BRIJMOHAN s/o BHIKULALJI CHANDAK v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
2009-08-21
B.P.DHARMADHIKARI, F.M.REIS
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT F.M. REIS, J. :- Heard learned Adv. Mr. B. N. Mohta for the petitioners and learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader Mr. S. S. Doifode for the respondents. 2. The above petition has been filed, challenging the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, for acquiring 1.5 hectare of land belonging to the petitioners from the field surveyed under No. 446 of Mouza Malegaon. The Notification dated 10th February, 1992 was published in the Official Gazette on 19th March, 1992 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 3. It is the case of the petitioners that prior to the said notification, for the same purpose, namely for extension of Gaothan, the respondents had started acquiring land at village Malegaon from field Survey No. 556 belonging to one Gopal Walke. However, the said proceedings were dropped by the Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur, with an observation that apart from Govt. lands, plots were already available for Gaothan, which would fulfil the need of the respondents. 4. After dropping the said proceedings, the respondent No. 1 sought to acquire land from field Survey No. 555/1 owned by one Smt. Taibai. Those proceedings for acquisition of land of said Taibai, were, however, quashed by this Court by Judgment and Order delivered in Writ Petition No. 2591 of 1982, on the ground that the said land holder had a very small holding and the notification was vague. 5. It is the case of the petitioners that pursuant to the Notification issued in respect of the land belonging to them, they filed Objections under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act opposing such acquisition. However, the petitioners were not heard by the Land Acquisition Officer on such objections, and without hearing the petitioners, the Land Acquisition Officer submitted a report to the Divisional Commissioner, Nagpur Division, a copy whereof was also not furnished to the petitioners. After the petitioners learnt about the submission of such report, they applied to the Land Acquisition Officer for inspection of the report, which request too of the petitioners came to be rejected. Subsequently, the Declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued by the Additional Commissioner on 31st March, 1993. The petitioners, thus, feel aggrieved and are before this Court by filing the present petition with a prayer for quashing the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 for acquisition of their land.
Subsequently, the Declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued by the Additional Commissioner on 31st March, 1993. The petitioners, thus, feel aggrieved and are before this Court by filing the present petition with a prayer for quashing the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 for acquisition of their land. 6. In answer to the averments contained in the petition, the respondents filed their Submissions dated 26th July, 1993 on affidavit of respondent No.2, disputing the claim of the petitioners. 7. Learned Counsel Mr. B.N. Mohta appearing for the petitioners submitted before us that firstly the Declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was issued beyond the period prescribed and consequently the same is bad in law. It is his further contention that a preliminary notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was very vague and consequently, the same deserves to be set aside. Mr. Mohta further submitted that the State having failed in its attempt to acquire the ]and for the same purpose, were not entitled to issue the notification in respect of the land belonging to the petitioners, as the same exercise on the part of respondents was not bona fide. Mr. Mohta also contended that in the earlier proceedings, since it has come on record that Govt. land was available for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the respondent No.1, the question of acquiring the land of the petitioners does not arise and the same is not bona fide. Mr. Mohta argued that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners at the time of enquiry under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, as the copy of report thereof was not furnished to the petitioners. It is his further contention that the Gaothan is away from the land of the petitioners and such acquisition would result in establishing two Gaothans. Mr. Mohta also argued that the allegation of the respondents that the petitioners hold substantial land, and are not small land holders is per se incorrect. To substantiate his contentions, learned Adv. Mr. Mohta sought to rely upon following precedents : (a) Shivgonda Balgonda Patil and ors.
Mr. Mohta also argued that the allegation of the respondents that the petitioners hold substantial land, and are not small land holders is per se incorrect. To substantiate his contentions, learned Adv. Mr. Mohta sought to rely upon following precedents : (a) Shivgonda Balgonda Patil and ors. vs. The Director of Resettlement and ors., 1992(1) Bom.C.R. 177 , (b) Panjabrao Rupra Lakade vs. Sub Divisional Officer and another, Writ Petition No. 2903 of 1991 decided on 18th February, 1992 (Coram: Dhabe and Chavan, 11.), (c) Pushpabai Wamanrao Deotale vs. State of Maharashtra and ors., 1993 Mh.L.J. 142, and (d) Rangrao Bajirao Deshmukh and ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and ors., 2002(3) Mh.L.J. 281 . 8. On the other hand, learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader Mr. Doifode appearing for the respondents submitted that the Declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was published within a period of one year as contemplated therein, considering that the publication of the preliminary notification under section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act was made on 2nd May, 1992 and the Declaration under section 6 of the Act was published in the Official Gazette on 22nd April, 1993. It is his further contention that a proper opportunity of hearing in the enquiry under section 5-A of the Act was given to the petitioners, inasmuch as the petitioners were heard and even statements of the petitioners to that effect were recorded by the Land Acquisition Officer. Mr. Doifode stated that the respondents were entitled to issue a fresh preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act, as the public purpose still subsisted and no material of any sort has been brought by the petitioners on record to the effect that such notification lacked bona fides. It is his further contention that the allegation of the petitioners that the Govt. land was available for the same public purpose is without substance, as there was no land which could have been utilized for such purpose, and in any event, the available land was not at all suitable for such public purpose. 9. After hearing both the learned Counsels Mr. Mohta and Asstt. Govt. Pleader Mr.
land was available for the same public purpose is without substance, as there was no land which could have been utilized for such purpose, and in any event, the available land was not at all suitable for such public purpose. 9. After hearing both the learned Counsels Mr. Mohta and Asstt. Govt. Pleader Mr. Doifode and perusing the records, we find that as far as the claim of the petitioners that the Declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is beyond the period of one year is concerned, the same is devoid of any merits. The record reveals that the preliminary notification under section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act is dated 10th February, 1992, the same was published in the Govt. Gazette on 19th March, 1992, it was published in two daily newspapers on 20th and 21st February, 1992, and the public notice of the substance of said notification was made at the place of the locality on 2nd May, 1992. Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act provides that the last date of such publication and the giving of such public notice shall be the date of the publication of the notification. As such, considering that the said public notice of the notification was made on 2nd May, 1992 and the date of publication of Declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was 27th April, 1994, the same is within the period of one year as contemplated in section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. 10. With regard to the next contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners to the effect that no hearing was given to the petitioners on the objection filed by them under section 5-A of the Act, we find that the original petitioner himself admitted in Para 7 of the petition that he examined himself in support of his contention and deposed to that effect by even producing evidence in respect of adjoining properties, which, according to him, were suitable for acquisition. This shows that the petitioners were given a personal hearing on their objection to the acquisition and consequently it is not open to the petitioners to contend now that they were not given a hearing on their objection. 11.
This shows that the petitioners were given a personal hearing on their objection to the acquisition and consequently it is not open to the petitioners to contend now that they were not given a hearing on their objection. 11. The question of supplying the copy of the report submitted by the Land Acquisition Officer to the appropriate Government does not arise at all, as, such a report containing the recommendations on the objections raised by persons interested is to be submitted to the appropriate Government for its decision. Merely because the copy of such a report was not furnished to the petitioners, does not, in any way, vitiate the proceedings initiated by the respondent No. 1 to acquire land pursuant to the Preliminary Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. In fact, on perusal of the report submitted by the Land Acquisition Officer, we find that all the objections, which were raised by the petitioners to the acquisition by respondent No.1, were duly considered by the Land Acquisition Officer and a report was accordingly submitted to the respondent No.1. 12. With regard to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the preliminary notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is vague, we find that the notification itself contemplates that apart from specifying the survey number as well as area sought to be acquired, the map was made available in the Office of Land Acquisition Officer to locate the land which was sought to be acquired. It is not the grievance of the petitioners that no such map was available in the office of Land Acquisition Officer. Apart from that, in the submissions of the Land Acquisition Officer, he has stated that a map was shown to the petitioners during the course of enquiry under section 5-A of the Act. As such, it cannot be accepted that there was any vagueness in the preliminary notification issued by the respondents under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. 13. As far as the contention of the petitioners to the effect that there were previous notifications with regard to the adjoining lands, which had lapsed and/or quashed by this Court, we find that admittedly the land of the petitioners was not the subject-matter of those earlier notifications.
13. As far as the contention of the petitioners to the effect that there were previous notifications with regard to the adjoining lands, which had lapsed and/or quashed by this Court, we find that admittedly the land of the petitioners was not the subject-matter of those earlier notifications. Besides that, the action of acquisition was dropped essentially on the ground that the land sought to be acquired was from small land holders. Issuing a fresh notification for a different land, namely the land of the petitioners, when such public purpose requires that exercise does not per se establish any lack of bona fides on the part of the respondents. 14. While dealing with the contention of the petitioners to the effect that Govt. lands in the vicinity of the land of the petitioners were available which were most suitable for the purpose of acquisition proposed to be done by the respondents, we find that in the submissions filed by Respondent No. 2 - Land Acquisition Officer, 'it has been stated that there was no suitable land in the vicinity to meet the public requirement, except the land of the petitioners. It is further stated that the Govt., lands neighbouring Abadi, namely Survey Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4, are adjoining the river Kolar and the same come in the Flood Zone and hence the lands under said survey numbers are totally unfit for extension of Abadi. As far as the Govt., lands bearing Survey Nos. 243 and 323 are concerned, the same are unused "Pandhans" which are about a 20 wide strips of land and so unsuitable for laying plots for residential purposes and extension of the Abadi. 15. As such, the claim of the petitioners to the effect that suitable Govt. land was available for the public purpose for which the land of the petitioners was sought to be acquired cannot be accepted in view of the material on record brought by respondent No.1. In deciding whether the acquisition of a particular land is for a public purpose or not, and whether such land is suitable and adaptable for such purpose, the Government is the last arbiter regarding the existence of the need or the suitability of the land and ordinarily the Court shall not substitute its own opinion for that of the Government with that regard.
Normally, the Courts shall not interfere in such acquisition, except where such power is exercised by the Govt., mala fide or for collateral purposes, or the action is irrational or the purpose is actually no public purpose at all, or is being exercised in colourable exercise of power. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to establish that the acquisition sought to be done by the respondents is unreasonable or that the same was being done in colourable exercise of power. On the contrary, the material on record establishes that the objections raised by the petitioners were duly considered by the Land Acquisition Officer whilst submitting the report, and by no stretch of imagination, can it be said that the acquisition is not for a public purpose, or lacks bona fides. 16. As such, we find that no grounds are available to the petitioners to the challenge the notifications issued by the respondent No. 1 to acquire the land of the petitioners. In view of what has been held hereinabove, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. 17. In the above premises, there is no merit in the present petition and consequently the same stands dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.