JUDGMENT 1. This appeal has been preferred against the dismissal of the suit of the plaintiff for restoration of possession by the Court below in a concurrent manner. 2. Case of the plaintiff is that he entered into an agreement of purchase with defendants/respondent No.1 on 3.7.1974 (Ex. P/2) for a consideration of Rs.5,000/-. A sum of Rs. 3,500/- was paid out of the consideration as advance and possession was obtained. Later on, registered sale deed was .executed on 22.7.1975 (Ex. P/1).His name was mutated as revealed in Ex. P/3. He was dispossessed on 16.8.1977. Hence the suit for restoration of possession. 3. Defendant/respondent No.1 submitted his written statement refuting thereby the allegations contained in the plaint regarding receipt of consideration, execution of agreement of sale and registered sale deed. Suit stood dismissed by the Courts below in concurrent manner with a finding that the defendant/ respondent No.1 was an illiterate villager and knew only to put his signature. Both the documents are not proved to have been executed by him after he was duly apprised of the contents. Similarly, possession was never found to have been delivered to the plaintiff pursuant to the sale agreement and sale deed and plaintiff is not found to have been dispossessed by the defendant No.1. Consequently, it was found that the title was not conveyed to the plaintiff and the plaintiff is not entitled to the recovery of possession. 4. The present appeal has been admitted and heard on the following substantial question of law : "Whether in spite of admission of the respondent No.1 that he has signed the registered sale deed (Ex. P/1) dated 22.7.1994 and also executed an agreement on 3.7.1994 vide Ex. P/2, can it be said that the due execution of the sale deed has not been proved and the Courts below have committed an error in declaring the sale deed as null and void?" 5. Shri C.R. Roman and Shri S.K. Jain; learned counsel appearing for the respective parties made their submissions. 6. It is contended by Shri Roman, learned counsel that the signature of the defendant No.1 is found proved by the learned lower appellate Court in paragraph 22 of the impugned judgment. Therefore, title of the plaintiff shall be held proved and the relief of restoration of possession ought to have been granted. 6. It is contended by Shri Roman, learned counsel that the signature of the defendant No.1 is found proved by the learned lower appellate Court in paragraph 22 of the impugned judgment. Therefore, title of the plaintiff shall be held proved and the relief of restoration of possession ought to have been granted. Reliance has been placed on 1997 RN 186 (State of M. P. v. Gulab Bai) 1999 (1) MPLJ 436 (Manorama Devi v. Suresh), 1992 JLJ 714 (Indira Gangole v. Shailendra Kumar Gangole) and 1995 (1) MPWN 236 (Sarnam Singh v. Ram Swarup). 7. On the other hand, Shri S.K. Jain, learned counsel has supported the impugned judgment. He placed reliance on AIR 1966 SC 735 (Bhagwati v. Chandramaul), 1992 RN 367 = AIR 1992 MP 22 (Ramjan Khan v. Baba Raghunath Dass) and 1981 (II) MPWN SN 184 (Narendra Nath Thakur v. Mukutram). 8. It is argued by Shri Roman that the defendant No. 1 has merely denied the execution of the agreement as well as sale deed. He has not taken any specific defence. Therefore, both the documents having been proved, the suit ought to have been decreed. Case of the defendant cannot be considered in the light of any defence, which has not been specifically pleaded in view of the law laid down in the Manorama's case (supra) and Guddibai's case (supra). 9. It is true that the defendant No. 1 in specific has not pleaded that the documents were got executed without apprising him of the contents. However, he has categorically pleaded in the written statement that it is denied that he had sold the suit land after receiving consideration of Rs. 5,000/- and had handed it over to the plaintiff. Similarly, receipt of consideration was also denied and the execution of agreement and sale deed was also denied. 10. It is trite law that execution of a document without making the executant aware of the contents is of no meaning. Learned lower appellate Judge has clearly found in para 24 that on appreciation of the evidence on record, it is found that the respondent No.1 merely knew to put his signature and is an illiterate person and therefore the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that he was well apprised of the contents of Ex. P/1 and P/2 before their execution. Plaintiff has not examined the attesting witness. P/1 and P/2 before their execution. Plaintiff has not examined the attesting witness. In his own statement he has not stated that the defendant No.1 was made aware of the contents and that he was explained about the substance of the said documents. Neither the attesting witness nor the scribe of the documents was examined to establish that the contents were explained to defendant No.1 before their execution. Thus, merely on account of admission or finding about the signature of defendants No.1 on Ex. P/1 and P/2, it cannot be held that the title of the suit land stood conveyed to the plaintiff 11. I may successfully refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Ramjan Khan v. Baba Raghunath Dass 1992 RN 367 = AIR 1992 MP 22 . In the light of material on record, it is clear that the parties were at issue that whether title of the suit land was meant to be conveyed by Ex. P/1 and P/2 and whether the possession of the suit land was delivered pursuant to them. Merely on the basis of technicality in the matter of pleadings of rural areas, an illiterate person cannot be made to suffer. I may successfully refer to the following observations of the apex Court in the case of Bhagwati v. Chandramaul ( AIR 1966 SC 735 ) ; "If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely, in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case." Thus, merely by proof of signatures of defendant No.1, it cannot be necessarily said that the title of the disputed land stood conveyed to the plaintiff. Reference may also be made on this point to this Court decision in the case of Narendra Nath Thakur v. Mukutram [ 1981 (2) MPWN 184 ]. 12. In view of the aforesaid position of law, plaintiff/appellant does not get assistance from the decisions in the case of Samam Singh (supra) and Indira Gangole (supra). 13. In the totality of the facts and circumstances stated herein above, the substantial question of law is decided against the appellant. Appeal accordingly is dismissed with no order as to costs.