Judgment :- A. Kulasekaran, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 211. 2002 made in W.P. No. 33925 of 2002 of the learned single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent herein, which was filed challenging the order of the third appellant refusing to exercise its power conferred under Section 279 (2) of The Income Tax Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as Act to compound the offence. 2. The facts involved in this case is that the respondent herein was prosecuted by the appellants for the offence under Section 120-B, 420 read with Section 109 IPC and Section 278 of the Act before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences), Egmore, Madras in EO C.C. No. 637 of 1985 and by order dated 30.11.1998, the said Court convicted and sentenced the respondent herein to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each under each of the offences under Section 120B, 420 read with 109 of IPC and under Section 278 of the Act, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Challenging the said conviction and sentence imposed by the said Court, the respondent herein has filed an appeal in C.A. No. 250 of 1998 before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai, which is pending. Pending disposal of the said appeal, the respondent has filed a petition under Section 279 (2) of the Act before the third appellant on 09.04.2001 to compound the offence and also expressed her willingness to pay the entire amount towards compounding fee. The said petition was rejected by the third appellant by proceedings dated 02.08.2002 on the sole ground that already the criminal court convicted her, hence, the request for compounding the offence is not acceptable. Aggrieved by the said order dated 02.08.2002, the respondent herein has filed W.P. No. 33925 of 2002, which was allowed by this Court on 211. 2002 quashing the said proceedings dated 02.08.2002 of the third appellant herein, in which para Nos. 2 and 3 are relevant, which are extracted hereunder:- "2. Aggrieved by the said order dated 02.08.2002, the respondent herein has filed W.P. No. 33925 of 2002, which was allowed by this Court on 211. 2002 quashing the said proceedings dated 02.08.2002 of the third appellant herein, in which para Nos. 2 and 3 are relevant, which are extracted hereunder:- "2. It is not in dispute that the respondents-department themselves in a case similarly placed, moved this Court seeking to invoke the powers conferred under Section 279 (2) of the Income Tax Act for compounding offence while the matter was pending before this Court for revision and obtained leave of this Court to commute offence by exercising power conferred under Section 279 (2) of the Income Tax Act vide order dated 11.02.2000 in Crl.M.P. No. 984 of 2000 in Crl.R.C. No. 588 of 1996, even though the respondent-accused therein was also convicted and whose conviction was subsequently upheld by the Appellate Court. 3. If that be so, the refusal of the third respondent to consider the request of the petitioner to compound the offence in the instant case, by exercising the power conferred on him under Section 279 (2) of the Income Tax Act is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory and therefore, I am obliged to quash the impugned proceedings and direct the respondents to consider the representation of the petitioner for compounding the offence said to have been committed by him in spite of his conviction and pass appropriate orders on merits expeditiously, in any event within 60 days from today. Till then, the order of stay granted by this Court in WMP No. 50161 of 2002 shall continue. This writ petition and W.M.P. No. 50161 of 2002 are disposed of accordingly. No costs." 3. Mr. Ramasamy, learned Senior Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellants submitted that the respondent has filed the petition for compounding the offence on 09.04.2001 i.e., after the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences), Egmore, Madras in EO C.C. No. 637 of 1985 dated 30.11.1998, hence, at that stage, seeking compounding of the offence was not permissible under Section 279 (2) of the Act; that on considering the above said factors, the third appellant has rightly refused to compound the offence sought for by the respondent and prayed for allowing this writ appeal. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Sasidharan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that Section 279 (2) of the Act is provided to facilitate compounding of offence, either before or after institution of the proceedings, considering the same, the learned single Judge has rightly applied it and set aside the impugned proceedings of the third appellant; that the appellants herein, in another case where the trial court has convicted a similarly placed assessee, whose appeal was also dismissed, and pending revision, the said assessee has filed a petition for compounding the offence invoking Section 279 (2) of the Act and in that case the appellants accepted the plea of the said assessee and went to the extent of filing Crl.M.P. No. 984 of 2000 in Crl.R.C. No. 588 of 1996 seeking leave of the Court to permit them to entertain the application under Section 279 (2) and ultimately compounded the offence, while so, adopting a different yardstick in the case of the respondent and refusing to compound the offence on the sole ground that she was convicted by the trial court is discriminatory, besides it is unsustainable in law and prayed for dismissal of the writ appeal. 5. This Court carefully considered the submission of counsel for both sides. The plea of the respondent is that Section 279 (2) of the Act permits the appellants to compound the offence either before or after institution of the proceedings, which power is not exercised without any valid reasons; that when similarly placed person was convicted and whose conviction was confirmed by the appellate court and pending revision before this Court in Crl.R.C. No. 588 of 1996, the assessee has filed similar petition for compounding the offence, which was entertained by the appellants after obtaining leave by filing Crl.M.P. No. 984 of 2000 in Crl.R.C. No. 588 of 1996, while so, refusing the same relief to the respondent, where the trial court alone convicted her and the appeal is pending, is discriminatory. 6. Now we look into Section 279 (2) of the Act, which reads as under:- "279. Prosecution to be at instance of Chief Commissioner or Commissioner. .(1) .... .(2) Any offence under this Chapter may either before or after the institution of proceedings, be compounded by the Chief Commissioner or a Director General...." 7. 6. Now we look into Section 279 (2) of the Act, which reads as under:- "279. Prosecution to be at instance of Chief Commissioner or Commissioner. .(1) .... .(2) Any offence under this Chapter may either before or after the institution of proceedings, be compounded by the Chief Commissioner or a Director General...." 7. It is evident from Section 279 (2) of the Act that any offence under this Chapter may either before or after the institution of proceedings, be compounded by the Chief Commissioner or a Director General. 8. The term proceedings is not defined in the Income Tax Act, 1961. The term proceedings is a term of wide amplitude and comprehensive and generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right. It is not a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning would be governed by statute. In this context, it is useful to refer to the below mentioned decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court. i) (Babu Lal vs. M/s. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and others) AIR 1982 SC 818 wherein in Para-17, it was held thus:- “17. The word proceeding is not defined in the Act. Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines it as ‘carrying of an action at law, a legal action or process; any act done by authority of a Court of law; any step taken in a cause by either party’. The term proceeding is a very comprehensive term and generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right. It is not a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning would be governed by statute. It indicates a prescribed mode in which judicial business is conducted. The word proceeding in S.22 includes execution proceedings also. ii) (P.L. Kantha Rao and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others) AIR 1995 Supreme Court 807 wherein in Para No.3, it was held thus:- “3. .....Therefore, the term proceeding in S.29 is a very wide term to mean a prescribed course of action to enforce the legal right. It indicates the prescribed mode in which the judicial business is conducted. The execution is a step in the judicial process. It seeks to enforce the final order to realise the result of the adjudication.....” .9. .....Therefore, the term proceeding in S.29 is a very wide term to mean a prescribed course of action to enforce the legal right. It indicates the prescribed mode in which the judicial business is conducted. The execution is a step in the judicial process. It seeks to enforce the final order to realise the result of the adjudication.....” .9. The term proceeding shall also include the proceedings at the appellate stage. In (Lachhman Dass Vs. Santokh Singh) (1995) 4 SCC 201 in para-7, it was held by the Honourable Supreme Curt thus:- .“7. .....Precisely stated, an appeal is a continuation of a suit or proceedings wherein the entire proceedings are again left open for consideration by the appellate authorities which has the power to review the entire evidence subject, of course, to the prescribed statutory limitations. But in the case of revision whatever powers the revisional authority may have, it has no power to reassess and reappreciate the evidence unless the statute expressly confers on it that power. That limitation is implicit in the concept of revision. In this view of the matter we are supported by a decision of this Court in State of Kerala vs. K.M. Charia Abdullah and Co.” 10. In the case on hand, against the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court, on the complaint preferred by the appellants, the respondent has filed an appeal and the same is pending, which is a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right. The said appeal is also a proceeding as contemplated under Section 279 (2) of the Act. .11. For the discussions above, this Court is of the considered view that pending appeal, the appellants can very well compound the offence sought for by the respondent, which they failed. It is not out of context to mention that in earlier occasion, the appellants have allowed the application for compounding of offence filed by similarly placed assessee, who was convicted by trial court, his appeal was also dismissed, he filed revision and in the said revision, the appellants have filed Crl.M.P. No. 984 of 2000 in Crl.R.C. No. 588 of 1996 and obtained leave from the Court to consider it. While so, the appellants have refused to exercise such power in the case on hand by misinterpreting Section 279 (2) of the Act, which is unfair. While so, the appellants have refused to exercise such power in the case on hand by misinterpreting Section 279 (2) of the Act, which is unfair. The learned single Judge considered the above said facts and rightly set aside the order passed by the third appellant, hence, the writ appeal is dismissed. No Costs. Consequently, connected W.A.M.P. No. 540 of 2003 is closed. 12. In view of the fact that the respondent is aged about 83 years, who has filed the petition for compounding as early as on 09.04.2001, which was rejected by the third appellant on 02.08.2002, to meet the ends of justice, it is warranted to direct the parties as follows:- i) The respondent is permitted to pay the amount demanded by the appellants for compounding of the offence within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment ii) On such payment, the appellants are directed to receive it, compound the offence and inform the same to the Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai where the appeal in C.A. No. 250 of 1998 preferred by the respondent is pending, within a period of six weeks thereafter 13. It is needless to mention that on receipt of such intimation from the appellants or the respondent, the said Court shall dispose of the said C.A. No. 250 of 1998 pending before it in accordance with law expeditiously.