Judgment Ranjit Singh, J. 1. Aggrieved against the order of ejectment, the petitioners have filed this writ petition to impugn the said order. Claiming themselves to have purchased the land from some of the rightholders/proprietors, who are in cultivating possession of the shamlat land prior to 26 January, 1950, the petitioners have challenged the order of their ejectment. 2. The petitioners along with one Ram Sarup had purchased 7 marlas of land from Ami Chand son of Devi Dayal rightholder/proprietor. A sale deed in this regard was also registered and mutation was also entered. Similarly, Ram Sarup owner to the extent of 1/2 of the disputed land sold his share to petitioner No. 2 Shadi Ram in the year 1967. On 11.11.1964, Gram Panchayat village Brahman Majra filed an application under Section 7 (2) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 against the proprietors/right holders. It is claimed that these proceedings for ejectment were dropped on the ground that right-holders had produced documentary evidence to show that they were in cultivating possession before 26.1.1950. Now this land has come to vest in Municipal Committee and accordingly it has filed an application for eviction under Sections 4, 5 and 7 (2) of the Punjab Public Premises Act, 1973 before Collector, Fatehgarh Sahib. 3. The case set up by the Municipal Committee is that it has become owner of the disputed land vide order dated 15.2.1996 passed by the Honble Supreme Court. On 12.12.2003, the Collector directed eviction of the petitioners on the ground that they are in unauthorised possession of the disputed land. Reference is made to the case of Municipal Committee, Sirhind v. Parshotam Dass, 1996(2) RRR 142 : 1996 PLJ 158, wherein the Supreme Court has held that once the land is vested in the Municipal Committee, then the part of Shamlat deh covered within the municipal limits will be the governed by the provisions of Municipal Act and not by the provisions of the Village Common Lands Act, 1961 and the Municipality becomes its proprietor. It is also held that the original Khewatdars then can no more claim the property. 4. The petitioners, however, would stake their claim on the basis of registered sale deed dated 12.5.1966 and 27.7.1967.
It is also held that the original Khewatdars then can no more claim the property. 4. The petitioners, however, would stake their claim on the basis of registered sale deed dated 12.5.1966 and 27.7.1967. They would also claim that they are not in unauthorised possession of the disputed land and thus, the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court would not be binding on them. They would accordingly contest the order of the Collector ejecting them from the land. 5. The petitioners had filed an appeal, when the Deputy Commissioner had remanded the case back to Collector, Fatehgarh Sahib for verification of the title to this suit property. The Collector, Fatehgarh Sahib maintained his earlier order and in addition awarded damages of Rs. 14,099/- to the respondent-Municipal Committee. The petitioners then filed appeals against the orders of Collector and Commissioner etc., which are dismissed and thus they have filed the present writ petition. 6. While allowing the prayer for eviction of the petitioners, the authorities have noted that the disputed land has come to vest in Municipal Council as per the judgment of the Supreme Court and jamabandi has also been reflected accordingly. Even if the petitioners have bought land from a share-holder, then they certainly cannot have a better title than a share-holder. Once this land has come to vest in Municipal Council, Sirhind, the petitioners cannot claim themselves to be the owners of the land in dispute. On the basis of the documents and the evidence, the petitioners have been found to be in unauthorised possession of the land. The counsel for the petitioners has not been able to show any document or material to dispute this finding of fact returned by various authorities. Concededly, the land now is shown mutated in the name of Nagar Council, Sirhind. There is no ground made out as such for exercise of extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned order passed against the petitioners. There is, thus, no merit in the pleas raised by the counsel and writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.