JUDGEMENT 1. The petitioner seeks a direction for quashing of the order dated 18.7.2005 as contained in memo no. 1681 dated 3.11.2005 (Annexure-11) issued under the signature of the Joint Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Government of Bihar by which the application of the petitioner for renewal of its lease has been rejected and the lease has been cancelled and the authorities have been directed to take steps for resumption of the concerned land, as also the letter bearing memo no. 888 dated 12.11.2007 (Annexure-13) issued by the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms-cum-Khas Mahal Officer, Sadar Ara whereby the petitioner has been directed to pay an amount of Rs. 52,50,000/- for using the land for commercial purpose for a period of seven years in an unauthorized manner and also directing the petitioner to vacate the land forthwith. 2. The short facts leading up to the present writ petition are that the petitioner, Arrah Montessori School was established in the year 1968 and was duly registered alongwith its Regulations and Memorandum of Association under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 on 7.3.1968. It applied to the Government of Bihar for grant of land for educational purpose for establishing a Montessori School at Ara. By memo no. 4/KM 1-3085/70 5383/R dated 21.9.1970 (Annexure-1) the Government of Bihar in the Revenue Department sanctioned settlement of 94 decimals of Gov- ernment land in Arrah Town, Plot No. 2200, Khata No. 1766 in the district of Shahabad for the construction of the building of the proposed Montessori school at Arrah for a period of 30 years with the option of renewal free of salami but at a nominal rent of Rs. 50/- per year (excluding cess), subject to the condition that the land will revert to the Revenue Department if and when no longer required for the purpose. It was also laid down in the said letter of grant that the lessee will have to execute an agreement in the prescribed terms of the Government Khas Mahal Manual, 1953 within a period of three months with effect from the date of issue of the order failing which the settlement order was liable to be cancelled. The letter of grant further mentions that the Accountant General of Bihar had been informed about the same. The letter of grant further mentions that the Accountant General of Bihar had been informed about the same. Pursuant to the same the agreement dated 16.12.1970 was executed between the Governor of Bihar as the Grantor and the Secretary of the Arrah Montessori School as the Grantee laying down the terms and conditions of the lease. 3. Thereafter the school was established and continued to run in the buildings constructed on the said land. It is the stand of the petitioner that the Collector at the relevant time was the Chairman of the Managing Committee of the School and at the meeting of the Managing Committee dated 12.10.1971 it was resolved in terms of the Government grant that there would be a Building Construction Sub-Committee headed by the Collector which would perform all functions relating to construction of building. The said resolution dated 12.10.1997 is Annexure-15 to the writ petition. It is the case of the petitioner that the school has been functioning till Class-VI and it was proposed to extend the educational level from Class-VII to Class-XII. 4. On 19.5.2000 the petitioner-School exercised its option for renewal under the terms of the Government grant dated 21.9.1970 by filing an application for renewal of the grant on the same terms and conditions for a further period of thirty years. The said application was duly forwarded by the District Magistrate, Ara with his recommendation for renewal. In the meantime it appears that rent and cess had not been paid. The petitioner approached the Additional Collector. Ara on 19.6.2000 for issuance of a direction for acceptance of arrears of rent and by his memo no. 709 dated 22.6.2000, the Additional Collector directed the Circle Officer, Arrah to accept arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 50/- per year and accordingly the same was deposited by the petitioner and accepted by the authorities under receipt dated 8.7.2000. It is the further case of the petitioner that the District Collector by his memo no. 1146 dated 18.8.2000 directed that the renewal be granted and completed before 15.9.2000 and when nothing was done, again a letter contained in memo no. 7 dated 10.1.2001 was issued from the Collectorate to the Circle Officer, Arrah to complete the process of renewal. However, no such renewal was made and suddenly by letter no. 1146 dated 18.8.2000 directed that the renewal be granted and completed before 15.9.2000 and when nothing was done, again a letter contained in memo no. 7 dated 10.1.2001 was issued from the Collectorate to the Circle Officer, Arrah to complete the process of renewal. However, no such renewal was made and suddenly by letter no. 264 dated 6.2.2004 issued by the Additional Collector, Bhojpur, Arrah the petitioner was directed to show cause regarding the non-compliance of certain terms and conditions of the lease regarding the non-payment of the rent and cess in time and payment of the same in lump sum on 8.7.2000 at the time of end of the period of lease, for which he was liable to pay 12% interest and penal rent over the same and further regarding construction of two buildings from MLC fund for which prior permission of the Collector was not taken and non-payment of Municipal taxes, all of which were in violation of the terms of lease. The petitioner was further informed that the Circle Officer/ Deputy Collector, Land Reforms had recommended charging of five per cent commercial rent per annum for renewal on fresh terms and conditions for which its consent was sought. 5. The petitioner gave his reply to the same stating that none of the terms and conditions of the lease had been violated and that all constructions had been made for the purpose of the school under the Chairmanship of the Collector and rent had been deposited as per the directions of the District Magistrate. It was further asserted that the school was run on non-commercial basis and again requested that the process of lease be completed. However, without considering the same the Additional Collector sent another letter dated 5.3.2004 asking why for non-compliance of the condition of renewal of lease and the provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual action should not be taken in terms of para-8(kha) of the letter no. 1614 dated 15.4.1999 of the Revenue and Land Reforms Department and a civil suit for eviction be not filed against it. 1614 dated 15.4.1999 of the Revenue and Land Reforms Department and a civil suit for eviction be not filed against it. The petitioner in reply stated that the case of the petitioner comes under the provisions of para 8(ka) of the Government letter dated 15.4.1999 and not within sub-para (kha) as the petitioner had applied for renewal before the expiry of period and rent had also been deposited without objection before the expiry of the lease and again requested for renewal of lease on 11.3.2004. 6. Thereafter by the impugned letter dated 18.7.2005 as contained in memo no. 1681 dated 3.11.2005, the petitioner was informed that the State Government had rejected its application for renewal of lease and had decided to cancel its lease. Subsequently by the further impugned letter dated 12.11.2007 (Annexure-13) of the Deputy Collector-cum-Khas Mahal Officer, Ara, the petitioner has been directed to pay rent amounting to Rs. 51,50,000/- for commercial use of the land for seven years after the expiry of the period of lease. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the authorities and its representations in this regard not being heeded to, the petitioner has come to this Court. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is cryptic and non-speaking and no reason has been assigned for rejecting the claim of the petitioner. It is stated that under Clause 10 of the lease agreement dated 16.12.1970 it was provided that on the question of breach or non-observance of any terms and conditions of the agreement, the Collector shall be the sole Judge and an order of the Collector declaring that there has been a breach or non-observance of the same shall be final and conclusive proof of such breach or non-observance between the parties. It is urged by learned counsel that during the entire period of lease no such order was passed by the Collector rather the delay in payment of lease money had been condoned by issuance of an order to accept the unpaid amount of rent and cess and the same was also duly paid before the completion of period of lease and thus the authorities are estopped from raising such pleas. It is further submitted that not only the Collector has not passed any order regarding such breach having been committed, rather he had recommended the renewal of the lease. 8. It is further submitted that not only the Collector has not passed any order regarding such breach having been committed, rather he had recommended the renewal of the lease. 8. It is further contended by learned counsel that for the first time in the counter affidavit the stand has been taken that the school had been established for imparting education to the children from age group of 2 to 6 years but the terms and conditions have been utterly violated by the petitioner and they are imparting education up to 10th Class of the higher age group and the further stand has been taken that they have not complied with the other conditions in their Memorandum of Association under the Societies Registration Act regarding the provisions of various other facilities and on the other hand are running the school on a commercial basis by charging very high fees which are not affordable by poor and needy persons but only by rich people. It is argued by learned counsel that it was no part of the grant or agreement as to what fee will be charged by the Institution or that each and every aim and object laid down in the Memorandum of Association have to be complied with. It is urged by learned counsel that, as a matter of fact, the school is run only till Class-VI and there is only a proposal to extend the same to higher Classes. 9. Learned counsel further submits that the stand taken in the counter affidavit that the State Government has acted on the basis of the report received from the various Officers and the Flying Squad of the Government who had reported regarding the school running on profit and realizing high fees and using the school premises for other purposes including construction of shops and inviting people to contact to take on lease the shops, are all reasons which neither find place in the order passed by the Government nor with respect to which any show cause was issued by or under the direction of the Government to the petitioner. It is submitted that it is not open to the authorities to act upon any report or enquiry made behind the back of the petitioner without at the very least issuing a show cause to the petitioner after supplying it with the copies of the report so that the petitioner could have met the same. 10. It is urged by learned counsel that since none of the reasons have been mentioned in the impugned order dated 3.11.2005, it is not open to the respondents to add to the reasons while filing their counter affidavit in Court. 11. Learned counsel also submits that the right of renewal is their valuable right and the same flows both under the terms of the grant and the provisions of Khas Mahal Manual. The respondents having accepted the lease money and till the date of renewal of the lease not taken any action for eviction on the ground of violation of terms and conditions of the lease, they are estopped from taking any such plea at the time of renewal. In support of the said proposition learned counsel relies upon three decisions of this Court, the first being the case of Deba Jyoti Dutta and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Others:1988 PLJR 440, in para nos. 18 to 20 of which it has been held as follows: "18. It may be mentioned here that from the Khas Mahal Manual as also the terms of the lease it appears that the right of renewal conferred upon the lessee is a very valuable right and the renewal of lease is to be granted almost automatically unless and until the lessee is guilty of violation of the condition of lease or any of the provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual. 19. It is now well known in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in D. Nataraja Mundeliyar vs. State Transport Authority, Madras, AIR 1979 SC 114 that the right of renewal is a very valuable right. 20. From the order sheet as contained in Annexure-6 to the writ petition it is evident that although a notice for cancellation of the lease was proposed to be issued, no such notice in fact was issued for the petitioners at any point of time and they were not apprised as to what condition or conditions of the lease has been violated by them. The petitioners were, to say the least, entitled to the minimal requirement of the principles of natural justice. The respondents evidently did not consider the right of the petitioners get their lease renewal objectively." 12. The same view has been reiterated in the case of Manmohan Lal Bhagat vs. State of Bihar and Others and analogous cases reported in 1988 PLJR 12. He also relies upon a decision of this Court in the case of Rajat Nath Roy and Another vs. State of Bihar & Ors.: 1993(2) PLJR 348, in para-58 of which it has been held as follows: "The State either during the period when the application for renewal was pending or even in this proceeding did not make any allegation that the petitioners are guilty of the violation of the conditions of lease or the provisions of Khas Mahal Manual. No reason has been assigned as to why leases granted in favour of the petitioners or their predecessor in interest would not be renewed. No case for resumption of the leasehold properties have also been made out. In this situation in the facts and circumstances of this case, it must be held that the petitioners are entitled to a direction In the nature of mandamus commanding upon the respondent- Deputy Commissioner to renew the instrument of lease, details whereof have been given hereinbefore, subject, of course, to payment of enhanced rent In terms of instruments of lease." 13. It is also submitted by learned counsel that as per the lease agreement the purpose of the grant was educational purpose and not merely for the establishment of Montessori School which was merely the name of the school in question. It is submitted by him that under the rules of interpretation a strict interpretation of the document of grant has to be made against the grantor as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgarh Shah vs. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb and Others: AIR 1960 SC 953 , in para-13 in the following terms: "The correctness of these principles is too well established by authorities to justify any detailed discussion. The task being to ascertain the intention of the parties the cases have laid down that that intention has to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves. The task being to ascertain the intention of the parties the cases have laid down that that intention has to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves. In doing so the parties must be presumed to have used the words in their strict grammatical sense. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later clause. Where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the Court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantors document it has to be Interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee." 14. Learned counsel also relies upon the decision of this Court In the case of Nazareth Academy, Gaya vs. State of Bihar & Anr.: 2003(2) PLJR 509 . in which It was held that educational purpose Is not a commercial purpose. 15. Learned Additional Advocate General No. 3 appearing for the State, on the other hand, submits that the rights and liabilities of the petitioner are governed solely by the lease agreement dated 16.12.1970 and not the order of grant dated 21.9.1970 and the said lease agreement does not contain any provision for renewal. Thus, it is submitted that the case of the petitioner must fail on the said count alone and since it has no right of renewal in terms of the lease agreement, the various decisions relied upon by it cannot be of any avail to it. In this regard he relies upon the provisions of Section 2 of the Government Grants Act. 1895 and Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which are in the following terms: "Section 2 of the Government Grants Act. 1895. In this regard he relies upon the provisions of Section 2 of the Government Grants Act. 1895 and Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which are in the following terms: "Section 2 of the Government Grants Act. 1895. "Transfer of Property Act, 1882, not to apply to Government grants.Nothing in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, contained shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein heretofore made or hereafter to be made by or on behalf of the Government to or in favour of, any person whomsoever, but every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed." Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 "Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document. When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document Itself, or secondary evidence of its contents In cases In which secondary evidence Is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained. Exception 7.When a public officer is required by law to be appointed in writing, and when it is shown that any particular person has acted as such officer, the writing by which he is appointed need not be proved. Exception 2.Wills admitted to probate in India may be proved by the probate. Explanation 1.This Section applies equally to cases in which the contracts, grants or dispositions of property referred to are contained in more documents than one. Explanation 2.Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved. Explanation 3.The statement, in any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact." 16. Explanation 2.Where there are more originals than one, one original only need be proved. Explanation 3.The statement, in any document whatever, of a fact other than the facts referred to in this section, shall not preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact." 16. It is thus submitted by learned counsel on the strength of the aforesaid provisions that the Transfer of Property Act can have no application to a Government grant and since the terms of the grant have been reduced to the form of the lease agreement dated 16.12.1970 that is the document which governs the rights and liabilities of the parties. On the basis of the said document learned Additional Advocate General submits that the petitioner having no legal right to renewal, it cannot be permitted to seek a writ of mandamus from this Court since for the issuance of the same the petitioner must show existence of legal right in its favour and corresponding legal obligation of the State-respondents to compel them to renew. In support of the same, learned counsel relies upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court In the case of State of Orissa vs. Ram Chandra Dev and Another: AIR 1964 SC 685 , In paras 8, 11 and 12 of which it has been held as follows: "8. On the merits, the position is absolutely clear. Under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court is undoubtedly very wide. Appropriate writs can be issued by the High Court under the said article even for purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights and in that sense, a party who invokes the special jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 is not confined to cases of illegal invasion of his fundamental rights alone. But though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 is wide in that sense, the concluding words of the article clearly indicate that before a writ or an appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party, it must be established that the party has a right and the said right is illegally invaded or threatened. The existence of a right is thus the foundation of a petition under Art. 226. The existence of a right is thus the foundation of a petition under Art. 226. The narrow question which falls for our decision in the present appeals is whether the respondents can be said to have proved any legal right in respect of the properties of which they apprehended they would be dispossessed by the appellant." "11. As we have already observed, the High Court did not embark upon the enquiry as to title in the present proceedings, because that is a question which may be appropriately tried in a regular suit. In proceeding to issue a writ in favour of the respondents, the High Court, however, appears to have assumed that the appellant was not entitled to seek to recover possession of the properties after resuming the grants in question. Whether or not the grants in question are resumable, and if they are, whether or not the appellant can recover possession without filing a suit, are questions on which we propose to express no opinion in the present appeals. Ordinarily, where property has been granted by the State on conditions which make the grant resumable, after resumption it is the grantee who moves the Court for appropriate relief, and that proceeds on the basis that the grantor State which has reserved to itself the right to resume may, after exercising its right, seek to recover possession of the property without filing a suit. But apart from this aspect of the matter, it is difficult to see how the High Court was justified in issuing the writ in the present appeals the inevitable consequence of which would be that the respondents would remain in possession of the property until the appellant files a suit against them; and that, in our opinion, would not be justified unless questions of title are determined and it is held that the appellant must file a suit before the respondents can be dispossessed. It appears that in issuing the writ in favour of the respondents, the High Court failed to appreciate the legal effect of its conclusions that questions of title cannot be tried in writ proceedings. Once it is held that the question of title cannot be determined, it follows that no right can be postulated in favour of the respondents on the basis of which a writ can be issued in their favour under Art. 226. 12. Mr. Once it is held that the question of title cannot be determined, it follows that no right can be postulated in favour of the respondents on the basis of which a writ can be issued in their favour under Art. 226. 12. Mr. Tatachari, however, has contended that the right on which the petitions of the respondents are founded is a right flowing from the respondents continuous possession of the properties for many years, and he argues that if such a right is proved, the High Court would be justified in issuing a writ protecting that right. This argument is clearly fallacious. Mere possession of the property for however long a period it may be, will not clothe the possessor with any legal right if it is shown that the possession is under a grant from the State which is resumable. Such long possession may give him a legal right to protect his possession against third parties, but as between the State and the grantee, possession of the grantee under a resumable grant cannot be said to confer any right on the grantee which would justify a claim for a writ under Art. 226 where the grant has been resumed. In dealing with this argument, we have assumed without deciding that though a suit under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act would have been incompetent against the appellant, a similar relief can be claimed by the respondents against the appellant under Art. 226. Even on that assumption, no right can be claimed by the respondents merely on the ground of their possession, unless their right to remain in possession is established against the appellant, and this can be done if the grant is held to be not resumable." 17. Learned State counsel also submits that both the impugned orders have been passed after issuing show cause to the petitioner by the Additional Collector for violation of the terms and conditions of the lease and by the Deputy Collector with regard to payment of commercial rent. 18. Learned State counsel also submits that both the impugned orders have been passed after issuing show cause to the petitioner by the Additional Collector for violation of the terms and conditions of the lease and by the Deputy Collector with regard to payment of commercial rent. 18. Learned counsel further contends that the State Government has decided not to accord approval of renewal on the basis of the materials and facts which have been found by the various authorities including the District Magistrate and thus there is no illegality in the order of the State Government since the right of renewal is founded upon the full performance of the terms and conditions of the grant. The purpose of the grant being to establish Montessori School the land cannot be used for commercial purpose. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner in reply submits that the right of the petitioner does not depend solely upon the lease agreement dated 16.12.1970 as the same must be read harmoniously with the order of grant dated 21.9.1970. He also submits that the reliance upon the so called show cause can be of no avail as the main reasons for rejection as stated in the counter affidavit have been the violation of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the School as registered under the Societies Registration Act whereas the show cause does not speak of any such ground regarding the violation of the same. 20. I have considered the respective submissions of learned counsel for the parties but in view of the order proposed to be passed, it may not be necessary to deal with each of them. However, it would be appropriate to first consider the principal objection of learned Additional Advocate General that the matter of rights and liabilities of the petitioner is solely governed by the lease agreement dated 16.12.1970 and since the same does not contain any renewal clause, hence the petitioner has absolutely no right in the matter. 21. However, it would be appropriate to first consider the principal objection of learned Additional Advocate General that the matter of rights and liabilities of the petitioner is solely governed by the lease agreement dated 16.12.1970 and since the same does not contain any renewal clause, hence the petitioner has absolutely no right in the matter. 21. It is by now the settled proposition and well accepted that grants of the present nature are in this State governed by the provisions of the Bihar Government Estates (Khas Mahal) Manual, 1953 which lays down the various Rules indicating the Government policy in this regard as to how the said grants with respect to different Government estates are to be made and the powers of resumption of the Government with respect to them. It is evident from the order of grant dated 21.9.1970 that the same is covered by the provisions of Chapter-VIII of the Khas Mahal Manual relating to "alienation of Government land". Rule 167 defines the expression "alienation of Government land" to mean the transfer of such land, whether by private "sale", "lease" or otherwise to public bodies, associations or individuals but excluding the sales of Government lands or Estates which are governed by Chapter-VII relating to sale of Government Estates. Rule 168 lays down that no authority subordinate to the State Government is empowered to sanction an alienation of Government land. Rule 170 lays down that a model form of agreement to be executed with respect to these grants is contained in Appendix A(13). It is evident from Annexure-2, the lease agreement dated 16.12.1970, that the same has been executed under this very form. Rule 172 provides for the officers who may execute the deeds, contracts and other instruments. It is clearly provided in the said rules as follows: "These orders do not in any way increase the existing powers of local officers to enter into agreements for the alienation of Government lands. They simply authorize such officers to sign such agreement as a ministerial act instead of forwarding the deeds for the signature of a Secretary to Government." 22. Rule 173 provides that an annual statement of alienation of Government land are to be made in the prescribed form to the Accountant General of Bihar. 23. They simply authorize such officers to sign such agreement as a ministerial act instead of forwarding the deeds for the signature of a Secretary to Government." 22. Rule 173 provides that an annual statement of alienation of Government land are to be made in the prescribed form to the Accountant General of Bihar. 23. From a conspectus of the aforesaid provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual it is evident that alienation of land in the form of lease to an association like the petitioner can only be made by an order of the Government and further that the execution of the agreement of the lease by the Collector or others is a mere ministerial act. That being the position it has to be accepted that the lease agreement executed in terms of the grant of lease by the Government does not and cannot override the terms of the grant but is a document in support of the grant itself. Thus the submission of learned Additional Advocate General in this regard that the rights and liabilities of the petitioner are only governed by the lease agreement dated 16.12.1970 have to be rejected as not borne out from the provisions of the Khas Mahal Manual, apart from being wholly untenable on the general principles of law. The power to make a grant being vested solely in the Government, whatever is stated by the Government while sanctioning such a grant, will prevall over and override any subsequent Instrument like the lease agreement which Is an act of ministerial nature by the subordinate officers of the Government authorized to execute such an agreement. 24. With respect to the aforesaid matter neither the provisions of the Government Grants Act, 1885 nor Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act support the submission of learned counsel for the State. Section 91 of the Evidence Act merely forbids the giving of evidence in proof of the terms of such contracts, grants or other disposition of properties which have been reduced to form of a document; the same has to be seen also in the context of Explanation-I of Section 91 which clearly states that this Section applies equally to cases in which the contracts, grants or dispositions of property referred to are contained in more documents than one. It is evident that in the present case there are two documents pertaining to the grant: one the original grant contained in memo dated 21.9.1970 issued by the order of the Governor of Bihar, and the other is the lease agreement dated 16.12.1970. Thus the terms of the grant have to be seen by referring to both the documents and in case of conflict the original grant sanctioned by the Government of Bihar dated 21.9.1970 will prevail over the lease agreement executed as a ministerial act by the officers of the Government. In fact, in view of what has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgarh Shah (supra) both the order of grant dated 21.9.1970 and the lease agreement being the grantors document have to be interpreted strictly against the Government and in favour of the grantee. 25. In the aforesaid view of the matter, since the order dated 21.9.1970 clearly sanctions the grant for a period of thirty years with the option of renewal free of salami, on nominal rent of Rs, 50/- per year (excluding cess) It has to be held even In the absence of a renewal clause In the lease agreement dated 16.12.1970 that the grant was subject to an option of renewal and the same having been exercised by the petitioner within the time it has to be considered in accordance with law by the State-respondents before rejecting the same. 26. The aforesaid being the position, the further question is that in Deba Jyoti Duttas case (supra) this Court had clearly held that the principles of natural justice would apply in such matters if renewal is not granted or the lease is cancelled. It is the stand of the respondents that the show cause notice indicating various breaches by the petitioner was issued by the Additional Collector and only thereafter the final order has been passed. From the said show cause notice dated 6.2.2004, it is evident that the same has been issued by the Additional Collector on the basis of notes received by him from the Circle Officer. The show cause appears to have been issued by the Additional Collector on his own. It is evident that the grant having been made by the Government the question of the non-renewal of lease or its cancellation could be considered only by the Government. The show cause appears to have been issued by the Additional Collector on his own. It is evident that the grant having been made by the Government the question of the non-renewal of lease or its cancellation could be considered only by the Government. So far as the order of the Government is concerned, it is totally silent as to what has weighed with it for passing the impugned order dated 3.11.2005 rejecting the application for renewal and cancelling the lease. Even if it is assumed that the reply of the petitioner made to the Additional Collector was forwarded to the Government, it being the competent authority which had granted the lease with an option for renewal, there is nothing to show that there was an application of mind at the end of the Government and thereafter any show cause Issued either directly by the Government or at the behest of the Government by the District officials. Moreover, such show cause does not at all speak about the various grounds which appear to have weighed with the respondent authorities as stated In the counter affidavit. In the aforesaid circumstances, the so-called show cause notice issued by the Additional Collector cannot be considered a show cause in the eye of law and on the basis of the same no final order could have been passed by the competent authority. 27. Moreover, it is a well established principle of law as laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill vs. The Chief Election Commissioner and Others: AIR 1978 SC 851 , relying upon an earlier Constitution Bench decision in the case of Commissioner of Police, Bombay vs. Gordhandas Bhanji: AIR (39) 1952 SC 16, that if an order is based upon certain grounds its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. On the said ground also the impugned order dated 18.7.2005 contained in memo dated 3.11.2005 must be held to be illegal being non-speaking and without disclosing any reason which has been sought to be supported only by filing an affidavit. On the said ground also the impugned order dated 18.7.2005 contained in memo dated 3.11.2005 must be held to be illegal being non-speaking and without disclosing any reason which has been sought to be supported only by filing an affidavit. As held by this Court in Deba Jyoti Duttas case (supra) right to renewal being almost automatic if the same is to be taken away then it must be done by a speaking order based on reasons; otherwise the action of the authorities has to be considered as arbitrary and whimsical and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 28. There is another reason why the impugned order contained in memo dated 3.11.2005 cannot stand. It Is stated in the counter affidavit that the same has been passed relying upon the reports of various officials of the District Including the Collector as also that of the Flying Squad. It is the clear contention of the petitioner that such reports were made behind back of the petitioner and It was not supplied the said reports so that it could meet the same; thus, the same is also violative of the principles of natural justice. This Court is inclined to accept the said submission as the petitioner, before the cancellation of its lease, ought to have been informed of the materials relying upon which it was decided to reject its renewal application and cancel its lease. 29. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that the impugned order dated 18.7.2005 as contained in memo no. 1681 dated 3.11.2005 cannot be allowed to stand. The same is accordingly quashed. 30. So far as the other impugned order dated 12.11.2007 (Annexure-13) is concerned, the same is solely based on the ground that the lease of the petitioner had come to an end in the year 2000 and thereafter for a period of seven years, it had been using the land unauthorisedly for a commercial purpose, for which it was directed to pay an amount of Rs. 52,50,000/- as commercial rent. Since the impugned order of the Government rejecting the application for renewal and cancellation of lease has itself been set aside the subsequent order would have no legs to stand and the same is also fit to be quashed. Accordingly, the order dated 12.11.2007 is also quashed. 31. 52,50,000/- as commercial rent. Since the impugned order of the Government rejecting the application for renewal and cancellation of lease has itself been set aside the subsequent order would have no legs to stand and the same is also fit to be quashed. Accordingly, the order dated 12.11.2007 is also quashed. 31. Apart from the fact that the lease itself has been granted on rent fixed by the Government, this Court does not express any view on the question as to whether when a lease has been granted on nominal rent of Rs. 50/- per annum by the Government itself, it is open to any subordinate official to claim payment of any higher amount on the basis of alleged use of the land for alleged commercial purpose. 32. So far as the other issues raised by learned counsel for the parties are concerned, in view of the fact that the impugned order of cancellation has been quashed for the reasons aforesaid, and the matter must go back to the Government to consider afresh the question of renewal of lease in accordance with law, it would not be proper for this Court to express its opinion on the merits of the various submissions of the petitioner and it would be open to the petitioner to take such pleas before the respondent-State itself. 33. The writ application is accordingly allowed. The respondent-State shall be at liberty to re-examine the application for renewal or the question of cancellation of lease in accordance with law and in the light of the discussions made above.