JUDGMENT Heard Sri Ramakrishna, representing Sri V. Hari Haran, learned counsel for 159 appellants in all these civil miscellaneous appeals and Sri A. Narasimha Rao, representing Sri K. Ramesh Chowdary, learned counsel representing respondents. 2. C.MANo.215 of 2008 is filed by the appellant as against an order made in I.A.No.791 of 2007 in A.S.No.202 of 2007 on the file of VII Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vijayawada. 3. C.MANo.216 of 2008 is filed by the appellant as against an order made in I.A.No.792 of 2007 in A.S.No.202 of 2007 on the file of VII Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vijayawada. 4. C.M.A.No.217 of 2008 is filed by the appellant as against an order made in IANo.1134 of 2007 in A.S.No.202 of 2007 on the file of VII Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vijayawada. 5. C.M.A.No.218 of 2008 is filed by the self same appellant as against an order made in I.A.No.1135 of 2007 in A.S.No.202 of 2007 on the file of VII Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Vijayawada. 6. In view of the commonality of the questions involved in all these civil miscellaneous appeals, these are being disposed of by a common Judgment. 7. The appellant filed I.A.No.791 of 2007 in A.S.No.202 of 2007 aforesaid as against the respondents under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter in short referred to as "the Code" for the purpose of convenience) praying for temporary injunction restraining respondents from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. 8. The appellant filed I.A.No.792 of 2007 in A.S.No.202 of 2007 praying for temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code restraining the respondents from making any alienations either by way of sale or otherwise. 9. In the light of the reasons recorded in I.A.No.791 of 2007, I.A.No.792 of 2007 also had been dismissed. Aggrieved by the said orders, C.M.A.No.215 of 2008 and C.M.A.No.216 of 2008 had been preferred respectively. 10. 9. In the light of the reasons recorded in I.A.No.791 of 2007, I.A.No.792 of 2007 also had been dismissed. Aggrieved by the said orders, C.M.A.No.215 of 2008 and C.M.A.No.216 of 2008 had been preferred respectively. 10. The respondent in C.M.A.No.217 of 2008 filed I.A.No.1134 of 2007 in AS.No.202 of 2007 aforesaid praying for temporary injunction restraining the appellant in A.S.No.202 of 2007, his men, agents and followers from in any way interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code and temporary injunction was granted in favour of respondent in C.M.A.No.217 of 2008 in view of the orders made in I.ANo.791 of 2007. 11. The respondent in C.M.A.No.218 of 2008 filed I.ANo.1135 of 2007 in AS.No.202 of 2007 praying for temporary injunction restraining the respondent in the said application i.e., appellant in A.S.No.202 of 2007 from in any way interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code and the said application was allowed in view of the orders made in I.A.No.791 of 2007. 12. The respondent in C.M.A.No.217 of 2008 is Tatineni Purnachandra Rao and the respondent In C.M.A.No.218 of 2008 is Tatineni Purna Prasad. These Tatineni Purnachandra Rao and Tatineni Purna Prasad are shown as respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the other C.M.As. i.e., C.M.A.No.215 of 2008 and C.M.A.No.216 of 2008. 13. Sri Ramakrishna representing Sri V. Hari Haran, learned counsel for appellants in all these appeals Medasani Ramesh Babu would maintain that the learned Judge could not appreciate the documents relied on by either of the parties and the counsel also would maintain that the learned Judge could not appreciate EX.A-26, the certificate issued by the Secretary, Grama Sachivalayam, Pedapulipaka village. The learned counsel also pointed out to certain of the observations and the findings and also the evidence of P. W.1 and EX.A-5 and the Counsel also pointed out to Ex. The learned counsel also pointed out to certain of the observations and the findings and also the evidence of P. W.1 and EX.A-5 and the Counsel also pointed out to Ex. B-1 and EX.B-8 and would maintain that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the temporary injunctions prayed for by the appellants should have been granted and inasmuch as the respondents in the other civil miscellaneous appeals C.MANo.217 of 2008 and C.M.A.No.218, Tatineni Purnachandra Rao and Tatineni Purna Prasad being defendants in the original suit, in the absence of any counter-claim such parties are not entitled to pray for such temporary injunctions and the appellate court totally erred in granting temporary injunctions in those applications filed by those parties. In the light of the order made in I.A.No.791 of 2007 the learned counsel also pointed out to the relevant findings recorded by VII Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Vijayawada, and would maintain that in the facts and circumstances of the case, these civil miscellaneous appeals are to be allowed. The learned counsel also relied on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 14. On the contrary, Sri A. Narasimha Rao representing Sri K. Ramesh Chowdary, learned counsel representing respondents in all these civil miscellaneous appeals would maintain that under inherent powers temporary injunctions, which had been prayed for by certain of the respondents in these civil miscellaneous appeals-defendants in the suit, can be granted and it cannot be said that such orders are illegal orders. The counsel also pointed out to the prima facie findings recorded by the appellate court and would maintain that in the light of the fact that the applications filed by the appellants praying for temporary injunctions had been dismissed and in the light of the clear findings recorded the learned Judge thought it fit to allow the temporary injunction applications filed by respondents 2 and 3 in C.M.A.No.215 of 2008, who are shown as respondents in C.M.A.No.217 of 2008 and C.M.A.No.218.of 2008 respectively. The learned counsel also placed strong reliance on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 15. In the light of the facts and circumstances, the following points arise for consideration in these civil miscellaneous appeals: (1) Whether the orders made by the appellate court while deciding these applications praying for temporary injunctions to be disturbed or to be confirmed in the facts and circumstances of the case? 15. In the light of the facts and circumstances, the following points arise for consideration in these civil miscellaneous appeals: (1) Whether the orders made by the appellate court while deciding these applications praying for temporary injunctions to be disturbed or to be confirmed in the facts and circumstances of the case? (2) If so, to what relief the parties would be entitled? 16. Point No.1: For the purpose of convenience the parties would be referred to as appellants and respondents as shown in the appeal. 17. It is needless to say that respondents 3 and 2 in C.M.A.No.215 of 2008 are shown as sole respondents in C.M.A.No.217 of 2008 and C.M.A.No.218 of 2008 respectively. 18. The appellant filed a suit for declaration of title relating to the plaint schedule property and also prayed for consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the respondents, their representatives, agents from in any way interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. Several of the grounds raised in the memorandum of grounds of appeal also had been pointed out. 19. It is the case of the appellant that late Medasani Nagabhushana Rao is his father and first respondent is his mother. After the death of his first wife, his father married his mother. His father had a son by name Chandramouli through first wife who separated from his father in the year 1957. Subsequent thereto the appellant and his father constituted a Hindu joint family and had partitioned their properties under a partition deed, dated 04.12.1977. His father got the plaint schedule property of an extent of Ac.4-81 cents of wetland bearing R.S.No.38/3 in the limits of Pedapulipaka village and some more properties. The father of the appellant died on 22.7.1981 and before his death he executed a Will on 22.10.1979 in a sound and disposing state of mind and registered the same bequeathing his properties to the appellant and first respondent and it is his last Will and testament. He bequeathed the plaint schedule property in favour of the appellant with absolute rights. From the time of death of his father the plaint schedule property has been in his possession and enjoyment. He bequeathed the plaint schedule property in favour of the appellant with absolute rights. From the time of death of his father the plaint schedule property has been in his possession and enjoyment. While the appellant and his wife Ratna Kumari were living together in the family house along with his mother, the first respondent developed hegemonic attitude in the internal matrimonial and family affairs and in the management of the properties and, in fact, the appellant was made to succumb to the wishes of his mother which resulted in estrangement of his wife. First respondent also filed O.S.No.6 of 1998 against his wife to restrain her from entering into their family house and the same was dismissed for default, as he and his wife decided to resume their matrimonial relations during the second half of the year 2000. She also filed a criminal case C.C.No.167 of 1998 against his wife and others alleging that they were trying to trespass into their family house. After living for some time in their village, the appellant and his wife shifted to Vijayawada due to sadistic conduct adopted by the first respondent. First respondent developed hatred and animosity against him and forged the Wills with dates 02.1 .1980 and 24.2.1981 in the name of his father with the support of respondents 2 and 3 to claim the plaint schedule property and also brought into existence two sale deeds dated 04.9.2003 one in favour of respondent NO.2 for an extent of AC.3-00 cents and the second in favour of respondent No.3 for the remaining extent of AC.1-81 cents out of the plaint schedule property of AcA-81 cents. The first respondent also conveyed some house sites bequeathed originally to her in favour of her daughter claiming also under the earlier forged Will dated 02.01.1980. Neither the first respondent nor respondents 2 and 3 are in possession of the plaint schedule property. It is also averred that when the appellant asked the first respondent to give the original registered Will, dated 02.10.1979, executed by his father to him, but the first respondent told him that she herself wants the original Will in her custody, as she also got some property there-under from her husband and got the Photostat copy of the Will and handed over the same to him. The plaint schedule land has always been in his exclusive possession from the time of the death of his father and he has been cultivating the same by raising Paddy. In such circumstances, the appellant filed applications I.A.No.791 of 2007 and I.A.No.792 of 2007 praying for temporary injunctions restraining the respondents from interfering w~1h his possession relating to the plaint schedule properties and also restraining the respondents from making alienation of the plaint schedule properties. 20. In the counter filed by respondents 2 and 3 several of the allegations had been denied. It is needless to say that the stand taken in the counter of respondents 2 and 3 in I.A.No.791 of 2007, the same stand had been taken by these parties in the applications filed by them praying for temporary injunction in IANo.1134 of 2007 and I.A.No.1135 of 2007. 21. In the counter filed on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 in I.A.No.791 of 2007 several of the allegations had been denied and inter alia contended that it is true that late Medasani Nagabhushana Rao is the father of the appellant and the first respondent is his mother. After the death of hi~ first wife, the father of the appellant married the first respondent. Late Medasani Nagabhushana Rao had a son by name Chandramouli through first wife who separated from Medasani Nagabhushana Rao in the year 1957. The appellant and his father constituted a Hindu joint family and partitioned their properties under a partition deed, dated 04.12.1977, and Medasani Nagabhushana Rao got the plaint schedule property of Ac.4-81 cents of wet land bearing R.S.No.38/3 in the limits of Pedapulipaka village and some more properties. 22. Further it is stated that respondent NO.3 purchased an extent of Ac.1.81 cents in R.S.No.38/3 which is part of the plaint schedule property from the first respondent on 04.9.2003 under a registered sale deed bearing NO.3231/2003 and since then he is in possession and enjoyment of the same with absolute rights. Originally, the same land belongs to the husband of the first respondent who died on 22.7.1981. The said Nagabhushana Rao during his lifetime executed a Will, dated 24.2.1981, bequeathing the schedule property to the first respondent in a sound disposing state of mind and the said Will was acted upon after the death of the said Nagabhushana Rao. Originally, the same land belongs to the husband of the first respondent who died on 22.7.1981. The said Nagabhushana Rao during his lifetime executed a Will, dated 24.2.1981, bequeathing the schedule property to the first respondent in a sound disposing state of mind and the said Will was acted upon after the death of the said Nagabhushana Rao. The first respondent is in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property from the date of the death of her husband and she is regularly paying taxes to revenue authorities and the Mandai Revenue Officer, Penamaluru, also issued Pattadar Pass Book and Title Deed in favour of the first respondent in the year 1995. On 04.9.2003 respondent NO.1 also sold the other extent of AC.3.00 cents to respondent NO.2 under a registered sale deed bearing No.3230/2003 and since then respondent NO.2 is in possession and enjoyment of the same. There is a motor pump set and electricity connection vide Service NO.1305 02594 and the same was also sold to the second respondent in which respondent No.3 also having right to draw water to his land. Previously, for some time respondent NO.1 cultivated the schedule property and for some time she leased the same to third parties by name Veeramachineni Sudheer Babu, Mokkapati Sambasiva Rao and Musunuri Srinivasa Rao and they used to cultivate the land. 23. It is also stated that respondents 2 and 3 purchased the schedule property for a valuable consideration. The husband of the first respondent and father of the appellant late Nagabhushana Rao executed a Will on 24.2.1981, which is his final testament by cancelling the previous Wills executed by him. After the death of Nagabhushana Rao, respondent NO.1 took possession of the plaint schedule property and enjoying the same as an absolute owner to the knowledge of one and all including the appellant. 24. Further it is stated that the appellant is well aware of the above said facts and the appellant and respondent NO.1 resided together in the same house at Tadigadapa. The appellant was never in possession of the plaint schldule property at any point of time and nevef cultivated the said land. 24. Further it is stated that the appellant is well aware of the above said facts and the appellant and respondent NO.1 resided together in the same house at Tadigadapa. The appellant was never in possession of the plaint schldule property at any point of time and nevef cultivated the said land. The schedule property was in the possession of Nagabhushana Rao during his lifetime and after his death it was devolved on respondent NO.1 and she alone was in possession and enjoyment of the same till the date of execution of the registered deeds in favour of respondent Nos.2 and 3. 25. The suit for declaration of title of the appellant is not maintainable as the appellant is not owner of the plaint schedule property and he was never in possession of the said land. The first respondent on 15.3.2003 sold the property which is adjacent to the schedule property to one Janachaitanya Housing Limited in which also she referred the Will, dated 24.2.1981 only, but the appellant did not raise any objection to the said sale. Immediately after purchasing the property, respondents 2 and 3 requested the M.R.O. Penamaluru, to issue Pattadar Pass Book and Title Deed, but after one and half year the M.R.O. issued an endorsement that it is not possible to issue Pattadar Pass Book to them, as there is a civil suit pending in O.S.No.1 065 of 2003. Respondents 2 and 3 preferred an appeal against the said endorsement before the Sub-Collector and the Sub-Collector, after enquiry, gave a direction to the M.R.O to issue Pattadar Pass Book and Title Deed to them and the M.R.O., as per the directions of the Sub-Collector, issued Pattadar Pass Book and Title Deed in their favour. Subsequently, the appellant challenged the orders of the Sub-Collector before the High Court and the High Court suspended the orders of the Sub-Collector with an observation that a civil suit is pending. 26. It is also stated that as respondents 2 and 3 purchased the schedule property for a valuable consideration in a bona fide manner and good faith, neither the appellant nor the first respondent nor none else question the said sale nor having any right to claim in any manner whatsoever. 27. 26. It is also stated that as respondents 2 and 3 purchased the schedule property for a valuable consideration in a bona fide manner and good faith, neither the appellant nor the first respondent nor none else question the said sale nor having any right to claim in any manner whatsoever. 27. Further it is stated that the learned III Additional Senior Civil Judge, after trial, passed judgment with an observation that the appellant is not in possession of the plaint schedule property. The appellant did not file any document to prove that he is in possession of the property. The evidence of the appellant in the lower court itself shows that he was never in possession of the plaint schedule property and he never paid any tax to the said land and moreover he himself admitted that his mother has been paying taxes to the said land from 1981 to 2002 in her name. The appellant with an intention to cause loss to respondents 2 and 3 and to harass them in collusion with respondent NO.1 filed the present appeal and also the present applications for temporary injunction. 28. These are the respective stands taken by the parties in these applications. 29. Strong reliance was placed on the decision in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal AIR 1962 SC 527 wherein it was observed at para 18 as hereunder: "There is difference of opinion between the High Courts on this point. One view is that a Court cannot issue an order of temporary injunction if the circumstances do not fall within the provisions of Order XXXIX of the Code: Varadacharlu v. Narsimha Charlu, AIR 1926 Mad 258 ; Govindarajulu v. Imperial Bank of India, AI R 1932 Mad 180; Karuppayya v. Ponnuswami, AIR 1933 Mad 500 (2); Murugesa Mudali v. Angamuthu Mudali, AI R 1938 Mad 190 and Subramanian v. Seetarama, AIR 1949 Mad 104. The other view is that a Court can issue an interim injunction under circumstances which are not covered by Order XXXIX of the Code, if the Court is of opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such in~erim injunction: Ohaneshwar Nath I,Ghanshyam Ohar, AIR 1940 All 185;\ Firm Bichchha Ram Baburam v. Firm Baldeo Sahai Surajmal, AIR 1940 AI1 241; Bhagat Singh v. Jagbir Sawhney, AIR 1941 Cal 670 and Chinese Tannery Owners' Association v. Makhan Lal, A. I. R 1952 Cal 560. We are of opinion that the latter view is correct and that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances, which are not covered by the provisions of Order XXXIX, C. P. C. There is no such expression in S. 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX or by any rules made under the Code. It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, or the simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect of the expression ' if it so prescribed' is only this that when the rule prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interests of justice, but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If the provisions of S. 94 were not there in the Code, the Court' could still issue temporary injunctions, but. it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. No party has a right to insist on the Court's exercising that jurisdiction and the Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of S. 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent power." 30. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of S. 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent power." 30. Strong reliance was placed on the decision in Javvaji Sambamurthy v. Cheukumalli Srinivasa Rao 1987 (2) AL T 630 wherein the learned Judge of this Court held at paras 12, 14, 15 and 16 as hereunder: "All interlocutory applications are entertained by the Court in suits or original petitions, for the purpose of enabling the Court to grant an effective relief in the main suit or original petition. The court entertains such interlocutory applications to ensure that, by the time it is able to give notice to the other side, take evidence and decide the dispute between the parties in a satisfactory manner, the subject matter of the property is preserved or the rights of the parties are maintained in such a manner that the ultimate relief does not become infructuous or otiose or impracticable. So far as the plaintiff is concerned who seeks temporary injunction pending suit, he can claim such injunction on grounds mentioned in either of the three clauses (a), (b) and (c) in Order 39, Rule 1, C. P. C. In cases where the grounds relied upon by the plaintiff are not those enumerated in the above said three clauses of Order 39, Rule 1, it is now permissible, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lai's case (supra) to invoke the inherent power of the court in Section 151 C. P. C. for the purpose of obtaining a temporary injunction. In fact, the Supreme Court pointed out in the above said case that Section 151 C.P.C. does not confer an inherent power on the civil courts but that it only maintains and continues an existing and inherent power of every Civil-Court. In fact, the Supreme Court pointed out in the above said case that Section 151 C.P.C. does not confer an inherent power on the civil courts but that it only maintains and continues an existing and inherent power of every Civil-Court. Therefore, in cases where the specific provisions contained in Order 39, Rule 1, C. P.C., are not attracted it is up to the plaintiff to invoke Section 151 C. P. C. and claim a temporary injunction on grounds other than those mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Order 39, Rule 1, the main purpose being that the relief to which he is ultimately entitled in the suit may not become 165 infructuous, otiose or impracticable. The courts agree to exercise such inherent powers so that the implementation of the ultimate decree may not be defeated. Unless it is a case of a counter claim or set-off, the defendant is not entitled to any relief against the plaintiff in the main suit or original proceedings. In other words while it is plaintiff who gets a positive relief in the main suit and for that purpose pays court-fee, the defendant does not get any positive relief in the suit in cases where no setoff or counter claim is made. The only benefit the defendant, gets in the event of his success, is that the plaintiff is refused relief. The object behind sub-clause (a) of Rule 1 of Order 39 appears to me to be to preserve the property intact and not allow it to be damaged, or wasted or alienated or sold by any party, be he the plaintiff or the defendant, pending suit. For that purpose, an injunction could even be granted in favour of defendant and against the plaintiff. In fact, if such a relief is granted under clause (a) it would equally sub-serve the ultimate relief that may be granted in the suit in favour even of the plaintiff or even in case the suit is dismissed so that the defendant is, left where he is so far as the property is concerned. But to grant a positive relief in the manner mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 1 of Order 39, C.P.C. in favour of defendant is permissible only if a relief of a similar nature could be granted in favour of the defendant in the main suit or original petition. But to grant a positive relief in the manner mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 1 of Order 39, C.P.C. in favour of defendant is permissible only if a relief of a similar nature could be granted in favour of the defendant in the main suit or original petition. If the defendant is not entitled to any such relief in the main suit against the plaintiff-he not having filed any counter claim or asked for any set-off, the defendant could not ask for any interim relief of a similar nature. That in my opinion, is the reason why the defendant cannot invoke the inherent powers of the court under Section 151, C.P.C. for getting a temporary injunction against the plaintiff in circumstances other than those covered by clause (a) of Rule 1 Order 39, C.P.C. The inherent power of the court which could be invoked for sub-serving the ultimate relief to be granted in the main suit or proceeding, cannot be invoked by a defendant who could not be granted any positive relief in the main suit or proceeding except in cases where a counter claim or set-off is claimed. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that Section 151, C.P.C. could still be invoked by the defendants in cases not covered by clause (a) of Rule 1 of Order 39, C.P.C. is therefore not correct." 31. It is not in serious controversy that no counter-claim as such had been putforth by any of the defendants in the suit. It appears that respondents 2 and 3 in the appeal Tatineni Purnachandra Rao and Tatineni Purna Prasad filed applications I.ANo.1134 of 2007 and I.ANo.1135 of 2007 praying for temporary injunctions and in the light of the orders made in I.ANo.791 of 2007 in AS.No.202 of 2007 aforesaid these applications were allowed by the learned VII Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Vijayawada, since the applications filed by the 9Ppellant I.A.No.791 of 2007 and I.A.No.79f of 2007 had been dismissed. 32. Granting or non-granting of temporary injunctions as prayed for by the appellant/plaintiff would be something different from the granting of temporary injunctions as I prayed for by the defendants in the suit. 32. Granting or non-granting of temporary injunctions as prayed for by the appellant/plaintiff would be something different from the granting of temporary injunctions as I prayed for by the defendants in the suit. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the applications filed by the said Tatineni Purnachandrda Rao and Tatineni Purna I Prasad, the contesting defendants in the suit, the respondents in the appeal cannot be allowed, that too, in the light of the dismissal of the applications I.A.No.791 of 2007 and I.A.No.792 of 2007 filed by the appellants. This approach adopted by the appellate court, the learned VII Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Vijayawada, being erroneous, the said orders are unsustainable and it is needless to say that the other civil miscellaneous appeals C.MANo.217 of 2008 and C.M.A.No.218 of 2008 are to be allowed on this ground alone. 33. As far as the applications filed by the appellant I.A.No.791 of 2007 and I.A.No.792 of 2007 are concerned elaborate submissions had been made relating to the aspect of possession and the counsel representing the respective parties had pointed out the relevant findings recorded in this regard. 34. In Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan v. Nawab Zulfiquar Jah Bahdur and five others AIR 1975 A.P. 187 = 1975 (1) An.W.R. 32 the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held as hereunder. "It is well-settled that the grant or refusal of a temporary injunction is covered by three well established principles viz., (1) whether the petitioners have made out a prima facie case (2) whether the balance of convenience is in their favour i.e., whether it would cause greater inconvenience to them if the injunction is not granted than the inconvenience which the opposite party or persons claiming through the opposite party would be put to if the temporary injunction is granted and (3) whether the petitioners would suffer irreparable injury. With the first condition as sine qua non, at least two conditions should be satisfied by the petitioners conjunctively and a mere proof of one of the three conditions does not entitle the petitioners to obtain a temporary injunction in their favour. 35. With the first condition as sine qua non, at least two conditions should be satisfied by the petitioners conjunctively and a mere proof of one of the three conditions does not entitle the petitioners to obtain a temporary injunction in their favour. 35. On the aspect of prima facie case in Law of Injunctions by Justice P.S. Narayana (8th edition) it was stated as hereunder: "The relief of temporary injunction can be granted on making out a prima facie case and also balance of convenience and irreparable loss in case injunction is refused. The party seeking the aid of the Court for an injunction must establish that the act complained of. is in violation of his right or is at-least an act which if carried into effect will necessarily result in a violation of the right. It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to show that he has a prima facie case but it must be further established that in the event of withholding the relief of temporary injunction he will suffer irreparable injury and even in the event of his success in the suit he will not have the proper remedy in being awarded adequate damages. Though there is prima facie case when the balance of convenience is in favour of the defendant, temporary injunction cannot be granted in such case. A prima facie case cannot be equated with proof but the expression may mean that there is a good ground for proceeding with a particular matter." 36. In N. T. Raghunathan v. All India Reporter Ltd. Bombay AIR 1971 Bombay 48 it was observed as hereunder. "Turning to the balance of convenience or inconvenience counsel for the appellants urged that prohibiting them from s411ing their entire digest is causing \them such irreparable injury as cannot be compensated subsequently and it would be impossible to ascertain the measure of damages afterwards. He urged that the balance of convenience lies in allowing the defendants to sell their digest subject to an account being kept of the number of copies sold so that the plaintiff would be enabled later to assess his damages, should he succeed in his suit. According to counsel if the sales are prohibited now, the defendant NO.1 will not be able to assess damages at all because it would be impossible for him to prove hypothetically how many copies might have been sold. According to counsel if the sales are prohibited now, the defendant NO.1 will not be able to assess damages at all because it would be impossible for him to prove hypothetically how many copies might have been sold. No doubt there is this difficulty in the way of defendant but it is not possible to prove damages in spite of that because evidence can always be adduced to prove what would have been the probable number of copies which the defendant could have sold if the injunction had not been granted there is at least some standard to go by in the sales which have already taken place. But as against this inconvenience to the defendants by the grant of the injunction, there is also the inconvenience to the plaintiff by not granting the injunction. The plaintiff's digest has been published and if the defendant's digest prima facie containing the printed matter is also allowed to be sold, it will be impossible for the plaintiff to prove how much it has suffered as in the shape of copies which could not be sold. I hold that in all circumstances, it is the plaintiff who would be more inconvenienced if the injunction does not issue. L Even if the convenience or inconvenience were equal, the defendants who have been prima facie proved offended must suffer the inconvenience etc." 37. On the aspect of balance of convenience in Law of Injunctions by Justice P.S. Narayana (8th edition) it was commented as hereunder: "Balance of convenience may mean the convenience and inconvenience of the parties contesting an application for temporary injunction and the same may be equated with what had been left out after weighing the prima facie case of both sides." 38. While granting or refusing to grant temporary injunction mere prima facie case is not sufficient and further the Court has to see the balance of convenience. Where the appellate Court has absolutely not given any reasons in support of balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff for granting a temporary injunction except saying that there was an injunction during the pendency of the suit it was held in the under mentioned case that such an injunction deserves to be vacated. Where the public interest is involved in a litigation while appreciating the aspect of balance of convenience, the interest of the public also is to be considered. Where the public interest is involved in a litigation while appreciating the aspect of balance of convenience, the interest of the public also is to be considered. Where in a case if temporary injunction is not granted plaintiff may be sustaining some loss due to failure to cultivate the land but if temporary injunction is granted, defendants will be unable to construct fishing harbour, it was held that in such a case it cannot be said balance of convenience is in favour of plaintiff. 39. On the aspect of irreparable injury in Law of Injunctions by Justice P.S. Narayana (8th edition) it was specified as hereunder: "Irreparable injury is one which is substantial and which cannot be remedied by damages. Apart from the prima facie case and the balance of convenience the Court is also concerned with the irreparable injury while granting or refusing to grant the relief lef temporary injunction. Where the lower appellate Court accepted the unconditional undertaking and refused injunction, it was held to be a good ground for refusing injunction." 40. The well settled principles relating to the granting of temporary injunction or refusing thereof need not be further dealt with in elaboration. The Will relied upon by the appellant was marked as Ex.A-9. However, specific stand had been taken that the father of the appellant cancelled EX.A-9 Will and executed EX.B-17 Will. The family disputes and the other probabilities of the case also had been taken into consideration. The evidence available on record apart from the documentary evidence, the oral evidence and the findings recorded by the trial court also had been taken into consideration and ultimately the learned Judge after recording reasons, especially, in the light of the oral evidence and findings recorded by the trial court and in the light of EX.A-9 and EX.B-17 came to the conclusion that the appellant had not made out a strong prima facie case to grant temporary injunction in his favour from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. The appellate court relied on the prima facie findings recorded by the trial court in this regard and came to the conclusion that during pendency of the appeal, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it would not be just and proper to grant temporary injunction in favour of the appellant till the disposal of the main appeal. 41. The appellate court relied on the prima facie findings recorded by the trial court in this regard and came to the conclusion that during pendency of the appeal, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it would not be just and proper to grant temporary injunction in favour of the appellant till the disposal of the main appeal. 41. It is no doubt true that the factum of possession in the context of the findings recorded by the trial court had been appreciated and the relief of temporary injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the appellant had been negatived in I.A.No.791 of 2007 in A.S.No.202 of 2007. 42. On a careful analysis of the findings, this Court is satisfied that the said findings need no disturbance at the hands of this Court, however, the appellant is relying on EX.A-9 and the contesting respondents are relying on EX.B-17. Though' findings had been recorded by the trial court, since the appeal is pending, in the affidavit filed in support of the application in I.A.No.792 of 2007 it was specified that during pendency of the appeal if the respondents make alienations by way of sale or otherwise the appellant would be put to serious loss. At the stage of hearing the counsel representing respondents in C.MANo.215 of 2008 and C.M.A.No.216 of 2008 stated that the respondents are not interested in making any such alienation. 43. In the light of the facts and circumstances, this Court is satisfied that C.MANo.215 of 2008 being devoid of merit, the same is liable to be dismissed, but however, in C.MANo.216 of 2008 restraint order to be made granting temporary injunction restraining the respondents from making alienation of the plaint schedule property during the pendency of the appeal. 44. Point No.2: In the result, C.MANo.215 of 2008 is hereby dismissed; C.MANo.217 of 2008 and C.M.A.No.218 of 2008 are hereby allowed setting aside the temporary injunction orders granted in favour of respondents-defendants Tatineni Purnachandra Rao and Tatineni Purna Prasad and C.MANo.216 of 2008 also is hereby allowed granting temporary injunction in favour of the appellant Medasani Ramesh Babu, restraining the respondents from making any alienations relating to the plaint schedule property by way of sale or otherwise, till the disposal of the appeal. The parties to bear their own costs.