JUDGMENT 1. - This is plaintiff's second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 8/1/2001 passed by District Judge, Ajmer in Regular Civil Appeal No. 87/1999 whereby the appeal of the plaintiff was dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 24/10/1994 passed by Civil Judge, (Junior Division), Ajmer City (West), Ajmer in Civil Suit No. 295/1987 has been affirmed. 2. According to the office report, this appeal has been filed after a delay of 3229 days and an application under section 5 read with section 14 of the Limitation Act has also been filed, therefore heard learned counsel for the parties on the application filed by the appellant for condonation of delay. 3. It was inter alia contended that on account of paucity of funds, the appellant could not avail the statutory remedy of filing second appeal within the stipulated period of 90 days. It was then submitted that on getting the financial aid from the relatives and friends he filed a Civil Writ No. 5928/2005 on 12/10/2004 and challenged the impugned order of termination dated 27/9/1985 and that writ petition came to be decided on 2/12/2008 wherein this Court has granted liberty to the appellant to file second appeal and also observed that appellant can avail the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act for the period w.e.f 12/10/2004 to 2/12/2008, therefore appellant has good reason for seeking condonation of delay occurring in filing this appeal. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment delivered in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , wherein it was held that courts should adopt a liberal and justice oriented approach and while condoning the delay of four days on the part of the State in filing the appeal it was further observed that hyper technical ground of bar of limitation should not be adopted. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment delivered in the case of Bhikhabhai Mavjibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1994(1) Gujarat Law Reporter page 151 wherein it was held that technical plea should ordinarily not be taken by Government or a public authority. 4. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment delivered in the case of Bhikhabhai Mavjibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1994(1) Gujarat Law Reporter page 151 wherein it was held that technical plea should ordinarily not be taken by Government or a public authority. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed the prayer of condonation of inordinate delay and submitted that according to the plaintiff, his services as a teacher were terminated by a letter dated 27/9/1985 and in that regard a suit was filed on 5/12/1987 which came to be dismissed on 24/10/1994 and appeal preferred against that judgment was also dismissed on 8/1/2001 and now this second appeal has been filed on 9/2/2009 by the appellant. It was then submitted that the court fee payable was only Rs. 196/- and according to the appellant he did not prefer the appeal and directly came in writ jurisdiction for quashing the order dated 27/9/1985 whereby his services are said to have been terminated, therefore he deliberately did not choose to file the second appeal, therefore there is no justification in condoning the inordinate delay. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment delivered in the case of Rabindra Nath Samuel Dawson v. Sivakami and others, reported AIR 1972 Supreme Court 730 wherein it was held that time spent in prosecuting previous proceedings could only be excluded if such proceedings have been initiated with bonafide and good faith. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment delivered in the case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another, reported in AIR 1998 Supreme Court 2276 wherein it was held that there should be a reasonable and satisfactory explanation for an inordinate delay and in absence thereof it is not appropriate and judicious to condone the delay. 5. I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar. The admitted position is that the parties are under litigation since 1987 for the cause of action arose in 1985. The first appeal was dismissed on 8/1/2001 but the appellant did not prefer second appeal against that judgment and decree and chose to file writ petition for the same cause of action three years thereafter i.e. in the year 2004. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant was prevented and having a sufficient cause for not filing the second appeal within a period of limitation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant was prevented and having a sufficient cause for not filing the second appeal within a period of limitation. It is also evident from the material on record that court fee payable was only Rs. 195/- and therefore in the circumstances where the appellant filed a writ petition, it cannot be said that he was not having fund of Rs. 195/- for filing the second appeal. Keeping in view the entire facts and circumstances, I am not satisfied that the inordinate delay in filing the appeal is due to sufficient cause, therefore in my considered view it is not a fit case for condonation of delay. 6. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation.Appeal Dismissed. *******