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2009 DIGILAW 1104 (RAJ)

Gheesa Lal v. Shri Mahavir Prasad

2009-04-23

R.S.CHAUHAN

body2009
JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has challenged the order dated 23.07.1996 passed by the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Jaipur Division, Jaipur ('the Commissioner' for short) whereby the learned Commissioner has quashed and set aside the permission granted by the Municipal Council, Sikar on 24.11.1994 and has also quashed and set aside the order dated 18.07.1995 whereby the District Collector, Sikar had upheld the said permission. 2. In a nutshell the facts of the case are that wanting to construct few shops in a residential area, the petitioner had sought the permission of the Municipal Council under Section 2170 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act 1959 ('the Act of 1959, for short). Along with his application seeking the said permission, the petitioner also submitted the required maps. The Municipal Council, respondent No.2, called for objections from the public. One Mahavir Prasad, respondent No.1, and few residents of the neighborhood filed their objections. Both Mahavir Prasad and the residents were aggrieved by the fact that the petitioner wanted to construct shops in a residential area. However, notwithstanding their objections, vide order dated 24.11.1994 the Municipal Council granted the permission for construction of the shops. Since Mahavir Prasad was aggrieved by the said order, he preferred an appeal before the District Collector, Sikar. Vide order dated 18.07.1995, the District Collector, Sikar upheld the order dated 24.11.1994 and dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, Mahavir Prasad filed a revision petition before the Divisional Commissioner, Jaipur Division, Jaipur. Vide order dated 23.07.1996, the learned Divisional Commissioner allowed the revision and quashed and set aside the permission dated 24.11.1994 and the order dated 18.07.1995. Hence, the present petition before this Court. 3. Mr. R.K. Mathur, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently argued that the learned Commissioner has based his entire reasoning on the fact that the title of property in dispute was not clear as a Civil First Appeal is pending before this Court with regard to the title of the property. According to the learned counsel, neither the Municipal Council, nor the learned Commissioner could go into the issue with regard to the title of the disputed property. Therefore, the entire basis for quashing and setting aside the permission dated 24.11.1994 and the order dated 18.07.1995 is without any legal foundation. 4. On the other hand, Mr. According to the learned counsel, neither the Municipal Council, nor the learned Commissioner could go into the issue with regard to the title of the disputed property. Therefore, the entire basis for quashing and setting aside the permission dated 24.11.1994 and the order dated 18.07.1995 is without any legal foundation. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Sudhanshu Joshi, the learned counsel for respondent No.1, has contended that the petitioner had applied for construction of shops in a area. The permission was granted by the Municipal Council for construction of shops even before the land usage was changed from residential to commercial. But until and unless the land usage were changed, such a permission for construction could not be given by the Municipal Council. Therefore, the learned Commissioner is legally justified in passing the impugned order. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order. 6. It is a settled principle of law that the construction has to be in conformity with the nature of the usage of the land. Therefore, before a permission for construction can be given, the nature of the land needs to be changed. Admittedly, the petitioner wants to construct shops in a residential area. However, the land usage has not been changed from residential to commercial. Mr R.K. Mathur has contended that since conversion charges had been deposited for changing the land usage from residential to commercial, the Municipal Council was justified in granting the permission. However, this plea places the cart before the horse. Merely because conversion charges have been deposited does not imply that the land usage has been changed from residential to commercial. Until and unless the use of the land is changed from residential to commercial, the permission for construction of shops cannot be granted by the Municipal Council. Hence, the learned Divisional Commissioner was justified in quashing the permission dated 24.11.1994 and the order dated 18.07.1995. Hence, there is no perversity or illegality about the order dated 23.07.1996. 7. In this view of the matter, this petition is devoid of any merit. Thus, it is, hereby, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed *******