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2009 DIGILAW 1050 (DEL)

ABHAY SINGH KUSHWAHA v. JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA

2009-09-25

ANIL KUMAR

body2009
JUDGMENT Anil Kumar, J.-The point for determination in the writ petitions is whether the petitioners who have become eligible for admission to BDS course on the basis of their merit ranking in the entrance examination conducted by the respondent/ University, be denied admission on the ground that they have appeared in the entrance examination after a gap of number of years after passing their Intermediate, qualifying examination. 2. Relevant facts to comprehend the disputes are that the petitioners had appeared for entrance examination for admission to the course of Bachelor of Dental Surgery, 2009-2010 conducted by the respondent University. The respondent is a fully aided and centrally funded University. The petitioner while applying for entrance examination for admission to the course of Bachelor of Dental Surgery (BDS) 2009-2010 disclosed their date of birth and the age as on31st December, 2009. They also disclosed the year of passing the intermediate examination which is the minimum educational qualification to appear for the entrance examination. 3. The petitioner Sh. Abhay Singh Kushwaha passed his intermediate examination in 1998 and Sh. Mohnmmad Asif had passed his intermediate examination in 1999. The petitioner Sh. Mohammad Yasin had passed his intermediate examination in the year 1995. 4. On the basis of the result of the entrance examination the respondent declined a merit list. The petitioner Mohd. Asif having Roll No. 1784 was placed at merit ranking 1; Sh. Abhny Singh Kushwaha having Roll No.2214 was placed at merit ranking 9 and Sh. Mohd. Yasin having Roll No. 2973 was placed at merit, ranking 15. 5. The petitioners had to attend the counseling on 23rd July, 2009 with all of their certificates. On 23rd July, 2009 the petitioners appeared before the Dean, Faculty of Dentistry for counseling and for medical formalities. However, after seeing their certificates the Dean instructed the petitioners not to undergo medical test and to come on 24th July, 2009. The other candidates who had been placed in the merit list were, however, allowed to complete the formalities for their admission and they were given admission in the course of BDS. 6. On 24th July, 2009, the respondent after making the petitioners wait for the whole day intimated them that they cannot be given admission as there is a gap between the Intermediate Board examination and the BDS course which the petitioners want to pursue during the Session 2009-2010. 7. 6. On 24th July, 2009, the respondent after making the petitioners wait for the whole day intimated them that they cannot be given admission as there is a gap between the Intermediate Board examination and the BDS course which the petitioners want to pursue during the Session 2009-2010. 7. The petitioners were given no reason in writing or any order in writing stating the reason for not admitting the petitioners to BOS course despite the fact that the petitioners had been selected according to their merit ranking in the entrance examination. On inquiry the petitioners were disclosed that since there is a considerable gap between their qualifying the intermediate examination and the BOS course which they want to pursue from 2009, a committee comprising Registrar, Proctor, Dean, Student Welfare and one nominee of the Vice-Chancellor and Dean, Faculty of Dentistry had taken the decision not to admit them. 8. The petitioners contend that some other candidates who had gap between qualifying the intermediate examination and the BOS course of 2009-2010 from 3 to 7 years, however, have been admitted in the course of BDS. The petitioners categorically asserted that Mr. Shahroz Raza has a gap of more than three years; Mr. Zubair Aslam has a gap of seven years; Ms. Shama Parveen has a gap of seven years and Mr. Pritesh Monu has a gap of six years, however, they hove been given admission. 9. The petitioner Mohd. Asif asserted that after qualifying the intermediate examination he had all along been associated with academic activities. He had joined coaching classes, private tuitions and he had appeared in various entrance tests, few of which were cleared by him like Uttaranchal Council Entrance Pre-Medical Examination but he did not get admission because of very high amount of fees. The said petitioner was also associated with New Step Pre-Medical Institute where he undertook coaching classes from the year 2000 to 2005. Mr. Abhay Singh Kushwaha also contended, that he had cleared entrance examination of BHMS Kanpur in the year 2006 but he preferred not to join since he was interested in dental surgery. Sh. Mohd. Yasin also contended that he had been associated with academic activities and he had joined coaching classes, private tuitions and he had also been appearing in various entrance examinations. 10. Sh. Mohd. Yasin also contended that he had been associated with academic activities and he had joined coaching classes, private tuitions and he had also been appearing in various entrance examinations. 10. On denial of admission to the petitioners to the course of Bachelor of Dental Surgery (BOS), 2009-2010 on the ground that they have been selected in the entrance examination after a considerable gap of passing the intermediate examination so they are not fit to pursue the said course, the petitioners have filed the present petitions contending inter alia that there is no maxim um age limit prescribed by the respondent and in the circumstances the petitioners cannot be denied admission on the ground that they had qualified the intermediate examination a few years back. Relying on Punjab Communications v. Union of India, V (1999) SL T 237= (1999) 4 SCC 727 it was contended that in such after qualifying entrance examination the petitioners have legitimate expectation to claim admission. The assertion of the petitioners is that fixing of gap year is inconsistent with the general practice followed by other institution where there is no such condition of gap year for the same course. 11. The petitioners have also assailed the decision of the respondent to deny them admission despite having been selected and placed in the merit list, on the ground that they have not been heard before taking a decision and in the circumstances principles of natural justice have been violated. The petitioners have also invoked discrimination on the ground that other candidates have been given relaxation whereas petitioners have been denied admission in the similar circumstances. On behalf of petitioners it is very vociferously contended that for other categories of the students, the gap year is not insisted upon whereas in the general category the petitioners have been denied admission on the ground that they have been selected in the merit list for the course of BDS after a considerable gap of qualifying the intermediate examination. The petitioners have also challenged Clause 13 of the rules for admission contemplating that a candidate seeking admission after a gap of three or more academic years after passing qualifying examination may be considered for admission by the admission Review Committee. Cause 13 of the rules is as under: "13. The petitioners have also challenged Clause 13 of the rules for admission contemplating that a candidate seeking admission after a gap of three or more academic years after passing qualifying examination may be considered for admission by the admission Review Committee. Cause 13 of the rules is as under: "13. Candidates seeking admission after a gap of three or more academic years after passing qualifying examination, may be considered for admission by the Academic Review Committee consisting of Shaikh-ul-Jamia (Vice-Chancellor), the Dean, Students Welfare, the Dean of the Faculty concerned, the Head of the Department concerned, and the Proctor." 12. The petitioners contended that they were asked to submit affidavits regarding their activities during the period after qualifying entrance examination which were duly given which could not be ignored and in any case without hearing the petitioners and giving an opportunity to them, they could not be denied admission to the course of BDS on the basis of their merit ranking. The petitioners also contended that no reasons were communicated to the petitioners for denying admission despite having placed in the merit list for admission to the BDS course 2009-2010. 13. The petitioners have also challenged the action of the respondent not admitting them to the course of Bachelor of Dental Surgery (BDS) on the grounds that Clause 13 of the Rules regarding admission is arbitrary and there is no rationale for admitting a student who has a gap of three years or till seven years and not to admit the students who have gap of more than seven years between the qualifying examination and admission to the course. It is contended that Rule 13 is not supported by any guideline or scheme on the basis of which the decision could be taken by the alleged committee. The petitioners have also asserted that if the respondent did not want to admit the petitioners to the BDS course, the specific guideline should have been framed and without giving a show cause notice or an opportunity to the petitioners to explain their case, denying admission to the petitioners is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioners have also asserted that if the respondent did not want to admit the petitioners to the BDS course, the specific guideline should have been framed and without giving a show cause notice or an opportunity to the petitioners to explain their case, denying admission to the petitioners is in violation of the principles of natural justice. Relying on Manish Talwar v. Principal, Rajdhani College, 1998 (44) DRJ 26 ; Javed Akhtar v. Jamia Hamdard, W.P(C) No. 15257 /2006 it is contended that the eligibility criterion which was not in the bulletin of information could not be introduced later on and the same is in violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners. The petitioners have also pleaded that the respondent cannot have the guideline contrary to the regulations of Dental Council of India which do not bar admission to the bachelor of Dental Surgery on account of gap between the qualifying examination and getting selected in the entrance examination. 14. The petitioners also gave the instance of the candidates admitted to medical colleges after a gap of 10 to 12 years in different medical colleges who were not debarred from taking admission as the Medical Council of India and Dental Council of India do not have any such regulation. 15. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied on Udai Singh Dagar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., VI (2007) SLT 304= (2007) 10 SCC 306 ; Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University & Anr., (1989) 2 SCC 145 ; Clariant International Ltd. & Anr. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, IV (2004) BC 449 (SC)=V (2004) SLT 752= (2004) 8 SCC 524 ; Union of India & Anr. v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 ; Om Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India, VIII (2000) SL T 463= (2001) 2 SCC 386 ; Raojibhai fivabhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., 1989 Suppl. (2) SCC 744; Union of India v. Chaffeurs (Class-III) Association, 143 (2007) DLT 377; Monica Garg v. University of Delhi, AIR 1993 Delhi 73; Dr. fai Hari Agarwal v. University of Delhi, 100 (2002) DLT 144; Mohini fain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka and Ors., (1992) 3 SCC 666 ; Unni Krishnan, J.P and Ors. (2) SCC 744; Union of India v. Chaffeurs (Class-III) Association, 143 (2007) DLT 377; Monica Garg v. University of Delhi, AIR 1993 Delhi 73; Dr. fai Hari Agarwal v. University of Delhi, 100 (2002) DLT 144; Mohini fain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka and Ors., (1992) 3 SCC 666 ; Unni Krishnan, J.P and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., (1993) 1 SCC 645 ; Bandhu Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors., (1984) 3 SCC 161 ; M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., VIII (2006) SLT 1= (2006) 8 SCC 212 ; and Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra), in support of their pleas and contentions. 16. The petition is contested by the respondent/University and an affidavit of Professor Z.H. Khan, Registrar of the respondent was filed. The respondent has contended that the case of a candidate seeking admission to a course in the respondent University after a gap of three years or more is to be considered for the purpose of admission by the Admission Review Committee. Para 4 of the Ordinance 1 pertaining to the Admission Review Committee is as under: "4.1 The case of a candidate seeking admission to a regular course other than research and part time courses in languages, who has given up his/ her studies for three or more academic years after passing a Degree/ Diploma/Certificate Examination may be considered for admission by the Admission Review Committee." 17. The respondent also filed the order dated 24th July, 2009 of the Admission Review Committee deciding that in case of general category candidates a gap of more than seven years is not to be condoned. The decision of the Admission Review Committee dated 24th July, 2009 is as under: "(i) In case of general category candidates the gap of more than 7 years was not condoned. As a result these candidates were denied admission to the University. (ii) For such candidates who had a gap of 7 years or less, a certificate from Notary in support of intervening period would be submitted to the office of the concerned Head/Dean/Director. (iii) In case of SC/ST, PH, female candidates, the intervening period was condoned subject to the availability of seats and he/she would submit a certificate from Notary in support of intervening period to the office of the concerned Head/Dean/Director. (iii) In case of SC/ST, PH, female candidates, the intervening period was condoned subject to the availability of seats and he/she would submit a certificate from Notary in support of intervening period to the office of the concerned Head/Dean/Director. (iv) The list of candidates cleared by the ARC meeting would be handed over to the concerned Dean/Head/ Director." 18. The respondent in the circumstances contended that the policy of the University has been that all those with gaps of more than seven years should generally be not granted admission unless the applicants are able to put forward excruciating circumstances for explaining such gaps. It is contended that in case of petitioners the gap is without any cogent explanation though the petitioners have filed their affidavits giving the details for the activities carried on by them during the gap years. The rationale given by the respondent to deny admission to those who have more than seven years of gap is that such candidates are not able to acclimatize and cope with the academic homogeneity of the group leading to the problems of discipline and maladjustment. The respondent also contended that the petitioners were not able to explain the gap and that reflects lack of motivation on the part of the petitioners. Comparing the petitioners with other candidates having gap of less than seven years it is contended that those candidates who have academic continuity in their favour should be encouraged to complete their academic cycle rather than deprive them of admission for the sake of those with elongated breaks in their intellectual career and consequently the applicants with a gap are not given precedence over those who have had a continuity in academics. In the circumstances, it is contended that the net result is that the ones with continuity would suffer and lend to breach in their academic careers as well if the petitioners are not declined admission. 19. This is not disputed that the Dental Council of India does not have any regulation which bars the candidates who are eligible for admission on basis of their merit in the entrance examination for admission to BDS course after a number of years of passing the qualifying examination. This fact has also not been denied by the respondent that in other Universities and institutions the candidates are given admission even after a gap of 10 to 12 years. 20. This fact has also not been denied by the respondent that in other Universities and institutions the candidates are given admission even after a gap of 10 to 12 years. 20. The decision was taken by the Review Committee on 24th July, 2009 that the candidates who had a gap of seven years or less shall be eligible for admission and those with more than seven years will not be eligible, however, affidavits from the candidates were taken on that date or thereafter. This cannot be disputed that the affidavits were given by the petitioners in which they clearly disclosed the activities carried on by them during the years after passing the qualifying examination. Reasons may vary and they will be condonable on the consideration of reasons and not on the basis of mere number of years. 21. Clause 13 of the rules contemplates that the case of a candidate having a gap of more than three or more academic years after passing qualifying examination shall be considered for admission by the Admission Review Committee. From the decision dated 24th July, 2009 it is apparent that the cases of the petitioners have not been considered individually rather a general decision has been taken not to admit any candidate who has a gap of more than seven years. The reasons for not admitting the candidates having gap of for more than seven years have not been given. The learned Counsel for the respondent is unable to show any reason as to why the gap years up to seven years have been condoned and the admission granted and why the gap years for more than seven years are not condonable and the admission is not to be granted. 22. This also cannot disputed that the reasons for not granting admission to the petitioners were not communicated to the petitioners and they have not been given any reasonable opportunity nor the pleas and contentions of the petitioner for the gap between qualifying examination and entrance examination have been considered. 23. The reasons given by the respondent in the counter affidavit cannot be relied on to support the decision dated 24th July, 2009 as the said order does not reveal any reasons which have been taken subsequently in the counter affidavit. 23. The reasons given by the respondent in the counter affidavit cannot be relied on to support the decision dated 24th July, 2009 as the said order does not reveal any reasons which have been taken subsequently in the counter affidavit. It is no more res integra that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons. The order dated 24th July, 2009 is a general order not to admit any student with a gap of more than 7 years between qualifying examination and admission to the course of BDS after getting selected on the basis of merit ranking in the entrance examination conducted by the respondent. The Apex Court in AIR 1978 SC 851 = (1978) 1 SCO 405, Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, had held that the orders cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons as otherwise an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. The Apex Court in case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) in para 8 at page 417 had held as under: "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order blued on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw, attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji, ( AIR 1952 SC 16 )- "Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." 24. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." 24. The reason given in the counter affidavit that petitioners will not be able to acclimatize and cope with the academic homogeneity of the group leading to the problems of discipline and maladjustment and the gap reflects lack of motivation were not considered by the review committee of the respondent. The order not to admit the petitioners rather gives no reason at (Ill. No reasons have been given as to why a student with a gap of 7 years will be able to cope with academic homogeneity and will not face problems of discipline and maladjustment and a student of more than 7 years will not be able to cope, have been considered arid given. It appears that the decision is based on no material or any study carried out by the university. No factors have been disclosed for such a decision. In order to determine the reasonableness of the decision of the university, what is to be considered is as to what relevant factors had been taken into consideration or what irrelevant factors have been taken into consideration and whether any relevant factors have been left out. In absence of any reasons, it is apparent that the decision cannot be termed "reasonable and cannot be sustained. In Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCO 463, at page 472 the Supreme Court while considering as to what is reasonable and what can be termed as irrational had held as under: ".....Therefore, to arrive at a decision on reasonableness the Court has to find out if the administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors. The decision of the administrator must have been within the four corners of the law, and not one which no sensible person could have reasonably arrived at, having regard to the above principles, and must have been a bona fide one. The decision could be one of many choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not for the Court to substitute its view. 13. The decision could be one of many choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to decide upon the choice and not for the Court to substitute its view. 13. The principles of judicial review of administrative action were further summarised in 1985 by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service as illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. He said more grounds could in future become available, including the doctrine of proportionality which was a principle followed by certain other members of the European Economic Community. Lord Diplock observed in that case as follows- ... Judicial review has I think, developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call illegality, the second irrationality and the third procedural impropriety. That is not to say that further development on a case-by-case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of proportionality which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community. Lord Diplock explained irrationality as follows: "By irrationality 1 mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as Wednesbury unreasonableness. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it." 14. In other words, to characterise a decision of the administrator as irrational the Court has to hold, on material, that it is a decision so outrageous as to be in total defiance of logic or moral standards. Adoption of proportionality into administrative law was left for the future." 25. No doubt the respondent has discretion in academic matters, however, even this discretion has to be exercised in view of purpose for which it is given and it is not to be exercised illegally and arbitrarily. In Clariant International Ltd. v. Securities & Exchange Board of India, IV (2004) BC 449 (SC)=V (2004) SLT 752= (2004) 8 SCC 524 , at page 538, the Apex Court had held as under: "28. In Clariant International Ltd. v. Securities & Exchange Board of India, IV (2004) BC 449 (SC)=V (2004) SLT 752= (2004) 8 SCC 524 , at page 538, the Apex Court had held as under: "28. The discretionary jurisdiction has to be exercised keeping in view the purpose for which it is conferred, the object sought to be achieved and the reasons for granting such wide discretion." 26. High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ordinarily is reluctant to interfere with the matters relating to the internal working of educational institutions since the decisions taken by the academic bodies are in the nature of policy decisions. The decisions, however, can be interfered with in case they are unreasonable or arbitrary or in denial of principles of natural justice. It has already been held that the decision is unreasonable. 27. The Supreme Court in Deepak Sibal (supra) had struck down the rule of admission in the evening classes only to regular employees of Government and semi Government institutions. The possibility of production of bogus certificates by the employees of the private companies and insecurity of their services were held not to be such circumstances which will justify the exclusion of the employees of the private establishments from the evening classes. In Clariant International Limited and Another (supra), it was held that when a criterion is fixed by statute or by a policy, an attempt should be made by the authority making the delegated legislation to follow the policy broadly and substantially and act in conformity therewith. 28. The Dental Council of India has not framed any such regulation which will restrict admission of a candidate who is entitled for admission on the basis of his merit ranking in the entrance examination on the ground that he has appeared after a considerable gap of passing the qualifying examination. In order to ascertain the reasonableness, it was held that what is to be seen is whether the concerned authority has left out relevant factors or have taken into consideration irrelevant factors. Though no reasons were given at the time of taking decision to deny admission to the candidates who have a gap of more than seven years, however, in the counter affidavit it is contended that such students who have more than seven years lack motivation to join and complete a course. Though no reasons were given at the time of taking decision to deny admission to the candidates who have a gap of more than seven years, however, in the counter affidavit it is contended that such students who have more than seven years lack motivation to join and complete a course. The plea of the respondent is without any legal or factual basis. Though all the petitioners have a considerable gap after passing the qualifying examination, however, in the entrance examination they have secured good merit ranking which rather reflects extreme motivation on the part of all the petitioners. In the circumstances, the decision of the Review Committee not to admit the students after a gap of seven years is unreasonable and without any rationality as it defies logic or accepted standards. None other institutions and universities deny admission to a candidate who has a good merit ranking on the ground that he has appeared in the entrance examination after seven years of passing the qualifying examination. The petitioners have given the instances of various institutions and universities which have not been denied by the respondent. Opportunity to acquire higher education cannot be and should not be denied on the alleged grounds which have been alleged in the counter affidavit, though the decision was not based on those reasons. 29. In Union of India & Anr. v. G. Ganayutham, the Supreme Court had held relying on Wednesburys case that "reasonableness of an administrative decision has to be found whether the concerned authority has left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors". In Raojibhai Jivabhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., the Supreme Court had held in case of Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 that the restriction contemplated under the said Act applies to law made by State Legislature alone and not when any restriction is placed under a Central Law in the facts and circumstances of that case. 30. In Monica Garg (supra), a Division Bench of this Court had held that classification of candidates on the basis of entrance examination is rational and reasonable and have a nexus to the objects sought to be achieved i.e. to select the best candidates. 30. In Monica Garg (supra), a Division Bench of this Court had held that classification of candidates on the basis of entrance examination is rational and reasonable and have a nexus to the objects sought to be achieved i.e. to select the best candidates. To deny the admission to a candidate who has merit ranking in the entrance examination on the ground that he had appeared in the entrance examination after a couple of years of passing the qualifying examination in the facts and circumstances, therefore, cannot be justified by the respondent. In Dr. Jai Hari Agarwal v. University of Delhi, a candidate was seeking admission to post-graduate degree course. A note in the bulletin of information prescribed that a student of diploma holder will have to wait for two years before such a candidate could get admission in subject other than in which he has done diploma. Such a condition was held to be arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Such a restriction was held to be ul1reasonnblc restriction on the right of education. In Mohini Jain (supra) the Supreme Court had held charging of capitation fee as illegal and impermissible as it amounted to denial of citizens right to education. The Supreme Court had held charging of capitation fee as arbitrary and violative of Article 14. It was held that any such action or inaction which defeats any constitutional mandate stated in the directive principles is per se arbitrary and violative of Article 14. 31. The learned Counsel for the respondent has also relied on 77(1999) DLT 833, Sushma Shukla Pandey v. lamia Milia Islamia, where a candidate was denied admission because the maximum age limit for admission was fixed as 23 years whereas the candidate was over age by four years. In those circumstances it was held that the eligibility criterion has to be left to the University authorities and since no mala fides were alleged the preference given to those students who met the eligibility criterion, could not be termed arbitrary. Apparently the order relied on by the respondent is distinguishable as in the case of admission to BDS no maximum age has been fixed. Apparently the order relied on by the respondent is distinguishable as in the case of admission to BDS no maximum age has been fixed. The regulations framed by the Dental Council of India also does not have any such regulation that a candidate will not be entitled for admission to the BDS course in case he qualifies the entrance examination after considerable gap years of passing the qualifying examination. The reason which has not been taken by the respondents committee for denying admission cannot be allowed to taken in the counter affidavit to deny admission to such petitioners in the facts and circumstances. 32. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio anci not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it.• It must be remembered that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd., VII (2003) SL T 322=(2003) 2 SC 111 (vide para 59), the Supreme had observed: "It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision." The Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd and Anr. v. N. R. Vairamani and Anr., VI (2004) SL T 586=AIR 2004 SC 778 had also held that decision cannot be relied on without considering the factual situation. In the same judgment the Supreme Court also observed: "Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed: Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclids theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes." In P.S. Rao v. State, 11(2002) SLT 483=JT 2002 (3) SC 1, the Supreme Court had held as under: "There is always a peril in treating the words of judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in setting of the facts of a particular case Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases." In Rafiq v. State, 1980 SCC (Cri) 946, it was observed as under: "The ratio of one case cannot be mechanically applied to another case without having regard to the fact situation and circumstances obtaining in two cases." 33. The learned Counsel for the respondent has also contended that a considerable gap reflects lack of motivation on the part of the candidate. However, considering that the petitioners for n considerable period had been appearing in the entrance examination and either studying or teaching in the various institutions and thereafter again appearing In the entrance examination and one of the petitioner being placed at merit ranking 1 rather shows dedication and motivation on the part of the petitioners. On the grounds Alleged by the respondent in the facts and circumstances it will not be appropriate to deny admission to the petitioners. 34. The alleged rationale that those general category candidates who enter the academic filed after a long gap arc not able to acclimatize and cope with the academic homogeneity is negated by the act of the respondent in permitting not only the reserved candidates but the female candidates of the general category to get admission after any number of gap years. The alleged rationale that those general category candidates who enter the academic filed after a long gap arc not able to acclimatize and cope with the academic homogeneity is negated by the act of the respondent in permitting not only the reserved candidates but the female candidates of the general category to get admission after any number of gap years. The learned Counsel for the respondent has not been able to explain as to how the alleged academic homogeneity shall be disturbed only by the male candidates of the general category and not by the reserved category candidates that is Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and female candidates. This cannot be disputed any more that if the object of the classification appears to be illogical, unfair and unjust for the classification, the classification shall be held as unreasonable. The alleged homogeneity is more a figment of imagination of the respondent and the learned Counsel has not been able to explain as to how it is logical, fair and just. What fair and logical objective shall be served by such classification whereby only the general category male candidates are deprived of admission to the Bachelor of Dental Surgery course despite obtaining very high ranking. 35. The action of the respondent is also in denial of principles of natural justice. In order to deny admission to the petitioners, they were entitled for a notice or opportunity so that they could represent and show that have dedication and motivation and allay the fears of the committee of the respondent. 36. The respondents Review Committee has not taken decision to condone the gap of less than seven years and not to condone the gap of more than seven years on the basis of the affidavits filed by the candidates, as the decision stipulates that a certificate be taken from the Notary in support of intervening period of such candidates. In the circumstances, it is apparent that first decision was taken and thereafter, candidates were directed to give affidavits duly notarized so that the decision already taken by the review committee could be justified. The procedure adopted by the Review Committee in the circumstances is contrary to Clause 13 of the rules. 37. In the circumstances, it is apparent that first decision was taken and thereafter, candidates were directed to give affidavits duly notarized so that the decision already taken by the review committee could be justified. The procedure adopted by the Review Committee in the circumstances is contrary to Clause 13 of the rules. 37. In the facts and circumstances, the petitioners are entitled for the relief claimed and the writ petitions are to be allowed and the respondent/University is liable to admit the petitioners in the course of B.D.5. 2009-2010. In W.P (C) 10464 of 2009 the respondent was directed to keep seats for the petitioners during the pendency of the petitions in the course of BD.S. 38. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons the writ petitions are allowed and the decision of the Review Committee dated 24th July, 2009 deciding not to admit the students despite being eligible on their merit ranking in the entrance examination on the ground that they have gap of more than seven years from passing the qualifying examination is quashed. The respondent is directed to admit the petitioners in the writ petitions in the course of B.D.s. 2009-2010 forthwith. Considering the facts and circumstances the respondent is also liable to pay costs of Rs. 15,000/ - (Rs. 5000/ - each) to the petitioners. 39. Copies of the order be also given dasti under the signatures of the Court Master to the parties or their Counsel. Writ Petitions allowed.