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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 1006 (MP)

Lalita Tomar v. State of M. P.

2009-08-20

S.K.GANGELE

body2009
ORDER 1. This petition is filed by the petitioner for challenging order Annexure P-1 dated 14.3.2008 and also non-selection of the petitioner on the post of Aaganwadi worker. The petitioner along with other persons applied for the post of Aaganwadi worker for Aaganwadi Centre Devpur in Gram Panchayat Gurichchha. Copy of the application has been filed as Annexure P-2. Along with petitioner other persons have also applied for the post. The District Level Committee in its meeting dated 16.8.2007 rejected the application of the petitioner on the ground that she is resident of village Gurichchha, because as per policy of appointment of Aaganwadi worker, candidate must be a resident of same village or ward. The committee decided to appoint one Ku. Asha as Aaganwadi worker. Subsequently, it was found that Ku. Asha was under age hence she could not be appointed as Aaganwadi worker. Thereafter, petitioner filed an appeal before the Collector mentioning that she is entitled to be appointed as Aaganwadi worker. The Collector vide order dated 14.3.2008, Annexure P-1 rejected the appeal of the petitioner on the ground that petitioner does not fulfill the requisite criteria for appointment as Aaganwadi worker because she is not a resident of village Devpur. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the decision of the Collector and the District Committee that the petitioner is not entitled to be appointed as Aaganwadi worker because she is not the resident of village Devpur is arbitrary, illegal and violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. In support of this contention, the learned counsel relied upon judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and others [2002 SCC (L&S) 935], and judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Savitri Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, reported in 2004(1) MPWN 66 =2003(4) MPLJ 106]. 3. Contrary to this learned Deputy Advocate General has submitted that petitioner is not a resident of village Devpur and as per policy of the State Government, which was prevailing at that time candidate of Aaganwadi worker must be a resident of same village. Hence, the candidature of the petitioner has rightly been rejected. 3. Contrary to this learned Deputy Advocate General has submitted that petitioner is not a resident of village Devpur and as per policy of the State Government, which was prevailing at that time candidate of Aaganwadi worker must be a resident of same village. Hence, the candidature of the petitioner has rightly been rejected. In support of her contention learned Deputy Advocate General relied upon judgment of Division Bench of this Court passed in Writ Appeal No.421/2007 Smt. Sadhana v. State of M.P. and others. 4. From the facts of the case, it is clear that candidature of the petitioner has not been considered on the ground that she is not a resident of village Devpur. It has been mentioned by the District Committee in the proceeding dated 16.8.2007 that the petitioner is a resident of village Gurichchha and village Gurichchha is a part of Gram Panchayat Devpur. The appointment of Aaganwadi worker in question was for Aaganwadi Centre, Devpur. The Women and Child Development Department issued a policy with regard to appointment of Aaganwadi worker, copy of the policy has been filed as Annexure P-3 dated 27.5.2006. In the aforesaid policy the eligibility criteria for appointment has also been mentioned. One of the eligibility criteria is the name of the woman must be recorded in the voter list of the same village and ward. Subsequently the department issued another policy/ circular dated 10.7.2007 for appointment with regard to Aaganwadi worker. Copy of the same has been filed along with the rejoinder. In the aforesaid policy, it has been mentioned with regard to eligibility criteria for appointment that the applicant must be resident of same village and ward. The aforesaid criteria has been considered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Savitri Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, reported in 2004(1) MPWN 66 =2003(4) MPLJ 106]. The learned Single Judge has held as under: "After hearing the learned counsel for both the sides, this Court is of the opinion that the view taken by the Commissioner, Rewa, on the basis of the circular of the State Government is illegal. The learned Single Judge has held as under: "After hearing the learned counsel for both the sides, this Court is of the opinion that the view taken by the Commissioner, Rewa, on the basis of the circular of the State Government is illegal. Recently in Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan [ AIR 2002 SC 2877 ], it has been held by the Supreme Court that residence within a District or rural areas of that District could not be a valid basis for classification for the purpose of public employment. The argument in favour of such reservation which has the overtones of parochialism is liable to be rejected on the plain terms of Article 16(2) and in the light of Article 16(3). An argument of this nature flies in the fact of the peremptory language of Article 16(2) and runs counter to our constitutional ethos founded on unity and integrity of the nation. Residence by itself -- be it be within a State, region District or lesser area within a District -cannot be a ground to accord preferential treatment or reservation save as provided in Article 16(3). It is not possible to compartmentalize the State into Districts with a view to offer employment to the residents of that District on a preferential basis. In view of the above legal position, the circular dated 27.5.1996 on which reliance has been placed by the Commissioner, suffers from constitutional infirmity. The instructions contained in this circular that a person of the same village should be appointed as Aaganwadi worker is legally not sustainable. It is against the provision, in Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner could not be discriminated on the ground that she is resident of village Bharhut and not of village Dadari. As far as public employment is concerned, the classification on the basis of residence in a region or locality or village is constitutionally impermissible. 5. From the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court, it is clear that a person could not be denied appointment on the post of Aaganwadi worker on the ground that she is a resident of another village of same Gram Panchayat. In arising out of the aforesaid finding the learned Single Judge of this Court relied on the judgment of the Hon'b1e Supreme Court Kailash. In arising out of the aforesaid finding the learned Single Judge of this Court relied on the judgment of the Hon'b1e Supreme Court Kailash. Chand Sharma [2002 SCC (L&S) 935], whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under with regard to classification of residence on the basis of geography wise: "(13) Before proceeding further we should steer clear of a misconception that surfaced in the course of arguments advanced on behalf of the State and some of the parties. Based on the decisions which countenanced geographical classification for certain weighty reasons such as socio-economic backwardness of the area for the purpose of admissions to professional colleges, it has been suggested that residence within a district or rural areas of that district could be a valid basis for classification for the purpose of public employment as well. We have no doubt that such a sweeping argument which has the overtones of parochialism is liable to be rejected on the plain terms of Article 16(2) and in the light of Article 16(3). An argument of this nature flies in the face of the peremptory language of Article 16(2) and runs counter to our constitutional ethos founded on unity and integrity of the nation. Attempts to prefer candidates of a local area in the State were nipped in the bud by this Court since long past. We would like to reiterate that residence by itself - be it be within a State, region, district or lesser area within a district cannot be a ground to accord preferential treatment or reservation, save as provided in Article 16(3). It is not possible to compartmentalize the State into districts with a view to offer employment to the residents of that district on a preferential basis. At this juncture it is appropriate to undertake a brief analysis of Article 16. (14) Article 16 which under clause (1) guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State reinforces that guarantee by prohibiting under clause (2) discrimination on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Be it noted that in the allied Article -- Article IS, the word 'residence' is omitted from the opening clause prohibiting discrimination on specified grounds. Be it noted that in the allied Article -- Article IS, the word 'residence' is omitted from the opening clause prohibiting discrimination on specified grounds. Clauses (3) and (4) of Article 16 dilutes the rigour of clause (2) by (i) conferring an enabling power on the Parliament to make a law prescribing the residential requirement within the State in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the State; and (ii) by enabling the State to make a provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which is not adequately represented in the services under the State. The newly introduced clauses (4A) and (4B), apart from clause (5) of Article 16 are the other provisions by which the embargo laid down in Article 16(2) in somewhat absolute terms is lifted to meet certain specific situations with a view to promote the overall objective underlying the Article. Here, we should make note of two things; firstly, discrimination only on the ground of residence (or place of birth) in so far as public employment is concerned is prohibited; secondly, Parliament is empowered to make the law prescribing residential requirement within a State or Union territory, as the case may be, in relation to a class or classes of employment. That means, in the absence of Parliamentary law, even the prescription of requirement as to residence within the State is a taboo. Coming to the first aspect, it must be noticed that the prohibitory mandate under Article 16(2) is not attracted if the alleged discrimination is on grounds not merely related to residence, but the factum of residence is only taken into account in addition to other relevant factors. This, in effect, is the import of the expression 'only'. (15) Let us now turn our attention to some of the decided cases. As far back as in 1969 a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.V.S. Narasimha Rao v. State of A.P. declared that the law enacted by the Parliament in pursuance of clause (3) of Article 16 making a special provision for domicile within the Telengana region of the State of Andhra Pradesh for the purpose of public employment within that region and the rules made thereunder as ultra vires the Constitution. Pursuant to the enabling power conferred under section 3 of the Public Employment (Recruitment as to Residence) Act, rules were made making a person ineligible for appointment to a post within the Telengana area under the State Government of A.P. or to a post under a local authority in the said area unless he has been continuously residing within the said area for a period of not less than 15 years immediately preceding the prescribed date. The Government issued an order relieving all 'non-domicile' persons appointed on or after 1.11.1956 to certain categories of posts reserved for domiciles of Telengana under the A.P. Public Employment (Recruitment as to Residence) Rules. Such incumbent of post was to be employed in the Andhra region by creating a supernumerary post, if necessary. This legislative and executive action was struck down by this Court. After referring to Article 16, the Court observed: "The intention here is to make every office or employment open and available to every citizen, and inter alia to make offices or employment in one part of India open to citizens in all other parts of India. The third clause then makes an exception. The legislative power to create residential qualification for employment is thus exclusively conferred on Parliament. Parliament can make any law, which prescribes any requirement as to residence within the State or Union Territory prior to employment or appointment to an office in that State or Union Territory. Two questions arise here, firstly, whether Parliament, while prescribing the requirement, may prescribe the requirement of residence in a particular part of the State and, secondly, whether Parliament can delegate this function by making a declaration and leaving the details to be filled in by the rule making power of the Central and State Governments." The argument that a sweeping power was given to the Parliament to make any law as regards residential requirement was repelled thus: "By the first clause equality of opportunity in employment or appointment to an office is guaranteed. By the second clause, there can be no discrimination, among other things, on the ground of residence. Realising, however, that sometimes local sentiments may have to be respected or sometimes an inroad from more advanced States into less developed States may have to be prevented, and a residential qualification may, therefore, have to be prescribed, the exception in clause (3) was made. Realising, however, that sometimes local sentiments may have to be respected or sometimes an inroad from more advanced States into less developed States may have to be prevented, and a residential qualification may, therefore, have to be prescribed, the exception in clause (3) was made. Even so, that clause spoke of residence within the State. The claim of Mr. Setalvad that Parliament can make a provision regarding residence in any particular part of a State would render the general prohibition lose all its meaning. The words 'any requirement' cannot be read to warrant something which could have been said more specifically. These words bear upon the kind of residence or its duration rather than its location within the State. We accept the argument of Mr. Gupta that the Constitution, as it stands, speaks of a whole State as the venue for residential qualification and it is impossible to think that the constituent assembly was thinking of residence in districts, taluqas, cities, towns or villages. The fact that this clause is an exception and came as an amendment must dictate that a narrow construction upon the exception should be placed as indeed the debates in the constituent assembly also seem to indicate." Thus, this Court was not inclined to place too wide an interpretation on Article 16(3), keeping broadly in view the constitutional philosophy. "(16) In Pradeep Jain v. Union of India though the Court was concerned with the question whether residential requirement or institutional preference in admissions to technical and medical colleges can be constitutionally permissible in the light of Article 15(1) and 15(4), Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court expressed his prima fade opinion thus as regards residential requirement in the field of public employment: "We may point out at this stage that though Article 15(2) bars discrimination on grounds, not only of religion, race, caste or sex but also on place of birth, Article 16(2) goes further and provides that no citizen shall on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them be ineligible for or discriminated against in State employment. So far as employment under the State or any local or other authority is concerned, no citizen can be given preference nor can any discrimination be practised against him on the ground only of residence. So far as employment under the State or any local or other authority is concerned, no citizen can be given preference nor can any discrimination be practised against him on the ground only of residence. It would thus appear that residential requirement would be unconstitutional as a condition of eligibility for employment or appointment to an office under the State ..... But, Article 16(3) provides an exception to this rule by laying down that Parliament may make a law "prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or other authority in a State or Union Territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union Territory prior to such employment or appointment". Parliament alone is given the right to enact an exception to the ban on discrimination based on residence and that too only with respect to positions within the employment of a State Government. But even so, without any Parliamentary enactment permitting them to do so many of the State Governments have been pursuing policies of localism since long and these policies are now quite widespread. Parliament has in fact exercised little control over these policies formulated by the States. The only action, which Parliament has taken under Article 16(3) giving it the right to set a residence requirement has been the enactment of the Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957. There is, therefore, at present no Parliamentary enactment permitting preferential policies based on residence requirement except in the case of Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and Himachal Pradesh where the Central Government has been given the right to issue directions setting residence requirements in the subordinate services. Yet, in the face of Article 16(2) some of the States are adopting sons of the said policies prescribing reservation or preference based on domicile or residence requirement for employment or appointment to an office under the Government of a State or any local or other authority or public sector corporation or any other corporation which is an instrumentality or agency of the State. Prima facie this would seem to be constitutionally impermissible though we do not wish to express any definite opinion upon it, since it does not directly arise for considertion in these writ petitions and civil appeal." However, in so far as admissions to educational institutions such as medical colleges are concerned, it was pointed out that Article 16(2) has no application and residential requirement cannot per se be condemned as unconstitutional. It was observed that the only provision of the Constitution on the touchstone of which such residence requirement can be tested is Article 14. On a conspectus of earlier decisions of this Court, the learned Judge summarised the position thus in so far as admissions to professional education colleges are concerned: "It will be noticed from the above discussion that though inter State discrimination between persons resident in different districts or regions of a State has by and large been frowned upon by the Court and struck down as invalid as in Minor P. Rajendran's case [ AIR 1968 SC 1012 ] (supra), and Perukaruppan's Case [ AIR 1971 SC 2303 ] (supra), the Court has in D.N. Chanchala's case and other similar cases upheld institutional reservation effected through university wise distribution of seats for admission to medical colleges. The Court has also by its decisions in D.P. Joshi's case [ AIR 1955 SC 334 ], and N. Vasundhara's case [ AIR 1971 SC 1439 ] (supra), sustained the constitutional validity of reservation based on residence requirement within a State for the purpose of admission to medical colleges. These decisions which all relate to admission to MBBS course are binding upon us and it is therefore not possible for us to hold, in the face of these decisions that residence requirement in a State for admission to MBBS course is irrational and irrelevant and cannot be introduced as a condition for admission without violating the mandate of equality of opportunity contained in Article 14. We must proceed on the basis that at least so far as admission to MBBS course is concerned, residence requirement in a State can be introduced as a condition for admission to the MBBS course." Bhagwati, J. underscored the need for evolving a policy of ensuring admissions to the MBBS course on all India basis "based as it is on the postulate that India is one nation and every citizen of India is entitled to have equal opportunity for education and advancement". But, it was observed that the realization of such ideal may not be realistically possible in the present circumstances. It was then concluded: "We are, therefore, of the view that a certain percentage of reservation on the basis of residence requirement may legitimately be made in order to equalize opportunities for medical admission on a broader basis and to bring about real and not formal, actual and not merely legal equality. The percentage of reservation made on this count may also include institutional reservation for students passing the PUC or pre-medical examination of the same university or clearing the qualifying examination from the school system of the educational hinterland of the medical colleges in the State." It is not necessary for us to refer in extenso to various other decisions of this Court dealing with the scope of Article 15(1) ad 15(4) vis-a-vis reservations based on residence within a university of other local area for the purpose of admissions to professional colleges. A summary of those decisions has been given by Bhagwati, J. in the passage extracted (supra). The requirement of residence and education within the university area for allocation of seats in medical colleges affiliated to that university was upheld on special considerations noticed in that judgment. (17) We may, however, advert to one recent decision wherein the view taken in Rajendran's case (supra), was reiterated. In Govind A. Mane v. State of Maharashtra, it was laid down: "Since it is not disputed by the respondents that for the purpose of admission to BEd. course, seats were distributed districtwise without indicating any material to show the nexus between such distribution and the object sought to be achieved, it would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution." The lack of material to establish nexus between the geographical classification and the object sought to be achieved thereby was thus held to be violative of Article 14. (18) The question which fell for consideration of this Court whether the action of the State in State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon was in reserving certain percentage of seats available in medical colleges in favour of candidates from rural areas, hill areas and Uttarakhand was justified? The reservation was sought to be justified from the stand point of Article 15(4). RepelJing the contention, Ray, C.J., speaking for a three Judge Bench observed that: "The Constitution does not enable the State to bring socially and educationally backward areas within the protection of Article 15(4)". It was pointed out that the accent in Article 15(4) is on classes of citizens: "The expression "classes of citizens" indicates a homogeneous section of the people who are grouped together because of certain likenesses and common traits and who are identifiable by some common attributes. The homogeneity of the class of citizens is social and educational backwardness. Neither caste nor religion nor place of birth will be the uniform element of common attributes to make them a class of citizens." Eschewing the test of poverty as the determining factor of social backwardness this Court made the following pertinent observations: "A division between the population of our country on the ground of poverty that the people in the urban areas are not poor and that the people in the rural areas are poor is neither supported by facts nor by a division between the urban people on the one hand and the rural people on the other that the rural people are socially and educationally backward class. Some people in the rural areas may be educationally backward, some may be socially backward, there may be few who are both socially and educationally backward, but it cannot be said that all citizens residing in rural areas are socially and educationally backward. Eighty per cent of the population in the State of Uttar Pradesh in rural areas cannot be said to be a homogeneous class by itself. They are not of the same kind. Their occupation is different. Their standards are different. Their lives are different. Population cannot be a class by itself. Rural element does not make it a class. Eighty per cent of the population in the State of Uttar Pradesh in rural areas cannot be said to be a homogeneous class by itself. They are not of the same kind. Their occupation is different. Their standards are different. Their lives are different. Population cannot be a class by itself. Rural element does not make it a class. To suggest that the rural areas are socially and educationally backward is to have reservation for the majority of the State." It was further observed : "The reservation for rural areas cannot be sustained on the ground that the rural areas represent socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. This reservation appears to be made for majority population of the State. Eighty per cent of the population of the State cannot be a homogeneous class. Poverty in rural areas cannot be the basis of classification to support reservation for rural areas". It was then observed that "the present case of classification of rural areas is not one of under-classification. This is a case of discrimination in favour of the majority of rural population to the prejudice of the students drawn from the general category." (19) However, the learned Judges took the view that the hilland Uttarakhand areas in U.P. State are 'instances' of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens and-that those living in the hill and Uttarakhand areas can be considered to be socially and _ educationally backward classes of citizens. The social, economic and educational factors justifying such conclusion were set out succinctly by the learned Judges. Ultimately the reservation in favour of candidates from rural areas was declared unconstitutional while upholding reservation for the candidates from hill and Uttarakhand areas. The principle laid down in the above decisions, though in the context of interpretation of Article 15(4) is an answer to the contention of the State that bonus marks are provided for uplifting the rural educated persons so as to utilize their services for the upliftment of the fellow rural people through the spread of education. Prohibition of discrimination on the basis of place of residence in the context of public employment is an additional factor which makes it well nigh impossible to accept the above plea. Prohibition of discrimination on the basis of place of residence in the context of public employment is an additional factor which makes it well nigh impossible to accept the above plea. (20) Before examining the further pleas in support of the impugned action taken by the State it would be apposite to refer to the decision in State of Maharashtra v. Raj Kumar, on which reliance has been placed by the High Court and reference has been made in the course of arguments before us. In that case a rule was made by the State of Maharashtra that a candidate in order to be treated as a rural candidate must have passed SSC examination which is held from a village or a town having only 'C' type municipality. The object of the rule, as pointed out by this Court, was to appoint candidates having full knowledge of rural life and its problems so that they would be more suitable for working as officers in rural areas. The rule was struck down on the ground that there was no nexus between classification made and the object sought to be achieved because "as the rule stands any person who may not have lived in a village at all can appear for SSC examination from a village and yet become eligible for selection". The rule was held to be violative of Articles 14 and 16. Another point discussed by the Court was about the propriety of giving bonus marks for the rural candidates and the Court held thus : "The rules also provide that viva-voce Board would put relevant questions to judge the suitability of candidate for working in rural areas and to test whether or not they have sufficient knowledge of rural problems, and this no doubt amounts to a sufficient safeguard to ascertain the ability of the candidate regarding his knowledge about the affairs of the village. In such a situation there was absolutely no occasion for making an express provision for giving weightage which would virtually convert merit into demerit and demerit into merit and would be per se violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as being an impermissible classification. In such a situation there was absolutely no occasion for making an express provision for giving weightage which would virtually convert merit into demerit and demerit into merit and would be per se violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as being an impermissible classification. The rule of weightage as applied in this case is manifestly unreasonable and wholly arbitrary and cannot be sustained." (21) This decision is not a direct authority for the proposition that a citizen cannot be preferred for employment under the State on the ground that he or she hails from rural area. However, what has been laid down in regard to the first point assumes some relevance in the cases on hand. The criterion for identifying a rural candidate was held to be irrelevant as it had no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In the present case, the position is much worse as the impugned circular does not spell out any criteria or indicia to determine whether an applicant is a rural candidate. (22) Realising the difficulty in sustaining the impugned circular of the Government merely on the basis of classification between persons residing in rural areas and towns, Mr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel as well as the learned counsel appearing for the State, sought to draw support from the plea taken by the State in the counter affidavit filed in SLP (C) No.10780/2001 that the award of bonus marks to the residents of rural areas is a measure of affirmative action or compensatory discrimintion to help the disadvantaged sections, namely, the rural people. It is trite to say that India lives in villages and inhabited predominantly by poorer sections of people. The people in the rural areas suffer many handicaps especially in the sphere of education. These factors, according to the learned counsel justify the State action to throw up better employment opportunities to the rural citizens and such act of levelling, it is contended, is nothing but an instance of protective discrimination. According to the learned counsel, the State, in the instant case, has resorted to least offensive and least obtrusive method of protecting the interests of the rural citizens instead of going in for wholesale reservation and it does not in any way violate the mandate of Article 14 or Article 16. According to the learned counsel, the State, in the instant case, has resorted to least offensive and least obtrusive method of protecting the interests of the rural citizens instead of going in for wholesale reservation and it does not in any way violate the mandate of Article 14 or Article 16. The learned counsel reminds us that giving relaxations and concessions to disadvantaged people are an integral part of the equality clause enshrined in Article 14. (23) This plea proceeds on the supposition that the proportion of employment of rural residents is much less than that of the residents in the towns; in other words, the major chunk of appointments in State services are going to those born in and brought up in towns. The other assumption underlying this argument is that the educated people in the rural areas are economically weaker than those living in towns. None of these assumptions are based upon any data or concrete material. We must say that the argument built up on this plea falls more in the realm of platitudes rather than affording 'a solid basis for the classification. In Nidamarti Mahesh Kumar v. State of Maharashtra, when regionwise classification for admissions to medical colleges was sought to be defended on the ground that Vidharbha and Marathwada regions are backward as compared to Pune and Bombay regions, this Court declined to accept such contention. It was observed: "In the first place there is no material to show that the entire region within the jurisdiction of the university in Vidharbha is backward or that the entire region within the jurisdiction of Pune University is advanced. There are quite possibilities even in the region within the jurisdiction of Pune University predominantly rural areas which are backward and equally there 'may be in the region within the jurisdiction of the university in Vidharbha areas which are not backward. We do not think it is possible to categorise the regions within the jurisdiction of the various universities as backward or advanced as if they were exclusive categories and in any event there is no material placed before us which would persuade us to reach that conclusion." , (24) Here too, in the absence of any material, we cannot take it for granted that the premise on which the argument is sought to be built up is correct. Similarly, when the reservations of certain percentage of seats in medical colleges in favour of candidates from rural' areas was sought to be justified on economic considerations, a three Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Ray, C.J., in State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon emphatically rejected the plea. We quote: ".... A division between the population of our country on the ground of poverty that the people in the urban areas are not poor and that the people in the rural areas are poor is neither supported by facts nor by a division between the urban people on the one hand and the rural people on the other that the rural people are socially and educationally backward class. Some people in the rural areas may be educationally backward, some may be socially backward, there may be few who are both socially and educationally backward, but it cannot be said that all citizens residing in rural areas are socially and educationally backward. The following observations may also be noticed : "The reservation for rural areas cannot be sustained on the ground that the rural areas represent socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. This reservation appears to be made for majority population of the State. Eighty per cent of the population of the State cannot be a homogeneous class. Poverty in rural areas cannot be the basis of classification to support reservation for rural areas.... The incident of birth in rural areas is made the basic 'qualification. No reservation can be made on the basis of place of birth as that would offend Article 15." (25) Though the Court was primarily dealing with an argument based on Article 15(4) and the import of the expression "socially and educationally backward classes of citizens" occurring in that Sub-Article, the observations quoted above are quite relevant in testing the plea raised on behalf of the State to save the classification. In the face of what has been laid down in Pradip Tandon's case, the State cannot possibly invoke Article 16(4). In the face of what has been laid down in Pradip Tandon's case, the State cannot possibly invoke Article 16(4). (26) Our attention has however been drawn to the following observations in Nidamarti's case (supra), in reiteration of what was said in Pradeep Jain's case (supra) : "It is therefore, clear that where the region from which the students of a university are largely drawn is backward either from the point of view of opportunities for medical education or availability of competent and adequate medical services, it would be constitutionally permissible, without violating the mandate of the equality clause, to provide a high percentage of reservation or preference for students coming from that region, because without reservation or preference students from such backward region will hardly be able to compete with those from advanced regions since they would have no adequate opportunity for development so as to be in a position to compete with others. By reason of their socially or economically disadvantaged position they would not have been able to secure education in good schools and they would consequently be at a disadvantage compared to students belonging to the affluent or well to do families who have had best of school education. There can, therefore, legitimately be reservation or preference in their favour so far as admissions are concerned in case of medical college which is set up or intended to cater to the needs of a region which is backward or whose alumni are largely drawn from such backward region." (27) These obervations, in our view, cannot be legitimately pressed into service for the purpose of justifying reservation or weightage in favour of rural candidates on the ground of nativity/residence for purposes of public employment. The difference in approach in relation to Articles 15 and 16 was indicated by Bhagwati, J. in Pradeep Jain's case and we have quoted the relevant passage extensively. It was made clear in Pradeep Jain's case that in the matter of admissions to professional colleges the considerations were different. As far as public employment is concerned, the classification on the basis of residence in a region or locality was broadly held to be constitutionally impermissible. Moreover, the preferential treatment of rural candidates in the instant case is not on the ground that they hail from the backward region. As far as public employment is concerned, the classification on the basis of residence in a region or locality was broadly held to be constitutionally impermissible. Moreover, the preferential treatment of rural candidates in the instant case is not on the ground that they hail from the backward region. All or most of the villages in the district or the State cannot be presumed to be backward educationally or economically. Such a claim was not accepted in Pradip Tandon's case by a three Judge Bench. Even in Nidamarti's case, it was held that in absence of material, certain regions cannot be dubbed as backward. (28) The justifiability of the plea stemming from the premise that uplifting the rural people is an affirmative action to improve their lot can be tested from the concrete situation which confront us in the present cases. We are here concerned with the selections to the posts of teachers of primary schools, the minimum qualification being SSC coupled with basic training course in teaching. Can the Court proceed on the assumption that the candidates residing in the town areas with their education in the schools or colleges located in the towns or its peripheral areas stand on a higher pedestal than the candidates who had studied in the rural area schools or colleges? Is the latter comparatively a disadvantaged and economically weaker segment when compared to the former? We do not think so. The aspirants for the teachers jobs in primary schools -- be they from rural area or town area do not generally belong to affluent class. Apparently they come from lower middle class or poor background. By and large, in the pursuit of education, they suffer and share the same handicaps as their fellow citizens in rural areas. It cannot be said that the applicants from non-rural areas have access to best of the schools and colleges which the well to do class may have. Further, without any data, it is not possible to presume that the schools and colleges located in the towns -- small or big and their peripheral areas are much better qualitatively, that is to say, from the point of view of teaching standards or infrastructure facilities so as to give an edge to the town candidates over the rural candidates. Further, without any data, it is not possible to presume that the schools and colleges located in the towns -- small or big and their peripheral areas are much better qualitatively, that is to say, from the point of view of teaching standards or infrastructure facilities so as to give an edge to the town candidates over the rural candidates. (29) We are, therefore, of the view that the first plea raised by the State which is also found in the counter affidavit filed before the High Court (as seen from the judgment in Deepak Kumar Suthar's case) is untenable. 6. From the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has struck down the concept of preference in employment on the basis of geography. 7. The learned Deputy Advocate General relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court passed in Writ Appeal No.421/2007(s) Smt. Sadhana v. State of M.P. and others. As per learned Deputy Advocate General, the Division Bench of this Court affirmed the policy of the department for appointment of Aaganwadi worker to the effect that the Aaganwadi worker must be a resident of same village. The Division Bench of this Court has held as under : "The facts briefly are that the appellant was appointed as Aaganwadi worker by order dated 1.12.2006. Respondent No.3 filed appeal before the Collector saying that she is a Scheduled Caste person and was placed at serial No.1 by the Pariyojna Adhikari yet the appellant was appointed as Aaganwadi worker for Datia area. The Collector issued notice to the appellant and held that in the voter list the name of one Hemlata was mentioned who was the first wife of Har Narayan and Har Narayan after divorce from Hemlata got married to the appellant and taking advantage of the mention of the name of Hemlata in the voter list as wife of Har Narayan, the appellant has been appointed as Aaganwadi worker. After recording aforesaid finding the Collector set aside the appointment of the appellant and directed an enquiry into the matter. After recording aforesaid finding the Collector set aside the appointment of the appellant and directed an enquiry into the matter. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Writ Petition No.2606/2007(S) but by the impugned order dated 22.6.2007, learned Single Judge did not find any merit in the writ petition and disposed of the writ petition with a direction that the concerned authority may take a decision with regard to appointment of Aaganwadi worker within period of thirty days from the date of receipt of the order. Mr. Raghuvanshi, learned counsel for appellant submitted that under Article 16(2) of the Constitution, appointment in a post on the basis of place of residence has been prohibited as discriminatory. He cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kailash Chand Sharma etc. v. State of Rajasthan and others [ AIR 2002 SC 2877 ], in which it has been held that residence by itself -- be it be within a State, region, district or lesser area within a district -- cannot be a ground to accord preferential treatment or reservation save as provided in Article 16(3). He submitted that the appointment of the appellant as Aaganwadi worker could not be set aside by the Collector on the ground that her name did not find place in the voter list. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and we find that in the policy for appointment of Aaganwadi workers contained in order dated 27.5.2006 of Government of M.P. Women and Child Welfare Department, one of the conditions for appointment of Aaganwadi worker was that the name of woman candidate should find place in the voter list of village. Yet another condition in the order dated 27.5.2006 of the Government of M.P., for appointment of Aaganwadi worker is that the woman candidate should be a resident of the village or ward for which she is being considered as Aaganwadi worker. The appointment of the appellant has been set aside by the Collector not because she was not a resident of village or ward but because her name did not find place in the voter list. Hence, the contention of Mr. Raghuvanshi that place of residence cannot be the basis for appointment as Aaganwadi worker because of the bar under Article 16(2) of the Constitution does not arise for decision in this case. Hence, the contention of Mr. Raghuvanshi that place of residence cannot be the basis for appointment as Aaganwadi worker because of the bar under Article 16(2) of the Constitution does not arise for decision in this case. Since inclusion in the voter list was the requirement for appointment as Aaganwadi worker in policy of the Government of M.P., we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the Collector in the setting aside the appointment of the appellant as Aaganwadi worker. Mr. Raghuvanshi further submitted that the appellant has made an application for inclusion of her name in the voter list. In the enquiry ordered by the Collector, this aspect may be considered by the concerned authority. 8. It is clear from the judgment of the Division of this Court that the name of the appellant did not find place in the voter list. It has clearly been observed by the Division Bench that the appointment of the appellant has been set aside by the Collector not because she was not resident of village or ward but because her name did not find place in the voter list. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench did not consider the argument of the learned counsel with regard to eligibility criteria of resident for appointment of Aaganwadi worker in view of Article 16(2) of the Constitution of India. Hence, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court could not be held to be a precedent for deciding the point with regard to the criteria for the purpose of appointment of Aaganwadi worker that, a candidate must be a resident of the same village or ward. 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sumtibai and others v. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm [ AIR 2007 SC 3166 ], Court has held as under with regard to binding nature of precedent: "10. As observed by this Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra [ AIR 1968 SC 647 ], vide para 13 : "A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury, LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901 AC 495] : Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may .seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all". 11. In Ambika Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and others [( 1987) 1 SCC 213] (vide para 18), this Court observed: "The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. 12. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. [ (2003)2 SCC 111 (vide para 59), this Court observed (2002 AIR SCW 4939, para 59) : "It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the presidential valued of a decision". 13. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and another v. N.R. Vairamani and another [ AIR 2004 SC 4778 ], a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual sitution. 13. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and another v. N.R. Vairamani and another [ AIR 2004 SC 4778 ], a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual sitution. In the same judgment this Court also observed (2004 AIR SCW 5457, paras 10, 11 and 12) : "Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of the context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC 737 at p.761], Lord Mac Dermot observed: "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. [1970(2) AI1.ER 294], Lord Reid said, Lord Atkin's speech ..... is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition it will require qualification in .new circumstances. Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L. J. as if it were an Act of Parliament. And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972(2) WLR 537], Lord Morris said: "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a 'single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo, J.) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." *** *** *** "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it." 10. In my opinion, the point of eligibility criteria in appointment of Aaganwadi Worker has already been decided by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Savitri Singh (supra), and the judgment of the learned Single Judge is based on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Kailash Chand Sharma (supra). The candidature of the petitioner has been rejected only on the ground that she is not a resident of village Devpur. However, it is a fact that she is a resident of village Gurichchha which is part and parcel of Gram Panchayat Gurichchha. Hence, exclusion of petitioner from consideration to the post of Aaganwadi Worker on the ground that she is not resident of village Devpur is arbitrary and illegal. 11. Consequently, the petition of the petitioner is allowed. The impugned order Annexure P-l passed by the Collector and the proceedings dated 16.8.2007 of District Level Committee are hereby quashed. 12. The matter is remanded back to the District Level Committee to consider the case of the petitioner and other eligible candidates afresh on the basis of observations made by this Court in the writ petition within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 12. The matter is remanded back to the District Level Committee to consider the case of the petitioner and other eligible candidates afresh on the basis of observations made by this Court in the writ petition within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. It is further clarified that this Court has not observed anything about the merits of the candidates. No order as to cost.