JUDGMENT:- This Civil Revision Application is filed by original defendant against whom decree of eviction is passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nandurbar in R.C.S. No.73 of 1985 decided on 20.9.1999 which judgment and decree is further confirmed by District Judge-I Nandurbar in R.CA. No.36 of 1999 decided on 17.10.2007. 2. It is no more disputed that the present appellants, who are the legal representatives of original defendant Yadav Koli, are tenants of the respondents in the suit premises i.e. house constructed on plot No.40 in Shri. Ambika Colony, Nandurbar. The original suit was filed for eviction on the grounds that the defendant Yadav Koli was willful defaulter, that he had damaged the property and that the tenancy of the defendant was forfeited as a result of disclaimer of plaintiff s title by the defendant. The suit is decreed by the trial court on the ground of disclaimer of title and the said decision is upheld in appeal by the learned District Judge and it is this order which is challenged in this revision. 3. The ground of disclaimer was added by way of amendment to the plaint by adding paragraph 4-A. It is stated therein that by contentions raised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the written statement (Exh.12), the defendant Yadav Koli denied the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit property. It is stated by defendant in paragraph 2 of the written statement that the say of the plaintiff that plot No.40 in Shri. Ambika Colony and house constructed thereon was owned and possessed by plaintiff, is false. Plot is owned by Shri. Ambika Society and the house was constructed on that plot out of loan given by Co-operative Housing Finance Society, Mumbai to Ambika Cooperative Housing Society and therefore the plot and the building thereon are not owned by the plaintiff and the same belong to Shri. Ambika Co-operative Housing Society. It is, however, stated in paragraph 3 of the written Statement that the defendant had taken suit I premises on rent from the plaintiff and Shri. Ambika Society at the rate of Rs.175/- p.m. and had agreed to pay taxes in respect of the suit premises. It is further stated that the house premises were taken on rent by defendant from Shri. Ambika Housing Society. 4. It is further stated that the house premises were taken on rent by defendant from Shri. Ambika Housing Society. 4. Shri. Abhyankar, learned Advocate of the defendant-appellant argued that the defendant has denied plaintiff's proprietary title, but not the title as landlord under the Rent Act. Shri. R. R. Mantri, learned Advocate for the respondent argued that this is mere play of the words and pointed out that paragraph 2 of the written statement is very clear in which ownership of the plaintiff over the plot and construction thereon is denied in unequivocal terms. He also submitted that deliberately, this defence is taken so as to create confusion regarding jurisdiction of the court and with a view to protract the trial. There appears some substance in this submission of Advocate Shri. Mantri, if we consider alternate submissions made by learned counsel for appellant-defendant. Advocate Shri. Mantri also argued that both the courts have specifically stated that there is a disclaimer and even in his cross-examination, the deceased defendant Yadav Koli has specifically stated that when he met Popatlal - the husband of the plaintiff, he was aware as to who was owner of the suit plot and the house. Defendant further affirmed the contents in paragraph 2 of the written statement by saying that the same were true and that plot No.40 and construction thereon was not owned by plaintiff and the same belonged to Ambika Society. He further stated that the reply to the notice (Exh.78) was drafted and sent by his Advocate as per his instructions and therein also it was alleged that the plaintiff was not the owner of the house and she should prove that she was the landlady. In the circumstances, this is clear case of disclaimer of title of the landlady and there is no substance in the submission of learned Advocate for the revision applicant that it is case of disclaimer. Both the courts have rightly held that this is a case of disclaimer. 5. It is argued before this court by the learned Advocate for the appellant that since there is a disclaimer, the relationship of landlady and tenant did not subsist as on the date of filing of the suit and, therefore, the Rent Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the suit ought to have been filed in the general court of Civil Judge, Junior Division. Learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, while meeting this argument in paragraph 28 of his judgment, has observed that the Rent Court and the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division are one and the same. The suit was filed on 30.4.1985. More than 14 years were spent in fighting the litigation before him. The effect of rejection of plaint will be that the plaintiff will have to institute the suit under ordinary jurisdiction of Civil Court and it will be before the same court and considerable time would be required for disposal of the same and, therefore, since the civil court is both, the rent court as well as ordinary civil court, it had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. 6. It is argued that if it is the same court which is to decide the suit by following almost same procedure, and if it also functions in same way, then since parties come to the courts for getting justice, there is no reason why the view taken by the trial court should be said to be wrong or erroneous. We find some support to this argument in Full Bench Ruling of this Court in the case of Ranchodlal Vs. Mahendra Kumar, AIR 1956 Bombay 481. However, District Court has answered this point, saying that even the Rent Court has jurisdiction to pass decree of eviction in case of disclaimer. 7. Learned Advocate for the appellant cited certain authorities. The first is Brij Kishor Vs. Mushtari Khatoon, AIR 1976 Allahabad 399. In that case, while considering Section III (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Court observed that denial of landlord's title should relate to landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. The question of ownership of the property is not material. However, those were the observations in the peculiar facts of that case. Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act reads : “111. The question of ownership of the property is not material. However, those were the observations in the peculiar facts of that case. Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act reads : “111. Determination of leaseA lease of immovable property, determines(a) to (0 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (g) by forfeiture, that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may reenter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease;" (emphasis is supplied). 8. Thus, there can be forfeiture even in case lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. In the present case, the defendant has denied the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit premises and set up title in Shri. Ambika Society and therefore the case clearly fans within clause (2) of Sec.111(g) of the Act. 9. Learned Advocate for the appellant further cited case of Sheela Vs. Firm Pralhad Rai Prem Prakash - (2002)3 SCC 375 . However, the facts of the said case were totally different. Though there was denial of title of the landlady, the bonafide question as to how title came to vest in landlady had arisen. It was observed in the said circumstances that if tenant makes a bonafide demand that the landlord to prove his ownership, with the aim of protecting himself or of earning protection available under rent control law and (ii) without disclaiming the character of his own possession of the tenanted premises as a tenant, such demand cannot be said to be a denial of landlord's title or a disclaimer of tenancy. But, in reported case it was a genuine bona fide act on the part of the tenant to protect his own interest. 10. In the present case, there are no bona fides on the part of the tenant. But, in reported case it was a genuine bona fide act on the part of the tenant to protect his own interest. 10. In the present case, there are no bona fides on the part of the tenant. He wants to set up different defences, such as, whether the civil court can exercise jurisdiction or the Rent court and after fighting for several years to say that the plaint should have been returned back for filing the same in the civil court and the rent court had no jurisdiction. No attempt was made by defendant to prove his assertion that Shri. Ambika society was the owner of the plot, so also construction thereon. 11. The third case cited on behalf of the appellants is Vithal Sakhara Vs. Gopala Gangaram, 1956 BLR (LIX) 60. That was a case under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and it was held that the landlord cannot terminate the tenancy on the ground of forfeiture by disclaimer of landlord's title by the tenant. The Division Bench considered sections 13 and 34 of the said Act. It was a ruling on interpretation of provisions of different statute applicable to agricultural lands and the case is not applicable to the facts of our case. 12. Learned Counsel for the appellants also relied upon the case of Guru Amarjit Singh V s. Rattan Chand - AIR 1994 SC 227 . In that case, it is held that repudiation of title must be clear and unequivocal and must be anterior to suit for ejectment and must be relatable to knowledge of lessor. It is argued that in the present case renunciation or disclaimer was by way of written statement and, therefore, subsequent to filing of the suit. However, we will be referring to some other cases in which it is held that even a disclaimer in the written statement is enough to pass the decree of eviction. Secondly, in cross-examination, defendant- Yadav Koli has specifically admitted that in reply to notice (Exh.78), he had denied the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit property and stated that she should prove her ownership. So, the case of Amarjit Singh is also not applicable to the facts of the of our case as the reply to the notice was prior to the filing of the suit. 13. So, the case of Amarjit Singh is also not applicable to the facts of the of our case as the reply to the notice was prior to the filing of the suit. 13. Learned Advocate for the appellant also relied on ruling in Ratanlal Shah Vs. Chanabasappa Chincholi, AIR 1978 Bombay 216. But, the facts of the said case were different. In the reported case, defendant was claiming to be tenant of third person and not of the plaintiff and paying rent to third person even prior to the suit. However, it was held that the plea of disclaimer was proved observing that there was disclaimer of title even prior to the suit. The suit was filed for eviction under the Rent Act and it is held that there was no bar of disclaimer of title. In paragraphs 38 and 39, it is laid down that where the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant was not in existence at the time of or even prior to the suit for eviction as a result of disclaimer of title, the bar of jurisdiction of civil court does not apply. The relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for the attract ability of the provisions of S.28 and if such a condition is not fulfilled, it is open to the owner of the property to recover possession of the premises dehors the provisions of the Rent Act. 14. In the reported case, it is laid down that when there is a disclaimer prior to filing of the suit, ordinary civil court. will have jurisdiction. In our case, appellant-defendant taking different stands viz. in one breathe saying that civil court has jurisdiction and in another breathe saying that the Rent. Court has jurisdiction. This clearly substantiates the argument advanced by learned Advocate Shri, Mantri for the Respondent that the defences in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the written statements were deliberately taken so as to confuse the court, protract the litigation and as such there is no bona fide denial of title. 15. It is argued before this court that in the year 1990, the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division was established at Nandurbar. 15. It is argued before this court that in the year 1990, the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division was established at Nandurbar. Earlier to that, Civil Judge, Junior Division had jurisdiction to entertain the suit under the Rent Act, but after establishment of the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division, the jurisdiction vests in that court and not in the court of Civil Judge, Junior Division and, therefore, the suit ought to have been decided by the Civil Judge, Senior Division and not by the Civil Judge, Junior Division. However, this aspect is also now well settled in the Full Bench case of Ranchodlal V s. Mahendrakumar, AIR 1956 Bombay 481, wherein, it has been laid down that when the Legislature confers special jurisdiction upon an ordinary Court of the land, that jurisdiction has to be exercised by the ordinary Court according to the procedure of that Court unless the legislation conferring special jurisdiction there is some provision to the contrary. In Section 28 there is no indication whatever that the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, to which suits have to be transferred under Section 28(2)(a), has to function in any different manner than it would function as the ordinary Court, or that the procedure which has got to be followed has to be any different procedure. In the reported case, transfer of a rent suit by the District Judge under Section 28(2)(a) was not to the Civil Judge, Senior Division, but to the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division. It is observed that under the provisions of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, the Principal Judge of the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division can refer that suit to anyone of his colleagues, who has been appointed to assist him in disposal of the cases on his file and the colleague may be Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division or he may be Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division. 16. Learned Counsel of the appellant cited case of Appasaheb Kalgonda Patil Vs. James Luchas Ranbhise, 1980 Bom. R.C. 166. 16. Learned Counsel of the appellant cited case of Appasaheb Kalgonda Patil Vs. James Luchas Ranbhise, 1980 Bom. R.C. 166. In that case, Single Bench of this Court held that when a suit or claim under the Rent Act is pending in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division and if such a claim or suit has been entertained by the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division same cannot be transferred to the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, by reason of the prohibition as to the jurisdiction contained in Section 28(1) of the Act. This ruling is considered in subsequent judgment of larger bench and, therefore, cannot be considered as precedent in any manner. 17. The last case cited on behalf of the appellant is Vijaykumar Pathak Vs. Madhukar Chitale, 2002(5) Mh.L.J. 415 . In the reported case, Single Bench of this Court held that it was necessary to institute execution proceedings in the court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, and not in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division in the facts and circumstances of that case. But the Full Bench ruling in the case of Ranchodlal (supra) is very clear and it does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Single Bench. 18. So far as last two rulings are concerned, entire position of law has been discussed in the case of Silver Jubilee Dryers and Cleaners Vs. Hiralal Nemichand Shah - 2006(6) Mh.L.J. 840 . I reproduce paragraphs 30, 31 and 32. "30. The Apex Court in the case of J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. V s. M. R. Murali, (2002)3 SCC 98 , held as under :- "A plea taken by the defendant in written statement can itself be made a ground for allowing relief to the plaintiff subject to well known limitations. I reproduce paragraphs 30, 31 and 32. "30. The Apex Court in the case of J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. V s. M. R. Murali, (2002)3 SCC 98 , held as under :- "A plea taken by the defendant in written statement can itself be made a ground for allowing relief to the plaintiff subject to well known limitations. The plea taken in the written statement should by itself be enough as furnishing a ground for relief to the plaintiff; the plea taken by the defendant does not stand in need of any further pleadings being joined by the party; an issue is framed and put to trial unless the facts of the case show that the parties actually went to trial fully alive to the real issue between them and had opportunity of adducing evidence, that is, to put it in other words, the parties know that the plea taken in the written statement too was subject matter of trial and could form basis for relief to the plaintiff. In such case, though the pleadings may be lacking or there may be failure to frame an issue or a specific issue, the applicability of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Nagubai Ammalal Vs. Shama Rao, AIR 1956593 SCR 451 would be attracted. 31. The ratio of the aforesaid two judgments referred to hereinabove unequivocally go to show that if the tenant is apprised of the transfer of title of landlord and if he had acknowledged title of transferee, expressly or impliedly by paying rent to him; then also rule of estoppel comes into operation. The tenant is not permitted to approbate and reprobate and challenge relationship of landlord and tenant. That the denial of title in the written statement can also be a foundation of decree for eviction. Following the principles of law holding the field, applying the same to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, it would be clear that the petitioners-tenants have denied title of the plaintiff-petitioners landlord, who had taken over land lordship of the premises. It would, thus, be clear that denial of title was not bona fide. It was just to protract the litigation........... "32. Having said so, it is necessary to take note of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and anr. Vs. It would, thus, be clear that denial of title was not bona fide. It was just to protract the litigation........... "32. Having said so, it is necessary to take note of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and anr. Vs. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi, 1996(1) Mh.L.J. (SC) : (1995)6 SCC 576 , in para 9, before considering rival submissions, wherein following observations were made - "Before parting with this judgment we would like to say that the High Court was not justified in extending its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the present case. The Act is a special legislation governing landlord tenant relationship and disputes. The legislature has, in its wisdom, not provided second appeal or revision to the High Court. The object is to give finality to the decision of the appellate authority. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes"." 19. Thus, this court has taken a view that denial of title of landlord by tenant. when such denial of title is not bonafide, forfeits the right of tenancy. The Supreme Court in the case of J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has held that the plea taken by the defendant in the written statement can itself be made ground for allowing the landlord-plaintiff to claim relief subject to well-known principle of limitation. Plea taken in the written statement by itself should be enough as ground for plaintiff to the relief. Here, plaintiff amended the plaint, added para 4-A and then issue regarding disclaimer is framed. 20. It is argued by learned counsel Shri. Mantri for the Respondent that in view of paragraph 32 in S.J. Dryers & Cleaners (supra), this court in revisional jurisdiction cannot re-appreciate evidence when both the courts have concurrently held that there was disclaimer and that view taken by the courts below is legal and proper and, therefore, revision deserves to be dismissed. 21. Learned Counsel for the appellants cited the case of Savitribai Vs. Vithal Hari, AIR 1981 Bombay 430, which is a Division Bench ruling. 21. Learned Counsel for the appellants cited the case of Savitribai Vs. Vithal Hari, AIR 1981 Bombay 430, which is a Division Bench ruling. Therein, the question of jurisdiction of Civil Court so far as Rent Act is dealt with and explained. Paragraph 12 of the judgment reads :- "In view of the above discussion, we holds that there being no Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Kolhapur, it is the' Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) which has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit under Section 28 of the Rent Act. The suit could be tried by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) who is the Principal Judge. It could also be tried by all the Joint Civil Judges (Senior Division) or by Joint Civil Judges (Junior Division) to whom the suit may be referred to for disposal by the Principal Judge or by the District Judge under Section 23 of the Civil Courts Act, 1869 or transferred to that Court under Section 24 of the C.P.C. This being the position in Jaw, the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Kolhapur was competent to try the suit in this case and consequently the decree passed therein is valid and executable." 22. As per Section 12(1) of the Bombay Rent Act, a landlord shall not be entitled to recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the said Act. One of the conditions of tenancy or lease as per Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, is that the tenant shall not deny the title of the landlord or shall not renounce his character as tenant by setting up title in third person or in himself. Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act is not inconsistent with the scheme of the Bombay Rent Control Act. 23. After giving anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances on record, in my opinion this revision application has no merit as the trial court and the first appellate court have considered all aspects of the matter. This revision application is therefore devoid of any merits and the same deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. 23. After giving anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances on record, in my opinion this revision application has no merit as the trial court and the first appellate court have considered all aspects of the matter. This revision application is therefore devoid of any merits and the same deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. The appellants to pay costs of Respondents and bear their own. Revision application dismissed.