Judgment : Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 3.10.2008 made by Industrial Court in Revision ULP No. 14/08, the present writ petition has been filed. 2. In support of writ petition, Mr.B.M.Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, argued that the Labour Court had made order on 18.5.2002 in Complaint (ULP) No. 81 of 1993 granting temporary interim relief, keeping dismissal order dated 25.5.2002 in abeyance. That order was challenged by the Corporation by filing Revision (ULP) No. 85/02. On 12.11.2007 the said Revision (ULP) No. 85/02 was unconditionally withdrawn by the Corporation by filing a pursis. Thereafter a fresh Revision, i.e. Revision (ULP) No. 14/08 was filed by the Corporation putting to challenge the same order dated dated 18.5.2002 made by the Labour Court. Industrial Court allowed the said Revision (ULP) No.14/08 and quashed and set aside the order dated 18.5.2002 made by the Labour Court and hence this writ petition against the order of Industrial Court dated 3.10.2008. He further argued that the Industrial Court completely erred in not applying the principle that second revision would not lie in the same subject matter or order when the earlier revision was withdrawn without liberty and according to Mr.Khan the Industrial Court has failed to apply the law correctly. 3. Per contra, Mr.Wankhede learned counsel for respondent supported the impugned judgment and Award made by Industrial Court and prayed for dismissal of writ petition. 4. I have gone through the long judgment and order written by the Industrial Court and after carefully hearing the learned counsel for rival parties, in the face of the above admitted facts I hold that the law laid down by Supreme Court in Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal – AIR 1987 SC 88 has not been correctly applied by the Industrial Court and, on the contrary, has recorded wrong reasons for ignoring the said concrete legal position. All other judgments relied on by the Industrial Court are wholly irrelevant and Revision (ULP) No. 14/08 which has been allowed by the Industrial Court could not have been entertained at all and the same was liable to be dismissed in the light of decision in Sarguja Transport Service’ case, supra. All other judgments relied on by the Industrial Court are wholly irrelevant and Revision (ULP) No. 14/08 which has been allowed by the Industrial Court could not have been entertained at all and the same was liable to be dismissed in the light of decision in Sarguja Transport Service’ case, supra. In this cited case, the Supreme Court has had to say in para 7 and 9 as under – “The Code as it now stands thus makes a distinction between `abandonment’ of a suit and `withdrawal’ from a suit with permission to file a fresh suit. It provides that where the plaintiff abandons a suit or withdraws from a suit without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3) of R.1 of O. XXIII of the Code, he shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim. The principle underlying R.1 of O. XXIII of the Code is that when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a Court and thereby avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be permitted to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter again after abandoning the earlier suit or by withdrawing it without the permission of the Court to file fresh suit. Invito beneficium non datur. The law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire. Whoever waives, abandones or disclaims a right will lose it. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason the Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-rule (3) of R.1 of Order XXIII. The principle underlying the above rule is founded on public policy, but it is not the same as the rule of res judicata contained in S.11 of the Code which provides that no court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly or substantially in issue has been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. The rule of res judicata applies to a case where the suit or an issue has already been heard and finally decided by a Court. In the case of abandonment or withdrawal of a suit without the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit, there is no prior adjudication of a suit or an issue is involved, yet the Code provides, as stated earlier, that a second suit will not lie in sub-rule (4) of R.1 of O.XXIII of the Code when the first suit is withdrawn without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3) in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. ... The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India without the permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High Court under that Article. On this point the decision in Daryao’s case (supra) is of no assistance. But we are of the view that the principles underlying R.1 of O. XXIII of the Code should be extended in the interests of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in a bench-hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution once again. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in a bench-hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution once again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Art.32 of the Constitution since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission. In the instant case the High Court was right in holding that a fresh writ petition was not maintainable before it in respect of the same subject-matter since the earlier writ petition had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition.” 5. Looking to the above rule of public policy enunciated by the apex court in respect of writ petition, I have no reason to not to apply the said principle in the proceedings under Section 44 of M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act. In the result, I make the following order. 6. Writ petition is allowed. Impugned judgment and order dated 3.10.2008 made by Industrial Court in Revision (ULP) No. 14/08 is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.