ORDER 1. Petitioner which is a Legal Aid Committee has filed the present writ petition in public interest under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction directing return of all criminal complaints filed under the provisions of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as "NI Act") that are pending in the Courts of the Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi, in which cognizance has been taken, even though the Metropolitan Magistrates have no territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try them. 2. Ms. Iyoti Singh, learned Counsel for petitioner stated that a large number of cases have been filed by various financial institutions, banks and other complainants under Section 138 of NI Act in Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi regarding dishonour of cheques, without first ascertaining whether the trial Courts in Delhi have territorial jurisdiction in the matter or not. According to Ms. Singh, in most of the cases, financial institutions/banks have filed complaints in Delhi only on the ground that the statutory notice of 15 days after dishonour of cheque had been issued from Delhi even though the same was communicated outside Delhi and further the cause of action also arose outside the territory of Delhi. She stated that in many cases, financial institutions/other complainants for their own convenience have filed complaints in Delhi even though the accused are staying in far off States like Kerala in South India. 3. Ms. Singh submitted that the Supreme Court in Harnam Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. National Panasonic India Pvt. Ltd., reported in 156 (2009) DLT 160 (SC)=I (2009) BC 649 (SC)=I (2009) SLT 102= 2009 (1) SCC 720 , has held that mere issuance of a notice from Delhi will not confer territorial jurisdiction on the Courts in Delhi to entertain a complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, as it would by itself not give rise to a cause of action. 4. Ms Singh stated that following the aforesaid judgment, Metropolitan Magistrates of Delhi had dismissed many complaints where the Courts at Delhi did not have territorial jurisdiction. She further stated that the Metropolitan Magistrates suo motu also dismissed certain complaints where they had already issued summons earlier, though erroneously. She submitted that the financial institutions aggrieved by the said orders of Metropolitan Magistrates filed several criminal revisions before this Court. 5. Ms. She further stated that the Metropolitan Magistrates suo motu also dismissed certain complaints where they had already issued summons earlier, though erroneously. She submitted that the financial institutions aggrieved by the said orders of Metropolitan Magistrates filed several criminal revisions before this Court. 5. Ms. Singh stated that a learned Single Judge of this Court decided a batch of matters vide common judgment dated 15th May, 2009 in the case [CICI Bank Ltd. v. Subhash Chand Bansal, reported in 160 (2009) DLT 379=III (2009) BC 430=III (2009) CCR 126=III (2009) CLT 166. In cases where learned Metropolitan Magistrates had dismissed the complaint at the very threshold and initial stage, without issuing notice, the learned Single Judge held that" I am in respect fill agreement with the above said ratio of the decision in the case of M/s. Hamam Electronics". After holding so the learned Single Judge upheld the order of trial Court returning the complaints on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. In respect of cases, where learned Metropolitan Magistrates had suo motu dismissed complaints and in cases where summons had already been issued, the learned Single Judge while relying upon Adalat Prashad Rooplal v. Jindal and Ors., reported in 113 (2004) DL T 356 (SC)=III (2004) CCR 176 (SC)=V (2004) SL T 353= 2004 (7) SCC 338 , held "after taking cognizance of the offence under Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 it is not open to them to suo motu throw out the criminal complaints abruptly by declaring that they do not have territorial jurisdiction to deal with the, matter. Adoption of such a course is strictly prohibited by the Apex Court in the case of Adalat Prashad". 6. According to Ms. Singh, the effect of the said judgment is that the Metropolitan Magistrates are not able to Suo motu dismiss/return the complaints in which they do not have territorial jurisdiction as they have already issued summons to the accused and they do not have the power to review / recall their order. Ms. Singh stated that the effect of the said course of action is that the Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates are flooded with complaints unnecessarily though they have no territorial jurisdiction. In this context, she referred to cause list of various Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi. Ms. Singh stated that the effect of the said course of action is that the Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates are flooded with complaints unnecessarily though they have no territorial jurisdiction. In this context, she referred to cause list of various Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi. She submitted that disposal of such complaints also takes a lot of time as in most of the matters the accused are either not served and even in cases where they are served, they do not appear before the Court because the amount involved is so small that accused thinks that he would ha ve to spend more money in reaching. Delhi and contesting the matter. Therefore, according to her, the matters remain pending and consume a lot of time of the Court. She submitted that as a result, pendency is increasing and Courts below are burdened with cases in which they have no jurisdiction. 7. Mr. Nazimi Waziri, learned Standing Counsel for GNCT of Delhi stated that he has no objection to the relief as prayed for being granted by this Court. 8. It is settled law that Article 226 of the Constitution confers extraordinary jurisdiction on the High Courts to issue high prerogative writs for enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other purpose. The power is wide and expansive. The Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer & Anr., reported in AIR 1966 SC 81 , has held as under: •1/(4) ........This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purposes for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression/Natural/, for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself. To say this is not to say that the High Courts can function arbitrarily under this Article. Some limitations are implicit in the article and others may be evolved to direct the article through defined channels. This interpretation has been accepted by this Court in T. C. Basappa v. Nagappa, 1955-1 SCR 250: ( AIR 1954 SC 440 ) and Irani v. State of Madras, 19622 SCR 169 : ( AIR 1961 SC 1731 ).” 9. Further the Supreme Court in Air India Statutory Corporation reported in 1997 (9) SCC 377 , has held that: “59. The Founding Fathers placed no limitation or fetters on the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution except selfimposed limitations. The arm of the Court is long enough to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Court as sentinel on the qui vive is to meet out justice in given facts......” 10. The Constitution does not place any fetter on exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, which certainly can be invoked in the present situation where Courts are flooded with complaints which they can neither entertain nor return and the pendency of such complaints is unnecessarily clogging the dockets of the subordinate Courts. In fact, Metropolitan Magistrates are not able to dispose of other cases which arc within their jurisdiction, as their cause lists are flooded with these Section 138 NI Act matters which are beyond their jurisdiction. It is pertinent to mention that work in respect of these Section 138 NIA matters where Delhi Courts have no territorial jurisdiction, has come to a virtual standstill and the accused are suffering harassment as they have to travel long distances at heavy costs to defend their cases. It is pertinent to mention that work in respect of these Section 138 NIA matters where Delhi Courts have no territorial jurisdiction, has come to a virtual standstill and the accused are suffering harassment as they have to travel long distances at heavy costs to defend their cases. Consequently, retention of these Section 138 NI Act matters violates fundamental and legal rights of the accused not only in these cases but also in other cases. Undoubtedly, right to speedy justice without harassment is also a facet of Article 21 of Constitution of India. 11. In any event, the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to enforce law of the land and in accordance with the judgment of Supreme Court in M/s. Hamam Electronics (supra), all pending complaints in Courts having no jurisdiction have to be returned. 12. Consequently, in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, we direct return to the complainants for presentation in the Court of competent jurisdiction all those criminal complaints filed under Section 138 of NI Act that are pending in the Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates in Delhi in which cognizance has been taken by them without actually having territorial jurisdiction. 13. With the aforesaid directions, present petition is allowed. Petition allowed.