Judgment : The petitioner challenges Ext.P5 decision disqualifying him from continuing as a member of the committee of a co-operative society for the reason that an order of surcharge has been passed against him under Section 68 of Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, hereinafter, "Act", for short. The impugned order is expressed as one issued under "Rule". The fact that there is a surcharge order against the petitioner is not in dispute. He states that he has challenged that order in an appeal. No interdicting order is issued by any authority in relation to the surcharge proceedings or order. The ground of challenge is that the impugned order has been issued without affording a pre-decisional opportunity of hearing, and that Rule 44 does not apply. 2. It is not disputed that the impugned order was issued without hearing the petitioner. The reason stated in the impugned order for excluding pre-decisional hearing is that the very factum of surcharge is the ground for disqualification of the petitioner and no useful purpose would be served by giving him yet another opportunity of hearing before declaration of disqualification on the ground of surcharge, he, having been heard before issuance of the surcharge order. This reasoning is supported by the learned Government Pleader on the ground that it may be an empty formality to extend such hearing when the petitioner has no case that any superior authority has stayed or otherwise interfered with the surcharge order. The learned Government Pleader pointed out that a person against whom a surcharge order has been issued, would be disentitled even to the membership of the society in terms of Rule 16(2) (f) of the Rules, unless he has purged himself of the incidence of surcharge. 3. The view in the impugned order that the petitioner having been heard in the course of the surcharge proceedings, it is unnecessary to give him an opportunity of hearing before disqualifying him on the basis of the surcharge order, may contain a spoon of wisdom since, in one view of the matter, it could be contended that it would be futile to extend a dual opportunity of hearing on the same set of facts. This is also the submission of learned Government Pleader. At the first blush, that argument may fall for consideration with considerable force. This is also the submission of learned Government Pleader. At the first blush, that argument may fall for consideration with considerable force. Adopting a functional approach to consider the applicability of natural justice to persons affected by decisions of administration, has commended recognition. A survey of the precedents would show that the plea of the administration that an opportunity of hearing need not be extended in cases where the outcome is indisputable has found some favors. If only one conclusion is possible on the admitted and indisputable facts and under the law, only one penalty is permissible, then the court may not compel the observance of the natural justice rule of hearing. This is not because it approves the non observance of natural justice but because the courts would not issue futile writs. Some support in this line could be found in S.L. Kapoor V. Jagmohan (AIR 1981 SC 136) and State of Karnataka v. Mangalore University Non-Teaching Employees' Association (2002(3) SCC 302). 4. But, that defence is impermissible when the statute law provides a definite and specific rule prescribing and directing pre-decisional hearing. When the statute under which an authority functions, itself lays down a procedure for the authority to follow, then that procedure has, necessarily, to be followed. Rule 16(2)(f) prescribes surcharge under Section 68 of the Act as an ineligibility from admission as a member of the cooperative society. Rule 44(1)(1) prescribes surcharge as a disqualification for a member of a society. Rule 16(4) and Rule 44(3) provide that the declaration as to such ineligibility and cessation of such status and office shall be made only after the person is given an opportunity to state his objections, if any, to the proposed action and if he wishes to be heard, he shall be given an opportunity to be heard. 5. Even in cases where the prescribed procedure falls deficient in any norms of natural justice, the courts have adopted the progressive approach of routing the principles of natural justice into the unoccupied interstices of the statute unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. If the statutory procedure is detailed, fair and complete, that may give rise to an implication that natural justice has been excluded and nothing more than the statutorily prescribed procedure need be followed by the concerned authority. If the statutory procedure is detailed, fair and complete, that may give rise to an implication that natural justice has been excluded and nothing more than the statutorily prescribed procedure need be followed by the concerned authority. If an evaluation of the statutorily prescribed procedure with reference to natural justice shows that the salutary cannons of natural justice have not been excluded, the better approach is to conceptualise the procedure in such cases, by filling any of the gaps therein, by bringing in the norms of natural justice. Profitable reference to Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna(AIR 1987 SC 71), Pual Wallis Furnell v. Whangarei High School's Board (AC 1973 660), Subhas Oil Industries v. State of U.P (AIR 1954 Allahabad 19) is apposite in this context. Furnell (supra) which adopted the restrictive approach of excluding natural justice in the wake of availability of statutory rules does not appear to stand with much support, as of now, since with the passage of time, the progressive approach of supplying the deficiency in the statutory rules by incorporating the norms of natural justice, except in cases of clear exclusion, express or implied, has gained foot in judicial thinking in India and abroad. In his classic work on Administrative Law, Sir William Wade, appears to characterize the Furnell decision as not free from doubt. It could therefore be treated as a principle of complete justice in the rule of hearing to say that while it may be open to import norms of natural justice where the procedure prescribed falls deficient of any of those norms and supplement the rules of procedure with rules of natural justice in cases where the functional approach to the given problem would call for such intervention, the procedure which is prescribed by a statute, if there is one, has to be naturally followed. 6. Rules 16 and 44 contain the statutory mandate that no order declaring disqualification or cessation of membership is to be issued without, a prior opportunity to state objections and, if sought for, an opportunity of hearing. Those pieces of subordinate legislation would not give way for any rule of wisdom not amounting to any superior statute law, which may be primary legislation under which those rules are framed, or may be, an overriding legislation and, of course, a constitutional provision. Those pieces of subordinate legislation would not give way for any rule of wisdom not amounting to any superior statute law, which may be primary legislation under which those rules are framed, or may be, an overriding legislation and, of course, a constitutional provision. The dictate of the subordinate legislation in hand is that even a person under the cover of a surcharge order has to be heard before an order declaring his disqualification is issued on the ground of being one who is surcharged. The legislative wisdom in the rules under construction may be that, by the time an action for disqualification is taken with reference to a surcharge, the person proceeded against would have purged himself of the consequence of surcharge or would have got an order from a superior authority in his favors. Whatever be the reason, the rules under consideration do not permit any exclusion of the opportunity to show cause and of hearing, if sought for. If the contrary has to be assumed; as a collorary, this court would be rendering those rules otiose in cases where declaration as to disqualification and cessation is proposed on the ground of surcharge. This is just impermissible. 7. It is profitable in this context to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Co-operative Society Ltd V. secretary (Food and Agriculture) Government of Andhra Pradesh and others (AIR 1977 SC 2313). That was a case that arose form a revisional decision of the Government, issued without giving notice to the party against whom such order was passed. That power of revision was coupled with the duty that no order prejudicial to any person shall be passed unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representation. In that case, the affected party had made a representation to the government, touching the matter. Yet, the procedure fell short of the fact that the government had not given any notice, calling upon him to make representation, if any. It is apposite to quote the following paragraph delivered by the Apex Court in that context: "21. Even though the appellant had filed some representations in respect of the matter, it would not absolve the Government from giving notice to the appellant to make the representation against the claim of the respondents. It is apposite to quote the following paragraph delivered by the Apex Court in that context: "21. Even though the appellant had filed some representations in respect of the matter, it would not absolve the Government from giving notice to the appellant to make the representation against the claim of the respondents. The minimal requirement under S.77(2) is a notice informing the opponent about the application and affording him an opportunity to make his representation against whatever has been alleged in his petition. It is true that a personal hearing is not obligatory but the minimal requirement of the principles of natural justice which are ingrained in S.77(2) is that the party whose rights are going to be affected and against whom some allegations are made and some prejudicial orders are claimed should have a written notice of the proceedings form the authority disclosing the grounds of complaint or other objection preferably by furnishing a copy of the petition on which action is contemplated in order that a proper and effective representation may be made. This minimal requirement can on no account be dispensed with by relying upon the principle of absence of prejudice or imputation of certain knowledge to the party against whom action is sought for". 8. The aforesaid case related to a rule which provides only for an opportunity to make a representation and not even for personal hearing. But the rules in hand provide for an opportunity to state objections, if any, to the proposed action and if he wishes to be heard, an opportunity of being heard. The law of the land as laid by the Apex Court as noticed above, applies with more vigor to the case in hand. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order issued without giving a pre-decisional opportunity to state objections and of being heard, is illegal and contrary to the Rules. In the result, the impugned Ext.P5 is quashed. This judgment will not stand in the way of first respondent initiating proceedings in accordance with law. The first respondent did not hear the petitioner whose plea is also that the period of time fixed to satisfy the surcharge has not run out and that the correctness of the surcharge order is pending before Government. Therefore, no decision de novo shall be based on the conclusions already arrived at and without hearing the petitioner. Writ petition ordered accordingly. Therefore, no decision de novo shall be based on the conclusions already arrived at and without hearing the petitioner. Writ petition ordered accordingly. No costs.