JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has filed this miscellaneous petition for quashing the first information report No. 92/2008. registered at Police Station Nawalgarh, District Jhunjhunu. The impugned report had been filed by Shri R.L. Jhakar, District Supply Officer, Jhunjhunu. 2. Earlier when this petition was heard by High Court, it was ordered for issuance of notice to the respondent. It was also ordered that in the meanwhile, the District Supply Officer shall not cancel the license of the petitioner and that he would not be arrested. On service having been effected on the respondents the matter was admitted on 18.2.2009. Subsequently, as agreed between the parties, the matter has been taken up for final hearing. 3. Instant report was lodged on 27.2.2008. It has been averred in the report that the supply of refilling was not being made by the gas agency at the residence of the consumers. It has also been averred that when the informant had visited the agency, inspection of the record was made and some of the consumers, present there, had complained for irregular supply of refilling, etc. etc. In the report, it has been alleged that the petitioners had breached the conditions of license, particularly condition No. 3 (a) I, II, III and IV. Therefore, it was stated in the report that the petitioners had committed the offence under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioners had argued that from the contents of the first information report, no offence alleged has been made out. According to him, the case of the informant himself is that of breach of condition of licence. Therefore, it has been submitted that the informant had in fact undertaken departmental proceedings for breach of condition of license and the license of the petitioners had been suspended on 28.2.2008. In that respect, he has submitted that the petitioners had challenged* the order of suspension of license by way of filing writ petition before the High Court (2238/2008) and the Court was pleased to pass an interim order on 12.3.2008, whereby the operation of the order of suspension was stayed. The Court had left it open to the respondents to continue with the enquiry with regard to breach of condition of license. The Court had left it open to the respondents to continue with the enquiry with regard to breach of condition of license. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that by lodging of the impugned report, it has been case of double jeopardy against the petitioner. It has also been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that it is a fact that during the relevant period, there had been shortage of supply of refilling of cylinders from the company itself as a result of which the consumers had themselves come to the office of the agency to take refilling as it was urgently required. The supply to the consumer at their residence was never refused by the agency. He has submitted that whatever supply was made by the company, the entire quantity was distributed to the consumers and this is apparent from the supply and stock record of the agency. Therefore it has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that no offence under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 is at all made out. 5. On the other hand, the learned Public prosecutor has submitted that there had been no supply of refilling of cylinders at the residence of the consumers and as such the consumers had felt agitated. Further, he has submitted that there had been complaint of not providing the concession of Rs. 8/- to the consumers when the supply was to be made at the office of the agency itself. However, he has clearly submitted that in the impugned report the main allegation is that there had been breach of condition of license. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by Counsel for the rival parties. A perusal of the first information report goes to show that the informant has lodged this report primarily on the ground that there had been breach of condition of license. Besides, it is also revealed from the report that some consumers had assembled at the time when the informant visited the office of the gas agency. It is also mentioned that the district administration had directed the informant to lodge the report. A perusal of the report leaves no room of doubt that it had been lodged by the informant on account of the pressure created by the consumers. It is also mentioned that the district administration had directed the informant to lodge the report. A perusal of the report leaves no room of doubt that it had been lodged by the informant on account of the pressure created by the consumers. The primary grievance of the consumers was that the cylinders were not being delivered timely at their residence. It is not a case of refusal by the agency to make home delivery. Therefore, in my view, the dispute in this case is purely in respect of breach of condition of license and it is not the case of the informant that there had been any non-supply, storage, hoarding, etc. by the agency. 7. It is a settled principle of law that the High Court has inherent powers to act ex debitojustitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the pro- cess of the Court. Needless to say, inherent power under section 482, Cr.P.C can be exercised inter alia to prevent abuse of the process of Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice and if any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to its notice, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the statute. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 had observed that the power under section 482, Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that to allow such proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to continue so as to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. It was observed in the said case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The said principle has been followed by the Apex Court in a number of cases thereafter. 9. It was observed in the said case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The said principle has been followed by the Apex Court in a number of cases thereafter. 9. In the later decision given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1991 (28) ACC 111 (SC) after taking into consideration various relevant provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as principles of law enunciated in a series of earlier decisions relating to exercise of extraordinary power and also inherent powers. It laid down certain categories by way of illustration in para 102 of the judgment, where inherent powers could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Said para of the judgment reads as under : "102 : (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused." (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of section 155 (2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and evidence collected in support of the same do not dis- close the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can never reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can never reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the pro- visions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 10. Again in the case of Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala, (2000) 8 SCC 590 : 2000 (41) ACC 1029 (SC) Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para 18, held as under : "18. It is well settled that the power under section 482, Cr.P.C. has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are initiated based on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per se illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence based on such material but also the trial it- self, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as it cannot but amount to abuse of the process of the Court; in such a case not quashing the proceedings would perpetuate abuse of the process of the Court resulting in great hardship and injustice to the accused. In our opinion, exercise of power under section 482, Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings in a case like the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice." 11. Subsequently, in the case of Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 (25) AIC 379 (SC) : 2005 (51) ACC 188 the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para 8, had held as under : "8.... It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 (25) AIC 379 (SC) : 2005 (51) ACC 188 the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para 8, had held as under : "8.... It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto." 12. Similarly in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. N.E.P.C. India Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 736 : 2006 (44) AIC 37 (SC) : 2006 (56) ACC 249 the Hon'ble Supreme Court had cautioned about a growing tendency to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Therefore, in para 13, it was observed as under : "13 .... Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged." 13. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it is to be noted that the averments made in the impugned report do not make out the of- fence alleged against the petitioners. In order to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice, it is necessary to quash the report and further proceedings emanating therefrom. Time and again, it has been laid down by the Apex Court that the Court must ensure that a criminal Proceeding is not used as a instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. Therefore, the impugned report, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 14. Therefore, the impugned report, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 14. It is significant to note that the administration had also suspended the license of the petitioners on 28.2.2008 and 1.3.2008 (passed by the informant) (sic). Against the said action, the firm of the petitioners had filed a Writ Petition No. 2238/2008. While considering the stay application, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court had taken note of some relevant facts as under : "The applicant Yuva Vikash Munch, Nawalgarh, Distt. Jhunjhunu (for short as "Munch") in its application has stated that members of the Munch are consumers of the petitioner-firm and they have submitted complaints and also launched agitation against the petitioner-firm. The Counsel for the petitioner submits that the its is between petitioner and I.O.C. as well as State, the applicant is not a necessary party." The Counsel for the petitioner-firm submits that the petitioner-firm was granted L.P.G. distributorship at Nawalgarh by the I.O.C. on 23.3.1990 but recently vide order dated 28.2.2008, the I.O.C. has suspended the distributorship of the firm and the Government has suspended the license also vide order dated 1.3.2008 and both the orders are highly unreasonable, arbitrary, unjust, unfair and no procedure established by law has been adopted. The Counsel for the petitioner further submits that a bare perusal of suspension order passed by I.O.C. would reveal that same has been passed simply on account of Dharna and threatening by Munch to go on huge strike and resort to other violent activities like blocking of roads etc. In the said order, it has further been mentioned that once the situation is back under control Investigations will be carried out to assess the correctness of allegations levelled against the petitioner-firm and set further course of action, which also reveal that even no preliminary enquiry was conducted. In the said order, it has further been mentioned that once the situation is back under control Investigations will be carried out to assess the correctness of allegations levelled against the petitioner-firm and set further course of action, which also reveal that even no preliminary enquiry was conducted. In the order of D.S.O., Jhunjhunu dated 1.3.2008 although the reasons have not been mentioned but the same reason prevailed with the D.S.O., while suspending the license of L.P.G. Gas, therefore, the same is equally unreasonable and arbitrary being violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India." The High Court had stayed the operation of the impugned orders of suspension of license on 12.3.2008 with the following observation : "I have considered the aforesaid aspects of the matter and prima facie it appears that I.O.C. has worked under threatening and pressure of the itervenor. It also appears that I.O.C. has not conducted any preliminary/regular Inquiry-wherein also a reasonable, just and fair procedure was to be adopted. A bare perusal of para No. 4 of the order dated 28.2.2008 would reveal that I.O.C. has maintained that once the situation is back under control, investigations will be carried out to assess the correctness of allegations levelled against the petitioner, clearly shows that the order of suspension of distributorship has been passed under threat by the Munch to go on huge strike and resort to other violent activities like blocking of roads etc. which is unconstitutional and contrary to the provisions of the relevant statutes as well as 'doctrine of just and fair procedure. I am also of the prima facie view that simple complaint followed by agitation, huge strike, road blocking etc. cannot be any consideration for not following the Rules and Regulations and principles of natural justice further made basis of suspension and only way is to demand preliminary /regular enquiry and in case the authority concerned did not take any action on the complaint then to seek appropriate remedy for aforesaid preliminary/regular inquiry. The District Administration also appears to have passed the orders under pressure of the Munch. Therefore, the petitioner-firm has a strong prima facie case in its favour. In my prima facie view, in case operation of impugned orders dated 28.2.2008 (Annexure-8) and 1.3.2008 (Annexure-9) are not stayed, then the petitioner-firm who is having balance of convenience in its favour, would suffer irreparable loss." 15. Therefore, the petitioner-firm has a strong prima facie case in its favour. In my prima facie view, in case operation of impugned orders dated 28.2.2008 (Annexure-8) and 1.3.2008 (Annexure-9) are not stayed, then the petitioner-firm who is having balance of convenience in its favour, would suffer irreparable loss." 15. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the contents of the first information report, I am of the considered opinion that it is a fit case for exercising the inherent powers of this Court to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice, and quash the first information report lodged by non-petitioner No. 2. 16. Consequently, this criminal miscellaneous petition is allowed and F.I.R. No. 92/2008, registered at Police Station Nawalgarh, District Jhunjhunu and all the proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed and set aside.Petition Allowed. *******