Judgment The petitioners are defendant in O.S.C.F.R.No.6655 of 2007 on the file of the Sub Court, Dharapuram. Plaintiffs/respondents filed the suit with respect to Trust property praying the Court to pass decree as follows: (a) framing a scheme for administration of the endowments made by the plaintiffs’ ancestors and endowed properties. (b) for appointing trustees and administer and manage endowed properties. (c) removing of the defendants 1 to 4 from de facto trusteeship of the endowments created toy plaintiffs ancestors. (d) directing the defendants 1 to 4 to deliver possession of items 1 to 3 described in the schedule A to the plaintiffs; (e) dealing that the sale of B Schedule Property effected by the defendants 1 to 3 in favour of the defendants 6 to 8 is not valid and binding on the plaintiffs and as a consequential relief, directing the defendants 6 to 8 deliver possession of item B Schedule described in the schedule to the plaintiffs; (f) granting permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 4 and 6 to 8 from dealing with the property by way of alienation or otherwise. 2. They also filed application In I.A.No.311 of 2007 under section 92 of C.P.C. with a prayer to grant leave to them to file the suit. 3. In the affidavit, they have stated that they are interested in performance of charities created by their ancestors and being the suit pertaining to the public trust and charities, they seek leave of the Court to institute the above suit in a representative capacity. They say that the suit is based upon a deed of trust dated 16. 1933, which is a Partition Deed between Vena Udayar Gounder, Kuppusamy Gounder and Periasamy Gounder, sons of Vena Udayar Gounder of Sankarandampalayam in Dharapuram Taluk. The petitioners were served with notice and they have also filed counter contending inter alia that the petitioners after Kumara Rathina Vena Udayar did not possess properties nor he performed any charities and one Nallammal was enjoying the properties, that the present respondents are not empowered to represent Vena Udayar Community and that Nallammal and her legal heirs alone have been performing the charities and hence the petition has to be dismissed. 4. 4. The learned Sub-Judge on detailed enquiry, after hearing both parties has passed an order, touching the merits of the case also, dismissing the application by observing that nucleus of property was not dedicated and only the income from the properties was offered for charity and by no stretch of imagination, Venadar Trust can be described as public trust and it cannot come within the purview of Section 92 of C.P.C. and the suit is for vindicating the personal dispute between the parties and that Venadar Trust has no ingredients of the public trust and it is only a private trust. 5. The respondents carry the matter in appeal in C.M.A.No.14 of 2009 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Erode, and they have also filed petition in I.A. No.48 of 2009 under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 and Section 151 of C.P.C., for granting a temporary injunction restraining the respondents, their men, agents, assigns, and successors in interest from any manner interfering with the petitioners and the beneficiaries i.e., pilgrims who are coming to the Palani Hills and utilising the Madam in item 3 of A schedule property mentioned in the petition for their stay and to perform Theerthakaavadi Abishekam and to have their food which have been performed from inception of the said Madam (Chathiram) at the Madam and other Schedule mentioned properties till the disposal of main Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and may also grant an ad interim injunction. 6. On 13. 2009, the matter was taken on file before the Court and the learned Principal District Judge passed an order of ex parte interim injunction with reference to item 3 of ‘A’ Schedule “Madam” property till 33. 2009 and of status quo be maintained as regards other items and also ordered notice to the respondents returnable by 33. 2009. Since lawyers boycotted the Courts, the respondents appeared before the Court represented and the above said order was passed. On 33. 2009 R1, R2, and R4 were presented and counter of R2 was filed. For counter of others and awaiting process of other respondents, matter was posted to 14. 2009 and on memo, Interim Order was extended. The following are the orders of the Court dated 13. 2009 and 33. 2009. “13. 2009 Petitioner appeared in person and argued. Impugned order of trial Court perused. For counter of others and awaiting process of other respondents, matter was posted to 14. 2009 and on memo, Interim Order was extended. The following are the orders of the Court dated 13. 2009 and 33. 2009. “13. 2009 Petitioner appeared in person and argued. Impugned order of trial Court perused. There, is prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the petitioners. Hence ad interim injunction is granted regarding item No.3 of ‘A’ Schedule (Madam) Property only till 33. 2009 status quo shall be maintained regarding other items of A & B Schedule properties till 33. 2009. Notice to respondents by them call on 33. 2009. 33. 2009. R1, R3 and R5 to R8 notice not yet received. R3 and R4 served. R1, R2 and R4. Counter of R2 filed. Counter of R1, R4 and await process of others. Call on 14. 2009. On memo, I.O. extended.” 7. This Court is of the view that in this juncture there is no need to embark upon any discussion regarding the merits of: the case nor the orders passed in I.A. No.311 of 2007. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution and the attention of this Court is focused to two aspects viz., the propriety of the lower appellate Court to pass interim injunction and the manner of passing the order and power of the High Court in these matters to interfere, exercising supervisory power. 8. In the civil revision petition the date of the impugned order has been typed as 20.2.2009. A memo has been filed on behalf of the petitioners stating that the date has been wrongly typed as 20.2.2009 instead of 13. 2009 which is a typographical error committed due to oversight and hence the petitioners may be permitted to amend the date as 13. 2009 instead of 20.2.2009. Memo is accepted. 9. Mr. W. Manokaran, learned counsel for the petitioners would strenuously contend that the order passed by the Court on 13. 2009 which is a typographical error committed due to oversight and hence the petitioners may be permitted to amend the date as 13. 2009 instead of 20.2.2009. Memo is accepted. 9. Mr. W. Manokaran, learned counsel for the petitioners would strenuously contend that the order passed by the Court on 13. 2009 does not conform to the statutory requirements as adumbrated in Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C., that the order does not contain any reason for grant of the interim injunction, inasmuch as the petition under Section 92 was discussed in detail by the trial Court and there is no suit pending on the file of trial Court, and grant of interim injunction by the appellate Court is not in accordance with law and that settled legal propositions would indicate that the High Court is empowered to interfere with the orders passed by the subordinate Court while they transgress powers and hence the orders passed by the Court below have necessarily to be set aside. 10. Arguing on the other side of the coin, Mr. M.S. Krishnan, learned senior counsel would submit that even if it is considered that the orders challenged, does not contain any reasons for grant of the interim injunction, still it is not open to the petitioners to seek remedy before this Court invoking supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, but they have to move the same Court for remedy either to vacate the interim injunction order or to agitate the merits of the matter before it and have the order set aside or to prefer appeal. 11. It is his further contention that a legal duty is case upon the Courts to take every endeavour to dispose of the Interlocutory Applications, where ad interim injunction was granted and if it could not be done within 30 days, it is for the Court to record its reasons for not having disposed of the matter. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed much reliance upon a decision of this Court in Managing Director M/s. Makka Tholai Thodarpu Kuzhumam Ltd. V. Mrs. V. Muthulakshmi 2007 (4) LW 942 in which the learned Judge while dealing with the powers of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, has referred to decisions of the Supreme Court, followed them and ultimately observed thus: “33. V. Muthulakshmi 2007 (4) LW 942 in which the learned Judge while dealing with the powers of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, has referred to decisions of the Supreme Court, followed them and ultimately observed thus: “33. In view of the above said legal position and on referring to the impugned order passed by the First Appellate Judge, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the order is liable to be set aside. The learned Judge, having heard the interlocutory application, especially in the circumstances when the trial Court has a detailed discussion elaborately and dismissed the interlocutory application, the learned First Appellate Judge has chosen to pass a cryptic order in one line stating that there should be injunction on the basis that there is apprehension.” 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner also says that this petition also comes in an identical circumstance wherein a detailed order was passed by the Trial Court, but the First Appellate Court has passed cryptic order in one line stating that balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioners (the respondents herein). While the order dated 13. 2009 is looked into, it does not contain any reasons. 14. In the above said decision, a decision of Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai V. Ram Chander Rai and Others 2003 (4) CTC 176 has been followed. This decision was also cited by the learned senior counsel for the respondents, in which Their Lordships have observed that the supervisory jurisdiction may be refused, to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. It is further held as follows: “25. ………………. So long as an error is capable of being corrected by a superior Court in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, though available to be exercised only at the conclusion of the proceedings, it would be sound exercise of discretion on the part of the High Court to refuse to exercise the power of superintendence during the pendency of the proceedings. However, there may be cases where but for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction, the jurisdictional error committed by the inferior Court or Tribunal would be incapable of being remedied once the proceedings have concluded.” “33. However, there may be cases where but for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction, the jurisdictional error committed by the inferior Court or Tribunal would be incapable of being remedied once the proceedings have concluded.” “33. We are of the opinion that the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court does not take away – and could not have taken away - the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari to a civil Court nor is the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution taken away or whittled down. The power exists untrammelled by the amendment in Section 115 C.P.C., and is available to be exercised subject to rules of self-discipline and practice which are well settled.” 37. (1) ………………………………………… (2) ……………………………………………. (3) ………………………………………….. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) ……………………………………………. (6) ……………………………………………. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above-said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.” “38. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227of the constitution cannot, be tied down in a strait-jacket formula or rigid rules. Not less than often, the High Court would be faced with a dilemma. If it intervenes in pending proceedings there is bound to be delay in termination of proceedings. If it does not intervener the error of the moment may earn immunity from correction. The facts and circumstances of a given case may make it more appropriate for the High Court to exercise self-restraint and not to intervene because the error of jurisdiction though committed is yet capable of being taken care of and corrected at a later stage and the wrong done, if any, would be set right and rights and equities adjusted in appeal or revision preferred at the conclusion of the proceedings. But there may be cases where “a stitch in time would save nine.” At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the judge.” 15. The Supreme Court has concluded, formulating principles to be followed by the High Court in the matter of exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution by holding that, power is there but the exercise is discretionary, which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial experience. 16. As far as the circumstances prevailing in this matter are concerned firstly there is no suit pending before the Trial Court and in such a situation, the Appellate Court granted ad interim injunction in a cryptic manner without furnishing any reasons and hence it has to be observed that jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted in law, as per the decision of the Supreme Court and hence the High Court may step into exercising its supervisory jurisdiction. 17. 17. The decision of the Apex Court also goes to the effect that if the High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty or justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. 18. Learned senior counsel for the respondents garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court in Ajay Bansal V. Anup Mehta and Others 2007 (3) CTC 604 in which it is held as follows: “13. Ordinarily, an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would not be maintainable where an Appeal lies. An appeal lay from the decree under Section 96 of the Code. When an appeal could be filed ordinarily, an Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would not be entertained.” 19. It is his bottom line contention that when a remedy of appeal is available to the petitioners, they cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. He also cited another decision of the Supreme Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Challappan and Others 2000 (4) CTC 358 in which Their Lordships have held thus: “18. Now what remains is the question whether the High Court should have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution when the party had two other alterative remedies. Though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of the constitutional powers of the High Court it is a well-recognition principle which gained judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedies one or the other before he resorts to a constitutional remedy. Learned single Judge need not have entertained the revision petition at all and the party affected by the interim ex parte order should have been directed to resort to one of the other remedies. Be that as it may, now it is idle to embark on that aspect as the High Court had chosen to entertain the revision petition.” 20. Learned single Judge need not have entertained the revision petition at all and the party affected by the interim ex parte order should have been directed to resort to one of the other remedies. Be that as it may, now it is idle to embark on that aspect as the High Court had chosen to entertain the revision petition.” 20. The learned senior counsel for the respondents also draws attention of this Court to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Share Holders’ Welfare Association v. Reserve Bank of India 2008 (4) CTC 776 wherein this Court has come down heavily on the attitude of the party who moved a contempt petition without disclosing any of the earlier facts relevant to the matter and obtained an order and the same has been described as forum-shopping. The said Judgment was challenged before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court confirmed the above said order and the Judgment of the Supreme Court has been in Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Share Holders’ Welfare Association v. S.C. Sekar and Others (supra). In view of this Court, no such circumstance as regards suppression of material facts, are available in the case on hand. 21. The learned senior counsel also relies upon another decision of this Court in M. Loganathan and 15 Others v. Mariyayeeammal 2009 (1) CTC 620 in which this Court followed the principles in Surya Dev Rai V. Ram Chander Rai and Others (Supra). 22. In Surya Dev Rai. V. Ram Chander Rai & Others (Supra) case, the Supreme Court has held that as per Rule 3-A to Order 39, when an ex parte interim injunction order was passed against the respondent, the Court shall make every endeavour for final disposal of the application within 30 days and if it is unable to do so, it has to record reasons for such inability. Pointing out this principle, the learned senior counsel would argue that the order was passed on 13. 2009 and 30 days from the said date has not been reached and hence there is no occasion for the appellate Court to record any reasons and it is for the petitioners to co-operate with the Court to complete the enquiry. 23. After an ex parte interim injunction order was passed on 13. 2009, these petitioners appeared on the next date of hearing on 33. 23. After an ex parte interim injunction order was passed on 13. 2009, these petitioners appeared on the next date of hearing on 33. 2009 and respondents/petitioners 1, 2 and 4 were present and counter of R2 was filed. But the Court extended the interim order till 14. 2009 awaiting the process of other respondents. Both the learned counsel would say that, arguments were advanced on the strength of the counter before the Appellate Court. But it was not recorded and the interim order was extended. There is no wrong on the part of the Court to await, process of others but when the counter of R2 was filed and arguments were advanced on the basis of the contention in the counter, it is incumbent upon the Court to advert to the merits of the matter to some extent and then to decide extension of the interim order. It is not necessary to go into the merits of the case. Reference of certain sentences in the counter is worth mentioning here: “During the year 2003 the 2nd respondent performed the above Mandala Padi by paying Rs.2,000/- and their authorities have a receipt for the same bearing number 019376 dated 3. 2008 is producing herewith for the current year a sum of Rs.2,000/-paid for the above said Kattalai to Arulmigu Dhandayuthapani Swami Thirukovil and the receipt is filed herewith likewise, the previous receipts also produced herewith.” When such allegations which are supposed to be supported by certain documents, the Court below should have looked into it. 24. In the considered opinion of this Court, the aptness of the orders passed by the Court on 13. 2009 and 33. 2009 have to be gauged and it has to be observed that this Court has to interfere with those orders under the supervisory jurisdiction, as per the cardinal principles settled by the Honourable Supreme Court contained in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others (supra). The errors which occurred in the said orders of the Court below require correction and hence intervention of this Court is inevitable. In such view of this matter, the orders challenged before this Court are liable to be set aside and accordingly they are set aside. The Civil Revision Petition deserves to be allowed. 25. In fine, civil revision petition is allowed. No costs. Connected M.P. is closed. In such view of this matter, the orders challenged before this Court are liable to be set aside and accordingly they are set aside. The Civil Revision Petition deserves to be allowed. 25. In fine, civil revision petition is allowed. No costs. Connected M.P. is closed. It is made clear that at the time of disposal of I.A. No.48 of 2009 the Appellate Court shall not get influenced by any of the observations made in this order.