Judgment ( 1. ) IN this intra- court appeal preferred under Section 2 (1) of the m. P. Uchcha Nayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, the legal sustainability of the order dated 12. 8. 2008 passed in Writ Petition No. 17742/2006 has been called in question. ( 2. ) SANS unnecessary details, the facts which are necessitous to be unfurled are that the respondent was appointed on 6. 7. 1974 and at the time of entering into service his age was recorded as 29 years in his service register. In the year 2003, on the basis of the mark-sheet of the High School Examination certificate and other documents brought on record, the present appellants undertook an exercise of verification of the date of birth of the writ petitioner. The respondent produced the mark-sheet and other documents from the Board of Secondary education and the same were got verified by the authorities from the Board which were found to be genuine. Because of the aforesaid situation, the matter was referred to the Age Determination Committee which, by its decision dated 22. 6. 2005 and 27. 6. 2005, assessed the age of the respondent as 57 and half years as on 22. 6. 2005 by its communication dated 28. 6. 2005. Eventually, the respondent was superannuated w. e. f. 31. 12. 2007 by order dated 31. 8. 2007. The said order was assailed before the learned single Judge on the foundation that there had been erroneous determination of the age on the basis of the entry in the Form-B Register despite the fact that authoritative and sanguine documents were available as per the Implementation Instruction No. 76. It was urged that it was incumbent on the part of the Age Determination Committee to have determined the age on the basis of the said documents but, as it is vivid, the age has been arbitrarily assessed the age to be 57 years and half as on 22. 6. 2005. ( 3. ) THE stand and stance of the respondent were combatted by the present appellant contending that in Form B register there was a declaration by the employee that he was 29 years of age in the year 1974 and, therefore, the contention that the date of birth should be recorded as 23. 11. 1953 was absolutely misconceived. 2005. ( 3. ) THE stand and stance of the respondent were combatted by the present appellant contending that in Form B register there was a declaration by the employee that he was 29 years of age in the year 1974 and, therefore, the contention that the date of birth should be recorded as 23. 11. 1953 was absolutely misconceived. That apart, it was resisted on the ground that the respondent sought correction of his date of birth at the fag end of his service career and in view of the decision rendered in Coal India Ltd. and another v. Ardhendu Bikas Bhattacharjee and others, (2005) 12 SCC 201, it was impermissible. ( 4. ) THE learned single Judge analysed the facts and expressed the view that the employer and its functionaries themselves had noticed the discrepancy and referred the matter to the Age Determination Committee; that the marksheet obtained from the Board of Secondary Education was to be given credence under the scheme of Implementation Instruction No. 76; that the Age Determination committee committed error in its assessment; and that the petitioner was entitled to continue up to sixty years of age treating his date of birth as 23. 11. 195 3. Being of this view, he directed the respondent-authorities to correct the date of birth of the petitioner and permit him to continue in service till the age of superannuation and extend him all consequential benefits which he has been deprived of as a result of the illegal order of superannuation. ( 5. ) WE have heard Mr. RS. Nair, learned senior counsel along with Mr. Shishir jain, for the appellants; Mr. S. R Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Naman Nagrath and Mr. Mourya, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2. ( 6. ) MR. Nair, learned senior counsel assailing the order passed by the learned single Judge submitted that when there is a categorical mention about the age of the petitioner in the form B Register and that was the earliest document in point of time and further the Age Determination Committee had determined the age on the basis of X-ray report, the same should have been accepted. It is proponed by him that the learned single Judge has fallen into error by not accepting the submission of the employer that the writ petitioner had raised a dispute at the fag end of his career which is not permissible. It is also urged that once the Age determination Committee has determined the age, the same should have been treated as final being beyond assail. ( 7. ) MR. S. P. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 submitted that the order passed by the learned single Judge cannot be found fault with as there has been appropriate and apposite analysis of the facts and the same is founded on the Implementation Instruction No. 76. It is canvassed by him that once the appellants had themselves sent the matter to the Age Determination committee, they cannot take a somersault and advance a plea that the respondent could not have raised the dispute as regards his date of birth towards the fag end of his career. ( 8. ) FIRST we shall deal with the facet whether the writ petition should have been thrown overboard on the ground that the dispute as regards the date of birth has been raised at the fag end of career. In Ardhendu Bikas Bhattacharjee and others (supra), the Apex Court has held as follows: ". . . . It is well settled that an employee will not be permitted to apply for change of date of birth at the fag end of his service career. In the instant case we do not know on what basis after 38 years the Secondary Education Board in Bangladesh corrected the matriculation certificate. This is essentially a question of fact, and in any case the High Court ought not to have exercised its writ jurisdiction to determine the real date of birth. . . . " ( 9. ) IN Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Dinabandhu Majumdar, (1995) 4 SCC 172 , it has been ruled thus: "entertainment by High Courts of writ applications made by employees of the Government or its instrumentalities at the fag end of their services and when they are due for retirement from their services, in our view, is unwarranted. " ( 9. ) IN Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Dinabandhu Majumdar, (1995) 4 SCC 172 , it has been ruled thus: "entertainment by High Courts of writ applications made by employees of the Government or its instrumentalities at the fag end of their services and when they are due for retirement from their services, in our view, is unwarranted. It would be so for the reason that no employee can claim a right to correction of birth date and entertainment of such writ applications for correction of dates of birth of some employees of Government or its instrumentalities will mar the chances of promotion of his juniors and prove to be an undue encouragement to the other employees to make similar applications at the fag end of their service careers with the sole object of preventing their retirements when due. Extraordinary nature of the jurisdiction vested in the High courts under Article 226 of the Constitution in our considered view, is not meant to make employees of Government or its instrumentalities to continue in service beyond the period of their entitlement according to dates of birth accepted by their employers, placing reliance on the so-called newly found material. The fact that an employee of Government or its instrumentality who will be in service for over decades, with no objection whatsoever raised as to his date of birth accepted by the employer as correct, when all of a sudden comes forward towards the fag end of his service career with a writ application before the High Court seeking correction, of his date of birth in his Service Record, the very conduct of non-raising of an objection in the matter by the employee, in our view, should be a sufficient reason for the High Court, not to entertain such applications on grounds of acquiescence, undue delay and laches. Moreover, discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court can never be said to have been reasonably and judicially exercised if it entertains such writ application, for no employee, who had grievance as to his date of birth in his service and Leave Record could have genuinely waited till the fag end of his service career to get it corrected by availing of the extraordinary jurisdiction of a High Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation, in holding, that ordinarily high Courts should not, in exercise of its discretionary writ jurisdiction, entertain a writ application/petition filed by an employee of the Government or its instrumentality, towards the fag end of his service, seeking correction of his date of birth entered in his service and Leave Record or Service register with the avowed object of continuing in service beyond the normal period of his retirement. " ( 10. ) IN State of U. P. and Others v. Giflaichi (SMT), (2003) 6 SCC 483 , a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court after referring to the decisions rendered in Union of India v. Harnam Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 162 , Secy and Commr. , Home Deptt. v. R. Kirubakaran, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155, State of Tamil Nadu v. T. V. Venugopalan, (1994) 6 SCC 302 and State of Orissa v. Ramanath Patnaik, (1997) 5 SCC 181 expressed the view that the application for correction of date of birth cannot be entertained at the end of service career. Their Lordships reiterated the principles which have been laid down in R. Kirubakaran wherein it has been held as follows: "this Court has repeatedly pointed out that correction of the date of birth of public servant is permissible, but that should not be done in a casual manner. Any such order must be passed on materials produced by the public servant from which the irresistible conclusion follows that the date of birth recorded in the service book was incorrect. While disposing of any such application, the Court or the Tribunal, has first to examine, whether the application has been made within the prescribed period under some rule or administrative order. If there is no rule or order prescribing any period, then the Court or Tribunal has to examine, why such application was not made within a reasonable time after joining the service. " ( 11. If there is no rule or order prescribing any period, then the Court or Tribunal has to examine, why such application was not made within a reasonable time after joining the service. " ( 11. ) IN State of U. P. and Another v. Shiv Narain Upadhyaya, (2005) 6 SCC 49 , their Lordships have held as under: "as such, unless a clear case on the basis of clinching materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent and that too within a reasonable time as provided in the rules governing the service, the Court or the Tribunal should not issue a direction or make a declaration on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued or declaration made, the Court or the Tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. If no rule or order has been framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application has to be filed, then such application must be within at least a reasonable time. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 12. ) THE principles that have been laid down in the aforesaid decisions clearly enunciate that an employee cannot raise a dispute with regard to his date of birth and claim it otherwise towards the fag end of his service career. But, a significant one, in the case at hand, the factual expose is quite different. The appellant-employer undertook an exercise in the year 2003 and referred the matter to the age Determination Committee, which recorded a finding. Once the employer took up the claim and on the basis of the documents placed by the respondent referred the matter to the Age Determination Committee it is estopped to raise a plea that there has been belated approach by the respondent. It is a somersault which has to be taken exception to. The same is not permissible and accordingly, on facts, we repel the submission of Mr. Nair, learned senior counsel for the appellant, on this score. ( 13. It is a somersault which has to be taken exception to. The same is not permissible and accordingly, on facts, we repel the submission of Mr. Nair, learned senior counsel for the appellant, on this score. ( 13. ) THE second aspect which we intend to advert to is whether the decision of the Age Determination Committee is final and is not subject to the judicial review by a writ court. In this context, we think it apposite to refer to the decision rendered in State of U. P. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 wherein the Apex Court has laid down the parameters of judicial review :-"however, Judicial review under Article 226 cannot be converted into appeal. Judicial review is directed, not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decisionmaking process. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 1 W. L. R. 1155 refers to the merits-legality distinction in judicial review. Lord Hailsham said: "the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. " Lord Brightman observed : ". . . . . Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. . . " And held that it would be an error to think : ". . . . . that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision-making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself. " When the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account of relevant, factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority, entrusted with the power in question could reasonably have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision-making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors. " ( 14. ) IN Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and Another v. Munna Lal Jain, (2005) 10 SCC 84 , a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court ruled thus: "10. " ( 14. ) IN Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and Another v. Munna Lal Jain, (2005) 10 SCC 84 , a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court ruled thus: "10. Lord Greene said in 1948 in the famous Wednesbury case that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. He said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered; or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. These principles were consistently followed in the UK and in India to judge the validity of administrative action. It is equally well known that in 1983, Lord Diplock in Council for Civil Services Union v. Minister of Civil Service (called the CCSU case) summarized the principles of judicial review of administrative action as based upon one or other of the following viz. , illegality, procedural irregularity and irrationality. He, however, opined that "proportionality" was a "future possibility". " Thereafter their Lordships, referred to the decisions in Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 , B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 and number of other decisions and eventually expressed the view as follows: "14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrators decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesburys case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. " ( 15. ) WE have referred to these decisions only to highlight that when the order passed by the authorities suffers from procedural irregularity, it is legally vulnerable. The said procedural irregularity would include where relevant factors have not been considered. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. " ( 15. ) WE have referred to these decisions only to highlight that when the order passed by the authorities suffers from procedural irregularity, it is legally vulnerable. The said procedural irregularity would include where relevant factors have not been considered. In the case at hand, the Age Determination Committee has not addressed at all with regard to the relevance of the mark sheet issued by the board of Secondary Education while determining the age. It is worth noting that the consideration of mark sheet and such other documents do find mention in the implementation Instruction No. 76. In this context, we may profitably reproduce the relevant portion of the Implementation Instruction No. 76: " (B) Review/determination of date of birth in respect of existing employees. (i) (a) In the case of the existing employees Matriculation certificate or Higher Secondary Certificate issued by the universities or Board or Middle pass certificate issued by the board of Education and/or Department of Public Instructions and admit cards issued by the aforesaid Bodies should be treated as correct provided they were issued by the said universities/board/institutions prior to the date of employment. " As is evincible the said facet has not been adverted to at all by the Age determination Committee. Thus, indubitably, the relevant factors have not been considered and when relevant factors have not been considered, the decision of the Age Determination Committee is irrefragably subject to judicial review as the decision making process is legally unsustainable. At this juncture, it is worth noting that keeping in view the stance of the appellants, we got the documents produced by the writ petitioner before the employer verified by the Board of Secondary Education and an affidavit has been filed by the competent authority of the Board of Secondary Education stating that the documents are absolutely genuine. ( 16. ) IN view of the aforesaid premises, we are of the considered opinion that an error has crept in the decision of the Age Determination Committee as it has ignored the mark sheet issued by the Board of Secondary Education which reflects the date of birth and, therefore, we concur with the view expressed by the learned single Judge. ( 17. ) EX consequenti, the writ appeal, being sans substratum, stands dismissed. ( 17. ) EX consequenti, the writ appeal, being sans substratum, stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.