JUDGMENT :- The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether in view of the documents Exs.22, 23, 61, 64, 65, 68,78,81 to 99 and 93, finding that the appellants had no share or interest in the suit property was perverse ? (2) Whether the Courts have correctly interpreted or refused to consider the documents at Exhs.22, 23,61, 63, 65, 68, 78,81 to 88 and 93 ? (3) Whether Spl. C.S. No.584/98 filed by respondent Anjanabai on 8/6/98 is within limitation in view of earlier Civil Suit No.2028/83 filed by appellant no. 1 ? 2. Few facts giving rise to the second appeal and to the afore-stated substantial questions of law are stated thus The appellants are the original defendants. Respondent-Anjanabai is the original plaintiff. A suit was filed by Anjanabai for a declaration that she was the owner of the suit property. Anjanabai had also claimed possession of the suit property from the appellants. It is the case of Anjanabai that the suit property is situated in Abhyankar Nagar, Nagpur and was allotted by the Nagpur Improvement Trust in favour of Balkrishna, the deceased husband of Anjanabai, on leasehold rights. It is the case of Anjanabai that the Nagpur Improvement Trust had constructed a structure thereon and some additional construction was also made in the year 1964. According to Anjanabai, Balkrishna had allowed his younger brother Ramchandra, the appellant no.1, to reside in a part of the suit property. Since Ramchandra did not vacate the suit property, in spite of the requests from Anjanabai, a suit for declaration and possession was filed. 3. Ramchandra filed the written statement and denied the claim of Anjanabai. It was the case of Ramchandra that the plot was sought to be allotted in the names of Balkrishna and Ramchandra and an application was jointly made by both the brothers to the Nagpur Improvement Trust, for allotment of the suit property. The Nagpur Improvement Trust had granted the loan amount in the name of Balkrishna as it was not possible to take the loan in the names of two persons. The hire purchase agreement was also in the name of Balkrishna for the same reason. According to Ramchandra, both the brothers started residing in the suit house since the year 1964. The Nagpur Improvement Trust had granted the loan amount in the name of Balkrishna as it was not possible to take the loan in the names of two persons. The hire purchase agreement was also in the name of Balkrishna for the same reason. According to Ramchandra, both the brothers started residing in the suit house since the year 1964. There was a mutual understanding between the brothers and in the year 1977, a Samjhautapatra was executed in the presence of five panchas. It is the case of Ramchandra that both the parties had accepted the joint ownership of Balkrishna and Ramchandra over the suit property by the said Samjhautapatra. It is pleaded by Ramchandra that the brothers applied to the Nagpur Improvement Trust for mutation of their names, but the Nagpur Improvement Trust asked Ramchandra and Balkrishna to apply and obtain the permission of the Urban Land Ceiling authorities. Accordingly, the permission was sought and the same was granted by the authorities. A Deed of Declaration was executed between the parties on 18/8/1977 accepting the terms of the Samjhautapatra. The Nagpur Improvement Trust had informed Balkrishna and Ramchandra that it would be proper to execute the lease deed in favour of only one person and later on, Balkrishna may transfer a part of the property in favour of Ramchandra. The lease deed was to be executed after the repayment of the loan. However, before the execution of the lease deed, Balkrishna expired on 29/5/1981. According to Ramchandra, Anjanabai submitted an application to the Nagpur Improvement Trust for executing a lease in her favour, on 22/9/1982. Since the lease deed was executed in favour of Anjanabai, Ramchandra had filed a civil suit in the year 1983 for a declaration that he had half share in the leasehold property. The suit was registered as Regular Civil Suit No.2021 1983. Ramchandra also sought a partition of the suit property. However, the suit filed by Ramchandra was dismissed and Ramchandra preferred a first appeal against the judgment passed by the trial Court. The first appeal was numbered as First Appeal No.64 of 1986. During the pendency of the first appeal, an application was filed by Ramchandra for withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit. However, the suit filed by Ramchandra was dismissed and Ramchandra preferred a first appeal against the judgment passed by the trial Court. The first appeal was numbered as First Appeal No.64 of 1986. During the pendency of the first appeal, an application was filed by Ramchandra for withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit. The first appellate Court, by an order dated 23/3/1993, permitted Ramchandra to withdraw the suit and granted liberty to file a fresh suit in case it was necessary to do so. 4. It was pleaded by the defendants that the suit filed by Anjanabai was barred by limitation as the period of 12 years for filing the suit for declaration started running since the year 1983, when Ramchandra had asserted his title over a part of the leasehold property and the suit filed on 8/6/1998 was clearly barred by limitation. Ramchandra sought for the dismissal of the suit. 5. The trial Court framed the necessary issues and on an appreciation of the evidence on record, came to a conclusion that Anjanabai had succeeded in proving that the suit property belonged to deceased Balkrishna and after his death, Anjanabai became the owner of the same. The trial Court held that the suit was not barred by limitation. The Court held that Ramchandra had failed to prove that he became the owner of the eastern portion of the house and had also perfected his title over the suit property by adverse possession. The trial Court decreed the suit of Anjanabai and directed Ramchandra and the other defendants to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property to her. The judgment passed by the trial Court on 30th of November, 2000 was challenged by Ramchandra in a first appeal. The first appellate Court, however, by the judgment dated 31 st of July, 2002, dismissed the appeal filed by Ramchandra. Both the judgments are challenged by this second appeal. 6. Shri. S. M. Ghare, the learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that both the Courts committed a serious error in holding that the suit filed by Anjanabai was not barred by limitation. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that both the Courts failed to consider that the limitation period of 12 years for filing a suit for possession started running since the institution of the earlier suit by Ramchandra in the year 1983. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that both the Courts failed to consider that the limitation period of 12 years for filing a suit for possession started running since the institution of the earlier suit by Ramchandra in the year 1983. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, both the Courts have failed to consider this aspect of the matter and have erroneously held that the suit filed by Anjanabai was not barred by limitation. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Courts were not justified in holding that the time started running from 31/6/1998 when Ramchandra sent reply to the notice issued by Anjanabai, prior to the institution of this suit. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants took this Court through the record and proceedings and specially through the documents at Exhs•.22, 78, 61, 23, 63, 64, 65, 68, 81, 85, 86, 87, 93 and 27, to substantiate his submission that Ramchandra was also the joint owner of the suit property. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, these documents clearly lead to the only conclusion that Balkrishna and Ramchandra had sought the allotment of the plot in their names and both the brothers were the joint owners of the suit property. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the trial Court had merely made a passing reference to these documents in one of the paragraphs of the judgment and has failed to consider these documents while deciding the suit. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the first appellate Court also did not give due weightage to these documents though some of the documents were considered by the first appellate Court. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the Courts had failed to correctly interpret the said documents to answer the issue of joint ownership in favour of the appellants. 8. Shri. R. B. Deo, the learned counsel for the respondent, supported the judgments passed by both the Courts and submitted that the Courts had rightly held that the suit was filed by Anjanabai within the prescribed period of limitation. 8. Shri. R. B. Deo, the learned counsel for the respondent, supported the judgments passed by both the Courts and submitted that the Courts had rightly held that the suit was filed by Anjanabai within the prescribed period of limitation. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there was no dispute about the fact that Ramchandra had asserted his title over the suit property in the year 1983 and normally, the time would have started running for computing the period of limitation in this case in the year 1983, but in the instant case, the animus or hostility was broken within a period of 12 years with the withdrawal of the suit on 23/3/1993, and hence there was no question of filing the suit for possession within a period of 12 years from the institution of the previous suit. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the hostility had ceased to exist in the year 1993 on the withdrawal of the suit and hence, the time would not begin to run from 1983 for the purpose of determination of limitation in this suit. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1995 Orissa 239 and A.LR. 1990 Himachal Pradesh 1, to substantiate his submission. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Anjanabai was entitled to wait till the decision in the previous suit filed by Ramchandra as the parties were bona fide contesting the proceedings in order to have their mutual rights and obligations finally settled and hence the cause of action to file the suit for possession would arise only on the date when the earlier proceedings finally settled the rights and obligations between the parties. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in any case, Anjanabai could have waited till the culmination of the proceedings initiated by Ramchandra in the year 1983. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decision reported in 1970 Lab.LC. 708 to substantiate this submission. 10. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the property in question is not owned by Anjanabai, but is allotted to Anjanabai on leasehold rights. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decision reported in 1970 Lab.LC. 708 to substantiate this submission. 10. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the property in question is not owned by Anjanabai, but is allotted to Anjanabai on leasehold rights. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the lease deed is executed by the Nagpur Improvement Trust in favour of Anjanabai and none of the documents referred to by the counsel for the appellants, shows that the property was leased in favour of Ramchandra. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, it is not the case of Ramchandra that Ramchandra and Balkrishna were the coowners of the property and there is absolutely nothing on record to show that Ramchandra had equally expended for seeking the allotment of the property. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, both the Courts have concurrently held that Ramchandra had no money at the relevant time and he had not contributed for the allotment of the plot and the structure standing thereon. The documentary evidence on record, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, clearly showed that almost entire amount was paid by Balkrishna to the Nagpur Improvement Trust and Ramchandra could not have claimed joint ownership in view of the application made by him for the allotment of the said property. The findings recorded by both the Courts, in this regard, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, are pure findings of facts and they do not give rise to any substantial question of law. The learned counsel for the respondent sought for the dismissal of the appeal. 11. On hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on a perusal of the record and proceedings, it appears that the Courts did not commit any error in recording the finding that the suit was filed by Anjanabai within the prescribed period of limitation. Though Ramchandra had asserted his title over a part of the allotted property in the year 1983, it is necessary to note that the suit filed by Ramchandra was dismissed by the trial Court Ramchandra had not prosecuted the appeal filed by him before the first appellate Court and had withdrawn the suit on 23/3/1993, with liberty to file a fresh suit in case it was necessary to do so. Though the prescribed period of limitation of 12 years under the provisions of Section 65 of the Limitation Act, started running from the year 1983 with the institution of the suit by Ramchandra and with his assertion of ownership over the suit property, as rightly submitted on behalf of the respondent the expression of animus and hostility was broken within a period of 12 years, on 23/3/1993. Though the first appellate Court had granted liberty to Ramchandra to institute a fresh suit in case it was necessary to do so, it is necessary to note that no suit was actually instituted by Ramchandra after 23/3/ 1993. With the withdrawal of the suit instituted in the year 1983, the expression of hostility or animus had ceased to continue or exist and it cannot be said in such circumstances that it was necessary for Anjanabai to institute a suit within a period of 12 years from the institution of the previous suit in the year 1983. The period after 23/3/1993 cannot be taken into consideration for computing the period of limitation under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. In view of the aforesaid observations, it would not be necessary to consider the other limb of the submissions on this issue i.e. Anjanabai could have waited till the culmination of the proceedings instituted by Ramchandra in the year 1983. Though both the Courts had not considered the plea of Ramchandra that time started running from 1983 when he asserted his rights over a part of the suit property, even on consideration of the said plea, it is found that the suit was filed by Anjanabai within the prescribed period of limitation as there was a stage of change or interruption in the expression of animus or hostility on 23/3/1993 and the period prior to the change or interruption could not be taken into consideration. In the instant case the expression of hostile animus amounting to denial of title did not continue for an uninterrupted period of 12 years. The third substantial question of law framed by this Court is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the appellants. 12. The other two substantial questions of law framed by this Court are interrelated and they are required to be answered in the negative and against the appellants. The third substantial question of law framed by this Court is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the appellants. 12. The other two substantial questions of law framed by this Court are interrelated and they are required to be answered in the negative and against the appellants. Exh.22 is the receipt issued by the Nagpur Improvement Trust and this shows that an amount of Rs.900/- has been received from Balkrishna and Ramchandra. Exh.23 is the Samjhautapatra. This document recites that certain amounts had to be spent by Ramchandra and Balkrishna. There are certain other terms and conditions in the Samjhautapatra. The Samjhautapatra recites that four panchas were present at the time of execution of the same. It is necessary to note that none of the panchas mentioned in the Samjhautapatra was examined by Ramchandra and Khushab Bhandekar, the witness examined by Ramchandra, was not shown to be pancha in the said Samjhautapatra. The plaintiff had denied the signature of Balkrishna on the Samjhautapatra and in such circumstances, since none of the 4 panchas mentioned in the Samjhautapatra was examined on behalf of Ramchandra, the Courts rightly disbelieved this document. The Courts further did not commit any en-or in holding that assuming that the Samjhautapatra was duly executed between the parties, the evidence of Ramchandra clearly showed that this Samjhautapatra was not acted upon as there was hardly any evidence tendered by Ramchandra to show that he had abided with the terms and conditions mentioned in the Samjhautapatra and had indeed repaid the loan of the Nagpur Improvement Trust. The Courts have heavily relied on the admission of Ramchandra in his cross-examination that he had no funds at the relevant time. A finding of fact has been recorded by the first appellate Court on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record that Ramchandra had neither jointlymrchased the suit plot, nor had paid the loan amount. The Court further recorded the finding that Ramchandra also had not spent any amount on the construction on the leasehold plot. Merely because the documents were produced by Ramchandra on record to show that Balkrishna and Ramchandra had both desired at some point of time that the property be allotted and recorded in their joint names, the same would not confer any right or title on Ramchandra over the leasehold property. Merely because the documents were produced by Ramchandra on record to show that Balkrishna and Ramchandra had both desired at some point of time that the property be allotted and recorded in their joint names, the same would not confer any right or title on Ramchandra over the leasehold property. I have minutely perused the exhibits on which appellant Ramchandra has relied on for the purpose of claiming joint ownership over the suit property. Though these documents may indicate that at some point of time, the brothers had intended to acquire the leasehold right in their joint names, it was actually not acquired in their joint names at the subsequent point of time and the property was allotted only in the name of Anjanabai. Since there is absence of evidence on record to show that Ramchandra had abided by the terms of the Samjhautapatra and had repaid the loan of Nagpur Improvement Trust and had expended some amount for construction, the issue of joint ownership was rightly answered against Ramchandra by both the Courts, specially when the lease deed was executed in the name of Anjanabai and Ramchandra had not set up a case of co-ownership. Though the trial Court has not specifically considered the documents relied on by the appellants, the first appellate Court, as a final fact finding Court, has not failed in its duty to consider these documents and on a proper appreciation of the same, has held that they do not support the case of Ramchandra for holding that he is the joint owner of the suit property. The findings recorded by both the Courts that the appellants do not have any share or interest in the suit property cannot be said to be perverse by any stretch of imagination. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the first appellate Court has not correctly interpreted or has refused to consider the document at Exhs.22, 23, 61, 63, 65, 68, 78, 81 to 88 and 93. 13. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. Second Appeal dismissed.