JUDGEMENT Jyoti Saran, J. 1. It is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Patna. It is with respect to the judgment and order dated 6.7.1999, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 4475 of 1998 (The Managing Committee of Madarsa Islamia Fatahul Muslemeen versus The State of Bihar and Ors.). whereby the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition was inter alia pleased to hold that the Madarsa Board had no power to interfere in matters relating to termination/dismissal of service of the employees of the Madarsa. We shall go by the description of the parties and annexures as per the writ proceedings unless otherwise clarified by specific reference. 2. The writ petition bearing C.W.J.C. No. 4475 of 1998 was filed by the Managing Committee of Madarsa Islamia Fatahul Muslemeen at Sheohar in the District of Sheohar (respondent No. 7 in appeal), questioning the legality and validity of the order dated 13.4.1998 (Annexure-12), passed by the Chairman of the Bihar State Madarsa Education Board, whereby the Chairman had directed the Managing Committee to take necessary action for payment of the salaries of private respondent Nos. 7, 8 and 9, namely, Md. Abu Zafar, Md. Noorul Hassan and Md. Jawaid Anwar Siddique respectively (appellants herein) in the light of the order dated 21.1.1998, passed in L.P.A. No. 1012 of 1996. 3. The brief facts leading to the writ petition are that the writ petitioner is one of the oldest Madarsa at Sheohar in the District of Sheohar, and is affiliated to the Bihar State Madarsa Education Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"). On charges of continued absence and embezzlement of the Madarsa fund, respondent Nos. 7, 8 and 9, who were working as a Assistant Teacher in the Madarsa, were initially suspended, vide decision taken in the meeting of the Managing Committee dated 15.10.1986, and approved by the Board, vide letter Nos. 2014-18 dated 1.12.1987, followed by their dismissal. It was the case of the petitioner that proceeding was initiated against respondent Nos. 7 to 9, charges were served upon them, and they were directed to show cause as to why they be not dismissed from service for the said charges. 2014-18 dated 1.12.1987, followed by their dismissal. It was the case of the petitioner that proceeding was initiated against respondent Nos. 7 to 9, charges were served upon them, and they were directed to show cause as to why they be not dismissed from service for the said charges. However, they did not respond to the show cause issued to them despite several opportunities offered by the Managing Committee, leaving no other option but to dismiss them from service. 3.1. It was contended that the said three respondents had earlier moved this Court through C.W.J.C. No. 3891 of 1987 for payment of their salary which was dismissed by the Division Bench vide order dated 9.9.1987 copy of which is placed at Annexure-3 to the writ petition. 3.2. Undeterred, respondent No. 7 again filed a writ petition in this Court giving rise to C.W.J.C. No. 6803 of 1995 seeking a direction inter alia for payment of salary with effect from January, 1986 and which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court vide order dated 19.8.1986 (Annexure-5), on the ground that it raised a stale issue. Perhaps respondent Nos. 7, while filing C.W.J.C. No. 6803 of 1995 suppressed the fact of having moved this Court earlier for same set of reliefs through C.W.J.C. No. 3891 of 1987. along with respondent Nos. 8 and 9 which was dismissed by order passed on 9.9.1987 (Annexure-3), as is borne from paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit filed in the said case on behalf of Madarsa Board placed at Annexure-6. 4. Respondent No. 7 filed an appeal against order of the learned Single Judge giving rise to L.P.A. No. 1012 of 1996, which was heard on 21.1.1998, when statement was made on behalf of the Madarsa Board that payment shall be made to the appellants in terms of an order dated 20.3.1996, passed by the Board. Respondent No. 7 chose to withdraw the appeal which was permitted vide order dated 21.1.1998 (Annexure-11). The Madarsa Board thereafter issued an order dated 13.4.1998 (Annexure-12). requesting the District Education Officer, Sitamarhi, to take necessary action for payment of salary of respondent Nos. 7 to 9 in the light of the order dated 21.1.1998 passed by the High Court. 5. Respondent No. 7 chose to withdraw the appeal which was permitted vide order dated 21.1.1998 (Annexure-11). The Madarsa Board thereafter issued an order dated 13.4.1998 (Annexure-12). requesting the District Education Officer, Sitamarhi, to take necessary action for payment of salary of respondent Nos. 7 to 9 in the light of the order dated 21.1.1998 passed by the High Court. 5. Aggrieved by the communication dated 13.4.1998 (Annexure-12), the Managing Committee of the Madarsa moved through the writ petition in question praying inter alia for quashing of the order dated 13.4.1998 of the Madarsa Board. It was inter alia the case of the writ petitioner that the Board had no jurisdiction to issue such an order, as the private respondents stood suspended with effect from 15.10.1986, followed by their dismissal, and hence they were not entitled for any relief. 6. The writ petition was heard by a learned Single Judge of this Court who, by the impugned order dated 6.7.1999, was pleased to allow the writ petition. The learned Single Judge took notice of the statement made at paragraphs 6 to 8 of the counter affidavit filed by the Secretary of the Madarsa Board in the earlier round of proceedings arising from C.W.J.C. No. 6803 of 1995 (Annexure-6), regarding embezzlement of funds of the Madarsa by respondent Nos. 7 to 9, and their continued absence. It was also stated in the counter affidavit that the Madarsa had no power to take decisions or make payment ignoring the decision of the Managing Committee and that the Managing Committee was fully empowered to take appropriate decision in the matter. The learned Single Judge also took notice of the fact that respondent Nos.7 to 9 stood dismissed from service by decision of the Managing Committee dated 31.7.1992. Learned Single Judge taking note of the judgment reported in 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 509 (Bihar State Madarsa Education Board vs. Anjuman Ahle-Hadees and Another), and another judgment reported in (1999)3 SCC 676 (Yunus Ali Sha vs. Mohamad Abdul Kalam and Others), was of the opinion that the Madarsa Board had no power to interfere with matters of termination/dismissal of services of employees of the said school in question which was a minority institution and was pleased to quash the order dated 13.4.1998 (Annexure-12). 7. 7. It is relevant to state that the Madarsa Board has not chosen to assail the order of the learned Single Judge, rather it is private respondent Nos. 7 to 9 who are appellants before us, repeating their claim for payment of salary. 8. Mr. Ram Suresh Roy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, contended that they were entitled for payment of salary for the period they had worked in the Madarsa and the authorities had no jurisdiction to withhold the same. Mr. Roy with reference to judgment reported in AIR 1985 Patna 315 [1985 PLJR 837] (Anjuman Ahle Hadees, Darbhanga and Others vs. State of Bihar and Others) and 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 509 (Bihar State Madarsa Education Board vs. Anjuman Ahle-Hadees and Another), submitted that Section 24 of the Act 1981 having been declared ultra vires, it was the duty of the State to introduce a legislation and frame relevant rules to carry out the aims and objects of the Act and they are liable for appropriate direction. 9. Mr. Sanjay Kumar, G.P.-15, learned counsel for the State contended that the issue of payment of salary did not fall for consideration before the learned Single Judge rather validity of the order dated 13.4.98, was under scrutiny in the writ proceedings. It was also contended that no direction was issued by the Court in L.P.A. No. 1012 of 1996, rather the appeal was withdrawn by respondent No. 7 on the statement of the Madarsa Board, who had no jurisdiction to meddle with the internal affairs of the Madarsa. 10. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and considered the materials available on record. The contention of Mr. Roy have only to be taken for being rejected. The judgments cited by Mr. Roy are self-sufficient to negate claim of respondent Nos. 7 to 9 (appellants herein) of payment of arrears of salary. The claims are based on the direction issued by the Madarsa Board dated 20.3.1996 (Annexure-10), and the order dated 13.4.1998 (Annexure-12), also passed by the Madarsa Board requiring the authorities to take appropriate action in the light of the direction passed by this Court in its order dated 21.1.1998, passed in L.P.A. No. 1012 of 1996. It is manifest from the order dated 21.1.1998 (Annexure-11), that no direction was issued by the Court. It is manifest from the order dated 21.1.1998 (Annexure-11), that no direction was issued by the Court. We in this regard wish to reproduce paragraph 3 of the judgment of the Apex Court reported in 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 509 which was arising out of the judgment and order of this Court reported in AIR 1985 Patna 315 [:1985 PLJR 837], and was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and runs as follows: "The reasons adduced by the High Court for striking down these two provisions appear to us unexceptionable as these provisions are patently violative of Article 30 of the Constitution. As is evident, tremendous control is put in the hands of the Board to meddle with the affairs of the minority institutions. Such control is inconceivable in the scheme of things and specially in the context of Article 30 of the Constitution. In the situation, it is for the State Legislature to consider and examine whether it would be prudent and feasible to redraft these two provisions in the manner in which the Board-appellant is attempting to have these provisions read down. We do not think that this would be healthy and prudent in the facts and circumstances to redraft legislation by means of judicial interpretation. If the Board wants to assume some power in the context, it may have to request the Government to introduce legislation in the spirit of Article 30 of the Constitution to carry out the aims and objects of the Act. For these reasons, we dismiss this appeal. No costs." (Emphasis supplied) The said position was confirmed in a subsequent judgment of Apex Court reported in (1999)3 SCC 676 (Yunus Ali Sha vs. Mohamed Abdul Kalam and Others). 11 Apart from the fact that the issue regarding payment of salary to respondent Nos. 7 to 9 (appellants herein) stands concluded by the earlier orders of this court which have since attained finality, the Madarsa Board has no jurisdiction to interfere with the management of affairs of the Madarsa as held by the judgments referred to herein above and which exclusively vests in the Managing Committee of the Madarsa. The Managing Com- mittee having taken a conscious decision in the year 1986 of initially suspending respondent Nos. The Managing Com- mittee having taken a conscious decision in the year 1986 of initially suspending respondent Nos. 7 to 9, followed by their dismissal, no claim of salary can be entertained, particularly in view of the order dated 9.9.1987 (Annexure-3). 12. We are in full agreement with the order of the learned Single Judge which has been passed after taking into consideration the statutory provisions and the settled principles of law supported by judicial pronouncements on the issue. 13. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/ to be deposited by the appellants with the High Court Legal Services Committee within a period of four weeks from today. S.K.Katriar, J. 14 I agree.