Judgment ( 1. ) This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 29-11-1994 passed by Sixth Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal in S. T. No. 377/1993 whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo R. I. for 5 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default, to suffer R. I. for 3 months with a further direction that in case of recovery of fine the entire amount be paid to complainant Gagan (PW3) as compensation. By that judgment only, co-accused Mohd. Shafique was acquitted of the offence. Admittedly, no appeal has been preferred by the State against the order of acquittal. ( 2. ) The prosecution case, in short, may be stated thus - (i) At the relevant point of time, complainant Gagan (PW3) was residing in Mahamai ka Baag, Jahangirabad, Bhopal whereas house of his friend Suresh, who owned a betel shop, was located near Radhakrishna Mandir in Barkhedi, Bhopal. (ii) On 16th of June, 1993 at about 7.45 p.m., Gagan (PW3), on a scooter, had gone to Barkhedi to meet Suresh and not finding him at the residence or the shop, went on looking for him in the locality. While doing so, he happened to meet another friend namely Manoj (PW4) and both of them started searching for Suresh. In the process, they entered into a lane situated in front of Lal Building. While returning, as they reached in front of Ekta Kirana shop, the appellant who was accompanied by co-accused Mohd. Shafique, obstructed their way and inquired about Suresh and as Gagan. expressed his ignorance, Mohd. Shafique exhorted the appellant to kill Gagan. Thereupon, the appellant inserted a Chhuri into the abdomen of Gagan whereas Mohd. Shafique dealt a sword blow on the person of Manoj. Sustaining the injury, Gagan fell down and observing that Sunil Shrivastava (PW7) was also proceeding towards the spot, the appellant and the co-accused fled away. (iii) Gagan was immediately taken to Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal where Dr. Ajay Mehta (PW10) examined him. Noticing a bleeding incised wound on the left side of Gagans waist, the medical expert admitted him to the hospital and referred the case to RSO (Surgery) for further examination and treatment. Dr. Yogesh Gautam (PW9), the RSO, had to perform exploratory Laparotomy as well as Nephrectomy to repair the injury categorized by him as dangerous to life. Noticing a bleeding incised wound on the left side of Gagans waist, the medical expert admitted him to the hospital and referred the case to RSO (Surgery) for further examination and treatment. Dr. Yogesh Gautam (PW9), the RSO, had to perform exploratory Laparotomy as well as Nephrectomy to repair the injury categorized by him as dangerous to life. (iv) The information (Ex. P-15) communicated by the CMO as to admission of Gagan to the Hospital was recorded by ASI Sohan Lal (PW12) in the Rojnamcha of P.S. Jahangirabad. Thereupon ASI S. L. Pandey (PW6) rushed to the hospital where he scribed Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P-3) at the instance of Gagan in Surgical Ward No. 2. Accordingly, a case under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC was registered against the appellant and his companion Mohd. Shafique. (v) During investigation, the appellant was apprehended and at his instance, the weapon of offence viz. chhuri was recovered from his house. ( 3. ) The appellant abjured the guilt and pleaded false implication due to animosity in view of non-payment of an amount of Rs. 500/- as charges due for repairing Gagans scooter in the workshop run by him. An alternative defence that the injuries were received by Gagan in a vehicular accident was also raised by making reference to the case diary statement (Ex. D/3) of his father Premnarayan in the chief examination of ASI S. L. Pandey, who though examined as prosecution witness No, 6 was wrongly permitted to be transposed as defence witness No. 1 (See. State of M. P. v. Badri Yadav and Anr. AIR 2006 SC 1769 : (2006 CriLJ 2128).) ( 4. ) The prosecution sought to prove the charges by examining as many as 12 witnesses including the injured and the eye witnesses. Upon a critical appraisal of the evidence on record, learned trial Judge concluded that it was only sufficient to prove the charge of attempt to murder, beyond a reasonable doubt, against the appellant. He, accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as indicated hereinabove. ( 5. ) Legality and propriety of the conviction in question have been challenged inter alia on the following grounds- (i) Non-holding of test identification parade despite the fact that the assailant was not named in the FIR. He, accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as indicated hereinabove. ( 5. ) Legality and propriety of the conviction in question have been challenged inter alia on the following grounds- (i) Non-holding of test identification parade despite the fact that the assailant was not named in the FIR. (ii) Non-corroborative evidence of the persons examined as eye-witnesses namely Pradeep (PW2), Kapil (PW5) and Sunil Shrivastava (PW7) and Sushila Sahu (PW8). (iii) Non-existance of the essential ingredients of the offence of attempt to murder. In response, learned Panel Lawyer, while making reference to the incriminating pieces of evidence on record, has contended that the conviction was fully justified. ( 6. ) In order to appreciate the merits of the rival contentions in a right perspective, it would be necessary to first advert to medical evidence on record. ( 7. ) Dr. Ajay Mehta (PW10), the then CMO of Hamidia Hospital, testified that in the night intervening 16th and 17th of June, 1993 at about 00.10 hours, Gagan with an incised wound over left waist was brought by Sunil Shrivastava. According to him, he immediately referred the case to RSO (Surgery) for further examination and treatment by scribing the MLC report (Ex. P-10). Corroborating these facts, Dr. Yogesh Gautam (PW9) stated that noticing a bleeding incised wound on left flank at mid axillary line measuring 1" x " x peritoneal cavity deep at umbilical level, he had to perform exploratory laparotomy to save life of Gagan. The operative findings recorded by the surgical specialist in his report (Ex: P-8A) may be reproduced as under- (i) Incised penetrating wound on left kidney piercing from lateral to medial side involving hilum. (ii) 2 cm. tear on spleenic flixar of colon with haemotoma outside and in the luman of bowel. (iii) Haemo-peritoneum approximately 2.5 liters of dark coloured blood present on peritoneal cavity. He further explained that the operative procedure also involved left sided Nephrectomy with repair of colonic tear with tube cecostomy. In his opinion, the injury was caused by sharp cutting and penetrating object and was grievous in nature and dangerous to life. ( 8. ) No dispute was raised as to nature and situs of injury. It is relevant to note that none of the medical experts was questioned on the point as to whether the injury could be sustained in a vehicular accident. ( 8. ) No dispute was raised as to nature and situs of injury. It is relevant to note that none of the medical experts was questioned on the point as to whether the injury could be sustained in a vehicular accident. The corresponding plea was, therefore, rightly rejected as an afterthought. ( 9. ) Coming to the other evidence on record, it may be observed that Gagan had substatially reiterated the allegations as recorded at his instance only by ASI S. L. Pandey (PW6) in the Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P- 3). According to him, it was upon his expression of ignorance as to whereabouts of Suresh that the appellant had pierced the knife into left side of his abdomen. His evidence drew ample support from the eyewitness account rendered by Manoj (PW4), who was also named in the Dehati Nalish. Even though, other witnesses to the incident namely Pradeep Lalwani (PW2), Kapil (PW5), Sunil Shrivastava (PW7) and Susheela Sahu (PW8) did not support the prosecution version yet, their non-corroborative evidence did not assume any significance in view of the fact that no material contradiction as to identity of the appellant as the author of the injury could be elicited in the cross examination of Gagan and Manoj. ( 10. ) The contention as to non-holding of test identification parade lost its significance in the light of one of the alternative defences based on the alleged bitterness of relations due to dispute as to payment of repair charges, Corresponding assertions made in the examination, under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, could not be ignored as a mere defence strategy (State of U. P. v. Lakhmi AIR 1998 SC 1007 : (1998 CriLJ 1411) referred to). Even otherwise, test identification parade, not being a substantive evidence, cannot be used to corroborate statement of identifying witness in the Court, that constitutes a substantive testimony. It is well settled that evidence as to identification of the accused for the first time in the Court is also not totally irrelevant and inadmissible. Law on the subject was explained by the Apex Court in Budhsen v. State of U. P. AIR 1970 SC 1321 : (1970 Cri LJ 1149) in the following words - "The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, seems to be to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. Law on the subject was explained by the Apex Court in Budhsen v. State of U. P. AIR 1970 SC 1321 : (1970 Cri LJ 1149) in the following words - "The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, seems to be to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in Court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceeding. There may, however, be exceptions to this general rule, when, for example, the Court is impressed by a particular witness, on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration." ( 11. ) Looking at the circumstances leading to infliction of injury, Gagan was not expected to forget face of the person who had subjected him to such a traumatic and unforgettable experience. ( 12. ) Thus, in the light of the overwhelming evidence on record the identity of the appellant as the person causing the injury to Gagan was established beyond reasonable doubt. ( 13. ) This brings to the question as to what was the offence committed by the appellant? ( 14. ) Learned counsel for the appellant had strenuously contended that the conviction for attempt to murder was not sustainable on facts suggesting that the appellant had no intention to cause death of Gagan. According to him, the appellant ought to have been convicted for the offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder for the reason that had Gagan died, the appellant would have been guilty of the offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. ( 15. ) To buttress the contention, he has placed reliance on the following precedents- (i) Sunil Kumar v. N. C. T. of Delhi (1998) 8 SCC 557 . (ii) Ram Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar (1998) 9 SCC 497 : (1998 CriLJ 1622) (iii) State of M. P. v. Jamshed (1977 (II) MPWN 455) (iv) State of M. P. v. Subhag Singh (1996 (1)MPWN 29) (v) Mittulal alias Manohar Prajapati v. State of M. P. (1998 CriLR (M. P.) 238). ( 16. (ii) Ram Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar (1998) 9 SCC 497 : (1998 CriLJ 1622) (iii) State of M. P. v. Jamshed (1977 (II) MPWN 455) (iv) State of M. P. v. Subhag Singh (1996 (1)MPWN 29) (v) Mittulal alias Manohar Prajapati v. State of M. P. (1998 CriLR (M. P.) 238). ( 16. ) As explained in Sunil Kumars case (supra), the offence punishable under Section 308 of the IPC postulates doing of an act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if one by that act caused death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. An attempt of that nature may actually result in hurt or may not. ( 17. ) In Ram Prakash Singhs case (1998 CriLJ 1622) (above), conviction of the appellant under S. 302 was converted to one under S. 304 Part II IPC in view of the factual scenario suggesting that the accused and the deceased were friends and it was during a hot exchange of words that only one knife blow was given without aiming any particular part of body and further that, the doctor, who had performed the post-mortem examination, had not stated that the injury, thus caused to the deceased, was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, whereas in the case on hand, the injury cutting Gagans vital organs viz. kidney and colon, was so imminently dangerous that it would in all probability has caused death. Further, in the light of the defence that animosity already existed regarding payment of repairing charges, it was not possible to hold that it was a case of sudden quarrel. ( 18. ) The facts in other cases are also apparently distinguishable. In the case of Jamshed (ibid), no vital organ was cut whereas Subhag Singhs case (supra) was one of sudden and grave provocation and in Mittulals case (above), the treating doctor was not examined to clarify as to whether any internal organ was also injured and, ultimately, it was found to be a case of surgical emphsema. ( 19. ) It is true that the appellant apparently had no intention to cause death of Gagan but intention and knowledge are alternative ingredients of S. 307. ( 19. ) It is true that the appellant apparently had no intention to cause death of Gagan but intention and knowledge are alternative ingredients of S. 307. In other words, the offence of attempt to murder can still be made out even where no intention to cause death has been established but knowledge as to imminently dangerous nature of the act can easily be attributed. As explained by the Apex Court in Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 843 : (1965) 1 CriLJ 766, if a vital organ is cut, the offence would fall under Section 307 of the IPC. This guiding principle has been followed consistently in all subsequent pronouncements on the point including the one in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bala Patil AIR 1983 SC 305 . ( 20. ) Accordingly, the appellant was rightly held guilty of the offence of attempt to murder. ( 21. ) Coming to the question of sentence, learned counsel for the appellant, while inviting attention to the contents of medical report suggesting that he is now a patient of Schizophrenia, has submitted that no useful purpose would be served by sending him back to jail wherein he has already suffered imprisonment for more than two months. However, fact of the matter is that the appellant has been found guilty of causing injury that necessitated performance of Laparotomy as well as Nephrectomy. As such, the delay occasioned in disposal of appeal cannot be treated as a mitigating circumstance (See. State of M. P. v. Salim and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 554 : (2005 CriLJ 3435). Taking into consideration the nature of allegations found proved, social impact of the crime and other relevant circumstances, ends of justice would meet if the term of custodial sentence is reduced to 3 years. ( 22. ) In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC and the consequent sentence of fine are hereby affirmed. However, the term of consequent sentence of imprisonment is reduced from five years to three years. ( 23. ) Appellant is on bail. He is directed to surrender to his bail bonds before trial Court on or before 5-11-2009 for being committed to the custody for undergoing remaining part of the sentence. Appeal partly allowed.RAJESH