respondent No.3 Bank. Appellant has submitted his reply but according to the minutes of JR recorded on 15.9.2008 ·since no reply was received from respondent No. 2 and 3, therefore the impugned order was passed. 7. As regards the jurisdiction of Joint Registrar that cannot be under challenge as the Joint Registrar Cooperative Societies Sagar according to Government notification dated 13.9.2004 have all powers in respect of District Damoh in reference to all the sections of the Act. It is also pertinent to note as the notice and order have been also endorsed to Distt. Central Cooperative Bank Damoh, which is a financing Bank, the Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, Damoh could not exercise any power as the financing bank was also impleaded. Therefore the objection about the Joint Registrar stepping into the matter is not sustainable. 8. The only point worth consideration is about the fact that whether the provision of section 19-C (2) has been followed or not. We have analysed this provision in greater detail in SA 5712009 (Nandlal Arora v. DRCS. Gwalior) The relevant part of this decision is therefore reproduced for arriving at a proper conclusion in the present matter. 9. We have analysed this matter of section 19-C in First Appeal No. 16/ 2006 Brijwasi Prasad v. JRCS Rewa and others in our order dated 14th May 2009 in detail. We therefore reproduce this part as the matter is quite identical. "In support of his argument on point No.1, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed his reliance on Revision Petition No. 23/05 (Jt. Registrar Cooperative Societies, Sagar v. Shankarpratap Singh Bundela) decided on 22.11.2005 in which the Tribunal while analyzing the provision of section 19-C (2) has held as under: It is argued that section 19-C (2) of the Act is non-obstantee clause. In view of the non-obstantee clause, Registrar is directly empowered to expel the member on the grounds mentioned U/S 19-A(a) (b) (c) (d) of the Act. In view of the non-obstantee clause, Registrar is directly empowered to expel the member on the grounds mentioned U/S 19-A(a) (b) (c) (d) of the Act. Section 19-C (1) empowers the Committee to expel the member on the ground. mentioned in 19-1 (a) (b) (c) (d) after affording an opportunity to the concerned. Sub-section (2) of section 19 of the Act although non-obstantee clause but it does not give an over-riding effect on the procedure laid down in Sub-section (1) of section 19. There is no inconsistency between both the provisions. The first limb of the section empowers Committee to take action. It is apparent from sub-section (2) of section 19 that the Registrar is empowered to expel any member of the society on his indulging any of the activities specified in sub-section (1) of the section 19 after calling upon such member and the society to explain why the member be not expelled. Thus, it is clear that apart from the member, society is also required to be given an opportunity of explaining why member be not expelled. This leads to infer that initially the Committee of the society is required to take action under sub-section (1) of section 19C and when Committee fails then Registrar comes in picture. Had it been the intention to give over-riding powers to the Registrar by incorporating non-obstantee clause then there would have been no need to call upon the society to furnish its explanation. Reference is made to the principles laid down by Hon 'ble Supreme Court in R.S. Raghunath v. State of Kamataka. AIR 1992 SC 81 at page 89, after considering the law laid down in Ashwani Kumar v. Arvindo Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 , Dominion of India (Now Union of India) v. S.A. Irani. AIR 1954 SC 596 , C. C. Ratna Rao v. Asha Lata, AIR 1987 SC 117 . AIR 1992 SC 81 at page 89, after considering the law laid down in Ashwani Kumar v. Arvindo Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 , Dominion of India (Now Union of India) v. S.A. Irani. AIR 1954 SC 596 , C. C. Ratna Rao v. Asha Lata, AIR 1987 SC 117 . Thus, the analogy that in view of the non-obstantee clause of sub-section (2) of section 19-C of the non-obstantee clause of Sub-section (2) of section 19-C the Registrar was competent to pass the order dated 2.12.2004 directly is not sustainable." As submitted by the Government Advocate, though section 19-C (2) begins that notwithstanding contained in this Act or Rules or Byelaws, there under it is an1ply clear that this section very well requires that along with the Member proposed to be expelled the concerning society has also got to be informed. No matter if action has been initiated u/s 19-C (1), the legislature in its wisdom has also provided in section 19-C (2) that there is every cause for the Registrar to hear the Society. However, even while initiating action suo-meto, as the action initiated by the Registrar is in the interest of the society, the society definitely shall be free to submit its side as well. The learned Government Advocate has pointed out in this respect that the copy of the notice has been endorsed to the society, therefore, the provision of this sub-section is complied with. We do not feel convinced with the argument of the Government Advocate as the notice to the society would mean that the society will definitely have its case submitted and proved by necessary documents or evidence when necessary. Only requiring the member to show the cause is the incomplete fulfillment of the provisions and it is certainly not complied with in full, since notice to the society as per requirement as well as necessary submission in the matter are missing. Therefore in confol1l1ity with the earlier decision of the Tribunal and in light of the above analysis, we are of the view that the action taken u/s 19-C (2) is not as per procedure required in law." 10. As a matter of fact the above citations are not relevant in this case as not only the notice to the society has been issued but it has also been provided proper opportunity along with the petitioner. 11. As a matter of fact the above citations are not relevant in this case as not only the notice to the society has been issued but it has also been provided proper opportunity along with the petitioner. 11. The only point which the counsel reiterated time and again was this that the appellant has been penalized for an Act committed by him in the bank with the expulsion of the membership of the society. The appellant has not committed any Act in the society which might attract action under section 19-C. 12. As regards sanctioning of over draft limit to the party by the bank and not taking proper action as pointed out in the audit report in the Board meeting, the appellant cannot be singled out with a severe punishment of uprooting him from the basic membership of a primary society whom he happens to represent in the bank. There are obviously many other actions contemplated in the Act for proceeding against any such misuse of office such as super-session under section 53, removal under section 53-B, making good losses caused to the society under section 58-B and also a dispute under section 64 if the situation so warrants. It is as if in the present case the respondent Joint Registrar was bent upon expelling the appellant from the Cooperation movement it self by expelling him from the primary membership of the primary society of the appellant. A punishment or penalty can neither be presupposed nor contemplated and action initiated accordingly in pursuance of it. The proper administration of justice will rather presuppose the initiation of proper investigation and then come to a conclusion if the person held responsible is to be penalized with a provision or not. 13. A land mark judgment in respect of expulsion from the Cooperative movement is often relied in such cases which is Kamta Prasad v. The Registrar, AIR 1967 MP211, 1967 MPU 337, in which Hon'ble High Court had held that there is no place in any Cooperative society for any member who is not honest and who is a liar and trickster and inclined to give false evidence. There is no such case brought out against the appellant in the present matter. There is no such case brought out against the appellant in the present matter. It has not been proved what injury to the credit of the primary society has been caused by the appellant intentionally and how the disrepute is brought about to it. The Tribunal in a similar matter in Bhaskar RaoJoshi v. Ashok Grih Nirmall Society, 2008 RN 291 has held that even when a person makes a complaint against a society it is causing no injury or disrepute to it. The appellant has even not done so in the present case. 14. The Cooperative movement is a need-based system. A person becomes the member of a Cooperative Society because he is in need of its services and the society in position to provide them. It is a system where one is for all and all are for one. Therefore every individual is an important unit in the collective fom1 of the system and the reduction of such unit without a sound basis could shake the very structure of its existence and cause a greater harm to it. It would definitely minimize the collective force of it inducing an unhealthy infighting making way into it. 15. In the light of above discussion and analysis of the whole situation and an in depth peep into the action and order against the appellant, we consider it proper to set aside the impugned order, therefore it is set aside and the appeal allowed. There are no orders in respect of cost to either sides.