Judgment : PIUS C. KURIAKOSE, J. Under challenge in this revision petition filed under Section 20 of Act 2 of 1965 filed by the tenant is the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court against the revision petitioner on the ground under Section 11(4)(iii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 i.e., tenant having possession of other buildings reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same city, town or village. The litigation has had a chequered carrear. In the first instance the RCP was allowed by the Rent Control Court. The eviction order was confirmed by the appellate authority. Finally the matter reached this Court in C.R.P. No: 2258/1991. By that time the Government initiated land acquisition proceedings for the acquisition of buildings having door Nos: 160 and 161 - the two buildings on the basis of which eviction order was passed against the tenant under Section 11(4)(iii). Certain documents were produced by the tenant before this Court to show that buildings having door Nos:160 and 161 were under acquisition proceedings. When the application seeking reception of documents came up for consideration it was submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the landlord that the landlord was being taken by surprise and that opportunity should be given to the landlord for adducing evidence. Thus, obviously on the basis of consensus, the judgments of the appellate authority and the Rent Control Court were set aside and the matter was remanded to the Rent Control Court. The documents were also transmitted to the Rent Control Court and both sides were permitted to adduce fresh evidence regarding the eviction ground under the Act. As regards the ground under Section 11(3) which was declined the landlord was permitted to file a fresh Rent Control Petition. 2. The matter was considered pursuant to the order of remand in C.R.P.2258/1991 by the Rent Control Court. That Court, again passed order of eviction under Section 11(4) (iii). The Court held that the acquisition proceedings was initiated more than twenty years, after the commencement of the rent control proceedings will not result in eclipsing the liability entailed by the tenant. The matter was considered pursuant to the order of remand in C.R.P.2258/1991 by the Rent Control Court. That Court, again passed order of eviction under Section 11(4) (iii). The Court held that the acquisition proceedings was initiated more than twenty years, after the commencement of the rent control proceedings will not result in eclipsing the liability entailed by the tenant. The Court also noticed that the tenant himself was the owner of buildings having door Nos: 160 & 161 and that the entire compensation for those buildings was received by the tenant and if that, if necessary it will be possible for the tenant to acquire another building with the money received by him as compensation. Appeal was preferred by the tenant. The appellate authority also concurred with the findings of the Rent Control Court and confirmed the order of eviction. 3. Adv. Shri. G. Mohan, learned counsel for the revision petitioner addressed strenuously and persuasively on the various grounds raised in the memorandum of revision. The learned counsel drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders (AIR 1975 S.C.1409) and judgment of this Court in Korah Abraham v. Varughis {2004(2) KLT 192}. The learned counsel argued that the subsequent event of the rooms having door Nos: 160 & 161 being acquired by the Government, is of fundamental impact on the right of the landlord to get eviction on the ground under Section 11(4)(iii) and the liability of the tenant is to suffer eviction on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the legislative objective underlying Clause (iii) of Sub Section (4) of Section 11 is that tenant who is having another building which is reasonably sufficient for his requirements should not be allowed to retain possession of the building which is the subject matter of the RCP. The counsel submitted that as on today that apart from the petition schedule building, the tenant has no other building in his possession for carrying on business. The submissions of Mr. Mohan were very forcefully resisted by Adv. The counsel submitted that as on today that apart from the petition schedule building, the tenant has no other building in his possession for carrying on business. The submissions of Mr. Mohan were very forcefully resisted by Adv. Shri. T.P.Sajid, learned counsel for the landlord placing strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivasatava (AIR 2001 S.C.803) the learned counsel submitted that the landlord is not responsible for the long delay which was caused in the matter of final disposal of the Rent Control Petition. The tenant himself was the owner of building having door Nos: 160 & 161. Acquisition of possession of those rooms itself resulted in the tenant entailing the liability for eviction on the ground under Section 11(4) (iii). The statutory time frame for disposal of rent control proceedings as per Section 24 of the Act is only four months. In the instant case the litigation is now about three decades old. To accept the argument that on account of an event which occurred about 21 years after the commencement of the litigation a ground which had become available to the landlord will cease to be available and will be most inequitable. 4. The landlord's counsel also referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Kanhangad Co.op. M.S.Society Ltd. v. Ganapathy Kamath {1995(1) KLT 681}. We have considered the rival submissions in the light of the judicial precedents which werecited before us by the learned counsel. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava (AIR 2001 SC 803} is aleading light regarding the relevancy of subsequent events in rent control proceedings. That was a case where the landlord sought for eviction of the building on the ground that the building is needed for accommodating the landlord's son for the purpose of commencement of a clinic. Due to several reasons the final disposal of the rent control proceedings was delayed by about 23 years. In the meanwhile the landlord's son secured employment in Government Service and he was transferred to some station far away from the place where the building in question is situated. The subsequent event of the landlord's son the defacto complainant joining Government service was projected as an event which eclipses the bonafide need claimed by the landlord. In the meanwhile the landlord's son secured employment in Government Service and he was transferred to some station far away from the place where the building in question is situated. The subsequent event of the landlord's son the defacto complainant joining Government service was projected as an event which eclipses the bonafide need claimed by the landlord. Their Lordship's held considering the contention as follows:- "We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bonafides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bonafides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists. During 23 years after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long inerregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period." 5. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad's case (supra) in our opinion, will apply abortion to the present case. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad's case (supra) in our opinion, will apply abortion to the present case. In the present case the ground invoked was Section 11(4)(iii) i.e the tenant's acquisition of other buildings reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same city, town or village. It became evident that buildings having door Nos: 160 and 161 came to be under the ownership and possession of the tenant. It also evident because that those buildings were reasonably sufficient for the tenant's requirement. It was on that basis that order of eviction was passed concurrently in the first instance of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority. It is during the pendency of a revision filed by the tenant 20 years after the RCP was instituted -after the tenant had already incurred the liability for eviction on the above ground, that the Government initiated proceedings for acquisition of rooms having door Nos: 160 and 161. When the tenant produced documents pertaining to the land acquisition proceedings for the purpose of bringing to the notice of this Court, the subsequent event of Government initiating land acquisition proceedings, the landlord's counsel virtually conceded that the matter can be remanded to the Rent Control Court so that, that Court can decide whether the documents produced before this Court can be admitted as legal evidence in the case. The remand order passed in C.R.P 2258/1991 in our opinion is virtually one passed on consensus and does not decide the implications of the subsequent event of acquisition of rooms having door Nos: 160 & 161 by the Government. Having regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad's case (supra) are original principles. We are of the view that the event of acquisition of buildings having door Nos: 160 & 161 by the Government 21 years after the tenant had entailed liability to be evicted under Section 11 (4)(iii) will not result in eclipsing the valuable right accrued in favour of the landlord for evicting the tenant on that ground. As indicated already, buildings having door Nos: 160 & 161 belonged to the tenant absolutely. The tenant has already received the entire compensation awarded by the Government for the landlord's rights both preparatory and over those buildings. 6. Mr. As indicated already, buildings having door Nos: 160 & 161 belonged to the tenant absolutely. The tenant has already received the entire compensation awarded by the Government for the landlord's rights both preparatory and over those buildings. 6. Mr. G. Mohan, learned counsel for the tenant submitted that one of the reasons mentioned by the Appellate Authority for ordering eviction against the tenant is that a substantial amount has been received by the tenant as compensation for buildings having door Nos: 160 and 161 which were acquired by the Government and it will be possible for the tenant to acquire another building with the compensation amount. According to the learned counsel, what the law requires is that the tenant must be possessed of buildings and not money to purchase building. The above argument of Mr. Mohan is not correct incorrect. At the same time, we notice that on the terms of Sub-Rule (8) of Rule 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules the authorities under the rent control statute are to be governed by principles of equity, justice and good conscience. According to us, it will be most inequitable to deprive the landlord of the right of eviction which had agreed to him in view of an event which occurred 21 years thereafter, especially when the landlord is in no way responsible for the acquisition of buildings having door Nos: 160 and 161. It is not disputed that a substantial amount was received by the tenant as land acquisition compensation. The amount has obviously been invested profitably by the tenant. The decision not to invest the amount for acquiring another building was the tenant's own. 7. The result is that we do not find any warrant for intervention of revisional jurisdiction for interfering with the judgment of the Appellate Authority and Rent Control Court. However, considering the last plea of Mr. Mohan that the revision petitioner can be granted reasonably long period of time, that is till 30.6.2010 on condition that the revision petitioner files an affidavit before the Execution Court or the Rent Control Court, as the case may be, within one month from today, undertaking as follows:- a) That he will peacefully surrender the buildings to the landlord on or before 30.6.2010. b) That he will discharge arrears, if any, as and when the subsequent rent falls due and also give peaceful surrender of the petition schedule building to the revision petitioner. c) If the Execution Court notices the affidavit as above filed on time, the Execution Petition will be adjourned to 1.7.2010. If the affidavit is not filed the eviction order will become executable forthwith.