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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2009 DIGILAW 1051 (MP)

Dinesh Lal Gupta v. Ram Karan Gupta

2009-08-27

U.C.MAHESHWARI

body2009
ORDER 1. The unsuccessful defendant/appellant, being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 3.3.2005passed by 1st Addl. District Judge Sidhi in Civil Regular Appeal No. 14-A /03 affirming the judgment and decree dated 28.4.03 passed by IV Civil Judge Class-II, Sidhi in Civil Original Suit No. 256-A/02 decreeing the suit of the respondent/plaintiff for eviction against him, has filed this appeal. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal in short are that respondent herein filed the suit for eviction against the appellant with respect of a premises described in the plaint and the annexed map contending that defendant being tenant for residential purpose at the rate of Rs.45/- per month, is in possession of such accommodation from the time of its earlier owner Bhagwat Teli from whom the respondent acquired the title with consideration, through sale-deed dated 21.2.89. As per further averments, the impugned suit was filed for eviction on the grounds of arrears of rent, bonafide genuine requirement of the respondent for residence of his family and on the ground of nuisance as the appellant has disclaimed the title of the respondent with respect of the premises. 3. In the written statement of the appellant, the averments of the plaint are denied. It is stated that initially he was inducted in the premises as tenant by Bhagwat Teli from whom he purchased the disputed accommodation through unregistered sale deed dated 5.9.88 and since then he is in possession as owner of the same. In such premises, the relationship of the landlord and tenant has come to an end. Subsequent to it, Bhagwat Teli did not have any authority or right to sell the disputed accommodation to the respondent and, in such premises, the respondent did not acquire any title with respect of the disputed house vide alleged sale deed dated 21.2.89 (Ex.P/14). It is also stated that the relationship of the landlord and tenant has not been established between the parties at any point of time. In such premises, the grounds stated in the plaint for eviction are also denied. In the special pleadings, it is stated that possession of the appellant over the disputed premises, in any case, is protected under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. In such premises, the prayer for dismissal of the suit is made. 4. In such premises, the grounds stated in the plaint for eviction are also denied. In the special pleadings, it is stated that possession of the appellant over the disputed premises, in any case, is protected under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. In such premises, the prayer for dismissal of the suit is made. 4. After framing the issues, the evidence was recorded by the trial Court, on appreciation of the same, the suit of the respondent was .decreed by the trial Court on all the grounds stated in the plaint. On filing the appeal by the appellant, the same was also dismissed by affirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Thereafter, the appellant has come forward to this Court with this appeal. 5. Shri V.S.Choudhary, the learned appearing counsel of the appellant, by referring the pleadings, evidence and the documents exhibited on record argued that initially the appellant was inducted in the premises as tenant by Bhagwat Teli. Subsequently, he purchased, the premises from such landlord vide unregistered sale deed dated 5.9.88. In pursuance of such transaction, his tenant by ended and since then he is in possession as owner of such property. Subsequently, such unregistered sale deed was impounded and the deficit stamp duty with penalty has been paid by the appellant, hence that document has become legally effected with retrospective effect fium 5.9.88, on which, the aforesaid unregistered sale deed/agreement was executed by Bhagwat Teli in favour of the appellant and, in such premises, the aforesaid sale deed executed by Bhagwat Teli in favour of the respondent, being subsequent to the document of the appellant, did not confer any right or title to the respondent. In such premises, the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant is not established. But contrary to it, by holding such relationship between the parties, in the lack of any admissible and reliable evidence, the suit of the respondent had been decreed by both the Courts below under the wrong premises and, prayed for admission of this appeal on the proposed substantial question of law mentioned in the appeal memo. He also placed his reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Hirumstan Steel Ltd. v. M/s. Dilip Construction Company [A.I.R. 1969 SC 1238]. 6. He also placed his reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Hirumstan Steel Ltd. v. M/s. Dilip Construction Company [A.I.R. 1969 SC 1238]. 6. Having heard the counsel at length, in order to consider his arguments, I have carefully gone through the record of both the Courts below and also perused the impugned judgment. It is apparent fact on record that the house in which the disputed accommodation is situated has been purchased by the respondent vide registered sale deed dated 21.2.89 (Ex.P/14) and as per concurrent findings of both the Courts below, subsequent to acquisition of such right, the appellant was informed, regarding such transaction and, also to pay the rent of accommodation to the respondent. 7. On the other hand, the appellant has contested the matter mainly on the ground that initially he was inducted in the premises as tenant by Bhagwat Teli the previous owner of the property from whom he purchased such accommodation with consideration, through unregistered sale deed dated 5.9.88 (Ex.D/1) and, in such premises, he was not bound to pay the rent of accommodation to the respondent treating him to be his landlord and, in such premises, the suit could not be decreed on any of the grounds stated by the appellant in the plaint. 8. The case law in the matter of Hindustan Steel Ltd. (supra) cited by the appellant is not helping him because such case was decided considering the circumstance that some un stamped Award was filed by the Arbitrator for making the rule of the Court which was challenged on the ground that it being "invalid, illegal and unstamped", is not admissible of any purpose. On consideration, in view of the provision of Section 35 and 36 of the Stamp Act, it was held that the provision of section 36 of the Act do not create any bar against an instrument not duly stamped, being acted upon. It was further held that the provisions are not meant to arm a litigant with technicalities to defeat the claim of the opponent. Such citation is based only on the provisions of the Stamp Act. The mandatory provisions of Registration Act and the Transfer of Property Act relating to the registration of the sale deed transferring the immovable property were not taken into consideration while deciding the aforesaid cited case. Such citation is based only on the provisions of the Stamp Act. The mandatory provisions of Registration Act and the Transfer of Property Act relating to the registration of the sale deed transferring the immovable property were not taken into consideration while deciding the aforesaid cited case. Under the law, the Award of the Arbitrator does not require registration under the Registration Act, hence on impounding such Award, if the deficit stamp duty, with or without penalty, is paid then such document could be recognized from the date on which it was executed, but where the registration of any document has been made compulsory under the law and the same was not registered at any point of time before impounding the document or subsequent to that, then such document cannot supersede the earlier registered document executed in accordance with the provisions of Section 54 read with section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 17 of the Registration Act. In the present matter, the alleged unregistered sale deed of the appellant dated 5.9.88 (Ex.D/l) was never registered at any point of time with the Registrar of Documents, while the sale deed (Ex,P/14) executed by the earlier owner in favour of the respondent, was registered with the Registrar of Documents on 21.2.89 and from such date, such registered document has come into effect and confers the title to the respondent in the disputed property. Therefore, the approach of both the Courts below holding that the aforesaid agreement (Ex.D/l) did not confer any right in favour of the appellant, could not be said to be perverse or arbitrary. In such premises, I have not found any circumstance, giving rise to any question of law, muchless the substantial question of law in the matter. 9. It is apparent on record that taking into consideration the oral evidence as well as the documentary evidence, both the Courts below have found that relationship of the landlord and tenant has been established between the parties. 9. It is apparent on record that taking into consideration the oral evidence as well as the documentary evidence, both the Courts below have found that relationship of the landlord and tenant has been established between the parties. It is settled proposition of the law that the concurrent findings of the Courts below regarding relationship of landlord and tenant, being finding of fact, could not be interfered at the stage of second appeal under section 100 of the CPC as held by Apex Court in the matter of Kalyan Singh vs. Ramswaroop and another [1996 JLJ-247] and again by this Court in the matter of Machala Bai v. NanakRam [2006(2) MPLJ-484]. So, in such background, I have not found any circumstance to frame the substantial question of law on such concurrent finding of the trial Court based on admissible evidence. 10. Apart from the above, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Dr.Rambir Singh v. Asharfilal [ 1995(6) SCC 580 ], the concurrent findings of the Courts below on the ground of bonafide genuine requirement being findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence, could not be interfered under section 100 of the CPC at the stage of second appeal. In such premises, this appeal does not involve any question of law muchless the substantial question of law on such ground also. 11. So far the other grounds of eviction under Section 12(1) (a) and 12(1) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 are concerned, in the available facts and circumstances, the approach of both the Courts below appears to be based on sound appreciation of the admissible evidence and the same do not appear to be perverse in any manner. It is noted that after holding the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties along with the rate of monthly rent, if it is found that no such rent was paid by the tenant appellant as per requirement of law then the suit could be decreed on the ground of arrears of rent. The denial of the respondent's title in his written statement was sufficient circumstance to draw the inference against the appellant to pass the decree on the ground of nuisance. 12. The denial of the respondent's title in his written statement was sufficient circumstance to draw the inference against the appellant to pass the decree on the ground of nuisance. 12. In the aforesaid premises, I have not found any circumstance in the appeal giving rise to any question of law, muchless, the substantial question of law requiring any interference under section 100 of the CPC at this stage. Hence, the appeal being devoid of any merits, deserves to be, and is hereby dismissed at the stage of motion hearing.