JUDGMENT P.K. Musahary, J. 1. There was an amorous affair before the marriage. It turned allegedly sore just after the marriage. Dipak Deb Barma, the accused-Appellant and Chhaya Rani Das (Deceased) spent about 15 years conjugal life with one daughter, Miss Tinna, fondly called Rupa, who was reading in Class-Ill till the alleged incident took place in the evening of 22.01.2002. Chhaya Rani Das was found lying dead in the type-II govt, quarter situated at Kunjaban Township of the Capital Town Agartala on 23.01.2002. The first informant, Shri Sanjay Das, the brother-in-law of the deceased having been informed about the incident by the police over mobile phone, rushed to the place of occurrence. Her husband Dipak was not around. Sanjay lodged a written FIR on 23.01.2002 with the Officer-in-charge, East Agartala Rs. naming Dipak Debbarma as the perpetrator alleging that he left the quarter and fled away after killing his wife. In the FIR, it was further alleged that after the marriage, Dipak used to torture Chhaya physically every day on different pretext and often threatened to kill her, which was disclosed to the informant by Chhaya herself before her death and her daughter Rupa. Based on this FIR, a crime being East Agartala P.s. Case No. 14 of 2002 was registered under Section 302 IPC. 2. The prosecution tells its story as under: Miss Tinna, daughter of the accused-Appellant and deceased, was studying in an English medium school at Champaknagar. In the evening of 22.01.2002, the accused Dipak Debbarma, his wife, his daughter Tinna, P W-5 Aruna Tripura and her daughter went to Champaknagar for leaving Tinna and daughter of PW-5 in the hostel. They returned home in the evening. Thereafter, on that night at about 10.00 P.M. Dipak was arrested by police from nearby area of a motor stand for alleged commission of offence punishable Under Section 290 IPC. He was produced before the Court on the following day i.e. 23.01.2002 wherefrom he was enlarged on bail. On 23.01.2002 one of the neighbours of the accused Dipak Debbarma went to GB. Police out post and informed the O.C. of the outpost that the quarter No. 103 of the Kunjaban township was found to be bolted from the outside and light was burning inside but neighbouring people did not hear any sound from inside. So they suspected something wrong and informed the police about the same. Sri Samir Kr. Police out post and informed the O.C. of the outpost that the quarter No. 103 of the Kunjaban township was found to be bolted from the outside and light was burning inside but neighbouring people did not hear any sound from inside. So they suspected something wrong and informed the police about the same. Sri Samir Kr. Deb, O.C, GB. Police outpost went to the quarter No. 103 along with staff and came to learn that the quarter belonged to the accused Dipak Debbarma. After reaching the quarter at about 12.20 hours, the O.C. pushed the door and found that the door was not bolted. Inside the room he found the dead body of a woman and came to learn that it was the dead body of the wife of the accused Dipak Debbarma. He tried to trace out Dipak Debbarma, but failed to trace him out. He found bleeding in-juries on the head of the deceased and also saw an iron rod, one glass from which smell of alcohol was coming and a bowl made of steel which contained some quantity offish curry. Getting the information of death of Chhaya Das, PW-1 who is the husband of Chhaya's sister rushed to the quarter of Dipak along with P W-3. This PW-1 lodged an ejahar to the I/C GB, T.O.P, who was present at that time in the quarter, on the basis of which East Agartala P.S. Case No. 14/2002 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was registered. Post Mortem on the dead body of Chhaya Das was held and it was cremated on 24.01.2002. Dipak Debbarma although was released on bail by the Court on 23.01.2002, did neither visit his quarter nor the hospital where post mortem examination on the dead body of his wife was held. Nor did he attend the cremation of his wife Chhaya Das. It is alleged that just after the death of Chhaya Das, Dipak was found absconding and police failed to arrest him in spite of repeated raids. However, only on 08.02.2002 police managed to arrest him from Gurchabasti area. The police on completion of investigation and having found prima facie case submitted charge sheet against him for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. 3. We have heard Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Appellant and also heard Mr. However, only on 08.02.2002 police managed to arrest him from Gurchabasti area. The police on completion of investigation and having found prima facie case submitted charge sheet against him for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. 3. We have heard Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Appellant and also heard Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Additional P.P. appearing on behalf of the State of Tripura. 4. The prosecution in order to prove the charge examined as many as 16 witnesses. None of them being eye witness, the prosecution, through P Ws-1, 2 & 7. projected a story that the Appellant was a drunkard and he used to torture his deceased wife physically and often used to threaten her to kill and even on the very day of occurrence, he gave such threatening in presence of his daughter, Tinna. P W-6. In this respect, the evidence of PW-2. Smti Maya Rani Das. elder sister of the deceased is very important. She deposed that her deceased sister used to tell her about the physical torture she had been receiving from her husband. According to her, even the minor daughter of the deceased told her about the same. The evidence of PW-2 has been corroborated by P W-1. Sanjoy Das, brother-in-law of the deceased. The evidence of PW-7, Smti Usha Rani Das. the mother of the deceased also corroborates the evidence of PW-2. The relevant portion of evidence of PW-7 is quoted below: My daughter Chaya was married to accused Dipak Dcbbarma. After marriage, she used to live with her husband at Kunjaban Govt, quarter. My daughter used to visit my house. She used to tell me that during night hours Dipak used to assault her physically being drunken. She has a daughter namely, Tinna. Tinna also told me about the physical torture of her father upon Chaya. My daughter was murdered by her husband Dipak Debbarma.... Similar evidence was tendered by informant PW-1, Sanjoy Das, brother-in-law of the deceased. He deposed as under: ...My sister-in-law used to tell me that she used to be physically tortured by her husband Dipak Debbarma. They were married 14/15 years back and before the marriage they were an amorous pair.... 5. The prosecution examined some neighbours as independent witnesses for corroboration of the aforesaid evidence. PW-3, Shri Sudharsan Choudhury scribed the FIR as a neighbour. They were married 14/15 years back and before the marriage they were an amorous pair.... 5. The prosecution examined some neighbours as independent witnesses for corroboration of the aforesaid evidence. PW-3, Shri Sudharsan Choudhury scribed the FIR as a neighbour. He deposed as under: I learnt on 23-01-2002 that accused Dipak Debbarma was arrested on 22.01.2002 at around 11 P.M. at Kaman Chowmohani in a drunken condition. In the I.G.M. Hospital Morgue Tinna came on 24.01.2002 at about 11.45 hours and told us that on 22.01.2002 Dipak Debbarma threatened his wife that day would be her last day. The wile of S.I. Prasun Tripura and the wife of Sri Shyama Charan Tripura took Tinna in the I.G.M. Hospital Morgue. 6. It is to be noted that this PW is a Police S.I. and he was posted in the city police control room on 22.01.2002. According to him on 23.01.2002. at about 12.15 P.M., Maya Rani Das. the elder sister of the deceased, came to his quarter and told him that Chhaya was murdered. Maya's husband Sanjoy Das, PW-1 also appeared after a while and they came to the quarter of the accused Dipak Debbarma where the police had already arrived and local people gathered. 7. The prosecution examined another neighbour Shri Narayan Chakraborty as PW-4. He deposed that the deceased Chhaya never disclosed anything to him about her family matters. This witness was declared hostile on the request of the prosecution. He was thoroughly cross-examined by the P.P. In cross-examination, he stated that he was examined by the I.O. in connection with the case but he denied that he made any statement under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure before the police to the effect that whenever he met Chhaya, she used to lament to him over the alleged assaults inflicted on her very often by her husband after consuming liquor. He also denied the suggestion that he was a close friend of Appellant Dipak Debbarma. The prosecution cited 2 other neighbours namely, Shri Dilip Shiv and Nirmal Choudhury as witnesses but they were not examined during trial. However, the prosecution examined the deceased's daughter Tinna Debbarma as PW-6. She also did not support the prosecution story that her father ever threatened her mother to kill. On being declared hostile, the learned P.P. cross-examined her. The prosecution cited 2 other neighbours namely, Shri Dilip Shiv and Nirmal Choudhury as witnesses but they were not examined during trial. However, the prosecution examined the deceased's daughter Tinna Debbarma as PW-6. She also did not support the prosecution story that her father ever threatened her mother to kill. On being declared hostile, the learned P.P. cross-examined her. She clearly denied that she ever stated before the police that her father told her mother that "your day is over immediately after giving her". She also denied that she ever made any statement before the police that her father at the time of taking her to school ever told her mother that "your day is over immediately after giving her to School". 8. There was an inter-caste marriage the Appellant being from a local Tribal community and the deceased from a Bengali community. It was a love marriage solemnized at a Temple named, 'Kasba Kalibari'. The deceased's mother did not attend the marriage ceremony. She did not arrange the marriage. It was stated so in cross-examination by PW-7, Smti Usha Rani Das herself, the mother of the deceased. From this evidence, it has become crystal clear that PW-7 did not easily accept her daughter’s marriage with the Appellant and she has been devouring the Appellant ever since he married her daughter. The evidence of PW-7 against the Appellant cannot be accepted as unflinching and reliable free from vengeance. PW 1 & 2 also deposed in the similar manner influenced by vengeance inasmuch as they are related and interested witnesses. The neighbour, Shri Narayan Chakraborty, who was examined as PW-4, did not support/corroborate the evidence of P Ws-1.2 & 7 as discussed earlier. The other neighbour Shri Sudharsan Choudhury, PW-3 is at best a partisan witness being the police S.I and cannot be treated as an independent witness in true sense. There is no independent, reliable and cogent evidence establishing the allegations that the Appellant has been subjecting his wife to physical torture immediately after the marriage and threatened to kill his wife before proceeding to School to drop their daughter in the hostel on the day of occurrence. The evidence of PW-6, the daughter of the Appellant has smashed the credibility and reliability of the evidence of P Ws-1, 2 & 7. The evidence of PW-6, the daughter of the Appellant has smashed the credibility and reliability of the evidence of P Ws-1, 2 & 7. The daughter is to be treated as the best witness to testify whether her mother was subjected to physical torture by her father. There is no reason to disbelieve her evidence unless the same is found tutored or influenced by any interested party. Although, she was thoroughly cross-examined by the P.P, after being declared as hostile, her evidence could not be shattered or dislodged. She was rather found consistent and firm in her statement. 9. Besides, there is no explanation why the prosecution withheld the other witnesses named in the charge sheet and preferred not to examine them inspite of the fact that PW-4, who was examined as the sole independent witness being a neighbour, refused to support the prosecution case and it became more incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the charge by examining more neighbours who were cited as independent witnesses. The prosecution is required to prove the charge of inflicting regular physical torture on the deceased by the accused by producing such persons who had seen or had been witnessing at least on some occasions, being their neighbours. The prosecution did not at all make any attempt to do so and as such, it has failed to prove the said charge beyond reasonable doubt as required under the criminal law. 10. Even if, for argument sake, the charge of consistent physical torture upon the wife is proved against the accused husband, can a Criminal Court on the basis of this proved fact alone, come to a conclusion that it is the husband and only the husband alone, who had murdered his wife? If the Court, on the basis of such evidence alone, recorded conviction of the accused, it would be called as a conviction on mere suspicion and not on proof of any standard. 11. Now to turn on whether the prosecution has been able to prove the charge of murder against the Appellant. The crime took place inside the residential house of the Appellant when the only daughter of the couple was away in a school hostel. There is no evidence as to whether there was any fourth person like domestic aide on other family member or relative in the house. The crime took place inside the residential house of the Appellant when the only daughter of the couple was away in a school hostel. There is no evidence as to whether there was any fourth person like domestic aide on other family member or relative in the house. The prosecution has laid no evidence to the effect that the accused was seen by anybody in the house together with his wife in the fateful evening just before the incident that allegedly took place between 8.00 P.M. and 8.30 P.M on 22.01.2002. This means the fact of the deceased's husband being seen last together with his wife has not been established. The prosecution, therefore, bent upon circumstances evidence to prove the charge of commission of murder against the Appellant. The following, according to prosecution, are the inculpatory circumstance on which it relied upon- (i) That while PW-3. Shri Sudharsan Choudhury, a Police S.I was going towards Shyamali Bazar, he found the Appellant coming towards the Circuit House in a scooter who stopped the scooter and inquired him where he was going to. It was on 22.01.2002 at about 6.30/ 7.00 P.M. Next day i.e. on 23.01.2002 at about 12.15 P.M. deceased's elder sister Maya Rani Das, PW-2 came to the quarter of PW-3 and told him that Chhaya was murdered. (ii) That while visiting the place of occurrence on 23.01.2002. PW-3 met one Shri Narayan Chakraborty, PW-4 who told him that "on the previous day i.e. 22.01.2002 at about 8.30/9.C0 P.M. he saw Dipak Debbarma was coming towards Raj Bhavan in a scooter at a very high speed and one some Deb called Dipak but he said that he had no time to wait. (iii) That 2/3 days thereafter, the said PW-3 again met Narayan Chakraborty in the house of the informant (PW-1). The said PW-3 also met there one Dhiman who told them that on 22.01.2002 at about 10.00 P.M he (Dhiman) saw Dipak Debbarma at Natunnagar boarding a jeep going towards Agartala. (iv) That Appellant was arrested on 22.01.2002 at about 11.00 P.M. at Raman Chowmani in a drunken condition under Section 290 IPC. (v) That after being arrested under Section 290 IPC in a drunken condition, he was produced before the Court on 23.01.2002 and released on bail but he was not present at the cremation of his wife and absconding till he was arrested on 08.02.2002. 12. (v) That after being arrested under Section 290 IPC in a drunken condition, he was produced before the Court on 23.01.2002 and released on bail but he was not present at the cremation of his wife and absconding till he was arrested on 08.02.2002. 12. Interestingly, the above evidence of Sudharsan Choudhury, PW-3 was not corroborated by the evidence of Narayan Chakraborty, PW-4, as he did not support the prosecution. He was declared hostile as demanded by the learned P.P. In cross-examination the prosecution could not extract any evidence from him to its help nor could it impeach his evidence. Curiously and surprising the prosecution did not examine the other witness Shri Dhiman (Das), although he was cited as a witness in the charge sheet. There is no answer or explanation as to why this vital witness was withheld by the prosecution. Thus, the alleged fact of accused Appellant going towards Raj Bhavan on a scooter at a very high speed meeting Narayan Chakraborty, PW-4 and having a brief talk with him at 8.30/9.00 P.M. on 22.01.2002 remained unproved. Similarly, the alleged fact of meeting of PW-3 with PW-4 and Dhiman (Das) in the residence of informant, PW-l and the story allegedly narrated to PW-3 by Dhiman also remained unproved. It is also to be noticed that in regard to arrest of Appellant under Section 290 IPC, no documentary or oral evidence was led to ascertain exactly at what time the accused Appellant was arrested on 22.01.2002. The timing is very important because the incident of murder and arrest of the Appellant took place in the evening of 22.01.2002, almost, may be, simultaneously or within a small time gap. It was, therefore, necessary to ascertain between these two incidents which one took place earlier. If the Appellant was arrested under Section 290 IPC before the incident of murder, there is no chance for charging him with subsequent offence namely under Section 302 IPC. No evidence was adduced to prove the alleged fact that the accused Appellant was driving a scooter in a drunken state in the evening of 22.01.2002 after killing his wife between 8.00 PM and 8.30 PM. On the basis of the aforesaid alleged incriminating circumstance and standard of proof as discussed above, we are not at all convinced that the accused-Appellant could be convicted under Section 302 IPC. 13. On the basis of the aforesaid alleged incriminating circumstance and standard of proof as discussed above, we are not at all convinced that the accused-Appellant could be convicted under Section 302 IPC. 13. The further incriminating circumstance, according to prosecution, is the recovery of an iron rod, a glass tumbler giving smell of alcohol, a steel bowl containing three fish bones and a TV set which was in operation during the visit of the place of occurrence i.e. inside the house on 23.01.2002 at 12.30 hours. According to prosecution, it is a strong circumstantial evidence against the accused-Appellant inasmuch as it is only the Appellant, being the husband of the deceased, who could enjoy liquor/alcohol inside the house and commit the offence keeping the TV set in operation so that no sound could go outside to attract neighbours' attention. 14. On perusal and examination of the records we find that the investigating agency did not take any care to preserve the fingerprint on the aforesaid seized articles. The seized iron rod and the drinking water glass were sent to finger print expert. By a letter dated 25.01.2002, one Dilip Chakraborty, S.I. of Police, CID, finger print expert, informed the I.O that no visible finger print was found on the glass and the surface of the iron rod and it was not suitable for extracting finger print. The investigating agency remained complacent with the aforesaid report of the Police S.I. The said Police S.I, fingerprint expert, was not examined by the prosecution nor was the letter dated 25.01.2002 aforesaid, proved or exhibited during trial. It thought the crime was solved with the seizure of these articles from the house of the accused-Appellant and it was enough for the prosecution to prove the guilt in the light of strong suspicion against him. The doctor started autopsy on the dead body on 2.30 P.M. and completed at 3.30 P.M. on 24.01.2002. The pause of death, in the opinion of the doctor, as recorded in the post mortem report, is due to ante mortem head injury produced by heavy object which was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. The time since death is about 40-42 hours as recorded in the post mortem report. The pause of death, in the opinion of the doctor, as recorded in the post mortem report, is due to ante mortem head injury produced by heavy object which was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. The time since death is about 40-42 hours as recorded in the post mortem report. The doctor who conducted the autopsy and prepared the post mortem report was not examined by the prosecution nor was the said post mortem report proved by any competent/authorized medical officer. No doctor was made available for cross-examination by the defence to test the veracity of the report. The prosecution offered no explanation why it did not examine the concerned doctor. The cause of death apparently fits in the nature of injury and the incriminating weapon namely iron rod. seized from the place of occurrence. The time of death is more relevant in this case. It was required to ascertain the approximate, if not, the exact time of death. By withholding the doctor as witness, the prosecution deprived the defence of its chance to cross-examine and ascertain from the doctor as to how he assessed the time of death to be at about 40-42 hours. 15. The locus classicus of the decision in regard to nature and character of proof of circumstantial evidence has been rendered by the Apex Court as far back as in 1952 in Hanumant v. State of MP, reported in AIR 1952 SC 342. Following basically this decision, the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622 came to a conclusion that the under noted five conditions must be fulfilled before the case against an accused based on circumstantial evidence can be said to be fully established; (i) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established: (ii) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (iii) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. The circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established: (ii) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (iii) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (iv) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (v) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusive consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. A case can be said to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can be convicted on pure moral conviction. These are called five golden Principles that constitute the 'Panchasheel' of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence. In the above referred case it is also held that a case can be said to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can be convicted on pure moral conviction and this is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence. 16. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., reported in AIR 1990 SC 79 , it is further laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else: and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. 17. In the case of State of U.P. v. Ashok Kr. Srivastava, reported in (1992)2SCC86. 17. In the case of State of U.P. v. Ashok Kr. Srivastava, reported in (1992)2SCC86. it is held that while appreciating circumstantial evidence, the Court must adopt a very cautious approach and should record a conviction only if all links in the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused and every hypothesis of innocence is capable of being negatived on evidence. Further it is held that a great care must be taken in evaluating the circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied upon is reasonable, capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. Further in Anil Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in (2003) 9 SCC 67 , the Supreme Court held that in order to base a conviction on circumstantial evidence, each and every piece of incriminating circumstances must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form a chain of events as would permit no conclusion other than the one of guilt of the accused and the circumstances cannot be explained on any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. 18. The Court has to be cautious and avoid a risk of allowing mere suspicion, howsoever strong to take the place of proof, for, a mere moral conviction or a suspicion howsoever grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof. The Apex Court has been consistently maintaining the aforesaid position of law and the same are still holding the field. Without referring to any further decision in this regard, we may, last of all, cite the case in B. Venkat Swamy v. Vijaya Nehru and Anr. 2008 AIR SCW 5908 wherein it is held that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touch-stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by the Supreme Court as far back as in 1952, which is obviously the case of Hanumant (supra). 19. Admittedly there is no eyewitness in the present case and the prosecution relied upon certain incriminating circumstances to establish its case. We have already discussed earlier about the said projected circumstances and the evidence adduced by the prosecution in this regard. 19. Admittedly there is no eyewitness in the present case and the prosecution relied upon certain incriminating circumstances to establish its case. We have already discussed earlier about the said projected circumstances and the evidence adduced by the prosecution in this regard. We have, with great care, evaluated the circumstantial evidence and the oral evidence tendered by the prosecution witnesses and found that they are far from being reliable and clinching for recording conviction of the Appellant. It may not be irrelevant to note here that the I.O of the case took the statement of PW-7, Smti Usha Rani Das, mother of the deceased on 24.01.2002, although, she was very much available on 23.01.2002 at the place of occurrence while the I.O was examining the other witnesses under Section 161 Code of Criminal Procedure PW-3, Sudharsan Choudhury, a neighbour who scribed the FIR, was examined by the I.O only on 03.02.2002 i.e. after 11 days from the date of occurrence. PW-4, Shri Narayan Chakraborty, another neighbour was examined by the I.O on 04.02.2002 i.e. after 12 days "of the date of occurrence. P W-6, Miss. Tinna, daughter of the deceased was examined by the I.O only on 01.04.2002 i.e. after more than 3 months from the dale of occurrence. Further more, through P Ws-1,2 & 7, all related and interested witnesses, the prosecution attempted to establish the charge that the accused-Appellant has been torturing the deceased physically just after the marriage. Then it examined PWs-3, 4 & 6 to prove the aforesaid charge by corroborating evidence of these witnesses but PW-4, Narayan Chakraborty, a neighbour and PW-6, daughter of the deceased refused to support the prosecution case. As stated earlier, PW-3 is a Policeman who was examined by the I.O after 11 days of the date of occurrence. We do not feel it safe to rely his evidence inasmuch as prosecution offered no explanation for such delay in examining him and there is a chance of building up an afterthought story of physical torture against the accused-Appellant. We are saying so because the daughter of the deceased, PW-6, who is the best person to testify the fact, has refused to lend any support to prosecution and it did not examine any other neighbours as independent witnesses, although, it named several neighbours as witnesses in the charge sheet. 20. We are saying so because the daughter of the deceased, PW-6, who is the best person to testify the fact, has refused to lend any support to prosecution and it did not examine any other neighbours as independent witnesses, although, it named several neighbours as witnesses in the charge sheet. 20. The prosecution having failed to prove the case of physical torture entertained itself a strong suspicion on the accused-Appellant as he was allegedly seen by some persons near the Circuit House driving a scooter at a very high speed and was arrested under Section 290 IPC allegedly in a drunken state in the same evening of 22.01.2002 i.e. the day of alleged occurrence and he did not attend the cremation of his wife. The manner and conduct of the accused may appear to be doubtful and may also raise strong suspicion against him but except his suspicious movement and conduct in the evening of the date of occurrence, there is no other evidence proving his guilt The learned trial Court failed to take into account the evidence on record that both Appellant-husband and deceased-wife along with P W-5 had been to School to drop their daughters in the hostel in the daytime on the date of occurrence. The Court cannot act upon uncorroborated evidence of some interested and partisan witnesses like P Ws-1, 2, 3 & 7. The allegation/charge of physical torture and killing of the deceased by the Appellant having not been proved; stood as a matter of conjecture and suspicion only and it bears no evidentiary value in the eye of law in view of the established law that a suspicion, howsoever strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof. In this respect, in addition to citation made earlier, we would like to refer the case of Anjlus Dungdung v. Slate of Jharkhand, reported in (2005) 9 SCC 765 . In our considered view, on the basis of afore mentioned circumstances and evidence on records, it is not possible to draw an irrestible conclusion which is incompatible with innocence of the Appellant so as to complete the chain as required under the existing law of evidence. 21. In our considered view, on the basis of afore mentioned circumstances and evidence on records, it is not possible to draw an irrestible conclusion which is incompatible with innocence of the Appellant so as to complete the chain as required under the existing law of evidence. 21. In view of what has been discussed and considered on the basis of available evidence on records, we firmly come to a conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the accused Appellant beyond all shades of reasonable doubt and the accused Appellant should get the benefit of doubt and get acquittal thereunder. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence handed down on the Appellant vide impugned judgment dated 03.09.2004 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in Case No. S.T. (WT/A) 24/2003. The Appellant, if he is not required in connection, with any other case, be set at liberty forthwith. 22. Send down the LCR to the Court below. Appeal allowed