Judgment 1. The following are the allegations succinctly, as per the petition under Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971: The property covered by the proceedings is spreading to an extent of 2757 Sq.ft. in the first floor of National Insurance Building in Door No.224, N.S.C. Bose Road, Chennai-1. The said building belongs to the first respondent and it is a Public Premises under Section 2(e) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as Act). It was leased out to the petitioner for a period of three (3) years on a monthly rent of Rs.37,220/- (at Rs.13.50 per sq.ft. Per month) for carrying on legal profession. The joint measurement was made on 30.4.2004 and 2757 sq.ft. was offered, a floor plan was also drawn accordingly and the same was sent to the respondent along with draft lease agreement for execution and registration. The keys of the premises were handed over to the petitioners on 5. 2004. Even before executing and registering the lease agreement, the petitioner started carrying out structural alteration in the premises, in variance to contract. On 112. 2004 the first respondent inspected the petitioners premises. It was found that the petitioner had unauthorisedly taken and encroached upon some more area pertaining to another tenant and he had taken a sketch of the area admeasuring 3216 Sqft instead of 2757 Sqft. Again the first respondent was required to send floor plan of the area occupied by him, by a letter dated 112. 2005 and required to execute lease deed before 30.12.2005 and informed that on failure, the entire offer shall stand withdrawn. Despite the opportunity given, the petitioner failed to submit the floor plan nor got the lease registered. Hence, on 1. 2006 the first respondent sent notice giving 15 days period intimating termination of tenancy and calling upon to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises. The petitioner acknowledged the notice on 1. 2006 and the notice period expired on 11. 2006. He is an unauthorised occupant and hence he may be evicted by an order of eviction by the Estate Officer. 2. The petitioner acknowledged the notice on 1. 2006 and the notice period expired on 11. 2006. He is an unauthorised occupant and hence he may be evicted by an order of eviction by the Estate Officer. 2. After filing of the above said application before the Estate Officer, the petitioner filed a petition under Section 5 of the Act, requesting the said authority to respect the below mentioned prayers: "(i) Hold that in view of the law laid down by the various High Courts and referred to in the accompanying affidavit. (a) the respondent-LIC is not entitled to take advantage of or recourse to the Public Premises Act to vacate/evict the applicant-tenant and (b)the respondent-LIC is only entitled to take recourse to regular Civil Court or Rent Control against the applicant-tenant (ii) consequently dismiss the Petition No.7 of 2006 as not maintainable in law and without jurisdiction. (iii) direct the respondent to pay the cost to the applicant-tenant and (iv) pass such further orders as deemed fit and necessary in the circumstances of the case and in the interest of Justice." 3. In the affidavit appended to this petition, the petitioner has mentioned that he has become a lawful tenant under the respondent-LIC in the month of May 2004 and he has spent more than Rs.50 lakhs to carry out the work of interior decoration, furnishing, etc., as required by any law firm of international standards. But the LIC and its officers, illegally, unlawfullly, high-handedly, maliciously and untenably sought to withdraw the allotment, refused to receive the rent. The correspondences exchanged between the parties would show the illegal and high-handed way, in which LIC acted. 4. After filing with the above said application, the Estate Officer required the first respondent by means of his communication dated 24.08.2006 to file a written reply to the averments made in the petition on 16.09.2006. 5. Reacting to the above said communication by the Estate Officer, the petitioner filed another application under Section 5 of the Act requesting the Estate Officer to recall and withdraw his suo motu communication dated 28. 2006. 5. Reacting to the above said communication by the Estate Officer, the petitioner filed another application under Section 5 of the Act requesting the Estate Officer to recall and withdraw his suo motu communication dated 28. 2006. In the affidavit annexed to the petition he has stated that since the authorised representative of the LIC had waived his right to file any counter or reply and argued the application and prayed for early orders, the authority cannot and should not suo motu reopen the application and ask the LIC to submit its written reply, particularly when there is no request by way of a formal application from the landlord. The landlord cannot be suo motu directed to file his counter without his written request by way of any application particularly as required by the landlord LIC, after full-fledged arguments were heard on the application and when at the fierce insistence of the landlord LIC, the application itself has already been posted for orders. The LIC representative was only going on repeating to say "Pass Eviction Order" but the authority explained to the LICs representative that the application is seeking to dismiss the Eviction petition for want of jurisdiction and thus advised to file a counter. Inspite of the advise from the authority as well as the advocate of this petitioner the LIC representative replied that he did not want to file counter. It seems that the LICs higher-ups after reading the application have privately instructed the Estate Officer to suo-motu reopen the application and direct the LIC to file written reply, though it is the LIC who had waived its right to file reply. 6. In the above said application the Regional Manager of the first respondent filed counter by stating that the proceedings before the Estate Officer cannot be equated to an Industrial Tribunal giving opportunity for Managements in the proceedings, where unique procedure is applied in conduct of proceedings and it is requested that the Interlocutory Application filed by the petitioner may be dismissed and main petition be taken up for enquiry. 7. This petitioner filed a reply affidavit to the above said counter. It is stated that he cannot be brought within the scope of Public Premises Act. The main petition is frivolous one. No explanation nor provision of law is found in the suo motu communication dated 28. 2006. There was no proceedings on 28. 2006. 7. This petitioner filed a reply affidavit to the above said counter. It is stated that he cannot be brought within the scope of Public Premises Act. The main petition is frivolous one. No explanation nor provision of law is found in the suo motu communication dated 28. 2006. There was no proceedings on 28. 2006. The authority and the landlord are having discreet sessions in the absence of the tenant. 8. On 30.4.2007, the Estate Officer passed a final Order in the main petition directing the appellant to vacate the schedule premises within 15 days and in the event of refusal or failure to comply with the order, the occupants are liable to be evicted, if needed, by the use of such force as may be necessary. 9. The said order was challenged before the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, in C.M.A.No.70 of 2007 by this appellant. After hearing both parties, learned Principal Judge, set aside the order and allowed the appeal remitting back the matter to the Estate Officer, directing him to decide the preliminary issue and pass orders on merits within a period of one month from the date of receipt of order. The Principal Judge has observed that it is evident that the office of the Estate Officer had received the written submissions filed by the appellant for the interim application on 5. 2007 thus indicating that no order could have been passed by the Estate Officer on 30.4.2007 or else, he could not have received the written submissions along with covering letter on 5. 2007 i.e., after the pronouncement of the purported Order and the same was affixed on the wall only on 17. 2007 after nearly three months and the letter dated 5. 2007 sent by the appellant discloses that the written submissions were served on the second respondent and therefore the orders could not have been passed on 30.4.2007, that the procedure followed by the Estate Officer does not inspire any confidence as he had not given real and effective opportunity to deal with the case put forth by the appellant but pronounced the impugned Order in a doubtful manner, giving rise to so many speculations. Further, the findings given regarding the preliminary objection raised by the appellant that if such course as sought for in the I.A. by the respondent is to be adopted, every petition has to be dismissed on the basis of the two Judgments cited, is not proper and the same is against law. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant argued in vehemence that even though the Appellate Authority has observed that the principles of audi alteram partem have to be strengthened, it should not have remitted the matter only to decide the preliminary issue and in this regard it has committed an error. It is further argued that even though the Principal Judge has unequivocally observed that the Estate Officer conducted the matter in a conducive manner, she should not have remanded the matter back again to the Estate Officer, that too for deciding the preliminary objections which purely based on law and the procedures laid down by various High Courts. 11. It is also contended that the Principal Judge did not consider the second Interlocutory Application filed by this appellant challenging the suo motu re-opening of the first Interlocutory Application to enable the first respondent of file his counter. While remitting back the appeal, the Appellate Authority have not directed the second respondent/Estate Officer to commence the proceedings on the second Interlocutory Application, before proceeding to hear preliminary objection in the preliminary issue in the first Interlocutory Application. 12. Per contra Mr. K.M. Vijayan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent would submit that the Appellate Authority should have rendered a finding that the petitioner is an unauthorised occupant under Section 2(g) of Public Premises Act and that in view of the termination of tenancy notice dated 1. 2006 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the petitioner had become unauthorised occupant and that the appellate authority should have found that under Section 4 of the Public Premises Act, objections to show cause notice is contemplated. But the same was not given by this appellant and that Interlocutory Applications filed by him are not permissible. It is also stated that without filing objections, the appellant cannot blame the Estate Officer. 13. But the same was not given by this appellant and that Interlocutory Applications filed by him are not permissible. It is also stated that without filing objections, the appellant cannot blame the Estate Officer. 13. It is quintessence of the contentions of the Appellant that he will not come under the definitions of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act, that he is a lawful tenant and the termination of tenancy ought to be decided only by the civil forum as per the guidelines issued by the Government of India (Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation - Directorate of Estates) in 2002. 14. Learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in 2008 (3) SCC 279 [New India Assurance Co. Ltd., v. Nusli Neville Wadia] in which Their Lordships have pointed out the responsibility of the Estate Officer. The operative portion of the Judgment in this regard goes thus:- "Where an application is filed for eviction of an unauthorized occupant it obligates the Estate Officer to apply his mind so as to enable him to form an opinion that the respondent is a person who has been in unauthorized occupation of the public premises and that he should be evicted. The Estate Officer with a view to determine the lis between the parties must record summary of the evidence. Summary of the evidence and the documents shall also form part of the record of the proceedings. Procedure laid down for recording evidence is stated in the rules concerned. The Estate Officer being a creature of the statute must comply with the same." 15. He also cited a Delhi High Court Judgment in 160 (2002) Delhi Law Times 497 (DB) [Uttam Prakash Bansal v. L.I.C. Of India] in which it is held that the object of enacting the Public Premises Act to provide a special remedy in respect to the eviction of unauthorised occupants of Governmental premises by avoiding a long-term legal process. It must have been the intention of the Legislature in promulgating the enactment that the recovery of Government properties from unauthorised occupants required special laws expediting the process of the general law. 16. It must have been the intention of the Legislature in promulgating the enactment that the recovery of Government properties from unauthorised occupants required special laws expediting the process of the general law. 16. In 1999 (2) CLJ 457 [Mirta Lina Private Limited v. Life Insurance Corporation of Indian & Ors.] the Calcutta High Court has opined that the Estate Officer at the time of final disposal shall also consider as to whether the guideline has any statutory effect or not. The above said two Judgments were relied upon by the respondent side to show that the guidelines in this regard are not binding upon the respondent. 17. In 1980 (4) SCC 435 [Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another] the Full Bench of the Supreme Court has laid down the following preposition of law: "In the present case the appellant-tenant continued to occupy the property even after the Premises Act came into force and in fact accepted the LIC as his landlord. Moreover, the lease was determined by the landlord by a notice under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act. In these circumstances, therefore, the case of the appellant squarely falls within the ambit of the definition of unauthorised occupation as contemplated by Section 2(g)." 18. The Supreme Court in 1994 (Supp) 3 SCC 694 [Jiwan Das v. LIC of India & Another] has held that an owner is entitled to deal with his property in his own way profitable in its use and occupation. A public authority is equally entitled to use the public property to the best advantage as a commercial venture, as an integral incidence of ejectment of a tenant/licence is inevitable. 19. A Division Bench decision of this Court in (2005) 1 M.L.J. 453 [Thayal Nayagi v. Union of India] was also cited by the first respondent side in which it is held thus:- "Decent people vacate the premises when the period of lease or license expire. When a person does not behave in a decent manner, the only way left is to forcibly throw him out. It is for this purpose that the aforesaid Act was enacted and the same object has been achieved by the learned single Judge namely, to throw out an unauthorised occupant." 20. When a person does not behave in a decent manner, the only way left is to forcibly throw him out. It is for this purpose that the aforesaid Act was enacted and the same object has been achieved by the learned single Judge namely, to throw out an unauthorised occupant." 20. Learned Senior Counsel also contends that no application is contemplated under Section 4 or 5 of the Act and the remedy for the tenant is only to file written statement and not any application and by filing petition under Section 5 of the Act, he has subjected himself to the Act and hence the revision is misconceived one. He also garnered support from a decision of the Supreme Court in (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 97 [Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.] wherein principles have been laid down as regards the powers exercisable by this court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The relevant portions in the Judgment are as follows: "6. ... ... the exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the fact of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to." 21. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to." 21. It is the bottom-line contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent that though the Government guidelines are expected to be followed as contended by the appellant, they do not prevail over the provisions of the Public Premises Act nor take away the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer and for this stand, the above said decisions were cited. 22. As far as the duty cast upon this Court is concerned, since the appellate authority has not adverted to the merits of the matter in detail, that is to say, whether the petitioner is an unauthorised occupant or not and whether the eviction order passed by the Estate Officer is sustainable, this Court does not embark upon dealing with those matters, since scrutiny of the appellate authority is very much essential on the merits of the matter, as regards the circumstance of this proceedings, in the view of this Court. Hence this Court is not at all rendering any finding on the merits of the matter. This Courts attention was focused to the attitude of the Appellate Court in remanding back the matter. 23. The Appellate Authority has also observed that the petitioner was under the impression that the arguments of both parties were heard in both I.As and the orders were reserved for those applications and at no point of time the attention of the appellant was drawn to the main petition and that no evidence was let in from both parties regarding the main petition and that since the petitioner had pleaded before the Estate Officer that he is not unauthorised occupant by filing I.As, the second respondent ought to have decided the issue whether the appellant is an unauthorised occupant or not, or the parties ought to have been informed that the same will be decided along with the main petition, but the same has not been done in this case. If it is so, the original authority has to record relevant evidence, if necessary and to hear both the parties in full with regard to main petition and I.As in a comprehensive manner and then come out with a definite finding. In the considered opinion of this Court, mere hearing of the I.As alone will not serve any purpose and when those applications are heard by the authority, incidentally it has to touch the merits of the matters covered by the main petition and the I.As could not be heard independent of the main petition since they are closely inter-related. 24. In such view of this matter, the remand order passed by the Appellate Authority has to be necessarily revised to the effect that the matter after remand shall be taken up in entirety and the second respondent shall decide the matter finally after affording ample opportunities to both parties. It is on record that the Estate Officer who passed Eviction Order retired on superannuation on 30.4.2007 and hence the parties may put forth their contentions before the present Estate Officer as they desire. 25. In the light of the above said observations, the remand order passed by the Appellate Authority is revised to the effect that the purpose of remand is not only to decide the preliminary objections or issue raised in the I.As filed by the petitioner, but also on the consideration of entire merits of the matter in the main petition comprehensively for just a decision at the end of the second respondent. The parties are directed to appear before the second respondent/Estate Officer on 13.06.2009 at 11.00 a.m. for further proceedings, without waiting for any notice from him. 26. The Civil Revision Petition is disposed of with the above said observations. No costs. Connected M.P. is closed.