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2009 DIGILAW 1101 (PNJ)

Lakhan Singh v. Narang Singh

2009-07-08

SABINA

body2009
Judgment Sabina, J. 1. Plaintiffs-respondents filed a suit for permanent injunction for restraining the defendants-appellants from interfering with their peaceful possession of the land in dispute. The suit of the plaintiffs was decreed by the Sub Judge, (Ist Class), Chandigarh vide judgment and decree dated 3.6.1986 and the same were affirmed by the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh vide judgment and decree dated 13.10.1995. Hence, the present appeal by the defendants-appellants. 2. Brief facts of the case, as noticed by the lower Appellate Court in para Nos. 2 to 7 of its judgment, are as under :- "2. The respondents-plaintiffs No. 1 to 21, residents of village Maloya, U.T.Chandigarh for themselves and on behalf of other residents of the said village had brought the suit under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC against the appellant Lakhan Singh and five others seeking a decree for permanent injunction against the Gram Panchayat, Maloya through its Sarpanch, Lakhan Singh and four other lamberdar of the village, seeking restraint against interference in possession and enjoyment of the land measuring 2698 kanals 3 marlas. 3. It is claimed that the land vested in the Gram Panchayat but 1842 Kanals and 6 Marlas out of the said land was mutated in the ownership of the proprietors from the ownership of Gram Panchayat vide mutation dated 4.6.1970 and then stands in the names of the proprietors of the Pattis Labuan and Baralian. Vide order dated 22.2.1977 of the Chief Commissioner, U.T. Chandigarh, a report of the Collector was called and it was allegedly held that the mutation was wrongly sanctioned at the back of the residents of the village and of the Gram Panchayat. 4. It was claimed that the defendants had no right, title or interest in the property except that the land in question could be used for the benefit of all the residents of the village and not exclusively for the benefits of the defendants. 5. It was set up further that the defendants were trying to affect the partition of the land in collusion with each other though the land belonged to the Gram Panchayat and to the whole village community. A relief of mandatory injunction was also sought against the Gram Panchayat, to use of the whole property for common benefit of the villagers and not to appropriate the land to their exclusive use. 6. All the defendants filed a joint written statement. 7. A relief of mandatory injunction was also sought against the Gram Panchayat, to use of the whole property for common benefit of the villagers and not to appropriate the land to their exclusive use. 6. All the defendants filed a joint written statement. 7. Controverting the allegations in the plaint, it was set up that details of the land were not complete. The validity and legality of the mutation dated 4.6.1970 was asserted claiming that such validity was held by the Financial Commissioner on 31.1.1993. It is averred that the plaintiffs had no concern with the land in question." 3. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the trial Court :- "1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction prayed for ? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for mandatory injunction prayed for ? OPP 3. Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is within limitation ? OPD 4. Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is not maintainable ? OPD 5. Whether a notice is required to be given to the Gram Panchayat before the filing of the present suit ? OPD 6. Relief." 4. The arguments raised by learned counsel for the appellants is that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in this case in view of Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 (for short the Act). The suit was liable to be dismissed or the plaint was liable to be returned to the plaintiffs to enable them to present the same before the competent Court of jurisdiction. 5. The plaintiffs have filed a suit for permanent injunction for restraining the defendants from interfering in their peaceful possession of the suit property and also a direction was sought directing Gram Panchayat, Maloya, Union Territory of Chandigarh-defendant No. 6 to use the entire property for the common benefits of the villagers only. 6. In the present case, the plaintiffs have been forced to file the suit against the Gram Panchayat seeking a direction that the suit land being Shamlat deh should be used only for the benefit of the entire villagers. The Act was made enforceable so far as the Union Territory of Chandigarh is concerned at the time of its formation on 1.11.1966. The Act was made enforceable so far as the Union Territory of Chandigarh is concerned at the time of its formation on 1.11.1966. However, the amendments in the Act made by the State of Punjab or State of Haryana have not been made applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. Section 13 of the Act reads as under :- "Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts :- No civil Court shall have jurisdiction - (a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or interest in any property is or is not shamlat deh vested or deemed to have been vested in a Panchayat under this Act; or (b) to question the legality of any action taken by the Commissioner or the Collector or the Panchayat under this Act; or (c) in respect of any matter which the Commissioner or the Collector is empowered by or under this Act to determine." 7. The said provision was substituted by Punjab Act No. 19 of 1976. Since the amendment made in the Act was not applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the present case was not barred as Section 13 is not applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. Hence, the Civil Court in the present case had the jurisdiction to determine as to whether the suit property was Shamlat deh or not. Although learned counsel for the appellants had cited certain judgments of this Court as well as the Apex Court to support his plea that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred but the said cases do not relate to the Union Territory of Chandigarh and as such, failed to have any bearing on the facts of the present case. 8. The case of the plaintiffs is that the suit land measuring 2698 kanals 3 marlas was shamlat deh and was property of Gram Panchayat, to be used for the benefit of the residents of the village. As per the revenue record on the file, suit land is described to be owned by Gram Panchayat. As per Section 2 (g) shamlat deh includes :- "1. lands described in the revenue records as shamlat deh excluding abadi deh; 2. shamlat tikkas; 3. As per the revenue record on the file, suit land is described to be owned by Gram Panchayat. As per Section 2 (g) shamlat deh includes :- "1. lands described in the revenue records as shamlat deh excluding abadi deh; 2. shamlat tikkas; 3. lands described in the revenue records as shamlat, tarafs, pattis, pannas and tholas and used according to revenue records for the benefit of the village community or a part thereof or for common purposes of the village; 4. lands used or reserved for the benefit of village community including streets, lanes, playgrounds, schools, drinking wells, or ponds within abadi deh or gorah deh; and 5. lands in any village described as banjar qadim and used for common purposes of the village according to revenue records." 9. After appreciating the evidence on record, both the Courts below have held that the suit land is shamlat deh and vests in the Gram Panchayat. 10. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the appellants has failed to point out as to how the suit land cannot be termed as shamlat deh. In fact, the only argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants was that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit was barred. The said argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is devoid of any force as Section 13, incorporated in the Act by way of amendment in the year 1976, was never made applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. No substantial question of law arises in this regular second appeal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.