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2009 DIGILAW 1073 (KER)

Najmunnisa v. State of Kerala

2009-11-11

M.C.HARI RANI, R.BASANT

body2009
Judgment : R. Basant, J. Does a literate detenu detained under the Kerala Anti-social Activities (Prevention) Act. 2007 (hereinafter referred, to as the ‘KAAPA’) have the right to be furnished with the relevant documents in a script and language which he can read and understand? Does the failure/omission to so furnish documents vitiate the detention? These questions arise for determination in this case. 2. To the vitally relevant facts first. The petitioner is the mother of the detenu. He is detained as per Ext.P2 order passed by the 3rd respondent under S.3 of the KAAPA. That order is dated 3/8/2009. The detenu was arrested and his detention commenced on 6/8/2009. The detenu is allegedly a known rowdy involved in seven cases, all of which come within the purview of S.2(t) of the KAAPA. Order of approval under S.3(3) and order of confirmation under S.10(4) have already been passed, it is submitted. 3. It is not disputed that the mother tongue of the detenu is Urdu. He hails from the border district of Kasargod close to the Kerala-Karnataka border. He studied in a Kannada medium school. He can speak and understand Malayalam; but he cannot read or write Malayalam. 4. The relevant documents referred to in S. 7(2) of the KAAPA were furnished to the detenu in English and Malayalam. Ext.P1 report of the sponsoring authority was in English; whereas all other relevant documents are in Malayalam. The documents were read over and explained to the detenu obviously in Malayalam. He evidently understood the contents of those documents. But copies were not furnished to him in Kannada and were furnished to him only in Malayalam. He did not raise any objections when the documents were furnished to him. He acknowledged receipt of the documents in his own hand in Kannada language. 5. Admittedly, the detenu did not make any representation to the Government or the Advisory Board under S.7(2) of the KAAPA. Through his mother, he chose to come before this court with this petition for issue or a writ of habeas corpus to assail the order of detention and the consequent detention. 6. On these fundamental facts stated in paragraphs 2 to 5 above, there is no dispute between the parties. Various grounds are urged to challenge. Ext.P2 order of detention and the consequent detention. At the end of the arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner Ms. 6. On these fundamental facts stated in paragraphs 2 to 5 above, there is no dispute between the parties. Various grounds are urged to challenge. Ext.P2 order of detention and the consequent detention. At the end of the arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner Ms. Padmakuinari.R submits that the petitioner does not want to assail the impugned order on any other ground. The learned counsel assails the impugned order on the following sole ground. That is: The copies of documents having not been furnished to the literate detenu in a language/ script which he can read, there is crucial and vital infraction of the mandate of Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India and S. 7(2) of the KAAPA. 7. Detailed arguments have been advanced before us. The learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Director General of Prosecutions have taken us through the relevant provisions of the Constitution, statute and precedents after due research. We may, at the outset, reiterate that the factual details narrated in paragraphs 2 to 5 above are not disputed by either side. In this fact scenario, this court has to decide whether the omission to furnish the relevant documents in the Kannada script which alone the detenu is able to read and write vitiates the detention. 8. It will be appropriate at the very outset to refer to Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and S. 7(2) of KAAPA. In this fact scenario, this court has to decide whether the omission to furnish the relevant documents in the Kannada script which alone the detenu is able to read and write vitiates the detention. 8. It will be appropriate at the very outset to refer to Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and S. 7(2) of KAAPA. We extract the same below: “Art. 22(5): When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” “S. 7(2): The grounds of detention, specifying the instances of offences, with copies of relevant documents, as far as practicable, on the basis of which he is considered as a “known goonda” or “known rowdy” and giving such materials relating to his activities on the basis of which his detention, has been found necessary, shall be furnished to him as soon as possible, nevertheless, in any case, within five days of detention and he shall also informed in writing, under acknowledgement, of his right to represent to the Government and before the Advisory Board against the arrest and detention.” Art. 22(5) confers on the person detained preventively, the right to be communicated the grounds on which the order of detention has been passed. He is also entitled to be afforded an earliest opportunity for making a representation against the order. 9. It is unnecessary to refer to the precedents specifically. It is by now well settled that the most cherished constitutional right of an individual is his right to freedom and liberty. Such rights of an individual deserve to be protected. Preventive detention is tolerated by the Constitution notwithstanding its burning commitment to the rights of the individual to freedom and liberty. A person preventively detained is deprived of his right to freedom and liberty not punitively for any contumacious and culpable act that he has committed or after due trial, but merely because there is an apprehension and a suspicion entertained by an executive authority subjectively that his activities may endanger public order. The law of preventive detention has aptly been described as the “jurisprudence of suspicion”. The law of preventive detention has aptly been described as the “jurisprudence of suspicion”. To prevent antisocial activities, a republic wedded to the rule of law and the right to freedom and liberty of an individual has chosen to swallow the bitter pill of preventive detention. Such a person whose right to freedom and liberty is taken away by an executive order f preventive detention is also guaranteed certain rights under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. The language of Art.22(5) suggests that more than a right for the individual., this constitutional provision is worded in such a manner as to impose a duty and obligation on the detaining authority to observe certain formalities. Whether a piece of statutory law by the Parliament or the State legislature reiterates the safeguards under Art. 22(5) or not, the detaining authority is duty bound to observe the mandate of Art.22(5). The constitutional safeguard under Art. 22(5) permeates into all statutes dealing with preventive detention-Central or provincial; and entrenches itself in all such statutes. Under Art.22(5), the detaining authority has a duty to communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order has been made. The detaining authority has the further obligation to afford the detenu an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. It is now trite that the obligation to furnish the relevant documents, stems from the twin requirement of apprising the detenu as to why he is detained as also to give him an opportunity to make a representation against the order. 10. Having so understood Art.22(5) of the Constitution, we now look at S. 7(2) of the KAAPA. Irreducible constitutional obligation under Art.22(5) finds statutory expression and reiteration in S. 7(2) of the KAAPA also. We repeat that whether S. 7(2) is there in the statute book or not the constitutional obligation of the detaining authority to communicate/furnish the relevant documents to the detenu will remain unabated. The obligation/right under S. 7(2) of the KAAPA falls within the constitutional umbrella of protection provided under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. In short, whether such statutory right is there or not, the constitutional obligation/right under Art.22(5) of the Constitution shall, occupy the field. 11. Questions had arisen before constitutional courts about true ambit of the expression “communicate” under At.22(5) and “furnish” in S. 7(2). In short, whether such statutory right is there or not, the constitutional obligation/right under Art.22(5) of the Constitution shall, occupy the field. 11. Questions had arisen before constitutional courts about true ambit of the expression “communicate” under At.22(5) and “furnish” in S. 7(2). It is expanding the concept of ‘communication’ and ‘furnishing’ in these provisions that it has been laid down beyond a scintilla of doubt now that the detenu has a right to be furnished with documents in language which he knows. Furnishing the relevant documents in a language not known to the detenu will not be of any help to give meaning and content to the obligation under Art.22(5) of the detaining authority to apprise the detenu of the grounds of his detention and to give him an opportunity to make a representation against such order of detention. 12. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC 911) considered this question. That was a case where the order of detention and the relevant documents were in English. The relevant documents were read over and explained to the detenu in his language Gujarathi. The detenu was a literate person. But he did not know English. The copies of documents were not furnished to him in the language which he knew. But evidently it was red over and explained to him in the language which he knew. 13. The question that arose for consideration was whether this would be sufficient compliance with the mandate of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. The following passage which appears in para. 8 of the said judgment appears to us to be of crucial significance. “Para.8:…………………………………………. ……………………………………………………………………………….If the detained person is conversant with the (English) language, he will naturally be in a position to understand the gravamen of the charge against him and the facts and circumstances on which the order of the detention is based. But to a person who is not so conversant with the (English) language, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution, the detenu must be given the grounds in a language which he can understand, and in a script which he can read, if he is a literate person.” (emphasis supplied.) 14. The 5 Judge Bench was specifically considering the question about the impact of Art. 22 (5) vis-à-vis, a literate person. The 5 Judge Bench was specifically considering the question about the impact of Art. 22 (5) vis-à-vis, a literate person. It is here that the crucial observations assume significance. The quintessence of the dictum as we understand the same is thus: if the detenu is a literate person, grounds must be furnished to him in a language, the script of which he can read. 15. Later in Hadibandhu Ds v. District magistrate Cuttack (AIR 1969 SC 43), the question came up for consideration again before a 3 Judge Bench and the said Bench in para.6 opined thus: “Para. 6:…………… ……………………………………………………………………….Mere oral explanation of a complicated order of the nature made against the appellant without supplying him the translation in script and language which he understood would in our judgment, amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making a representation against the order.” (emphasis supplied) The 3 Judge Bench was also concerned with a case-where oral explanation of the relevant documents had been to the detenu in a language known to him. But the relevant documents were not furnished to him in a script and language which he could read and understand. 16. Still later in Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1981 SC 728), a 2 Judge Bench relying on Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra (supra) and Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate Cuttack (supra) reiterated the position in Para.20. We extract the relevant portion: “Para.20: …………………………………………………………………………………………”Communicate” is a strong word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the ‘grounds’ should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the ‘ground’ are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Art. 22(5) is infringed. If any authority is needed on this point, which is so obvious from Art. 22(5), reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra (1962 Supp.2 SCR 918 : (AIR 1962 SC 911) and Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate (AIR 1969 SC 43)(ibid).” 17. If any authority is needed on this point, which is so obvious from Art. 22(5), reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra (1962 Supp.2 SCR 918 : (AIR 1962 SC 911) and Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate (AIR 1969 SC 43)(ibid).” 17. In this case also, the relevant documents were all fully explained to the detenu in a language known to him at the time of arrest. But those documents were not furnished to him in a language which he could read and understand. The Supreme Court reiterated the position that it was nto enough if the relevant documents were explained to the detenu in a language known to him. It was held to be imperative that the document must be made available to him in a language he can understand. 18. It is necessary to advert to more precedents. The position appears to be well settled that however earnestly the documents may have been red over and explained to the detenu in a language known to him, it is imperative that he must be left with the document in language and script which he can read and understand if he is literate. 19. Coming back to the facts of this case, the detenu is a literate person indisputably. His mother tongue is Urdu. That was his first language in his school also, there are indications. He studied up to the 8th standard in a Kannada medium school. He is not able to read to write Malayalam. But he can speak and understand Malayalam. It is to such a detenu that the documents have been explained in Malayalam. But significantly he was not left with any document in a script which he can read and understand. In short, though the documents were explained to the literate detenu in a language which he knows, he was left with no copies of the documents in a script and language which he can read and understand. 20. The expression “furnish” in S. 7(2) must definitely take cue and colour from the expression “communicate” in Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. It is the paramount right under Art. 22(5) which finds expression in the relevant statute. In some cases enlarged right is given to the detenu under the statute. 20. The expression “furnish” in S. 7(2) must definitely take cue and colour from the expression “communicate” in Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. It is the paramount right under Art. 22(5) which finds expression in the relevant statute. In some cases enlarged right is given to the detenu under the statute. At any rate, no statute can take away the irreducible non negotiable paramount fundamental right under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. For the moment we understand the expression “furnish” in S. 7(2) as convening the same duty, obligation, right and privilege which the Constitution confers/imposes under Art. 22(5) by use of the expression “communicate.” 21. The learned Additional Director General of Prosecution contends that such a rigid view is likely to lead to difficulties. First of all the learned Additional Director General of Prosecution contends that if such a strict view were taken, in respect of blind persons or illiterate persons, it will become impossible to comply with the mandate of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and. S. 7(2) of the KAAPA. An illiterate person has no language which he can read or write, so that it would become impossible for the detaining authority to comply with the mandate of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. 22. The contention though it appears to be impressive at the first blush cannot stand closer scrutiny. The Constitution Bench decision in Harikishan (supra) clearly shows that; there is an added obligation when the detenu is a literate. So far as a blind person who has no Braille proficiency or an illiterate person who cannot red or write is concerned the mandate of Art. 22(5) as explained in Harikishan (supra) cannot literally be complied. But that is no reason to argue that in respect of those for whom literal compliance is possible, such compliance need not be made. The mere fact that the mandate of Harikishan (supra) taken literally cannot be complied with in toto in respect of blind and illiterate persons cannot of course persuade us to go against the mandate clearly expressed in para.8 extracted above that a literate person must be furnished with the documents in a script which he can read and understand. The mere fact that the mandate of Harikishan (supra) taken literally cannot be complied with in toto in respect of blind and illiterate persons cannot of course persuade us to go against the mandate clearly expressed in para.8 extracted above that a literate person must be furnished with the documents in a script which he can read and understand. Impossibility of compliance of an obligation in respect of some persons on account of reasons beyond the control of the authorities cannot persuade the Courts to permit them to disregard the constitutional mandate as understood by precedents in its application to others. 23. The learned ADGP next contends that it was not possible for the officer/detaining authority to know that the detenu was not proficient in the Malayalam language. He is a keralite. He resides in Kerala though in the border district. He admittedly can speak and understand Malayalam on hearing. How is the detaining authority or the serving officer to know that the detenu is not proficient in the script of Malayalam which he can speak and understand on hearing but cannot read or write? The learned ADGP hence contends that it must be held that the detaining authority and the serving officer are not guilty of any contumacious infraction of the provisions of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and S. 7(2) of the KAAPA. This contention also appears to be very impressive. But we are afraid, even on facts, that contention cannot be accepted on detailed consideration. We wanted the learned ADGP to place the file before us and it is conceded unambiguously that when the documents were furnished to the detenu, he had acknowledged the same in the language in which he is proficient, ie. Kannada language. At least when the acknowledgment was so received in kannada the authorities must be held to be notified of the want of proficiency of the detenu in Malayalam script. It was definitely the mandatory duty of the detaining/serving authority to ensure that the obligation under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India and S. 7 (2) of the KAAPA was zealously observed by furnishing copies of the documents to the detenu in a language, the script of which he could read and understand. It was definitely the mandatory duty of the detaining/serving authority to ensure that the obligation under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India and S. 7 (2) of the KAAPA was zealously observed by furnishing copies of the documents to the detenu in a language, the script of which he could read and understand. The argument of helplessness on the part of the detaining and serving authorities cannot, in these circumstances, be accepted as sufficient to absolve them of the duty to comply with Art.22 (5) of the Constitutions and S. 7(2) of the KAAPA and to deprive the detenu f his corresponding right under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India as explained in Harikisan. 24. The learned ADGP thirdly contends that the detenu had not raised any objections. If he did not know the Malayalam language-ie, the script, to enable him to red and understand the relevant documents, he should have raised a prompt objection that the copies must be furnished to him in the language which he knows. He having raised no objections at any point of time prior to the filing of this Writ Petition, that grievance is liable to be ignored, contends the learned ADGP. We are afraid, we cannot accept this contention also. We must appreciate the position of a detenu under the preventive detention law. More often that not, we note that such detnus are not aware of their constitutional rights. More over the language of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and S. 7(2) of the KAAPA as we indicated earlier is not couched in the form of conferring a right on the detenu. It is more in the nature of imposing a duty on the detaining and serving authorities. It is not for the detenu to claim any rights under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and S.7(2) of the KAAPA. It is the duty of the authorities to comply with those obligations in view of the mandate of the Constitution and the statute. The compliance with Art.22(5) of the Constitution and S. 7(2) of the KAAPA is not to be made in response to a demand or objection raised by the detenu. But such duties and obligations are to be performed and discharged because the Constitution, the mother of all our laws and the statutory law, command the authorities to perform such obligations. The compliance with Art.22(5) of the Constitution and S. 7(2) of the KAAPA is not to be made in response to a demand or objection raised by the detenu. But such duties and obligations are to be performed and discharged because the Constitution, the mother of all our laws and the statutory law, command the authorities to perform such obligations. In this view of the matter, we are unable to agree that the want of a specific demand on the part of the detenu to furnish document to him in a script which he understands can be held to be sufficient to absolve the authorities of their constitutional duty or to deny the detenu his rights under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution as understood by the Supreme Court, in Harikishan (Supra). 25. The learned ADGP places reliance on the following decisions i) Lakhmir Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1987 Cri. LJ 421) Allahabad High Court; ii) Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1973 SC 1328); iii) Mr. Kubic Dariusz v. Union of India & Ors: (AIR 1990 SC 605 (1)); iv) Talib Hussain v. State of Jammu and kashmir ((1971) 3 SCC 118) to contend that the want of a demand on the part of a detenu is crucial, vital and fatal to the plea raised by him before Court that the constitutional/statutory mandate has not been complied with. 26. We are not able to agree with this contention. In all those decisions, the question was whether there has been effective communication. Was the detenu feigning ignorance of the language in which copy was furnished to him? It is to resolve that controversy that the courts took into account the want of objections on the part of the detenu. It is not as though the courts sailed to the conclusion that the obligation to communicate/furnish the relevant documents under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and S. 7(2) of the KAAPA need be complied with only if such demand is made by the detenu. According to us what perhaps tilts the scales in this case is the unambiguous acceptance of the position that the detenu is unable to read wand write the Malayalam script. He is a hanafi Muslim having Urdu as his mother tongue. He resides in the border district and had studied in Kannada medium school. According to us what perhaps tilts the scales in this case is the unambiguous acceptance of the position that the detenu is unable to read wand write the Malayalam script. He is a hanafi Muslim having Urdu as his mother tongue. He resides in the border district and had studied in Kannada medium school. His exposure to Malayalam speaking people in the State does enable him to speak Malayalam and understand Malayalam when he is spoken to in that language. But that cannot ever militate against his contention (which contention is not disputed and is admitted) that he cannot read or write the Malayalam script or understand the same. In a case where there is a dispute about the proficiency of a detenu in a language, the want of objection on his part may loom large and can be reckoned as a relevant input. But in a case where admittedly he is not proficient in the Malayalam script and is unable to read and write that script, the want of objections on his part cannot be given undue importance or significance. In this view of the matter, we are unable to accept the contention that the want of an objection promptly raised should persuade the Court to hold that there is no infraction of the mandate of Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution and S. 7(2) of the KAAPA. 27. The learned ADGP then contends that S. 7(3) of the KAAPA must come to the rescue of the respondent. Though Art. 22(3) declares that a detenu detained under a law providing for preventive detention is not entitled to the right to consult a lawyer under Art. 22(1) of the Constitution. S. 7(3) of the KAAPA recognizes such an enlarged right. We extract S. 7(3) of the KAAPA below: “S. 7(3): The Superintendent of the Jail where such person is detained shall afford him reasonable opportunity to consult a lawyer and reasonable assistance in making a representation against the detention order to the Government or to the advisory Board.” 28. Deviating from the scheme of Art. 22(3) of the Constitution, S. 7(3) of the KAAPA declares that a detenu has the right to consult a lawyer and also a right to receive assistance from the Superintendent of the Jail to make a representation against the detention order. Deviating from the scheme of Art. 22(3) of the Constitution, S. 7(3) of the KAAPA declares that a detenu has the right to consult a lawyer and also a right to receive assistance from the Superintendent of the Jail to make a representation against the detention order. The learned ADGP contends that S. 7(3) of the KAAPA gives a larger right to the detenu than what Art. 22 of the Constitution provides and contrary to the mandate of Art. 22(3) confers on him the right to consult a lawyer. There is also an obligation on the Superintendent of the Jail to afford the detenu reasonable opportunity to consult a lawyer and render assistance in preparing the representation. The learned ADGP argues that there is nothing to show that such assistance has not been given by the Superintendent of Jail. A. statutory obligation in the absence of contra assertions must be assumed to have been satisfied. The availability of person to read and explain the document to the detenu was sufficient satisfaction of the rights to know the grounds of detention and to make a representation against such an order of detention. In short, the learned ADGP contends that S. 7(3) of the KAAPA is a complete answer to the grievance raised that the non furnishing of copies of the relevant documents in a language, the script of which is not known to the detenu, would vitiate the detention. 29. This view found favour with us in the decision in Sathi v. State of Kerala (2009 (2) KLD 377 (D.B)). In para. 17 to 21, we took the view that in the light of such a provision which is peculiar to the KAAPA the precedents rendered under other preventive detention laws about the obligation to furnish the relevant documents in a language known to the detenu cannot be imported while considering the same question under the KAAPA. 30. However, a later DFull Bench decision of this Court has taken the view in the unreported judgment dt.30.09.09 in W.P. (Crl.) No.260 of 2009 P.K. Bose v. Secretary to Government* (see paragraphs 23 to 25) that the said view taken by us is not correct. The declaration of law by the Full Bench occupies the field and binds us now. This contention is therefore not available to the learned ADGP now. 31. The declaration of law by the Full Bench occupies the field and binds us now. This contention is therefore not available to the learned ADGP now. 31. The learned ADGP contends that the mandate of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and S. 7 (2) of the KAAPA must be read and understood reasonably and not in an over emotional or romantic manner. Art. 22(5) has twin purpose to serve and the first purpose is that the detenu must be apprised of the grounds of his detention at the earliest. The other twin purpose is that he must be given opportunity to make a representation against the order. When both these requirements are satisfied, it must be held that in substance, Art. 22(5) of the Constitution has been complied with. The learned ADGP relies on a passage from Mr. Kubic Dariusz v. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1990 SC 605(1)), where their Lordships has approved the earlier observations of the Court that commonsense is not to be kept in cold storage even while interpreting the Constitutional provisions relating to freedom and liberty. In short, the contention of the learned ADGP is that the right of the detenu to know the grounds of his detention and to make a representation against the order of detention have not in any way been affected by the alleged inadequacy in the furnishing of documents. 32. We are afraid, this contention cannot also be readily accepted. It is admitted that no representation was made to the Government or the Advisory Board. The petitioner would take the stand, that the detenu could not make such a representation because there was no effective communication/furnishing of the documents. We have no material to conclude otherwise. The fact remains that the alleged detenu did not admittedly make a representation before either the Government or the Advisory Board and was left to depend upon his mother to come to this Court to assail the order of detention and the consequent detention. It is difficult for us to assume that the detenu, did not make a representation before the Government of the Board because he accepted, his preventive detention under the impugned order without demur or because he did not want to make any representation. That he did not make a representation is evident. It is difficult for us to assume that the detenu, did not make a representation before the Government of the Board because he accepted, his preventive detention under the impugned order without demur or because he did not want to make any representation. That he did not make a representation is evident. We have no statement or affidavit by the Superintendent of the Prison that though he offered reasonable assistance under S .7(3) of the KAAPA, the detenu did not want to make a representation. In these circumstances, the inference appears to be irresistible that the more prudent course to be adopted by this Court is to accept the assertion of the petitioner that the detenu could not make a representation because he could not read and understand the documents. 33. The zealous insistence on compliance with the procedural stipulations in the preventive detention laws by the Constitution, statutes and precedents may arouse dissatisfaction in the minds of many. Is the system unreasonably insisting on compliance with procedural stipulations to the detriment of the substantive legislative purposes and demands of societal security? We must say that we do also at times have conscientious doubts on this aspect. The benefits of such approaches, more often than not, reach not paragons of virtue and righteousness but undeserving and unworthy hands tested on a moral plane. The lay polity may find it difficult to accept such approaches of the law. The yawning gap between the perceptions of the elite in law and lay polity may be injurious to the health of the legal system. But the system cannot ignore or overlook the fundamental constitutional commitment to the cherished values of individual freedom and liberty. In the battle for protection of such rights, procedural stipulations have been powerful weapons. That explains why the Constitution, preventive detention statutes and the precedents rendered by Courts have been insisting on strict compliance with procedural stipulations. To us, an efficient, competent and committed executive which recognizes the importance of the right to freedom and liberty of the individual and is at the same time alive to the needs and demands of societal safety and security, appears to be the only answer. The political and administrative executive must live up to athis challenge and that is the need of the hour. The political and administrative executive must live up to athis challenge and that is the need of the hour. The personnel have to be trained and equipped adequately to ensure strict compliance with procedure and to eliminate the possibility of undeserved, advantage being claimed on the basis of procedural lapses and inadequacies. 34. We do, in these circumstances, come to the conclusion that the paramount fundamental right under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India and statutory under S. 7(2) of the KAAPA of the detenu has been violated and the duty of the detaining/serving authorities under the said provisions have been breached in furnishing the relevant documents to the literate detenu in a language, the script of which he is unable to read and understand. 35. Following the decisions of the Supreme Court in Harikisan (supra), Hadibandhu Das (supra) and Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel (supra), conclusion appears to be inevitable that the correct binding law is that in respect of a literate detenu, the relevant documents have got to be furnished to him in a language and script which he can read and understand. Breach of that duty to furnish and the infraction of the right to receive such documents must certainly be held to invalidate and vitiate the detention. The challenge in this Writ Petition hence succeeds. 36. In the result: a)This Writ Petition is allowed; B) It is held that the detention of the detenu is illegal and unjustified; C) It is directed that the detenu shall forthwith be released from custody by the prison authorities if his continued detention is not necessary in connection with any other case; d) The Registry shall forthwith communicate the directions to the prison authorities at Central Prison, Kannur.