Jyoti Narayan Singh v. Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank Limited
2009-08-07
NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGEMENT 1. Petitioner joined the services of Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank Limited in the year 1968. He was promoted to the post of Land Valuation Officer in the year 1978 and then came to the cadre of Manager in 1980. He was posted at different places thereafter. He superannuated on 30.4.2002 while he was posted at Motihari. Having superannuated when his retiral dues were not being paid, he filed CWJC No. 4462 of 2003. Petitioner alleges that being aggrieved by the action taken by the petitioner to come to this Court seeking retiral dues, a charge-sheet dated 27.5.2003 was served on him in which it was stated that the petitioner had misutilized loan sanctioning facility during his service period and in particular in 1985 to 1988. Petitioner was held liable to pay 45% of the loan amount totaling to Rs. 75,722.40 p. This was the charge. Petitioner has come to this Court challenging the action. 2. Petitioners submission is short. He submits that he superannuated on 30.4.2002. No proceedings were even under contemplation much less started. As admitted in the counter affidavit now filed, for settling his retiral dues, after his retirement, Vigilance clearance was sought for. Vigilance, in course of enquiry, found/discovered these matters of 1985-1988 and thus the proceedings have been initiated for recovery of the said amount because of which other retiral dues have already been withheld. 3. On behalf of Bank, reference is placed on Rule 132(ii) of the Service Rules of the Bihar Rajya Sahakari Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti as also to Rule 151 and Rule 237 of the Rules to justify such a belated action. With reference to Rule 132(ii), it is submitted that it does not provide for any limitation as to cause of action or as to initiation of proceeding. It is submitted that it is materially different from Rule 43 of the Bihar Pension Rules, which provides a limitation. In other words what counsel has been submitted is that there being no statutory limit provided in Rule 132(ii), the bank can take whatever action when ever they like without any restriction. This is the basic dispute in the present case. For proper appreciation Rules 132(ii), 151 and 237 are quoted hereunder: "132(ii).
In other words what counsel has been submitted is that there being no statutory limit provided in Rule 132(ii), the bank can take whatever action when ever they like without any restriction. This is the basic dispute in the present case. For proper appreciation Rules 132(ii), 151 and 237 are quoted hereunder: "132(ii). If the Bank suffers any pecuniary loss due to fault, negligence, inefficiency or breach of rules and instructions of the Bank, by an employee who has retired, the Bank shall be at liberty to forfeit his retirement benefit and recover the loss from the amount payable to such employee. 151. Any controversy arising out of such cases which cannot be resolved by the Rules framed hereunder would be referred to the service rules and code of conduct framed by the State Govt. from time to time. 237. The issue not covered in this service rule framed hereunder, shall be governed by the provisions of, the Bihar Service Code and other relevant rules of the State Government." 4. Having considered the matter, in my view, the first thing that come to my mind is the well settled principle of service jurisprudence that on superannuation of an employee the master-servant relationship ends. The employee is under no disciplinary control of the employer. No proceeding can be normally initiated. Of course, these are in absence of any rule or regulation having force of law. To the contrary in Bihar Pension Rules we have Rule 43. In absence whereof no action can be taken or continue for any punishment. After superannuation of a person no realization should be made from his pensionary benefit. All proceedings in that regard would abate with superannuation or dead. 5. Here, first i may refer to Rules 151 and 237 with Rule 132(ii). These rules by themselves could not drive in the provision of Rule 43 of the Bihar Pension Rules for two simple reasons. These two rules i.e. Rule 151 and Rule 237 refer to Service Rule or Officer Rules. They do not refer to Pension Rules of the Bihar Services. Second, there is no pension payable in the Bank and therefore the Bihar Pension Rules would not apply.
These two rules i.e. Rule 151 and Rule 237 refer to Service Rule or Officer Rules. They do not refer to Pension Rules of the Bihar Services. Second, there is no pension payable in the Bank and therefore the Bihar Pension Rules would not apply. Now coming to Rule 132(ii), in the present case it would be seen that the charge-sheet was issued on 27.5.03 but it is not disputed that Rule 132(ii) itself was introduced for the first time with effect from 28.6.03. As such, on the day charge-sheet was issued there was no authority to issue any such charge-sheet. The charge-sheet was thus wholly without jurisdiction. It is liable to be quashed on that ground alone but as learned counsel has argued with regard to reasonableness of the action, I may refer to three decisions of the Apex Court in this regard, namely, AIR 1969 SC 1297 (State of Gujarat Vs. Patel Raghav Natha & Ors.) wherein the question came up for consideration with regard to power of Commissioner to revise order which prescribed no limit. It was argued before the Apex Court that there being no prescription of time limit, the matter could be revised at any point of time. This was negatived by the Apex Court. Looking to the nature of power, which was dealing with the building plan, it was held that the power must be exercised within two or three months and not thereafter at all. The next decision to which I may refer is 1983 SC 1239 (Mansaram Vs. S.P. Pathak & Ors.) wherein in para 12, the Apex Court has held that where the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of power inheres its exercise within a reasonable time. In that case power was given on the House Allotment Officer to summarily evict a person, who had unauthorisedly entered and occupied a residential premises. Even though the Apex Court found that the party, in question, had unauthorisedly entered the premises as rightly found by the House Allotment Officer and was liable to be summarily evicted, the Court restricts any such action on the ground of delay. The action was sought to be taken 22 years after the entry.
Even though the Apex Court found that the party, in question, had unauthorisedly entered the premises as rightly found by the House Allotment Officer and was liable to be summarily evicted, the Court restricts any such action on the ground of delay. The action was sought to be taken 22 years after the entry. Court held that the right being there was not exercised within a reasonable time, could not be permitted to be exercised at all. Then I may refer to a recent decision more in line with the present case being the case reported in (2005)6 SCC 636 : 2006(2) PLJR (SC) 121 (P.V. Mahadevan Vs. Md. T.N. Housing Board). This case related to a departmental proceeding and the question was inordinate delay 10 years in initiating the proceeding. The defence of the department was that they initiated the proceeding no sooner they came to know of that. This was not accepted as a good explanation. The Apex Court held that delay in initiation of departmental proceeding may be fatal. They were stale charges and cannot be continued. The proceedings were quashed. 6. Here I may add if what is submitted by the Bank that they only discovered these malpractices recently and initiated the proceeding is to be accepted and as such delayed action permitted, it would only put a premium on inefficiency. It would justify the Bank to sleep over the matter for a decade or more and then wake up, look into their books, which they ought to have done earlier and suddenly find mistake and rush to recover from the petitioner or his son or may be his grandson. That would be an abuse of power and cannot be countenanced. In the present case the delay is of about 20 years only and enquiry started after superannuation. 7. For the reasons stated above the writ petition is allowed, the charge-sheet served on the petitioner is quashed and respondents are directed to clear all retiral dues of the petitioner immediately.