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2009 DIGILAW 1055 (MAD)

A. Shanmugakani v. S. Rajan

2009-04-08

M.VENUGOPAL

body2009
Judgment :- The revision petitioner/tenants have filed this Civil Revision Petition in C.R.P (MD) SR. No.23813 of 2005 under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, [as amended by Act 23 of 1973 and by Act 1 of 1980] against the order dated 01.04.2005 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority viz., the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Madurai, passed in R.C.A.No.16 of 2001. 2. The Office of the Registry after scrutiny has returned the papers for compliance of certain returns. One among the queries in the return dated 05.07.2005 is that as to how the civil revision petition filed by the petitioners/tenants is maintainable as per Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, against the orders passed in R.C.A.No.16 of 2001 dated 01.04.2005, inasmuch as the same is filed beyond the time (30+30 days) as per the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. 3. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners/ tenants has complied with the returns made by the Registry and also answered in regard to the maintainability aspect stating that ‘as per endorsement in R.C.O.P and R.C.A certified copies of the civil revision petition is in time.’ 4.. In regard to the final return made by the Office on 29.01.2009, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners has stated that the civil revision petition filed under Section 25 of the Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is maintainable and that as per the endorsement made in the certified copies of R.C.O.P and R.C.A, the civil revision petition has been filed in time and if a combined calculation (R.C.O.P + R.C.A) will indicate that the civil revision petition is in time and already, necessary endorsements have been made to that effect in the returns 1 to 3, etc. and made a request that even after the said endorsement, if the Registry entertains a doubt, the matter may be posted before the Court for maintainability. 5. On the above background, the Registry has posted the civil revision petition in C.R.P.SR.No.21813 of 2005, for maintainability before this Court. 6. and made a request that even after the said endorsement, if the Registry entertains a doubt, the matter may be posted before the Court for maintainability. 5. On the above background, the Registry has posted the civil revision petition in C.R.P.SR.No.21813 of 2005, for maintainability before this Court. 6. The Registry is of the view that the fair and decreetal order in R.C.A.No.16 of 2001 are dated 01.04.2005 and that the copy application has been made only on 14.06.2005 after expiry of 74 days and that the civil revision petition has been filed on 01.07.2005 after lapse of 91 days and since there has been a delay of 74 days in filing the copy application, the combined calculation method has not been taken into account and hence, there is a delay of 61 days in preferring the civil revision petition, but Section 25 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, permits only a delay of 30 days. 7. In R.C.O.P.No.352 of 1988 on the file of the learned Principal District Munsif, Madurai Town, the order was passed on 04.07.2000. From the endorsement made on the certified copy of the decreetal order in R.C.O.P.No.352 of 1988, it is seen that the copy application has been made on 04.04.2005 and that the copy stamps have been called for on 23.05.2005 and that the copy stamps have been deposited on 25.05.2005 and the copies have been made ready on 03.06.2005 and the same has been delivered on 06.06.2005. 8. At this stage, it is pertinent to point out that in the certified copy of the decreetal order of R.C.A.No.16 of 2001 dated 01.04.2005, passed by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Madurai, an endorsement is seen to the effect that the copy application has been made on 14.06.2005 and that the copy stamps have been called for on 22.06.2005 and that copy stamps have been deposited on 24.06.2005 and the copy has bee made ready on 27.06.2005 and the copy has been delivered on 27.06.2005. 9. 9. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners/ tenants urges before this Court that the copy application in R.C.O.P.No.352 of 1988 has been filed on 04.04.2005 before the appellate Court and that in R.C.A.No.16 of 2001, the orders were passed on 01.04.2005 and in R.C.A.No.16 of 2001, the copy application has been filed on 14.06.2005 and that stamps have been called for on 22.06.2005 and that the stamps have been deposited on 24.06.2005 and that the copy has been made ready on 27.06.2005 and the same has been delivered on 27.06.2005 and therefore, if the endorsements made in the certified copy of the orders in R.C.O.P. and R.C.A, are taken into account, then the civil revision petition filed by the petitioners is in time. 10. The learned Counsel for the revision petitioners/ tenants, relies on the decision of this Court in T.I.Sultan Maideen v. Abdul Wahab and others reported in 1974 T.L.N.J 198 wherein it is inter alia held that the time taken for grant of copy of decree and that for the grant of copy of printed judgment has to be excluded and if it is so excluded, the appeal is in time. 11. He also relies on the decision of this Court in M.A.Rajarathnam v. J.Rajammal reported in 1982 T.L.N.J 138 at page 144 and 145, wherein it is held as follows: “We may now refer to the particular facts and circumstances in the instant case which have given rise to this reference by Swamikkannu, J. It appears from the record that the order of the Appellate Authority was made on 17th February, 1981. The revision petitioner applied for a certified copy of that order on 26th February, 1981. The copy was made ready on 22nd May, 1981. By this time the courts had closed for the summer vacation. The petitioner actually filed the revision in this Court on 22nd June 1981. The contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that although on the date of filing the revision petition the limitation period of 30 days had expired, still he is entitled to invoke the proviso to S.25(2) of the Rent Control Act and invoke the discretion of this Court for condoning the delay. The contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that although on the date of filing the revision petition the limitation period of 30 days had expired, still he is entitled to invoke the proviso to S.25(2) of the Rent Control Act and invoke the discretion of this Court for condoning the delay. It may be observed that this proviso put a ceiling on the power of this Court when it lays down that in no case shall the High Court extend the time beyond the period of 30 days from the end of the time-limit of one month fixed under S.25 of the Rent Control Act. In this case, however, it is common ground that if the time taken for obtaining certified copies is excluded by applying S.12 of the Limitation Act, then the further delay which the revision petitioner asks this Court to condone is within the period of 30 days laid down in the proviso to S.25(2) of the Rent Control Act. The objection of Mr.Rajappa is based on a different calculation. If S.12 of the Limitation Act is held not applicable, then, the filing of the application on 26th February, 1981 would exceed an aggregate of 60 days from the date of the order passed by the Appellate Authority. In that event according to Mr.Rajappa, the revision would be irredeemably barred by time. In the view we have held that S12 of the Limitation Act must be applied to petitions for Revision under S.25 delay in excess of 30 days does not arise. The delay, on such calculation, would be only 12 days. We did not hear much of argument from Mr.Rajappa on the question as to whether there was really sufficient cause for the 12 days delay which had occurred when the revision petitioner filed this revision on 22nd June 1981. In the affidavit in support of the petition the revision petitioner represents that he was engaged in celebrating his nephew’s marriage on the 11th June, 1981 at Tuticorin and immediately after the marriage because of ill-health which got aggravated by his exertions during the wedding, he had to undergo treatment under a medical practitioner. A certificate from the medical practitioner is part of the record. A certificate from the medical practitioner is part of the record. The explanation of the petitioner was that in his bad state of health, he could not undertake the long journey to Madras to hand over the papers to a lawyer for the purpose of filing the revision. We are satisfied that the explanation furnished by the petitioner for the delay of 12 days provides sufficient cause within the meaning of the proviso to S.25 (2) of the Rent Control Act. In the result, CMP No.6569 of 1981 is allowed.” 12. Continuing further, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners/tenants, brings it to the notice the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in India House v. Kishan N.Lalwani reported in (2003) 9 Supreme Court Cases 393, at page 394 whereby and whereunder, it is among other things observed that the Court’s power of condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for sufficient cause or qualified and limited by proviso to S.25(2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, under which revision is to be preferred within one month and further period only may be allowed by High Court and where the total time taken for filing revision applications on behalf of the respondent was 53 days, excluding the time taken for obtaining certified copy, held on facts, High Court had discretionary jurisdiction to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the exercise of the jurisdiction in favour of the respondent could not be faulted. 13. In this connection, this Court pertinently points out the decision in Kaspar Udayar v. M.V.R.Oorani Private Trust by its Managing trustee Ranganathan Chettiar and others reported in 1988 T.L.N.J 384, at page 388, wherein it is inter alia held that ‘as the appellate authority is the person empowered to certify the copy, the application therefore could well have been presented to him in the absence of the ministerial Officers. The contention that it was impossible for the petitioner to present an application for copies during the strike period is not sustainable and hence, that period cannot be excluded from computation of time etc.’ 14. The contention that it was impossible for the petitioner to present an application for copies during the strike period is not sustainable and hence, that period cannot be excluded from computation of time etc.’ 14. Further in the aforesaid decision, at page Nos.385 and 386, it is observed as follows: “In this case, there is no dispute that the order of the appellate Authority was communicated to the petitioner on 27-06-1988 as the order was pronounced in open Court after due notice. Hence, the revision could have been preferred in the normal course on or before 27-07-1988 and this Court could have granted further time till 26-08-1988 if the applicant had sufficient cause. But, in 95 LW 76 a Division Bench of this Court has held that S.12 of the Limitation Act will apply and the time requisite for obtaining certified copies of the order of the Appellate Authority shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation for filling revision petitions under Section 25 of the Act. By excluding the time taken by the Court for granting certified copies, viz., the period between 04-08-1988 and 17-08-1988 and (both days inclusive) the delay in filing the revision has been calculated to be 33 days by the petitioner. The maximum period which the Court has repeatedly held that the Court has no power to condone delay beyond the period of thirty days. Recently, I had occasion to reiterate the position after tracing the entire case-law-on-the subject in CRP.Sr.Nos.56119 and 56121 of 1986, and CMPSR.Nos.56123 of 1986, 85587 and 85590 of 1987 by order dated 01-08-1988. In view of the settled position in law, the Registry has questioned the maintainability of the petition and posted the matter for orders. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that on account of the strike by the entire staff of the subordinate Courts between 22-06-1988 and 25-07-1988, the Court must be deemed to have been closed and that period must be excluded from the computation of limitation. There is a factual error in the dates mentioned by learned counsel as the strike was from 27-06-1988 to 21-07-1988. Apart from that, both parts of the contention are fallacious. The Courts cannot be deemed to have been closed during the strike period for the simple reason that the presiding judicial officers were attending Courts and they did not abstain from work. Apart from that, both parts of the contention are fallacious. The Courts cannot be deemed to have been closed during the strike period for the simple reason that the presiding judicial officers were attending Courts and they did not abstain from work. The judicial officers were receiving the papers presented and keeping them in Court though they could not pass orders thereon. In fact the order sought to be revised was passed during the strike period which itself shows that the Appellate Authority was attending Court. Under the explanation to Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a Court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of the Section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the Court was closed between 27-06-1988 and 21-07-1988.” 15. In short, in the aforesaid decision, it is held that ‘as per Section 25(2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, there is no power to condone the delay beyond the period of thirty days. 16. Added further, in the decision in India House v. Kishan N.Lalwani reported in (2003) 9 Supreme Court Cases 393, at page 400, in paragraph No.11, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as follows: “11. So far as the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, the power of the court to extend the prescribed period of limitation on the ground of availability of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, stands circumscribed by the limitation imposed on the power of the High Court by the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act. The discretionary power to condone the delay in filing the revision can be exercised for condoning any delay which does not exceed one month over and above the period liable to be excluded from computing the period of limitation by reference to Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.” 17. This Court recalls the observation made in the decision in Pattanswami v. Amirtha Jothi reported in AIR 1997 MADRAS 308, wherein this Court has held that ‘Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application at all to the revisions filed under Section 25 of the Act. This Court recalls the observation made in the decision in Pattanswami v. Amirtha Jothi reported in AIR 1997 MADRAS 308, wherein this Court has held that ‘Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application at all to the revisions filed under Section 25 of the Act. Section 25 of the Act, provides for a period of one month for filing a revision and the maximum period which is liable to be condoned is only one month under the provisions to Section 25(2) of the Act. The proviso is to be given effect to the period of delay exceeding the period of one month is not liable to be excused and under the Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied to a revision petition filed in the High Court under Section 25 of the Act because Section 5 of the Limitation Act has impliedly excluded by prescribing special period of limitation. Section 25 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, itself contemplates the express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 18. In the decision of this Court in M/s.M.M.Handalappa, A.G.Balasubramania Mudaliar and Company v. M/s.H.G.Krishna Reddy and Company reported in 1984 (1) M.L.J.85, this Court has held as follows: “The proviso to Section 25(2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, confers a discretion in the High Court to allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing of any such application, it is satisfied that the applicant has sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time-limit of one month, as specified in that sub-section. This provision, being similar to what has come up before the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax-vs-Parson Tools(1975) 4 SCC 23; AIR 1975 SC 1039 and Mohd.Ashfaq –vs- State of U.P., (1976) 4 SCC 330 ; AIR 1976 SC 2161 , it is held that when such express exclusion is in-built in the proviso to section 25 (2), Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable and hence the petition filed to condone the delay is dismissed.” 19. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners has made a reference to Order IV Rules 20 and 21 of the Rules of the High Court Madras, Appellate Side, 1965, which run as follows: 20. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners has made a reference to Order IV Rules 20 and 21 of the Rules of the High Court Madras, Appellate Side, 1965, which run as follows: 20. Civil revision petitions shall be presented within such time as is prescribed by any enactment. Where no period of limitation is prescribed, the civil revision petition shall be presented within ninety days of the order complained of or within such further time as the Court may, on an application made for the purpose, allow. The provisions of Sec.12 of the Limitation Act shall apply in computing the said period of ninety days. 21. Civil revision petitions under Sec.115 of the Code or any other enactment shall be accompanied by (1) a certified copy of the decree or order which is to be revised. (2) a certified copy of the judgment, if any, on which decree is based, (3) a certified copy of the judgment or order, if any, or the Court or tribunal of the first instance, (4) one set of additional typewritten copies of the judgments and orders referred to above, [(5) as many clear authenticated copies on plain paper of the memorandum of grounds on the revision petition as there are respondents to be served, together with another such copy for the Court record; (6) the particulars for service of notices on the respondents set out in From No.2 of the Schedule to these rules; and (7) the fees prescribed for service of such notices on the respondents.]” 20. No wonder, a revision petition projected against the order of the appellate authority under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is indeed proceeding under the Act. Resultantly, Rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1974 applies to such proceedings. 21. It is an axiomatic fact that by virtue of sub-section 2 of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, the provisions of Section 12 are applicable for computing the period of limitation prescribed by any special or legal law. The period of limitation statutorily fixed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed from for equitable consideration. It is an axiomatic fact that by virtue of sub-section 2 of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, the provisions of Section 12 are applicable for computing the period of limitation prescribed by any special or legal law. The period of limitation statutorily fixed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed from for equitable consideration. However, one cannot brush aside a vital fact that full effect is to be given to those provisions which permit relaxation or extension in computing the period of limitation based on the facts and circumstances of the case. In view of the fact that Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands circumscribed by the limitation imposed on the power of the High Court by proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act, the discretionary power to condone the delay in filing the revision can be exercised for condoning any delay which does not exceed one month over and above the period liable to be excluded from computing the period of limitation by reference to Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. 22. One significant fact which is to be noticed is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act squarely applies to section 23 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Whereas Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 stands circumscribed by limitation imposed on the power of the High Court by proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act. 23. It is useful to refer to Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which enjoins as follows: “25.(1) The High Court may, on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the Appellate Authority, call for and examine the record of the Appellate Authority, to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly. (2) Every application to the High Court for the exercise of its power under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within one month from the date on which the order or proceeding to which the application relates is communicated to the applicant: Provided that the High Court may, in its discretion, allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing of any such application, if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time specified in this sub-section.” 24. In the present case on hand, admittedly, the orders have been passed in R.C.A.No.16 of 2001 by the learned Principal Sub Judge, Madurai, (the appellate authority) on 01.04.2005, but the copy application has been made only on 14.06.2005. Thus, the revision petitioners have filed the copy application after the delay of 74 days beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Therefore, the Benefit of combined calculation method by taking umbrage of the fact that the copy application has been filed in R.C.O.P. No. 352 of 1988 on 04.04.2005, will not accrue to the revision petitioners, in the considered opinion of this Court. 25. At this stage, this Court aptly points out the legal maxim “Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossiblia” viz., the law does not compel the impossible would apply and in that view of the matter, this Court comes to the inevitable conclusion that the civil revision petition in C.R.P.SR.No.23813 of 2005 is not maintainable and the same is hereby rejected. Accordingly, the point is answered.